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I’m currently on a beach on the south coast of
Devon in England. And this body of water behind me
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is the English Channel. Now, if this video had
a slightly higher budget, what I’d do now is
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jump into some kind of speedboat and zip out 12
nautical miles at which point I would tell you
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that we had reached an invisible line. For as
long as we remained this side of that line,
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we would remain in the jurisdiction of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;
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cross over that line and we’d be
bobbing about in international waters;
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bob too far and eventually we’d
cross over another invisible line
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and find ourselves in the
jurisdiction of the French Republic.
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The existence of these invisible lines and
the division of the world up into different
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countries with different laws and customs is
so foundational to so many aspects of our lives
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that we often fall into the trap of assuming that
is has always been this way; that countries and
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borders are some kind of natural phenomenon. Yet,
as soon as we take a moment to think about it,
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this obviously isn’t the case. Archaeological
evidence shows that human beings have lived in
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this area for somewhere between 40 and 45 thousand
years and few people would argue that those early
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humans would have referred to this patch of land
as England or themselves as English. In fact,
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as we’ll see shortly, you wouldn’t have to
travel anywhere near as far back in time
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to find a period in which the very concept of
a country (particularly in the specific way we
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use it in the present) would be outright
baffling to whoever you were talking to.
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There are plenty of videos and channels on YouTube
which tell interesting stories about countries,
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customs, maps and borders. In this video, I want
to dig deeper to explore what exactly a country
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is, the process of their evolution and invention
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and, finally, what might
happen to them in the future.
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So, before we can begin to discuss the
emergence of countries as a means of
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organising the world around us, we first need
to unpack precisely what a country is. And,
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in doing so, I think it’s helpful
to replace the somewhat vague word
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“country” with the slightly more technical term
“nation-state”. For, the phrase “nation-state”,
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in all its hyphenated goodness, helps to
articulate the manner in which what we often think
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of as a singular phenomenon—a country—is usually
actually comprised of two separate phenomena.
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Let’s begin by getting a handle
on each of these ideas—the nation
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and the state—individually. Firstly, what is
a “nation”? Steven Grosby defines a nation
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somewhat wordily as ‘a community of kinship,
specifically a bounded, territorially extensive,
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temporally deep community of nativity’. For our
purposes today, however, it’s perhaps enough to
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borrow Benedict Anderson’s description
of a nation as an ‘imagined community’.
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The nation thus refers to the community of human
beings that we think of when we think of “the
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Polish” or “the Japanese” or “the Swazis”. It
is the sense of commonality and camaraderie
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that often exists between people who consider
themselves to share a nationality. We see this
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expressed fairly clearly in international sports
where people are willing to pay huge sums of money
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and travel thousands of miles to cheer on athletes
who they have never met but who they nonetheless
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feel an attachment to due to their considering
themselves to belong to the same nation.
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Now, many right-wing, political nationalists
view nationality as one and the same as
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ethnicity or race. Others have instead viewed
the nation as a more voluntary association—what’s
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often referred to as “civic nationalism”. The
19th-century thinker Ernest Renan, for example,
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wrote that a nation was not simply ‘a group
determined by the configuration of the earth’
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but, instead, ‘a spiritual family’
based on a shared feeling of having
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‘common glories in the past’ and
‘a common will in the present’.
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It’s this more voluntaristic, civic view of the
nation which we often see invoked by liberal
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politicians, such as in descriptions of America as
a ‘nation of immigrants’. Either way, the imagined
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community of the nation is given substance by both
the sense of a shared history described by Renan
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and the notion of a shared culture: the songs,
stories, food, attitudes, character traits and
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anything else that might come to be described
as “French” or “Argentine” or “Madagascan”.
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This sense of community and identity provided
by nationality is deeply important to a lot of
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people. In fact, it’s pretty much taken as a given
that all of us should feel ourselves to be members
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of one of these imagined communities. As
Anderson writes, it is simply assumed that
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‘in the modern world everyone can, should, will
“have” a nationality, as [one] “has” a gender’.
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Despite this, these communities are (and can
only ever be) imagined. Even in a tiny country
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such as Nauru, with its estimated population
of just 9,770, no individual can ever hope to
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have a meaningful relationship with every other
person who considers themselves to be Nauruan.
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Furthermore, the perception that
the imagined community of the nation
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is an expression of shared interests elides deep
inequalities and exploitation between its members.
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Before we go any further, however, it’s useful to
introduce the second aspect of our nation-state
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formula: the state. If, in relation to our
everyday understanding of what a country is,
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the nation refers to the “ideas stuff” of
community and culture, the “state” refers to the
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political apparatus. Depending on which country
one has in mind, the state might include the
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parliament or congress, the monarch, president
or supreme leader, the court system, the police,
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the army, schools, the civil service, the
tax office; in some cases the press and/or
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religious institutions. As that list suggests,
states can take many, many different forms.
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The defining feature that all states share is
that, as the German sociologist Max Weber put
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it, the state is ‘the only human community
that (successfully) claims a monopoly of
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legitimate physical violence for itself,
within a certain geographical territory’.
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By this, Weber does not mean that all states
are constantly engaged in physical violence,
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but that the state is defined by its ability to
settle disputes through arresting, imprisoning and
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otherwise inflicting violence on people
without having to answer to a higher body.
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I would wager that, when most people think of a
country in the present day, it is a nation-state
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which they are thinking of: a political unit in
which a single state governs a single nation.
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This is in spite of the fact that, when we look
around the world, we find numerous examples in
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which there is not such a clean alignment between
these two phenomena. In Scotland, Catalonia and
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Quebec, to name but a few, we find examples
of nations which do not have their own states.
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In a slightly different mode, Northern Ireland
is presently governed as part of the United
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Kingdom, yet many who live there consider
themselves to belong to the nation of Ireland.
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Across the world (and for many different reasons),
we see similar disconnects between nation and
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state. Yet, these exceptions generally only go
to show how ingrained the idea that nations and
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states should go together is. For, in each
of these places, we find movements demanding
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(through various means and with varying degrees
of success) a shift towards that perceived norm.
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There is a lot to be said about
how states and nations interact.
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We could, for example, foreground the
fact that, when a country goes to war,
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it is generally because it is in
the interests of the state to do so.
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Nevertheless, few people are willing to
lay down their lives for the tax office.
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The state will therefore lean on people’s
identification with the imagined community of the
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nation to present a given war as an opportunity
for the nation to claim glory, settle scores or
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act as saviour to the oppressed; all of which
are far more appealing invitations to enlist.
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We’ll certainly touch upon some of the ways in
which states and nations interact a little later
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in this video. For the most part, however, I
want to focus on how these two phenomena came
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to be seen as so inseparable. Which I guess
means it’s time for a little history lesson.
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The first thing we need to establish in trying to
tell the story of the nation-state is: which came
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first? I think the manner in which modern states
so heavily dress themselves up in the iconography
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of the nation often leads us to assume that it
was the nation. In fact, states regularly actively
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work to convince us that this is the case. Go to
a country’s national museum or look through their
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school curricula and you will often find that they
begin telling the “story” of their nation many
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thousands of years ago. Such narratives can lead
to a perception that the nation in question has
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always been there; a notion which is particularly
problematic in settler colonial states.
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On a broader scale, this kind of thinking can
lead us to assume that the concept of the nation
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is an eternal one: that people have always
considered themselves to be members of nations
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and that the state merely emerged as a
means for nations to govern or be governed.
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Some scholars have argued that this is the case.
Subscribers to a view of nations referred to as
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“primordialism” hold that, as Umut Özkirimli puts
it, ‘nationality is a “natural” part of human
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beings, as natural as speech, sight or smell, and
that nations have existed since time immemorial’.
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Others, collectively known as “ethno-symbolists”
argue that, whilst it is wrong to describe nations
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as a “natural” phenomenon, nations have existed
in one form or another for a considerable amount
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of time. Anthony D. Smith, for example,
argues that ‘we find in pre-modern eras,
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even in the ancient world, striking parallels
to the “modern” idea of national identity
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and character’. Today, however, we’re going
to take what’s called a “modernist” position
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which seeks to stress that, whilst there might
have been parallels to nations throughout history,
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the forms of collective identity which
existed in the ancient and pre-modern
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worlds were not quite the same as that which
we describe as nationality in the present.
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What’s indisputable is that states have existed
for some time. Different researchers propose
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different societies as having developed the
first state. Francis Fukuyama, for example,
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awards this title to the Qin dynasty following its
establishment of a centralised government in China
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in 221 BCE. James C. Scott places the date much
earlier, locating the earliest states in the
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“southern alluvium” of Mesopotamia, near
modern-day Basra, in around 4,000 BCE. Such
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disagreements are partly a result of different
definitions of what should count as a state.
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But the matter is also complicated by the
fact that, after their first appearances,
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it still took many thousands of
years for states to really catch on.
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See, viewing things from the present day, most
people probably view the emergence of the state
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as an undeniable good; it’s certainly unlikely
that you would be able to watch this video (or
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that I would have had the tools to make it)
had our ancestors not taken that first step
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towards a more complex way of living. This
view is encouraged by the “social contract”
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theories of governance forwarded by Jean-Jacques
Rousseau and Thomas Hobbes which imagine our
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being governed by states to be the outcome of a
voluntary trade-off in which we decide to give
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up some of our liberties in return for safety
and stability. In reality, as Scott argues in
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his 2017 book Against the Grain, early states
were founded on coercion and exploitation.
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They were often politically chaotic and
were breeding grounds for disease. In short,
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if given the choice (and many people weren’t),
submitting oneself to the jurisdiction of a state
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would have rarely seemed like a good deal in
comparison to less formalised ways of living.
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It’s for these reasons, among others, that states
didn’t become a truly dominant presence in the
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world until around the 1600s. One key event
often highlighted by historians of Europe
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is the “Peace of Westphalia”, a set
of two peace treaties signed in 1648
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to bring an end to the Thirty Years’
War. A key cause of that conflict,
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which led to somewhere between 4.5 and 8
million deaths, was the manner in which
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political and religious jurisdictions in Europe
often overlapped and conflicted. On top of this,
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countries were constantly trying to interfere
in the domestic affairs of other countries,
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particularly with regard to religious matters.
In order to address this, writes Daniel Philpott,
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‘Westphalia […] made the sovereign state the
legitimate political unit’; it established
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the precedent that states had the exclusive
right to set laws within their own territory.
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Whilst the sovereign states of the 17th century
may have begun to resemble modern-day states,
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however, they were not yet nation-states. See,
across the globe, the states of the 17th century
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were largely monarchies or empires. If there
was an identity which accompanied the state,
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it was simply that of the King, Queen, Emperor or
Empress. While some people might have supported
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their ruler and recognised themselves as living
in their territory, that monarchical identity
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isn’t one that anyone other than the monarch and
their family are able to feel a cohesive part of.
00:14:46
The dominant mode of communal identity in
this period was instead that of the religious
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community. Whilst this might have manifested
physically in one’s local place of worship,
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in terms of mental conception, these communities
took little heed of national borders.
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To be a Christian, Muslim or Buddhist,
regardless of sect or denomination,
00:15:06
meant imagining oneself as part of a near-global
community which was open to membership by anyone,
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no matter where they were born. To consider
the birth of the modern country, then,
00:15:18
we have to take into account
the invention of the nation.
00:15:24
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Now… errrr… back to zat stupid English man, yes?
00:17:00
It took the interaction of several trends
and events in the 18th and 19th centuries
00:17:05
for monarchical and religious identities to be
replaced by the imagined communities of nations.
00:17:11
The most abrupt of these events were
the revolutions in America and France
00:17:15
during the late 1700s. The former saw a group of
people gain their independence from a King and the
00:17:21
latter saw a group of people execute one. Unless
they were to install new monarchs, this left them
00:17:27
with a quandary. See, the state sovereignty which
we discussed a moment ago was invested directly in
00:17:33
the monarch or emperor; hence us sometimes
referring to such figures as “sovereigns”.
00:17:40
Where was a state to gain its legitimacy and its
identity from if not from an individual ruler?
00:17:47
Well, in both America and France, we begin to see
some interesting language being used to describe
00:17:53
the post-revolutionary settlement. The United
States Declaration of Independence declares that
00:17:59
‘Governments are instituted among Men, deriving
their power from the consent of the governed’.
00:18:05
In France, the Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of the Citizen
00:18:09
asserts that ‘the nation is essentially the source
of all sovereignty’. In both instances, then,
00:18:16
we find the idea that, rather than stemming
from a monarch, a state’s sovereignty (and
00:18:21
legitimacy) comes from “the people” or “the
nation”. Who was included in that “people”
00:18:27
or “nation” and whose consent to be governed was
actually taken into consideration was, of course,
00:18:32
another matter; it would be another 87 years
before the abolition of slavery in the United
00:18:38
States and women didn’t gain the vote in France
until 1944. Nevertheless, in these declarations,
00:18:47
we find the germ of the idea that, rather than
being identified with an individual ruler and
00:18:52
their dynasty, the state might the political
expression of something called a “nation”.
00:18:59
Of course, a handful of rich guys declaring that
such a thing as a nation exists didn’t suddenly
00:19:03
mean that everyone felt a deep connection to the
national imagined community of the territory in
00:19:09
which they lived. That process, in America, France
and elsewhere, took much longer and was influenced
00:19:17
by several other political, religious and
economic trends. One such trend, which pre-dated
00:19:23
these revolutions, was the growth of what Benedict
Anderson calls ‘print-capitalism’. See, where the
00:19:30
early publishing industry had mostly printed books
in Latin for the wealthy and educated, from the
00:19:35
16th century onwards, they began to print more and
more volumes in vernacular languages (those which
00:19:41
people actually spoke in their day-to-day lives).
This had a couple of important effects. Firstly,
00:19:48
it led to linguistic standardisation. Previously,
a single country could contain dozens of different
00:19:55
dialects; Eric Hobsbawm highlights that, at
the time of the French Revolution in 1789,
00:20:01
‘50% of Frenchmen did not speak [French] at
all’ and ‘only 12-13% spoke it “correctly”’.
00:20:09
The printed word, however, contributed to the
promotion of one language as more important
00:20:14
within a certain territory whilst, at the same
time, standardising how that language was written
00:20:20
and spoken. Secondly, the production of
books for a certain linguistic community
00:20:26
(or proto-nation) contributed to the
cultivation of a shared national culture.
00:20:32
Ernest Gellner highlights that the development
of this shared culture was rarely democratic.
00:20:38
Instead, he writes, it most often manifested
as ‘the general imposition of a high culture
00:20:44
on society, where previously low cultures had
taken up the lives of the majority’. In short,
00:20:50
he suggests that the localised, folk cultures
of ordinary, poor people were often wiped out
00:20:56
as political and economic elites established their
own cultural preferences as those of the nation as
00:21:02
a whole. This is perhaps a simplification, however
Gellner’s foregrounding of the power dynamics at
00:21:08
play in who got to decide what the shared national
culture looked like is instructive. For, among
00:21:15
other things, Gellner points to the shift towards
a ‘school-transmitted culture’ rather than ‘a
00:21:20
folk-transmitted one’ as being another key force
in the development of nations. During the 18th
00:21:26
and 19th centuries, many countries in Europe began
to establish some form of state education. This,
00:21:33
again, helped to establish a greater degree
of cultural consistency across a territory,
00:21:39
but also ensured that it was the state (and, by
extension, those wealthy enough to be allowed
00:21:44
to vote) that got to decide how a nation’s past,
present and future were taught, which artistic and
00:21:51
literary works were included in syllabi and, thus,
what the substance of the national culture was.
00:21:59
In fact, where, earlier, I suggested that there
was an inconsistency between the idea that the
00:22:04
source of a country’s sovereignty was “the people”
and the limited number of those people that
00:22:10
actually got a say in how a country was run in
this period, Hobsbawm suggests that this might be
00:22:16
the whole point. For, while such ideas were useful
to the emerging bourgeoisie in legitimising their
00:22:23
overthrow of monarchs, when the dust settled,
they turned out to be far less keen on sharing
00:22:29
power with the working class than their initial
pronouncements might have suggested. The idea of
00:22:35
the nation, argues Hobsbawm, thus became a manner
in which the state (which, again, operated in
00:22:40
service of its wealthy electorate) could ‘maintain
or even establish the obedience, loyalty and
00:22:47
cooperation of its subjects or members, or its own
legitimacy in their eyes’. Alongside guiding the
00:22:55
development of already emerging processes, then,
Hobsbawm suggests that there was also a fairly
00:23:00
naked trend of inventing traditions as a means
of further fostering allegiance to the nation.
00:23:06
Thus the vogue for adopting national anthems
and national holidays during the 19th century.
00:23:13
Nevertheless, the idea of the nation turned out
to be more than a passing fad. With startling
00:23:19
velocity, the nation-state became the accepted
ideal for what a country should look like
00:23:24
and how it should operate. We see this in the
anti-colonial movements which gained momentum
00:23:29
during the 20th century, most of which expressed
themselves in national terms. Where the British
00:23:36
had usually referred to India as a subcontinent,
for example, the struggle for independence
00:23:42
was led by the Indian National Congress.
Partha Chatterjee warns against assuming that
00:23:48
previously colonised countries merely mimicked
the national forms of their former colonisers.
00:23:54
He writes instead that ‘the most powerful as well
as the most creative results of the nationalist
00:24:00
imagination in Asia and Africa are posited not
on an identity but rather on a difference with
00:24:07
the “modular” forms of the national society
propagated by the modern West’. Nevertheless,
00:24:13
these movements did operate on the broad
assumption that an independent state should
00:24:18
draw its legitimacy from its relationship
with the imagined community of the nation.
00:24:24
And, this scenario has pretty much continued
into the present day. A sentiment that runs
00:24:29
throughout the scholarly literature on nations and
nationalism is that belief in both the existence
00:24:35
of nations and the idea that nations and states
should be congruent is so widespread that it
00:24:41
almost goes unquestioned. But let’s close out
this video by briefly exploring that “almost”.
00:24:54
For the most part, in this video, I wanted
to focus on the history of our contemporary
00:24:58
understanding of countries and how we got to where
we are today. Nevertheless, I always like to end
00:25:04
with a bit of a provocation; and so I thought I’d
wrap things up by saying a few words about the
00:25:09
future of nations, states, sovereignty, borders
and countries. In 2018, The Guardian published
00:25:17
an essay by Rana Dasgupta who wrote that ‘the
most momentous development of our era […] is
00:25:22
the waning of the nation state: its inability
to withstand countervailing 21st-century forces,
00:25:29
and its calamitous loss of influence over
human circumstances’. He suggests that,
00:25:35
despite a resurgence in nationalistic posturing
by figures such as Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin,
00:25:41
Narendra Modi and Viktor Orbán, the nation-state
is an increasingly impotent force when compared to
00:25:47
multinational corporations such as Walmart, Amazon
and Shell. In fact, he frames the right-wing
00:25:53
nationalisms of those figures almost as the
death throws of the nation-state, a final hurrah
00:25:59
by ‘governments […] so desperate to prove what
everyone doubts: that they are still in control’.
00:26:05
This is not an unpopular assessment; and there is
a great deal of truth to it. For one, we live in
00:26:11
a world of gigantic corporations. If Walmart were
a country, it would have the 26th largest national
00:26:17
economy in the world, with its annual revenue
exceeding the GDPs of Thailand, Nigeria, Austria
00:26:23
and Ireland. Such companies have also become
adept at playing countries off against one another
00:26:29
in order to secure the best deals with regard to
taxation and regulation. This has led, at time of
00:26:35
writing, to the Biden administration pushing for
the adoption of a global minimum corporation tax.
00:26:41
The need for states to work together in such
a way further highlights that their individual
00:26:46
powerlessness. In more formalised models
of international collaboration, such as the
00:26:50
European Union, we find an even clearer ceding
of sovereignty to supranational institutions.
00:26:57
Whilst such analyses ably summarise things as
viewed from the perspective of the state, however,
00:27:02
they elide the view from below. For, whilst
capital and people living in the Global North can,
00:27:08
pandemics aside, move around the world in
an increasingly frictionless manner and
00:27:13
thus imagine themselves to be living in an
interconnected cosmopolis, that experience
00:27:18
and that imaginary are not open to all. To point
to one very basic way in which this is true,
00:27:24
regardless of their personal feelings about
nationality, people who are legal residents of
00:27:29
many countries in Asia and Africa will simply find
it much harder to cross a national border due to
00:27:35
the passport that they hold. Furthermore, many of
the resurgent nationalisms that Dasgupta suggests
00:27:42
reveal the weaknesses of the state have led to
increasingly authoritarian and violent policing
00:27:47
of borders. We thus find ourselves in a position
where the world looks increasingly borderless and
00:27:52
cosmopolitan to those at the top, whilst, for
those at the bottom, it remains anything but.
00:27:59
More broadly, we have to acknowledge how
resilient the nation-state form has proven.
00:28:04
People have been predicting its downfall
almost from the moment of its birth,
00:28:09
and yet still it remains central to the way
in which we think about the world around
00:28:13
us. Whilst it is likely that the nation-state
form will persist for some time, however, we can
00:28:19
all benefit from being far more critical about the
“naturalness” of nations, the legitimacy of states
00:28:26
and the manner in which both those phenomena
are weilded in our collective discourse.
00:28:33
Thank you so much for watching this video,
I hope it’s been worthy of your time.
00:28:36
If you’ve found it interesting or enjoyable in any
way, then I would be grateful if you’d consider
00:28:41
sharing it with a friend (either online or off-)
who you think might also get something out of it.
00:28:46
Thanks as ever to J Fraser Cartwright, Richard,
Kaya Lau, David Brothers, Max DeVos, Allan Gann,
00:28:54
Luke Meyer, Gary, Dylan Gordon, Diccon
Spain, Greg Miller, Bill Mitchell,
00:28:59
Al Sweigart, Z.C. Reese, Brent Cottle, Shab
Kumar, Collin York, Anil, Alexander Blank,
00:29:06
Niels Abildgaard, Sophia R, President Dwayne
Elizondo Mountain Dew Herbert Camacho, Sergio
00:29:13
Suarez and TwoBR0TwoB for being signed up to the
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00:29:23
how to do so at patreon.com/tomnicholas. Thanks
once again for watching and have a great week!
