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How can there be thought control in a
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democratic society such as the United
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States? Isn't that a contradiction?
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Well, it depends what you mean by
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democracy. Uh if you mean by democracy
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that uh ordinary people should have a
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play a meaningful role in controlling
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public affairs and determining decisions
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about how the system works and so on.
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Yeah. And it's a total contradiction.
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But the point is that elite elements,
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privileged elite elements have never
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meant that by democracy. They've always
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regarded democracy as a threat uh which
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has to be contained and controlled. And
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this goes way back to the uh first
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democratic revolutions in the 17th
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century in England. Uh as soon as it
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became clear that you're going to lose
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the you know that there would no longer
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be possible to control people by force
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it immediately followed as an almost as
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a corollary that you're going to have to
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control what they think. uh if you have
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a what we nowadays call a totalitarian
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state or a militaryrun state or
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whatever, you really don't care much
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about what people think. They can think
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anything they feel like uh because you
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can control them with a bludgeon. But as
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the state loses its capacity to coersse
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through uh threats or terror, just one
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or another form of force uh then other
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means have to be found to ensure that
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democracy doesn't work. uh that that
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democratic forms in other words persist
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but without interfering with the right
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of the privileged uh uh elements to
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rule. Now you know what the privileged
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elements are may differ in different
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societies. In modern capitalist
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democracies the privileged sectors are
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those who own are the corporate elite
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basically they own the country more or
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less. in fact more not less they
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effectively own the country and uh the
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and they basically control the political
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system in the United States this really
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a one party state it's a business party
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with two factions uh and they control
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the media the ideological system and
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they impose very sharp constraints on
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any form of policy any policy that's
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formulated even even if the political
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system ever got out of their control
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which is unlikely it couldn't get very
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far out because uh the weapons of
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capital strike and disinvestment and
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reduction of business confidence and so
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on are sufficient to control policy. Uh
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so there's there's lots of mechanisms
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that ensure that those who own the
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country govern it and we should bear in
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mind that that was the principle of the
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founding fathers that those who own the
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country ought to govern it. That's in
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fact a quote from John J, the president
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of the constitutional convention. uh
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that's the way the country's founded.
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Now the problem is how do you deal with
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all of this when people are free as they
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are like the state they can't send in
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the police to break up this
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conversation. So how do you deal with
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that? Well a lot of mechanisms are used
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and one of them primary one is thought
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control indoctrination. That's what the
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phrase necessary illusions comes from.
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It's uh not mine. It comes from Reinhold
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Neber who's a
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leading theologian. He's called the
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theologian of the establishment. He was
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the guru for the Kennedy intellectuals
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and you know George Kennan and so on you
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know a major figure in modern
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intellectual history. Uh and he pointed
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out once that uh the
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ordinary people don't have the capacity
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according to him to become involved in
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public affairs. Uh so it's the task of u
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the what he called the cool observers
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meaning us smart guys. It's our task to
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impose necessary illusions and
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emotionally potent
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oversimplifications to keep these poor
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simpleans on course. Uh and it would be
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kind of unfair to let ordinary people to
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let the democratic process really work.
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If you really let ordinary people make
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decisions or, you know, think about
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things or whatever, they don't get in
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trouble. Uh it's like letting a
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three-year-old cross the street. You
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know, it's it's for the interests of the
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three-year-old that you constrain them.
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Uh and similarly, it's to the interests
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of the general public that you
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marginalize them and ensure that the
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formal political system has not very
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much substance. Uh because it's only the
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smart guys, the cool observers uh who uh
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are who uh have the capacity to make the
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right decisions. And those now it turns
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out that the cool observers who are in a
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position to make the right decisions are
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those who serve the interests of private
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power. Uh other cool observers are not
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cool observers because they have the
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wrong decisions. He didn't bother
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mentioning that part. Uh and and that's
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a very typical view. It's not just his
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view. In fact, it's probably the
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dominant view. So for example, the uh
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the book that I co-authored right before
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this one is called manufacturing consent
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which borrows a phrase from Walder
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Lipman. It's a sort of dean of American
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journalists and major foreign policy
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critic. Uh and his view sort of the same
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was that you have to that's a it's
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crucial part of democracy he said is the
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manufacturer of consent.
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the population he referred to as the
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bewildered herd and he said we have to
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save ourselves from the rage and
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trampling of the bewildered herd. Uh and
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since unfortunately you can't do it by
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force you have to do it by other means
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uh the other means would be the
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manufacturer of consent uh the United
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States the public relations industry in
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the United States which goes back to the
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early part of the century is dedicated
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to that. It's a that's a pure business
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operation and they're dedicated to it.
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Everything from you know advertising to
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other mechanisms of influence in which
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they openly call and there are more
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honest days they openly call propaganda
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and the same is true of much of the
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intellectual class. U it's uh it's recog
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the more sophisticated people recognize
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that their job is thought control and
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they have they argue that it's the right
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thing because the bewildered herd will
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only get into trouble if you let them
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rage on by themselves. You'll notice of
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course the close similarity to Leninist
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ideology to bulcheism which also assumes
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that the radical intellectuals are the
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specialized class, the vanguard. They've
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got to lead the stupid and ignorant
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masses to a better society. In fact, the
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two conceptions are very much alike. I
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think that's probably one of the reasons
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why there's been historically such an
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easy transition from one to another. the
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move from being a Leninist enthusiast to
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a you know a passionate supporter
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of state capitalism and you know working
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for American Ames that takes place
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overnight it's been going on for years
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uh it's called the god that failed
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transition uh and it happens very simply
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and the transition is very easy I think
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because there isn't much of a difference
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in ideological change uh it's just a
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matter of where you think power lies if
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you think there's going going to be a
00:07:02
popular revolution and you can ride that
00:07:05
revolution to state power and then wield
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the whip over the masses, you're a
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Leninist enthusiast. If you see that
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that's not going to happen and power
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lies in the state capitalist
00:07:15
institutions which you have to serve as
00:07:16
a manager, an ideological manager, you
00:07:19
do that. But it's basically a very
00:07:21
similar position. And in fact uh in the
00:07:23
last century or so since there's been a
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more or less identifiable secular
00:07:28
intelligencia
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uh I think you find typically that they
00:07:32
fall into one or the other of these two
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categories. They associate themselves
00:07:37
with one or the other system of power
00:07:39
and hierarchy uh and subordination. Uh
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in fact what I just said is almost a
00:07:46
tautology. It's only if you submit to
00:07:48
those systems that you're counted as a
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respectable intellectual for obvious
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reasons. Well, coming up to more modern
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times in the postc world war period, uh
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car you find again deep concern over the
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need to control and deceive the public
00:08:03
to control the public mind. uh
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presidential historian Thomas Bailey
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wrote in 1948 at the time when we were
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sort of setting off on a new war, the
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Cold War, he wrote, "Because the masses
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are notoriously shortsighted and
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generally cannot see danger until it's
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at their throats, our statesmen are
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forced to deceive them into an awareness
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of their own long run interests.
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deception of the people may in fact
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become increasingly necessary unless
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we're willing to give our leaders in
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Washington a freer hand. And uh in 1981
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as the United States was launching a new
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crusade for freedom uh Samuel Huntington
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the professor of government at Harvard
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uh said in a private but published
00:08:50
discussion interchange you may have to
00:08:52
sell intervention or other military
00:08:54
action in such a way as to create the
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misimpression that it is the Soviet
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Union that you're fighting. That's what
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the United States has been doing ever
00:09:03
since the Truman doctrine. which is
00:09:05
quite accurate and gives a certain
00:09:07
insight into the nature of the cold war
00:09:10
in particular into the nature of the war
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against Nicaragua which is what he
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specifically had in mind. Well, these
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concerns over uh controlling the public
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mind tend to rise to the surface
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particularly uh after periods of wars
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and turmoil like the 17th century
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revolution, the civil war or like the
00:09:30
first world war when Woodro Wilson
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launched the major red scare which is
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the major example in modern American
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history all of American history of state
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repression that was really large scale
00:09:43
and effective in destroying unions and
00:09:46
uh uh destroying independent politics
00:09:49
and eliminating independent thought and
00:09:52
so on. And the same thing happened after
00:09:54
World War II uh with the u phenomenon
00:09:58
that's mislabeled McCarthyism. It's
00:10:01
mislabeled because it was actually
00:10:02
initiated by the liberal democrats in
00:10:05
the late 1940s. McCarthy just came along
00:10:07
at the tail end of it and vulgarized it
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a little. Uh the reason for this is and
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uh is that um periods of wars and
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turmoil have a tendency to uh arouse
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people from apathy and to make them
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think and to make them organize often.
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So that's why you get things like the
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red scare and McCarthyism uh right after
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periods of war and turmoil. And the same
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thing happened after the Vietnam war
00:10:33
which had the same effect. uh after the
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Vietnam war uh elites were concerned
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about what they called a crisis of
00:10:40
democracy. In fact, one of the most
00:10:42
interesting books on this topic or one
00:10:44
of the most interesting books on most of
00:10:46
the insightful books I think on modern
00:10:48
uh on the modern democratic system is
00:10:51
called the crisis of democracy. It's a
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study the only booklength study
00:10:55
published by the trilateral commission.
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uh it's an important group put together
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by David Rockefeller in
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1973 and it represents the more or less
00:11:04
liberal internationalists from the three
00:11:08
major centers of modern capitalism
00:11:10
United States, Western Europe and Japan,
00:11:13
hence trilateral. And remember this is
00:11:15
the liberals. This is the group out of
00:11:17
which Jimmy Carter and most of his
00:11:19
administration came. Uh the c what's the
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crisis of democracy that they're
00:11:24
concerned with in all of the democratic
00:11:26
societies? Well, the crisis is that uh
00:11:29
during the
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1960s, large groups of people who are
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normally passive and apathetic began to
00:11:36
try to enter the political arena to
00:11:37
press their demands. Uh and that's a
00:11:40
crisis which has to be overcome. The
00:11:42
naive might call that democracy, but
00:11:44
that's because they don't understand,
00:11:45
the sophisticated understand that that's
00:11:47
a crisis of democracy. Uh the American
00:11:51
spokesman again Samuel Huntington uh
00:11:54
wrote in his report that Harry Truman
00:11:57
had been able to govern the country with
00:11:59
the cooperation of a relatively small
00:12:01
number of Wall Street lawyers and
00:12:03
bankers. In those days there was no
00:12:05
crisis of democracy. Things were working
00:12:07
just right. But in the 1960s you got all
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this turmoil. I mean young people and
00:12:12
women and you know labor. I mean all
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kinds of weird people who were supposed
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to be sitting quietly in the corners
00:12:19
began to get involved and caused this
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crisis. I mean the same crisis that
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arose in the 17th century and that
00:12:25
repeatedly arises uh when people begin
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to try to take advantage of the uh uh
00:12:31
formal opportunities that exist. Uh
00:12:35
among the terrible things that were
00:12:36
happening during the 60s causing this
00:12:38
crisis they said was that you had this
00:12:40
group of people who they called
00:12:41
valueoriented intellectuals. uh people
00:12:44
who are concerned with things like truth
00:12:46
and justice and all that sort of
00:12:47
nonsense. Uh and they're opposed to the
00:12:50
good guys, the technocratic and policy
00:12:52
oriented intellectuals. They called them
00:12:54
the commaars, the ones who just do the
00:12:57
job, you know, which had these
00:12:58
valueoriented intellectuals and they
00:13:00
were doing all sorts of horrible things
00:13:02
like uh under delegitimizing the
00:13:06
institutions that are responsible for
00:13:07
the indoctrination of the young like
00:13:10
schools and universities. Remember this
00:13:12
is an internal discussion so they kind
00:13:14
of let their hair down. Uh their general
00:13:17
proposal at the end of all of this these
00:13:19
lengthy and thoughtful discussions was
00:13:21
that what we need is more moderation in
00:13:23
democracy to mitigate the excess of
00:13:26
democracy and to overcome the crisis. Uh
00:13:29
in plain terms, what that means is that
00:13:31
the public has to be reduced to their
00:13:33
proper state of apathy and obedience and
00:13:36
driven from the public arena if
00:13:38
democracy is to survive and the
00:13:40
appropriate sense with the specialized
00:13:43
class, you know, the cool observers, us
00:13:45
smart guys, u the technocratic and
00:13:48
policy oriented intellectuals doing our
00:13:50
job in the interests of the people who
00:13:52
have real power. Uh that's the liberal
00:13:54
side. I won't go into what the
00:13:57
reactionary side says about the matter.
00:14:00
The most prominent modern American
00:14:03
political scientist Harold Lasswell
00:14:05
who's a leading figure in communications
00:14:08
and such things uh he wrote the article
00:14:11
on propaganda in the international
00:14:13
encyclopedia of social sciences which
00:14:15
was published in 1933.
00:14:18
uh and in it he says that we should not
00:14:20
succumb to democratic dogmatisms about
00:14:23
men being the best judges of their own
00:14:25
interests. They are not. The best judges
00:14:29
are the elites, us smart guys, the cool
00:14:32
observers. And we must therefore be
00:14:34
insured the means to impose our will for
00:14:38
the common good. Of course, this he said
00:14:40
will require a whole tech new technique
00:14:43
of control largely through propaganda
00:14:45
because of the ignorance and
00:14:47
superstition of the masses. Same theme
00:14:49
all the way through. Uh the basic
00:14:53
problem is this. Uh the idea is that if
00:14:56
you have a society in which the voice of
00:14:58
the people is heard, you got to make
00:15:00
sure that that voice says the right
00:15:01
thing. In totalitarian societies, it's
00:15:04
not a big problem. You you got a club in
00:15:07
your hand. uh and if people don't behave
00:15:09
the right way, you hit them with a club
00:15:10
or threaten them with it. So it doesn't
00:15:12
really matter much what they think. What
00:15:14
matters is what they do and that you
00:15:16
control by force. But as the capacity of
00:15:19
the state to control by force erodess,
00:15:22
it's necessary to control what people
00:15:24
think. And in fact, I think you find
00:15:26
much more sophisticated concern uh for
00:15:29
thought control precisely as the society
00:15:32
becomes more free. I don't think it's
00:15:35
surprising that the sophisticated
00:15:37
discussion uh things like the public
00:15:39
relations industry and the academic u
00:15:43
side of it and you know the journalistic
00:15:45
side and all the kinds of things I've
00:15:47
been sampling uh I suspect if one did a
00:15:49
comparative study you'd find that they
00:15:51
develop primarily in relatively free
00:15:53
societies. Ours is a very free society
00:15:56
in the sense that the state has by
00:15:58
comparative standards very limited
00:16:00
resources to control by force and I
00:16:03
think it's undoubtedly in fact the most
00:16:05
sophisticated in the terms of in the
00:16:08
reliance on techniques of indoctrination
00:16:10
and control public relations industry in
00:16:12
particular as a an American creation