FALL BLAU 1942 - Examining the Disaster

00:56:13
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hzr6dD8fvVY

摘要

TLDROperation Blau was Germany's major offensive in the summer of 1942, aimed at capturing crucial resources from the Soviet Union. Initially appearing successful with territorial gains, it ultimately failed due to logistical challenges, insufficient troop allocation, and underestimating Soviet resistance. The operation's miscalculations, compounded by strategic overreach, led to severe consequences for the German military, notably setting the stage for the Battle of Stalingrad. It marked a pivotal moment, transitioning the momentum of the war to the Soviet forces and changing German military strategy thereafter.

心得

  • ⚔️ Operation Blau aimed to capture oil and food resources in the South.
  • 📉 Logistical issues led to strained German supply lines as they advanced.
  • 🚫 Insufficient troop strength hindered the Germans' objectives.
  • ⚠️ Underestimating Soviet resilience resulted in heavy German losses.
  • 🎯 Hitler's strategic decisions diluted troop effectiveness across fronts.
  • 🛑 Operation Blau set the stage for the eventual Battle of Stalingrad.
  • 📊 The Red Army's recovery allowed them to mount effective resistance.
  • 📅 Operation Blau's failure shifted momentum towards the Soviets.
  • 💔 Blitzkrieg tactics became ineffective in the prolonged conflict.
  • 🇩🇪 The operation revealed the limitations of German military strategies.

时间轴

  • 00:00:00 - 00:05:00

    The German summer offensive of 1942, known as Case Blue, is marked as a failure despite initial territorial gains, as it doesn't achieve its strategic objectives, ultimately leading to the decline of German war tactics.

  • 00:05:00 - 00:10:00

    To understand the failure of Case Blue, one must consider Operation Barbarossa's 1941 context. Hitler’s focus on capturing southern resources like oil and food in Ukraine significantly shapes the 1942 strategy, despite significant contention from German military command.

  • 00:10:00 - 00:15:00

    Hitler's insistence on moving south clashes with Halder’s prioritization of Moscow, leading to manipulation of troop deployments that disproportionately favors army group center, creating logistical nightmares for the subsequent campaign.

  • 00:15:00 - 00:20:00

    The vast distances and extensive territory of the Soviet Union present significant challenges not faced in prior campaigns, markedly differing from previous successes in France, indicating a flawed approach by Halder and German command.

  • 00:20:00 - 00:25:00

    The strategic mindset underlying Case Blue seems to inadequately account for the Soviet Union's resilience, where merely capturing Moscow or territory would not equate to victory, showing a severe misjudgment by German command.

  • 00:25:00 - 00:30:00

    Despite heavy losses, the Red Army begins to reform in 1942, replenishing its ranks and resources, applying lessons learned from prior defeats, and rising to counteract German advances effectively during Case Blue.

  • 00:30:00 - 00:35:00

    The plan for Operation Blue reveals deficiencies in German forces, with insufficient divisions allocated and operational overreach, creating a scenario where logistical support was critically inadequate.

  • 00:35:00 - 00:40:00

    As the offensive commences, the Germans encounter unexpected resistance from the reorganized Soviet military, diminishing the anticipated success, leading to a sluggish and inefficient advance.

  • 00:40:00 - 00:45:00

    Hitler's disconnect with field commanders deepens as disagreements arise over tactical decisions, further destabilizing the German command structure and hampering the overall effectiveness of the offensive.

  • 00:45:00 - 00:50:00

    Amidst the operation's chaos, various German units experience rapid gains, but these are overshadowed by the inability to encircle sufficient Soviet forces, rendering the tactic ineffective and culminating in critical operational failures.

  • 00:50:00 - 00:56:13

    In summary, Case Blue exemplifies the failure of the German military strategy, which, despite some territorial advances, could not translate those gains into sustained victory, leading to the eventual decline of the German war effort in the east.

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思维导图

视频问答

  • What was Operation Blau?

    Operation Blau was the major German summer offensive in 1942 aimed at capturing Soviet resources in the Caucasus and Ukraine.

  • Why did Operation Blau fail?

    It failed due to overextended supply lines, insufficient troop strength, and underestimating the Red Army's resilience.

  • What was the strategic objective of Operation Blau?

    The objective was to seize oil fields in the Caucasus and agricultural resources in Ukraine to sustain the German war effort.

  • How did logistics impact Operation Blau?

    Germans faced severe logistical strains as they advanced further into Soviet territory beyond their supply capacity.

  • What was the outcome of Operation Blau?

    It is considered a failure, leading to significant German losses and setting the stage for the subsequent Battle of Stalingrad.

  • What role did Hitler's decisions play in the failure of Operation Blau?

    Hitler's insistence on various strategic goals diluted forces and resources, contributing to the operation's uncoordinated effort.

  • How did the Red Army respond to the German offensive?

    The Red Army, recovering from prior losses, reorganized and mounted effective resistance, undermining the German advance.

  • What was the significance of Stalingrad in the context of Operation Blau?

    The defense of Stalingrad became crucial as it marked the turning point in the war, following the failures of Blau.

  • How did Operation Blau influence future German strategies?

    It demonstrated the limitations of blitzkrieg tactics over extended operations, forcing a shift in German military strategy.

  • What were the key lessons learned from Operation Blau?

    The operation highlighted the importance of logistics, the value of accurate intelligence, and the necessity of concentrated force against a resilient enemy.

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  • 00:00:00
    blau is a complete disaster for the
  • 00:00:02
    germans so much so
  • 00:00:03
    that it brings the german army to the
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    brink
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    and ends the traditional german way of
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    war
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    the war of movement on the surface
  • 00:00:13
    wow appears to be a success look at the
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    territory
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    that the germans take but when you dive
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    into the details
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    you find that this campaign the main
  • 00:00:25
    summer offensive of 1942
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    ends in failure having not achieved its
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    objectives
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    so let's dive into the details and
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    explain the failure
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    that was case blue
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    to fully understand blau we first need
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    to look back at
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    operation barbarossa what happens in
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    barbarossa in 1941
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    directly dictates what happens in 1942
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    during operation blau
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    and it really explains both why blau
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    became a thing in the first place
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    and also why blau failed germany invades
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    the soviet union in 1941
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    and hitler says that the priority is in
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    the south
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    he wants to take the food and the
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    minerals in the ukraine
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    and he wants to take the oil of the
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    caucasus
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    this is because german occupied europe
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    is suffering under a food crisis
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    and a massive oil deficit which is
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    bringing the german economy
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    to a halt and would bring the army to a
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    standstill
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    in october of 1941 so hitler
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    wants to prioritize the south in order
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    to get the resources that germany
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    desperately needs to continue the war
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    but france halda does not want to go
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    south halda
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    is the chief of staff of the german army
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    high command
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    the okh and halda looks at the french
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    campaign in 1940
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    sees that the reason they won that war
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    was because
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    they'd encircled the enemy forces and
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    then marched to paris
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    so he takes that to mean that the way to
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    win a war
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    is to encircle the enemy forces then
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    take the capital
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    he then applies this logic to the east
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    and wants to wage the same style of war
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    that had won
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    in france but against the soviet union
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    encircle the soviet troops first then
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    take
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    moscow and then win the problem is
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    that the soviet union and russia
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    previously
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    was a completely different animal to
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    france even a cursory glance had a map
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    will show you now the distance well
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    this is france and then this is the
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    soviet union
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    france versus the soviet union it
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    it's just it's a huge difference now the
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    population
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    is not as dense as it was in western
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    europe
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    but the landmass itself and the
  • 00:03:00
    distances
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    and the space is massively different
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    so much so that even the operational
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    plan for barbarossa
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    says well german panzers can't drive
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    to the pacific and that the ultimate
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    objective
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    is a line from archangelisk to astrakhan
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    this is just a made up line by the way
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    having no real world terrain border
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    the euro mountains are even further back
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    from this
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    so they won't even be affected if the
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    germans
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    got to this point which some other
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    spoiler they don't actually do
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    and unlike france the soviets and the
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    russians previously
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    knew that their strength lay in the
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    great distances that their state had
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    you see this in many campaigns the
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    famous one being napoleon's
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    conquest of moscow in 1812
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    which didn't bring about a collapse of
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    the russian state
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    but there are many more including world
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    war one
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    where the germans occupied vast tracts
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    of russian territory and yet the russian
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    and then soviet state
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    well it's still fighting although in
  • 00:04:12
    this case it was fighting itself
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    effectively this is a completely
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    different game
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    with different rules what works on the
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    european chess board
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    does not work on the asiatic go board
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    so taking the soviet capital and taking
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    vast amounts of territory
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    by itself probably won't bring about
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    the collapse of the soviet state and you
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    can see this
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    in hitler's logic if he takes the food
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    in the ukraine and the oil in the
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    caucasus
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    the soviet union would be deprived of
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    the means to fight
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    and germany would have all the resources
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    she needs to continue
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    the struggle this is very much a
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    strategic
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    mindset the type of logic needed on a go
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    board
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    but how does logic is let's defeat the
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    armies in the field
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    take moscow and then that will somehow
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    result in a victory
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    this is very much a chess player
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    type of logic but the reality is taking
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    moscow won't result
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    in victory and won't deprive the soviets
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    of the means
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    to keep fighting unlike the southern
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    route yet at the time prior to the war
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    against the soviet union
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    halda decides to apply what he learns of
  • 00:05:31
    the french campaign
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    on the barbarossa campaign regardless of
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    what
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    hitler wants so what halda does
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    is he manipulates hitler's orders to
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    change the priority
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    from the south where hitler wants to go
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    to the center moscow and he does this
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    without telling
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    hitler armor groups north centre and
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    south
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    are arranged with halder's logic in mind
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    armor group center takes the priority in
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    terms of units and supplies and so on
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    and army group south doesn't receive as
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    much as it really should have done
  • 00:06:10
    now david stahill in his book operation
  • 00:06:14
    barbarossa
  • 00:06:15
    and jeremy's defeat in the east goes
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    into this in a lot more detail and i
  • 00:06:21
    highly recommend it if you haven't read
  • 00:06:23
    it already but
  • 00:06:24
    basically hitler doesn't learn of how
  • 00:06:27
    does manipulation
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    and reorientation of the priority of the
  • 00:06:31
    campaign
  • 00:06:32
    until after the campaign is well
  • 00:06:34
    underway
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    halda's plan is to make it easier for
  • 00:06:38
    german armies to move
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    towards moscow so that hitler will then
  • 00:06:43
    conclude with halder that moscow
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    should become the priority um
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    the problem is that when hitler realizes
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    that's what's happened it results in a
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    conflict between halder and hitler
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    and this is another good example of why
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    hitler comes to the conclusion
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    that he shouldn't have listened to his
  • 00:07:05
    generals
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    because in this case he was right halder
  • 00:07:10
    had betrayed him
  • 00:07:11
    and had disobeyed his orders to the
  • 00:07:14
    detriment of the campaign
  • 00:07:16
    and the war as a whole hitler was
  • 00:07:19
    absolutely right to prioritize the south
  • 00:07:21
    and halda was dead wrong in prioritizing
  • 00:07:24
    moscow
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    and interestingly stalin in 1941
  • 00:07:29
    correctly guesses that hitler wanted to
  • 00:07:31
    attack
  • 00:07:32
    on the southern front this is why
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    there are so many units in the ukraine
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    in 1941 and
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    partly why they were caught off guard
  • 00:07:42
    when the german attack
  • 00:07:43
    came because while some soviet units
  • 00:07:46
    were still redeploying to the south
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    when barbarossa began when the german
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    attack goes towards moscow
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    the center axis the soviets in that area
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    are overwhelmed by
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    the concentration of german forces there
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    they go two or three months into the
  • 00:08:01
    campaign and the germans run out of fuel
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    and then get bogged down in fighting
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    outside moscow
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    fast forward to 1942 and stalin
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    concludes
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    okay i was wrong about hitler wanting to
  • 00:08:13
    go south in 1941
  • 00:08:15
    and clearly he's aiming for moscow
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    therefore
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    we need to prioritize the moscow area
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    in 1942 because this is where the main
  • 00:08:26
    german summer offensive will attack and
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    to take the germans off guard a little
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    bit
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    we'll launch a diversionary attack in
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    the south
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    at kharkov in fact marshall timochenko
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    actually proposed this attack in order
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    to divert german attention
  • 00:08:43
    and reinforcements from the upcoming
  • 00:08:45
    attack
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    on moscow attempting a pincer movement
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    against the germans at kharkov
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    their attacks are halted and well
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    they went almost nowhere why
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    because they'd gone straight into the
  • 00:09:00
    teeth of the german forces preparing
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    for the summer offensive foul blau
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    hitler once again instructed howler to
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    make the plan
  • 00:09:10
    this time for fall blau and i'm going to
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    emphasize that haldad does the majority
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    of the work for this plan
  • 00:09:17
    so many of the faults with this plan are
  • 00:09:20
    actually holders and we'll come back to
  • 00:09:22
    them later
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    but unlike the barbarossa plan hitler
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    and yodel
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    made alterations probably to ensure that
  • 00:09:31
    hitler's wishes were adhered to this
  • 00:09:33
    time and
  • 00:09:34
    this fact annoys halder who later
  • 00:09:36
    complains about both hitler
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    and google even though he was at fault
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    the first time the objective now
  • 00:09:42
    was absolutely set in the south and
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    the remainder of the ukraine was to be
  • 00:09:47
    taken the caucuses would be
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    captured as well along with her vital
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    oil fields after encircling and
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    destroying soviet forces
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    in the eastern ukraine the germans
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    would move along the dawn and eventually
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    reach
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    astrakhan at this point the plan was to
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    turn
  • 00:10:07
    south and go into the caucasus proper
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    taking makop and grozny
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    these were two major oil producing sites
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    north of the caucasus mountains now a
  • 00:10:18
    lot of people say that the germans
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    were trying to get to baku but that
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    doesn't seem to actually be the case
  • 00:10:24
    in fact this is why going to astrakhan
  • 00:10:27
    was important
  • 00:10:29
    if they take makeup and grozny and get
  • 00:10:32
    them
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    up and running the germans would have
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    substantially more oil and if they take
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    astracan
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    not only would this prevent soviet
  • 00:10:41
    reinforcements from
  • 00:10:43
    going south which may actually
  • 00:10:46
    ultimately help them reach baku
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    but they could block oil shipments from
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    the caucasus going to the rest of the
  • 00:10:53
    soviet union blocking the oil would then
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    [ __ ] the soviet economy completely in
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    1943
  • 00:10:59
    leading to her collapse and if not would
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    certainly hinder her
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    mechanized forces therefore baku wasn't
  • 00:11:05
    necessary for blau and the astrakhan
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    path
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    strategy was to block oil shipments
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    going north along the volga
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    this then explains why the decision was
  • 00:11:16
    later made
  • 00:11:17
    to go into stalingrad and this is
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    important to note
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    stalingrad wasn't the ultimate objective
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    of blau
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    and in fact it's barely mentioned in the
  • 00:11:28
    initial plan
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    when it is mentioned it says going into
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    the city
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    isn't a priority here's the stalingrad
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    quote from the plan
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    in any event every effort will be made
  • 00:11:38
    to reach stalingrad
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    itself or at least to bring the city
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    under fire
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    from heavy artillery so that it may no
  • 00:11:46
    longer be of any use as an industrial or
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    communications center
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    they didn't have to go into stalingrad
  • 00:11:52
    it wasn't seen
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    as that important what was more
  • 00:11:55
    important was the
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    northern guard line along the dawn and
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    the vulgar
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    in order to prevent the soviets from
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    breaking through
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    which would disrupt german efforts in
  • 00:12:06
    the caucasus
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    and blau can be summed up by saying
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    first we'll break through the soviet
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    lines
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    encircle and destroy them then race off
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    towards astrakhan
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    forming the northern flank and then
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    we'll head into the caucasus
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    that in a nutshell is operation blau
  • 00:12:24
    however there are several problems with
  • 00:12:26
    the blau
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    plan problem number one is the distances
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    involved remember when we said that the
  • 00:12:33
    soviet union
  • 00:12:34
    and russia previously had the advantage
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    of
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    vast distances which was one of the
  • 00:12:39
    state's natural strengths
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    well blau would send the germans another
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    800 kilometers
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    into soviet territory and if we bear in
  • 00:12:50
    mind that the german armies were already
  • 00:12:53
    at the limit of their logistical
  • 00:12:55
    capabilities
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    this would put further strain on german
  • 00:12:59
    supply
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    in fact in november of 1940 the army
  • 00:13:03
    quartermaster general
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    major general wagner predicted that
  • 00:13:07
    german logistics could
  • 00:13:09
    only take them about 500 to 800
  • 00:13:11
    kilometers
  • 00:13:12
    into the soviet union before it broke
  • 00:13:14
    down
  • 00:13:15
    he did in fact tell haldo who ignored
  • 00:13:19
    him
  • 00:13:19
    and wagner's predictions turned out to
  • 00:13:21
    be very
  • 00:13:22
    accurate the the point is that the
  • 00:13:25
    germans had already gone this distance
  • 00:13:27
    in 1940 and had broken down
  • 00:13:31
    now they were planning on going another
  • 00:13:34
    800 kilometers in 1942
  • 00:13:38
    it's simply madness uh auto lunacy
  • 00:13:42
    but it seems they had no choice problem
  • 00:13:45
    number two
  • 00:13:46
    they didn't have enough troops 72
  • 00:13:49
    german divisions will be allocated to
  • 00:13:52
    blau
  • 00:13:53
    however because the germans were
  • 00:13:56
    stretched thin across a front extending
  • 00:13:59
    from the crimea
  • 00:14:00
    to leningrad which is a front of around
  • 00:14:03
    2
  • 00:14:04
    700 kilometers at this point they
  • 00:14:07
    couldn't concentrate enough forces in
  • 00:14:09
    the south
  • 00:14:10
    to complete their objectives for blau
  • 00:14:13
    now a lot of people will say that the
  • 00:14:16
    germans
  • 00:14:17
    hadn't had already lost so many men in
  • 00:14:19
    1940
  • 00:14:21
    that they couldn't replenish their
  • 00:14:22
    losses for 1942.
  • 00:14:25
    this is actually incorrect the germans
  • 00:14:28
    did
  • 00:14:28
    in fact replenish their losses from 1941
  • 00:14:31
    their divisions may not be 100
  • 00:14:33
    replenished at the start of the campaign
  • 00:14:35
    but
  • 00:14:35
    the manpower certainly was around now
  • 00:14:38
    the problem
  • 00:14:39
    is that they were at the height of their
  • 00:14:42
    logistical
  • 00:14:43
    capabilities facing an enemy which knew
  • 00:14:46
    they were coming
  • 00:14:47
    and were about to stretch themselves
  • 00:14:50
    even thinner
  • 00:14:51
    by riding off towards astrakhan and
  • 00:14:54
    grozny
  • 00:14:55
    at the height of this advance the front
  • 00:14:58
    would be a massive 4 100 kilometers long
  • 00:15:03
    and once they'd got to astrakhan they
  • 00:15:06
    were then
  • 00:15:06
    going to guard the northern flank with
  • 00:15:09
    several armies
  • 00:15:10
    while they also went south into the
  • 00:15:12
    caucasus
  • 00:15:13
    this in itself was a major problem
  • 00:15:16
    german military cannon up to this point
  • 00:15:19
    said that one army group
  • 00:15:21
    could take one strategic axis this way
  • 00:15:24
    forces will be concentrated
  • 00:15:26
    and thrust towards one objective which
  • 00:15:28
    would give them
  • 00:15:29
    several operational and tactical
  • 00:15:31
    advantages
  • 00:15:32
    the problem with wow is that they were
  • 00:15:35
    going for three objectives
  • 00:15:38
    foreign then the caucasus now
  • 00:15:41
    technically they don't advance on all
  • 00:15:43
    three at the same time
  • 00:15:45
    but army group south would be torn
  • 00:15:48
    between
  • 00:15:49
    those three objectives no matter which
  • 00:15:52
    order they actually do them in or if
  • 00:15:54
    they do them all
  • 00:15:54
    or if they do them all at the same time
  • 00:15:56
    or what not therefore even before bar
  • 00:15:58
    was underway
  • 00:15:59
    the plan required at least two if not
  • 00:16:02
    three
  • 00:16:02
    full armor groups and the germans didn't
  • 00:16:06
    have the forces to create
  • 00:16:08
    two or three full armor groups in the
  • 00:16:10
    south
  • 00:16:11
    they had one and as we know from what
  • 00:16:14
    happened in operation barbarossa
  • 00:16:16
    this armor group armor group south
  • 00:16:19
    didn't even have priority in terms of
  • 00:16:22
    number
  • 00:16:22
    of units so they had to make them the
  • 00:16:25
    priority in 1942
  • 00:16:27
    even though they had 72 german divisions
  • 00:16:30
    for blau
  • 00:16:31
    this simply wasn't going to be enough
  • 00:16:34
    for this
  • 00:16:34
    campaign and they couldn't really spare
  • 00:16:37
    more
  • 00:16:38
    from the other two army groups there was
  • 00:16:40
    a siege going on at leningrad
  • 00:16:42
    in armed group north's zone and massive
  • 00:16:45
    battles at regenev
  • 00:16:46
    going on in army group center's area of
  • 00:16:48
    operations the soviets
  • 00:16:50
    are constantly counter-attacking at
  • 00:16:52
    rejev because they don't want the
  • 00:16:54
    germans to get
  • 00:16:56
    to moscow so unable to pull
  • 00:16:59
    more german divisions to the south
  • 00:17:02
    the germans needed help in addition to
  • 00:17:05
    the 72 german divisions allocated to
  • 00:17:07
    blau
  • 00:17:07
    22 divisions will be hungarian italian
  • 00:17:11
    and romanian plus more of these axis
  • 00:17:13
    allied forces would arrive as the
  • 00:17:15
    campaign progressed
  • 00:17:16
    for blau the germans had one million
  • 00:17:19
    soldiers
  • 00:17:20
    plus 300 000 axis allied
  • 00:17:24
    troops and to ensure that these forces
  • 00:17:26
    could operate over
  • 00:17:27
    two if not three strategic axes army
  • 00:17:30
    group
  • 00:17:31
    south would be split into two army
  • 00:17:33
    groups these would be army group a
  • 00:17:36
    which would go riding off into the
  • 00:17:38
    caucasus
  • 00:17:39
    and army group b which would guard the
  • 00:17:42
    northern don
  • 00:17:43
    volga flank in terms of strength this
  • 00:17:46
    split of armor group south was a fiction
  • 00:17:49
    these were not
  • 00:17:50
    full armor groups in fact by august
  • 00:17:53
    army group a and the caucasus would have
  • 00:17:55
    just two armies
  • 00:17:57
    while armor group b had six three of
  • 00:17:59
    which were non-german armies
  • 00:18:01
    so at a time when they needed two if not
  • 00:18:05
    three four army groups the germans had
  • 00:18:08
    two
  • 00:18:08
    half army groups and they weren't
  • 00:18:10
    entirely german
  • 00:18:11
    army groups either and of the 72 german
  • 00:18:14
    divisions allocated to wow
  • 00:18:16
    only nine were armored and five were
  • 00:18:19
    motorized the rest were basically
  • 00:18:21
    infantry or similar
  • 00:18:23
    this would have a massive impact on what
  • 00:18:24
    was clearly not a flawless plan
  • 00:18:27
    especially when you consider problem
  • 00:18:29
    number three
  • 00:18:30
    the red army this was no longer the
  • 00:18:33
    first 14 days of operation barbarossa
  • 00:18:36
    when halda had announced that the war
  • 00:18:38
    was won
  • 00:18:40
    the red army had survived 1941 and was
  • 00:18:44
    busy making
  • 00:18:44
    its recovery in 1942 the factories that
  • 00:18:47
    had been
  • 00:18:48
    packed up and shipped off to the euros
  • 00:18:51
    were now rebuilt and going back online
  • 00:18:55
    the troops in the field were beginning
  • 00:18:57
    to get more than just
  • 00:18:58
    rifles and outdated tanks unlike the
  • 00:19:02
    previous year when most
  • 00:19:04
    of the soviet tanks had been light or
  • 00:19:07
    bad
  • 00:19:07
    tanks roughly a quarter of the tanks
  • 00:19:10
    were now with t-34s
  • 00:19:12
    the red army was in the midst of a major
  • 00:19:16
    reorganization
  • 00:19:17
    and reconstruction program designed to
  • 00:19:20
    enable it
  • 00:19:21
    to engage their marked forces
  • 00:19:23
    successfully
  • 00:19:24
    in both the summer and the winter and it
  • 00:19:27
    would do so
  • 00:19:28
    the red army would put up a strong
  • 00:19:30
    resistance to the german
  • 00:19:32
    summer offensive which would hinder the
  • 00:19:33
    german advance
  • 00:19:35
    and stretch the german army to breaking
  • 00:19:38
    point
  • 00:19:39
    but the german commanders weren't stupid
  • 00:19:42
    they actually expected the soviets to
  • 00:19:44
    put up a fight
  • 00:19:45
    unlike what they'd done the previous
  • 00:19:48
    year
  • 00:19:48
    when barbarossa had achieved complete
  • 00:19:51
    strategic surprise
  • 00:19:53
    now in 1942 without strategic surprise
  • 00:19:56
    the germans expected the
  • 00:19:58
    initial period of blau to be more of a
  • 00:20:02
    static battle
  • 00:20:03
    and had planned accordingly but
  • 00:20:06
    when the great second german summer
  • 00:20:09
    offensive begins on the 28th of june
  • 00:20:12
    1942
  • 00:20:14
    this turned out to not be the case
  • 00:20:16
    beating the soviet forces immediately
  • 00:20:19
    ahead of them
  • 00:20:20
    the german second army and fourth panzer
  • 00:20:22
    army race off towards their objective
  • 00:20:25
    for an edge by the fourth of july
  • 00:20:29
    hoth's fourth panzer army had reached
  • 00:20:32
    the dawn
  • 00:20:32
    in several places on its left second
  • 00:20:36
    army
  • 00:20:36
    came up as well and six army to the
  • 00:20:39
    south
  • 00:20:40
    only began to move on the 30th of the
  • 00:20:42
    dune but also
  • 00:20:43
    broke through the soviet units with ease
  • 00:20:47
    take note though this position that
  • 00:20:50
    powers his army had broken through
  • 00:20:53
    with ease was a position that the
  • 00:20:55
    soviets have been constructing
  • 00:20:58
    for around about six months and
  • 00:21:00
    powerless had broken through it without
  • 00:21:03
    breaking a sweat
  • 00:21:04
    and now columns of soviet forces were
  • 00:21:08
    just
  • 00:21:08
    fleeing to the east almost as quickly
  • 00:21:12
    sixth army and fourth panzer armies
  • 00:21:15
    trapped
  • 00:21:16
    the soviet 40th army on the 2nd of july
  • 00:21:19
    which was
  • 00:21:20
    then devoured over the course of the
  • 00:21:23
    next few days
  • 00:21:24
    up to this point things had gone
  • 00:21:26
    relatively well
  • 00:21:28
    although the germans were now surprised
  • 00:21:30
    how quickly
  • 00:21:31
    soviet resistance had subsided the
  • 00:21:34
    soviets had
  • 00:21:35
    lost control and command of many of
  • 00:21:38
    their
  • 00:21:38
    sub units and the outlook for the
  • 00:21:41
    soviets in a hall
  • 00:21:42
    did not look good with this the second
  • 00:21:46
    phase of blau
  • 00:21:47
    began or sort of see von box
  • 00:21:51
    forces at voronezh were being counter
  • 00:21:53
    attacked
  • 00:21:54
    by a soviet tank force so vombock was
  • 00:21:57
    reluctant to send
  • 00:21:58
    forth panzer army south as
  • 00:22:02
    was part of the original blau plan
  • 00:22:05
    hitler became enraged later going on to
  • 00:22:08
    complain
  • 00:22:09
    about how his panzer force had wasted 48
  • 00:22:12
    hours sat
  • 00:22:13
    at varanesh thanks to von bark and this
  • 00:22:16
    is an issue especially when you consider
  • 00:22:18
    that the germans only had
  • 00:22:21
    nine armored and five motorized
  • 00:22:23
    divisions for this campaign
  • 00:22:25
    and that three armored and two motorized
  • 00:22:28
    of these
  • 00:22:29
    divisions were now tied up at the city
  • 00:22:32
    of varanesh
  • 00:22:33
    at stake here though is a much bigger
  • 00:22:37
    picture than just a simple little
  • 00:22:38
    argument the traditional german way of
  • 00:22:41
    war
  • 00:22:42
    said that an army commander could make
  • 00:22:44
    his own decisions
  • 00:22:45
    and act on his own initiative if
  • 00:22:49
    von bach wanted fourth panzer army for a
  • 00:22:52
    couple of extra days
  • 00:22:54
    then he was entitled to it right
  • 00:22:57
    no the objective is to take the oil
  • 00:23:00
    fields in the caucasus
  • 00:23:01
    not fight a tactical battle at varanesh
  • 00:23:04
    and
  • 00:23:04
    von bark is preventing that from
  • 00:23:07
    happening
  • 00:23:08
    hitler who has not been schooled in the
  • 00:23:11
    traditional german
  • 00:23:12
    juncker officer way of war does not care
  • 00:23:16
    about the tactical situation at varinesh
  • 00:23:20
    he has a strategic mindset unlike von
  • 00:23:23
    bark
  • 00:23:23
    and he wants forth panzer army to go
  • 00:23:26
    south
  • 00:23:27
    on the second and third of july hitler
  • 00:23:30
    and bach
  • 00:23:31
    need to discuss the situation and bach
  • 00:23:34
    conceded to the pressure from above to
  • 00:23:36
    release
  • 00:23:37
    fourth panzer army you hear often how
  • 00:23:41
    hitler should have listened to his
  • 00:23:43
    generals
  • 00:23:44
    well on the strategic level his generals
  • 00:23:47
    were squandering
  • 00:23:48
    what little time they had to win the war
  • 00:23:51
    another crack in the traditional german
  • 00:23:54
    way of war
  • 00:23:55
    on the 6th of july voronesh fell but on
  • 00:23:58
    the 8th of july von bokh
  • 00:24:00
    sent a message to halder and his outlook
  • 00:24:03
    for the campaign was not good
  • 00:24:05
    bach said that the german pincers would
  • 00:24:08
    probably close around nothing and that
  • 00:24:10
    in my opinion operation blau 2
  • 00:24:14
    is dead to explain this basically
  • 00:24:17
    blau was designed as a series of
  • 00:24:19
    operations rather than just one plan
  • 00:24:22
    it was more of a set piece battle with
  • 00:24:24
    timings and various thrusts which
  • 00:24:26
    was more like a british battle plan
  • 00:24:28
    rather than a traditional
  • 00:24:30
    german okay go figure it all out
  • 00:24:33
    as it goes plan the reason it was
  • 00:24:35
    planned like this was for two reasons
  • 00:24:36
    the first was because the traditional
  • 00:24:39
    german way of war had failed in
  • 00:24:41
    barbarossa
  • 00:24:43
    having your generals ride off into the
  • 00:24:45
    sunrise on their own initiative
  • 00:24:47
    is great but only if you don't leave
  • 00:24:50
    millions of enemy troops on your flanks
  • 00:24:52
    or rear
  • 00:24:53
    cadarian so instead of racing off to
  • 00:24:56
    create
  • 00:24:57
    massive encirclements which they
  • 00:24:59
    couldn't keep a tight ring around
  • 00:25:01
    allowing the red army to simply walk out
  • 00:25:03
    of the trap
  • 00:25:04
    the panzer forces now had to create
  • 00:25:07
    little encirclements
  • 00:25:09
    so the infantry could do their work this
  • 00:25:12
    meant that
  • 00:25:13
    the generals really couldn't have
  • 00:25:15
    operational freedom like they'd had
  • 00:25:17
    before
  • 00:25:18
    the two styles simply don't complement
  • 00:25:21
    each other
  • 00:25:22
    and so they were reigned in to fight a
  • 00:25:25
    more classic style of battle
  • 00:25:27
    rather than a war of movement the second
  • 00:25:30
    reason was because they expected the
  • 00:25:32
    soviets to fight
  • 00:25:33
    harder than they'd done the year before
  • 00:25:35
    since they no longer had the strategic
  • 00:25:37
    surprise
  • 00:25:38
    the soviets knew they were at war and
  • 00:25:41
    knew that the enemy ahead of them
  • 00:25:43
    could attack them so they were better
  • 00:25:46
    prepared than they had been the year
  • 00:25:47
    before
  • 00:25:48
    they'd also been digging defenses for
  • 00:25:50
    several months now
  • 00:25:51
    and seemed to be better prepared
  • 00:25:54
    also worth noting is that the year
  • 00:25:56
    before during barbarossa
  • 00:25:59
    the soviets had struck back into the
  • 00:26:02
    jaws
  • 00:26:03
    of the german pincers uh they'd
  • 00:26:06
    effectively counter-attack themselves
  • 00:26:08
    straight into the prisoner of war camps
  • 00:26:10
    but that was in 1941 in 1942 during
  • 00:26:14
    case blue something else was happening
  • 00:26:17
    now what i'm about to describe is is
  • 00:26:20
    still up for debate
  • 00:26:21
    but i want to provide some clarity to it
  • 00:26:24
    and not just make some sweeping remarks
  • 00:26:26
    that others have made
  • 00:26:28
    so please bear in mind that the picture
  • 00:26:30
    is
  • 00:26:31
    not clear on the 7th of july
  • 00:26:34
    timochenko ordered a general retreat
  • 00:26:38
    to prevent his forces from getting
  • 00:26:40
    encircled by the german
  • 00:26:42
    pincers so on the operational level at
  • 00:26:45
    least
  • 00:26:46
    the soviets ordered a purposeful
  • 00:26:49
    retreat but even as early as the 30th
  • 00:26:52
    of june 1942 soviet forces from mostly
  • 00:26:56
    divisional level downwards
  • 00:26:58
    were already retreating and this retreat
  • 00:27:01
    at divisional level downwards
  • 00:27:03
    was not the calm collected retreat
  • 00:27:06
    of an organized army no the soviets lost
  • 00:27:09
    command and control of their units there
  • 00:27:12
    was
  • 00:27:13
    large-scale desertions and the loss of
  • 00:27:15
    much equipment
  • 00:27:17
    it was a route as cetino points out in
  • 00:27:20
    his book death
  • 00:27:21
    of the bear marked the soviet troops
  • 00:27:24
    weren't stupid
  • 00:27:26
    they knew that especially in the summer
  • 00:27:29
    the german
  • 00:27:29
    panzer attacks would encircle and
  • 00:27:32
    destroy them
  • 00:27:33
    and they had no intention of becoming
  • 00:27:35
    prisoners of war
  • 00:27:36
    so they just began to flee on the one
  • 00:27:39
    hand then we have a
  • 00:27:40
    purposeful retreat on the other hand
  • 00:27:43
    a route and while many argue it was
  • 00:27:47
    one of the other the reality is it was
  • 00:27:49
    probably both
  • 00:27:50
    it just depends on what level of the
  • 00:27:52
    command structure you're talking about
  • 00:27:54
    either way though this retreat or route
  • 00:27:56
    would have dire consequences for the
  • 00:27:59
    plan for blue
  • 00:28:00
    and the german chances of success during
  • 00:28:03
    the summer offensive were also impacted
  • 00:28:05
    by this
  • 00:28:06
    this is because if the soviets retreat
  • 00:28:08
    then the german pincers won't encircle
  • 00:28:10
    them
  • 00:28:10
    if they don't encircle them then the
  • 00:28:12
    soviets will live to fight another day
  • 00:28:15
    they will effectively slip the noose
  • 00:28:18
    this is bad because the traditional
  • 00:28:20
    german way of war
  • 00:28:21
    said they had to destroy the enemy
  • 00:28:24
    forces before riding off to victory
  • 00:28:26
    and in this case the soviets were
  • 00:28:29
    retreating
  • 00:28:30
    so hitler reacts quickly launching bio2
  • 00:28:34
    on the 9th of july this was actually a
  • 00:28:37
    full two weeks earlier than planned
  • 00:28:41
    such is the desperation to keep blau
  • 00:28:43
    alive
  • 00:28:44
    army group south is now split into two
  • 00:28:48
    lists army group a and von box army
  • 00:28:51
    group
  • 00:28:51
    b and christ's first panzer army is let
  • 00:28:55
    loose across the donets river
  • 00:28:57
    what's happened over the course of the
  • 00:28:59
    next few days
  • 00:29:00
    in any other context but war
  • 00:29:03
    could be described as a comedy christ is
  • 00:29:06
    ordered to go
  • 00:29:07
    left then right then over here then over
  • 00:29:10
    there then over there
  • 00:29:12
    and it was a very frustrating time to
  • 00:29:14
    kleist whose army
  • 00:29:15
    finally met milorovo with sixth army and
  • 00:29:19
    fourth panzer army
  • 00:29:21
    the bag of soviet prisoners they took
  • 00:29:24
    was just 40
  • 00:29:25
    000. that was practically nothing
  • 00:29:28
    in fact in the previous two weeks the
  • 00:29:30
    germans had only taken
  • 00:29:32
    100 000 soviet prisoners of war this was
  • 00:29:35
    tiny
  • 00:29:36
    compared to what they'd hoped to have
  • 00:29:38
    taken you see because
  • 00:29:40
    of the desperation in trying to salvage
  • 00:29:43
    something from the bowel plan
  • 00:29:45
    the mobile elements had gone ahead to
  • 00:29:48
    try
  • 00:29:49
    encircle the fleeing soviet soldiers and
  • 00:29:52
    they had to do this rapidly otherwise
  • 00:29:54
    the soviets would
  • 00:29:56
    slip their grasp so the panzers
  • 00:29:59
    had actually shot off ahead of the
  • 00:30:02
    infantry much like the year before
  • 00:30:04
    and the infantry simply couldn't keep up
  • 00:30:08
    with them most of the soviet troops they
  • 00:30:10
    had encircled
  • 00:30:12
    had actually been driving alongside the
  • 00:30:15
    german panzer columns
  • 00:30:16
    or had dispersed before them or
  • 00:30:19
    hadn't actually been encircled because
  • 00:30:21
    the german infantry
  • 00:30:23
    couldn't keep up it was a repeat of the
  • 00:30:25
    same problems that had happened during
  • 00:30:27
    operation barbarossa
  • 00:30:28
    the chess game does not work on a go
  • 00:30:31
    board
  • 00:30:32
    it had all gone wrong and a scapegoat
  • 00:30:34
    was found von bokh
  • 00:30:36
    was sacked on the 17th of july and
  • 00:30:38
    replaced by vikes
  • 00:30:41
    the charge against bach was that he tied
  • 00:30:43
    up the panzer forces of varanesh
  • 00:30:45
    for too long although vikes had also
  • 00:30:47
    wanted the panzers
  • 00:30:48
    for voronos too so anyway the wild plan
  • 00:30:51
    was in tatters
  • 00:30:52
    and the soviets were now responding in
  • 00:30:55
    the wake of the german attack
  • 00:30:57
    and for his failings here and in the
  • 00:30:59
    previous year timochenko was dismissed
  • 00:31:02
    and in his place the staff got created
  • 00:31:04
    two new fronts the first
  • 00:31:06
    was the variness front on the 7th of
  • 00:31:08
    july which would be commanded
  • 00:31:10
    by fortune on the 14th of july
  • 00:31:14
    and the stalingrad front created on the
  • 00:31:16
    12th of july
  • 00:31:17
    this will be commanded by gordov from
  • 00:31:20
    the 21st
  • 00:31:21
    of july the stalingrad front consisted
  • 00:31:24
    of
  • 00:31:24
    three reserve armies the 62nd under
  • 00:31:28
    kolpachi
  • 00:31:29
    63rd under and
  • 00:31:32
    64th on the chirikov
  • 00:31:36
    two of these reserve armies would become
  • 00:31:38
    famous
  • 00:31:39
    in the battle of stalingrad now the
  • 00:31:42
    soviet high command still
  • 00:31:43
    thought the voroness front was the most
  • 00:31:47
    important because the germans were
  • 00:31:48
    clearly aiming towards
  • 00:31:50
    moscow and so the voronese front
  • 00:31:54
    engages with salmon's second army
  • 00:31:58
    but the stalingrad fronts forces are
  • 00:32:00
    miles away
  • 00:32:02
    they're at the don bend and really
  • 00:32:04
    there's nothing between them
  • 00:32:05
    and germans the germans then continue
  • 00:32:09
    what can only be described as a disaster
  • 00:32:12
    of their blitzkrieg
  • 00:32:14
    or the vegans greek warfare an
  • 00:32:16
    intelligence report indicated that the
  • 00:32:18
    soviets had withdrawn to the east of
  • 00:32:20
    rostov
  • 00:32:20
    so the germans untangled their armored
  • 00:32:24
    forces massing at millerovo
  • 00:32:26
    which itself wasn't a slick affair and
  • 00:32:29
    first panzer army was sent
  • 00:32:31
    back across the donuts river which it
  • 00:32:33
    had already crossed in the first stage
  • 00:32:35
    of blue
  • 00:32:36
    to thrust then towards rostov fourth
  • 00:32:38
    panzer army was sent
  • 00:32:40
    southeast towards the dawn northeast of
  • 00:32:42
    rostov trying to encircle
  • 00:32:44
    soviet forces south of the river 17th
  • 00:32:47
    army and third romanian army would
  • 00:32:50
    march from the west as well the only
  • 00:32:52
    exception was palace's sixth army which
  • 00:32:54
    was heading towards the don bend
  • 00:32:57
    all these armies except for the sixth
  • 00:32:59
    fell upon
  • 00:33:00
    rostov which was captured on the 23rd
  • 00:33:03
    of july interestingly the forces that
  • 00:33:06
    initially took
  • 00:33:07
    rostov in 1941 but the same forces that
  • 00:33:11
    had taken it
  • 00:33:12
    in 1941 at 42 as well
  • 00:33:15
    but just like at millerovo the pincers
  • 00:33:18
    at rostov
  • 00:33:20
    came up empty barely 33 000 prisoners
  • 00:33:22
    were taken
  • 00:33:24
    and it turns out the intelligence report
  • 00:33:25
    had been faulty
  • 00:33:27
    much like the rest of the plan for blau
  • 00:33:29
    despite taking territory the german army
  • 00:33:32
    had not
  • 00:33:32
    gobbled up the soviet forces in front of
  • 00:33:34
    it and it had only got
  • 00:33:36
    this far by consuming large quantities
  • 00:33:40
    of its own fuel its logistics were
  • 00:33:43
    getting stretched further
  • 00:33:44
    and further the more miles it went and
  • 00:33:47
    there was nothing
  • 00:33:49
    immediately ahead of the pincers to
  • 00:33:51
    destroy
  • 00:33:52
    so now we come to possibly one of the
  • 00:33:55
    big decisions
  • 00:33:56
    of the war one which scholars
  • 00:33:59
    have pondered over for years and which
  • 00:34:02
    nobody seems to have made a clear
  • 00:34:04
    answer to we're talking about fiora
  • 00:34:07
    directive number 45 this order is the
  • 00:34:10
    catalyst for the disaster at stalingrad
  • 00:34:12
    and has been seen as the ultimate
  • 00:34:14
    failure of the german summer
  • 00:34:16
    offensive in 1942. if you think
  • 00:34:19
    stalingrad
  • 00:34:20
    and the events of 1942 are the turning
  • 00:34:22
    point of world war
  • 00:34:23
    ii or just one of the big turning points
  • 00:34:26
    then
  • 00:34:26
    this is the order that you absolutely
  • 00:34:29
    have to understand
  • 00:34:31
    now much like the soviet retreat or
  • 00:34:33
    route debate before
  • 00:34:35
    scholars are still debating the reasons
  • 00:34:37
    for the decisions made
  • 00:34:38
    in fiora order number 45 so
  • 00:34:42
    as not to get ahead of ourselves first
  • 00:34:45
    i'm going to give you the reasons
  • 00:34:47
    for the decisions made in the context of
  • 00:34:50
    blau
  • 00:34:51
    and the wider war and then once you
  • 00:34:52
    understand why this decision was made
  • 00:34:55
    then i'll explain the consequences of
  • 00:34:58
    the decisions
  • 00:34:59
    the german economy and the war effort is
  • 00:35:01
    suffering under a massive
  • 00:35:03
    oil crisis even with romanian oil the
  • 00:35:07
    deficit
  • 00:35:07
    is crippling germany needs the oil of
  • 00:35:10
    the caucasus in order to continue the
  • 00:35:12
    wider war
  • 00:35:13
    germany is also at war with britain and
  • 00:35:16
    the united states
  • 00:35:17
    and while they only have three divisions
  • 00:35:20
    tied down in north africa at this point
  • 00:35:22
    there is a constant threat of an attack
  • 00:35:25
    in the west britain had raided the
  • 00:35:28
    french coast at bruneville
  • 00:35:30
    in february 1942 and would also read
  • 00:35:32
    again
  • 00:35:33
    in mid august the famous the upgrade
  • 00:35:36
    in addition there was a larger threat of
  • 00:35:39
    invasion thanks to the united states
  • 00:35:41
    and the only way germany could hope
  • 00:35:45
    to win a fight against the usa was to
  • 00:35:48
    gain
  • 00:35:49
    the oil her economy and mechanized
  • 00:35:51
    forces needed
  • 00:35:52
    hitler was aware of the soviet press and
  • 00:35:54
    propaganda talking about a coming second
  • 00:35:57
    front
  • 00:35:57
    in the west as promised by the western
  • 00:35:59
    allies hitler was also aware that the
  • 00:36:01
    success of the western allies is
  • 00:36:03
    dependent
  • 00:36:04
    on the soviet union surviving in the
  • 00:36:06
    east the more he wins in the east
  • 00:36:10
    the more likely an invasion of the west
  • 00:36:12
    becomes because the allies
  • 00:36:14
    have to attack germany while her armies
  • 00:36:16
    in the east
  • 00:36:17
    are tied up hitler
  • 00:36:20
    may have been an evil man but he was
  • 00:36:23
    also the leader of a nation
  • 00:36:25
    and he was not insane he understood the
  • 00:36:27
    strategic picture very well
  • 00:36:30
    unlike many of his generals who were
  • 00:36:32
    trained to look at things
  • 00:36:33
    tactically and operationally he
  • 00:36:36
    understood that this war was a war
  • 00:36:38
    for resources as to brony says this was
  • 00:36:41
    the first war for oil
  • 00:36:42
    and he understood that time was running
  • 00:36:44
    out for germany the window for success
  • 00:36:47
    a hard time limit was closing
  • 00:36:50
    and if germany didn't get oil soon she
  • 00:36:53
    would no longer
  • 00:36:54
    be able to wage a war of movement
  • 00:36:57
    and she would ultimately lose the static
  • 00:36:59
    attritional war that would
  • 00:37:00
    follow but in addition to the strategic
  • 00:37:03
    situation
  • 00:37:04
    and the need for oil so far the blau
  • 00:37:07
    operation had been an operational
  • 00:37:09
    mess it hadn't achieved anything except
  • 00:37:12
    for take some ground
  • 00:37:13
    it may have been a tactical success
  • 00:37:16
    maybe an operational success i guess you
  • 00:37:17
    could say
  • 00:37:18
    but so far none of this is translated
  • 00:37:21
    into a strategic success and it really
  • 00:37:23
    needed to turn into want soon the good
  • 00:37:25
    news was that
  • 00:37:27
    the soviet red army was no longer in the
  • 00:37:30
    field
  • 00:37:30
    she had disintegrated hitler and the
  • 00:37:33
    army high command
  • 00:37:34
    had believed prior to blah that the red
  • 00:37:36
    army was on the verge
  • 00:37:38
    of collapse and they had just witnessed
  • 00:37:41
    this
  • 00:37:42
    collapse or at least they thought so
  • 00:37:44
    regardless of whether it was
  • 00:37:46
    an intentional retreat or a route
  • 00:37:49
    or both that event that collapse
  • 00:37:53
    leads hitler to the conclusion that the
  • 00:37:55
    soviet will to fight
  • 00:37:57
    is dead in his mind the only thing
  • 00:38:00
    stopping the germans from getting to
  • 00:38:02
    astrakhan was the terrain
  • 00:38:04
    and the fuel gauge he concludes that the
  • 00:38:07
    soviets will not be able
  • 00:38:09
    to create a viable defensive position
  • 00:38:12
    west
  • 00:38:13
    of the volga river but he also knew what
  • 00:38:15
    was happening
  • 00:38:16
    elsewhere leningrad was still under
  • 00:38:19
    siege
  • 00:38:20
    and perhaps more importantly fighting
  • 00:38:22
    was going on
  • 00:38:23
    in the regime area near moscow the
  • 00:38:26
    germans had kept
  • 00:38:27
    approximately one-third of all
  • 00:38:30
    its divisions on the eastern front
  • 00:38:33
    at the regev miasma salient which
  • 00:38:37
    from the words of at least one historian
  • 00:38:39
    shows its desire to retain a suitable
  • 00:38:42
    bridgehead
  • 00:38:43
    as a staging area for a later offensive
  • 00:38:46
    operation
  • 00:38:47
    sidelits had just come to an end on the
  • 00:38:49
    22nd
  • 00:38:50
    of july this was the clearing up
  • 00:38:52
    operation of two
  • 00:38:53
    large bodies of soviet troops in the
  • 00:38:55
    rear of the german forces at rajev
  • 00:38:58
    and while casualty figures for the
  • 00:39:00
    germans are unknown
  • 00:39:02
    because of poor german record-keeping it
  • 00:39:04
    is
  • 00:39:05
    known that the german divisions taking
  • 00:39:07
    part in this clearing up operation were
  • 00:39:10
    bled white they were therefore in
  • 00:39:12
    desperate need of replacements or
  • 00:39:15
    reinforcements plus
  • 00:39:17
    with more soviet fences in this area
  • 00:39:19
    incoming
  • 00:39:20
    which they were and with a possibility
  • 00:39:22
    of launching their own offensive
  • 00:39:24
    to take moscow in 1942 it makes sense to
  • 00:39:28
    shift priority away from the south
  • 00:39:30
    to the center bearing all this in mind
  • 00:39:33
    especially the time limit and the need
  • 00:39:35
    for oil hitler decides to roll the dice
  • 00:39:38
    once more he makes the decision to
  • 00:39:41
    strike
  • 00:39:42
    towards the caucasus and the oil fields
  • 00:39:45
    now in the original plan of blau armor
  • 00:39:48
    group
  • 00:39:48
    south now split into two would strike
  • 00:39:51
    east to astrakhan
  • 00:39:53
    first form a northern blocking line
  • 00:39:56
    then strike south to the caucasus oil
  • 00:39:59
    fields
  • 00:40:00
    so east first then south but
  • 00:40:03
    now the plan is to try to strike towards
  • 00:40:06
    astrakhan
  • 00:40:08
    and into the caucasus simultaneously
  • 00:40:11
    east and south together including the
  • 00:40:13
    warren edge area
  • 00:40:16
    this was basically splitting the german
  • 00:40:17
    forces over three strategic axis
  • 00:40:20
    with two half army groups at the same
  • 00:40:23
    time
  • 00:40:24
    it is a big gamble but hitler feels
  • 00:40:28
    that there's no alternative to this time
  • 00:40:30
    is running out
  • 00:40:31
    he needs to get the oil now
  • 00:40:34
    as part of this order he sends four army
  • 00:40:37
    south
  • 00:40:38
    in army group a first and fourth panzer
  • 00:40:41
    army 17th
  • 00:40:42
    army and romanian third army army group
  • 00:40:45
    b
  • 00:40:45
    will consist of german second army
  • 00:40:48
    hungarian second army
  • 00:40:50
    eighth italian army and german sixth
  • 00:40:53
    army
  • 00:40:53
    manstein's eleventh army was initially
  • 00:40:56
    committed to go south as well but
  • 00:40:58
    was withdrawn which will come back too
  • 00:41:00
    and finally
  • 00:41:01
    sixth army was also ordered to take
  • 00:41:04
    stalingrad
  • 00:41:05
    for an eventual thrust on astrakhan
  • 00:41:08
    now sixth army is a big army it has six
  • 00:41:11
    core
  • 00:41:12
    at this time and may have been the
  • 00:41:13
    biggest german army on the eastern front
  • 00:41:16
    as well
  • 00:41:18
    that said he was given objectives that
  • 00:41:20
    were
  • 00:41:21
    far beyond its capabilities but hitler
  • 00:41:24
    does not see this because hitler thinks
  • 00:41:26
    the soviets
  • 00:41:27
    have been defeated in the south at least
  • 00:41:30
    but this is a false belief and by
  • 00:41:33
    diluting his forces what happens is axis
  • 00:41:36
    units
  • 00:41:36
    along the dawn are facing undefeated and
  • 00:41:40
    quite powerful
  • 00:41:40
    red army forces in fact the red army had
  • 00:41:43
    a front
  • 00:41:44
    facing each of the three axis armies of
  • 00:41:48
    army group b at this time
  • 00:41:49
    brian's front with more than three
  • 00:41:51
    armies
  • 00:41:52
    against salmon's second army variness
  • 00:41:55
    front with two armies facing johnny's
  • 00:41:58
    hungarian second army and the stalingrad
  • 00:42:00
    front
  • 00:42:01
    with five mostly reserve armies and two
  • 00:42:04
    tank armies although these haven't
  • 00:42:06
    actually formed yet facing palace's
  • 00:42:09
    sixth
  • 00:42:09
    army so this is optimism at best
  • 00:42:13
    and overconfidence at the least the
  • 00:42:16
    route of soviet forces in the early part
  • 00:42:19
    of blau convinced hitler that
  • 00:42:21
    manchester's 11th army wasn't even
  • 00:42:23
    needed
  • 00:42:24
    and it began moving to the leningrad
  • 00:42:26
    area to influence that siege
  • 00:42:28
    as i said last time 11 of the german
  • 00:42:31
    divisions taking part
  • 00:42:32
    in blau were withdrawn by mid-august
  • 00:42:35
    24th
  • 00:42:36
    132nd and 170th infantry plus
  • 00:42:40
    the 28th jaeger divisions were sent to
  • 00:42:43
    army group
  • 00:42:44
    north the grotesque land motorized
  • 00:42:46
    infantry division
  • 00:42:47
    ninth and 11th panzer divisions and
  • 00:42:50
    the 72nd infantry division were sent to
  • 00:42:53
    army group center
  • 00:42:55
    and the first motorized ss leap standard
  • 00:42:58
    adolf hitler
  • 00:42:59
    division and the 22nd and 257th infantry
  • 00:43:03
    divisions were also sent to the west
  • 00:43:06
    this was 15 of the german
  • 00:43:09
    divisions deployed for blau and 25
  • 00:43:12
    of blau's mobile formations on top of
  • 00:43:15
    the fact that reinforcements had
  • 00:43:17
    already been de-prioritized for the
  • 00:43:19
    southern front and sent to the central
  • 00:43:21
    front as shown in last monday's video
  • 00:43:24
    this effectively stripped and diluted
  • 00:43:26
    the german forces in the south
  • 00:43:28
    they no longer had the strength they
  • 00:43:31
    needed
  • 00:43:31
    to complete their objectives worse
  • 00:43:34
    the supply situation is completely
  • 00:43:37
    messed up
  • 00:43:38
    priority goes to army group a racing off
  • 00:43:41
    to the caucasus
  • 00:43:43
    and that's fine but sixth army is
  • 00:43:46
    starved
  • 00:43:47
    of supplies powerless engages
  • 00:43:50
    soviet forces at the don bend on the
  • 00:43:53
    24th
  • 00:43:54
    of july and by the 26th of july
  • 00:43:57
    as a combination of stiff soviet
  • 00:43:59
    resistance but also a lack of fuel and
  • 00:44:01
    ammunition
  • 00:44:02
    powers his army comes to a halt at the
  • 00:44:05
    dawn
  • 00:44:05
    bend coupled with the people's
  • 00:44:08
    commissaries of defense ordered number
  • 00:44:10
    227 the infamous
  • 00:44:12
    not a step back order which was issued
  • 00:44:15
    on the 28th of july 1942
  • 00:44:18
    sixth army becomes embroiled against
  • 00:44:20
    four soviet armies
  • 00:44:22
    and suffers heavy casualties now i'm not
  • 00:44:25
    going to go into detail
  • 00:44:27
    with this part of the battle today
  • 00:44:28
    because i'll be covering this in much
  • 00:44:30
    greater detail
  • 00:44:31
    in my main battle storm styling by
  • 00:44:33
    documentary which is
  • 00:44:35
    coming but effectively from the 24th of
  • 00:44:38
    july onwards the battle of stalingrad
  • 00:44:40
    is on and palace's forces are suffering
  • 00:44:44
    heavily
  • 00:44:45
    and they haven't even reached the city
  • 00:44:47
    yet hitler having stripped
  • 00:44:50
    army group b down far too much
  • 00:44:53
    realizes that he's made a mistake he
  • 00:44:56
    sees that he needs to reinforce powers
  • 00:44:59
    quickly in order to get the offensive
  • 00:45:01
    going again so he orders
  • 00:45:02
    hoths fourth panzer army from army group
  • 00:45:05
    a
  • 00:45:06
    to turn about once more and come back to
  • 00:45:09
    palace's rescue
  • 00:45:11
    it wasn't until the 7th of august that
  • 00:45:14
    palace could get going again
  • 00:45:16
    and hoff's forces spotted into action
  • 00:45:19
    from the 31st onwards
  • 00:45:21
    since fuel was also lacking for him as
  • 00:45:24
    well
  • 00:45:24
    the logistics strain on the whole
  • 00:45:28
    southern front was having a massive
  • 00:45:30
    impact
  • 00:45:31
    which would plague both powerless and
  • 00:45:33
    hoth
  • 00:45:34
    all the way up and into the thick of the
  • 00:45:37
    fighting
  • 00:45:37
    inside stalingrad city meanwhile this
  • 00:45:41
    stripping of
  • 00:45:42
    fourth panzer army from army group a
  • 00:45:44
    plus the fact
  • 00:45:46
    that manchester's 11th army had gone on
  • 00:45:48
    a picnic to leningrad
  • 00:45:50
    meant that liszt had just three armies
  • 00:45:54
    first panzer army 17th army
  • 00:45:57
    and romanian third army these would have
  • 00:46:00
    to drive
  • 00:46:01
    the 650 kilometers to grozny
  • 00:46:05
    getting stretched thinner and thinner
  • 00:46:07
    over a front that was 300 kilometers
  • 00:46:10
    wide while they drive
  • 00:46:11
    further and further away from their
  • 00:46:13
    supply base
  • 00:46:15
    oh and list only had
  • 00:46:18
    one german infantry division the 46th
  • 00:46:21
    the rest were mobile units meaning his
  • 00:46:24
    force on a whole
  • 00:46:25
    lacked infantry nonetheless liszt
  • 00:46:28
    crashed through the soviet front lines
  • 00:46:30
    on the 26th of july and just kept on
  • 00:46:32
    driving the romanians
  • 00:46:34
    were subordinated to ruoff's 17th army
  • 00:46:37
    which was now renamed armor group ruoff
  • 00:46:39
    or although this was more of a kant
  • 00:46:41
    group style unit rather than a separate
  • 00:46:43
    armor group since
  • 00:46:44
    it was on the armor group a the
  • 00:46:46
    romanians and the 17th army marched
  • 00:46:49
    sort of along the coast while kleist's
  • 00:46:51
    army
  • 00:46:52
    raced off towards mayor cop initially
  • 00:46:55
    they made great success
  • 00:46:56
    the soviets just fled before them and
  • 00:46:59
    mayor cop
  • 00:47:00
    fell on the 11th of august stalin was no
  • 00:47:04
    fool though
  • 00:47:04
    prior to the fall of makeup he warned
  • 00:47:07
    deputy oil commissar nikolai berbikov
  • 00:47:11
    that if he doesn't destroy the oil
  • 00:47:13
    fields before the germans captured them
  • 00:47:16
    he would be shot this was a good
  • 00:47:19
    incentive
  • 00:47:20
    the germans found the oil fields
  • 00:47:22
    completely destroyed
  • 00:47:23
    and well they were actually impressed by
  • 00:47:25
    the effort that soviets went to
  • 00:47:27
    in order to prevent the germans from
  • 00:47:28
    using the oil fields the germans would
  • 00:47:31
    get the oil fields
  • 00:47:32
    up and running again slightly but they
  • 00:47:34
    only got in the region of 750 tons of
  • 00:47:37
    crude oil from mayokop
  • 00:47:39
    which was a drop in the ocean compared
  • 00:47:40
    to what they actually needed
  • 00:47:42
    therefore the destruction of the oil
  • 00:47:45
    fields
  • 00:47:46
    was a success so well done
  • 00:47:49
    berbickoff now while makeup may have
  • 00:47:52
    fallen
  • 00:47:53
    soviet general boudini commander of the
  • 00:47:56
    north caucasus front
  • 00:47:57
    was beginning to slowly regain control
  • 00:48:00
    of the routed forces beneath him
  • 00:48:03
    and the thing is while most of the
  • 00:48:06
    troops were fleeing at this moment in
  • 00:48:07
    time
  • 00:48:08
    if he could steady them he'd have in the
  • 00:48:11
    region
  • 00:48:11
    of 600 000 men although
  • 00:48:14
    87 000 of these would be sailors from
  • 00:48:16
    the black sea fleet
  • 00:48:19
    this will be more than enough to halt
  • 00:48:21
    the diluted forces
  • 00:48:23
    of army group a and indeed it was
  • 00:48:26
    by late august list's forces had ground
  • 00:48:30
    to a halt in the caucasus mountains
  • 00:48:32
    and had been unable to get to grozny
  • 00:48:35
    reinforcements could not be
  • 00:48:37
    sent because fourth panzer and sixth
  • 00:48:40
    armies
  • 00:48:41
    were embattled at stalingrad there were
  • 00:48:43
    soviet attacks going on
  • 00:48:45
    uh boring and demian
  • 00:48:48
    zhukov and then kanyev's attacks at
  • 00:48:50
    rajev
  • 00:48:51
    from the 30th of july until september
  • 00:48:54
    which kept
  • 00:48:55
    army group center tied down so
  • 00:48:58
    it was obvious to all blau had failed
  • 00:49:01
    and its conduct was a complete disaster
  • 00:49:03
    this had not been
  • 00:49:04
    a smooth operation it hadn't captured
  • 00:49:08
    nearly as many soviet prisoners as hoped
  • 00:49:10
    and it stretched
  • 00:49:12
    the german elastic band to breaking
  • 00:49:14
    point the armies in the caucasus and
  • 00:49:16
    stalingrad were now
  • 00:49:18
    starved of fuel and ammunition
  • 00:49:21
    reinforcements were being sent
  • 00:49:23
    to the center rather than the south
  • 00:49:25
    which
  • 00:49:26
    would have massive consequences in the
  • 00:49:28
    battle of stalingrad
  • 00:49:30
    and the red army had not actually been
  • 00:49:33
    destroyed
  • 00:49:34
    they had been routed but now
  • 00:49:38
    they regained their composure they
  • 00:49:40
    hadn't suffered
  • 00:49:41
    ridiculous casualties certainly not as
  • 00:49:44
    bad as the year before
  • 00:49:46
    and now with the ural factories online
  • 00:49:49
    they were getting more and better tanks
  • 00:49:52
    artillery mortars aircraft they were
  • 00:49:55
    getting
  • 00:49:56
    the communications equipment needed to
  • 00:49:59
    conduct
  • 00:50:00
    offensive operations they were
  • 00:50:02
    reorganizing
  • 00:50:04
    their units and husbanding their
  • 00:50:06
    resources
  • 00:50:08
    for a future attack blau had spread the
  • 00:50:11
    german forces out
  • 00:50:12
    thin across a wide front of 4100
  • 00:50:15
    kilometers
  • 00:50:16
    their logistics were struggling to keep
  • 00:50:18
    up and
  • 00:50:19
    they had due to either poor staff work
  • 00:50:22
    or logistics
  • 00:50:23
    failed to reinforce army group b
  • 00:50:26
    sufficiently so
  • 00:50:28
    when the soviets mass for their
  • 00:50:30
    operazier
  • 00:50:31
    uran operation uranus there is nothing
  • 00:50:34
    beyond
  • 00:50:35
    the thin crust of axis frontline
  • 00:50:39
    troops that can stop them blau is a
  • 00:50:41
    failure
  • 00:50:42
    in and of itself but it gives the
  • 00:50:44
    soviets a golden opportunity to strike
  • 00:50:46
    back and when they do
  • 00:50:48
    they wipe out several axis armies and
  • 00:50:51
    drive them back
  • 00:50:52
    to plows starting point both hitler
  • 00:50:55
    and stalin instinctively seem to grasp
  • 00:50:58
    this
  • 00:50:59
    even before the conclusion of the blau
  • 00:51:00
    campaign hitler's anger boils over and
  • 00:51:03
    he no longer listens to his generals who
  • 00:51:05
    have
  • 00:51:06
    failed him box already gone liszt
  • 00:51:09
    is sacked on the 9th of september for
  • 00:51:12
    failing to
  • 00:51:12
    keep the offensive going several others
  • 00:51:15
    like general heim
  • 00:51:16
    are sacked as well halder the guy who
  • 00:51:20
    failed in barbarossa failed again at
  • 00:51:22
    plow and who
  • 00:51:24
    constantly argued and lied to his fiora
  • 00:51:27
    is sacked on the 24th of september he is
  • 00:51:30
    replaced
  • 00:51:30
    with zeitzler who would follow hitler's
  • 00:51:34
    orders somewhat more loyally than the
  • 00:51:36
    scheming halda did
  • 00:51:37
    this replacement of howler can be seen
  • 00:51:39
    as the end of the traditional
  • 00:51:41
    german general staff way of war and the
  • 00:51:43
    transition into a new style of warfare
  • 00:51:46
    one with hitler in charge for a change
  • 00:51:49
    hitler
  • 00:51:50
    no longer trusts his generals who have
  • 00:51:52
    betrayed him
  • 00:51:53
    and disobeyed his orders time and time
  • 00:51:56
    again
  • 00:51:57
    and wants them to do as he says and
  • 00:52:00
    interestingly stalin at the same time
  • 00:52:03
    transforms from a person unwilling to
  • 00:52:06
    listen to his generals
  • 00:52:07
    and continually ordering them to stand
  • 00:52:10
    or counter-attack against ridiculous
  • 00:52:12
    odds
  • 00:52:13
    to someone willing to take his general's
  • 00:52:16
    advice
  • 00:52:16
    and allow them time to prepare their
  • 00:52:20
    offensives
  • 00:52:21
    the end of blau with the germans
  • 00:52:23
    stretched thin
  • 00:52:25
    and without the oil and supplies needed
  • 00:52:27
    to attack
  • 00:52:28
    everywhere or even anywhere gives stalin
  • 00:52:32
    that time for the first real time in the
  • 00:52:35
    war
  • 00:52:35
    he can say to his generals sure take one
  • 00:52:38
    or two months to plan
  • 00:52:39
    operation uranus and get it organized oh
  • 00:52:43
    and
  • 00:52:43
    you want to make a delay of a couple of
  • 00:52:45
    days or even a couple of weeks well
  • 00:52:47
    sure you can do that and the failure of
  • 00:52:50
    wow
  • 00:52:51
    really allows this to happen stalin and
  • 00:52:54
    hitler
  • 00:52:55
    trade places almost trade roles
  • 00:52:58
    and it is directly because of this
  • 00:53:00
    turning point
  • 00:53:01
    in the war the initiative has gone
  • 00:53:04
    over to the soviets hitler knows he's
  • 00:53:06
    failed
  • 00:53:07
    and stalin knows he's won effectively we
  • 00:53:10
    can sum up
  • 00:53:11
    the outcome of blau with this quote from
  • 00:53:14
    centino
  • 00:53:15
    by this point the war with the soviet
  • 00:53:18
    union
  • 00:53:18
    had placed burdens on the wear marked
  • 00:53:21
    that were far
  • 00:53:21
    heavier than the traditional german way
  • 00:53:24
    of war could bear
  • 00:53:25
    blitzkrieg had failed in barbarossa
  • 00:53:29
    and had failed in blau and this was the
  • 00:53:31
    last
  • 00:53:32
    gasp for victory by hitler and his
  • 00:53:34
    regime failure to take the oil meant
  • 00:53:37
    germany did not have the fuel
  • 00:53:38
    and lost the resources to continue the
  • 00:53:41
    war the way it wanted to
  • 00:53:42
    blitzkrieg no longer worked
  • 00:53:46
    from now on it had to fight a static war
  • 00:53:49
    in november 1942 at the height of german
  • 00:53:52
    conquest
  • 00:53:53
    and just a few kilometers from grozny
  • 00:53:55
    you have el alamein
  • 00:53:57
    operation uranus and then the torch
  • 00:53:59
    landings which was
  • 00:54:00
    the entry of the united states latin
  • 00:54:02
    troops into the war
  • 00:54:04
    the traditional german way of war was
  • 00:54:08
    over blau came to an end not because of
  • 00:54:11
    vast hordes of soviet troops or
  • 00:54:14
    masses of len lee's trucks it was
  • 00:54:16
    because the german army
  • 00:54:17
    just wasn't capable of going the
  • 00:54:20
    distance
  • 00:54:21
    it was a sprinter not a marathon runner
  • 00:54:24
    and it was not designed to fight the
  • 00:54:25
    type of war going on
  • 00:54:27
    on the eastern front it was playing a
  • 00:54:30
    different game
  • 00:54:31
    with different rules this is why even
  • 00:54:34
    though i'm making
  • 00:54:35
    a battle storm styling red documentary
  • 00:54:37
    will be going down to the divisional
  • 00:54:39
    level
  • 00:54:39
    and below for the entire stalingrad
  • 00:54:42
    campaign between the 24th of july 1942
  • 00:54:45
    to the 2nd of february 1943 i will
  • 00:54:48
    happily stand here
  • 00:54:50
    and tell you that blau failed before
  • 00:54:53
    that battle had even begun
  • 00:54:55
    i will also say that the battle of
  • 00:54:57
    stalingrad was lost
  • 00:54:59
    outside the city before the germans had
  • 00:55:03
    entered the city
  • 00:55:04
    and the conditions for that loss were
  • 00:55:06
    set up
  • 00:55:07
    during the blau campaign
  • 00:55:10
    while i love going into details and i
  • 00:55:12
    intend to drown you in as much
  • 00:55:14
    detail as possible in the uh stalingrad
  • 00:55:17
    documentary itself
  • 00:55:20
    success on the tactical level
  • 00:55:23
    at stalingrad would not have resulted
  • 00:55:26
    in a strategic victory but that doesn't
  • 00:55:30
    mean it wasn't important
  • 00:55:31
    all that it's not interesting of course
  • 00:55:33
    the battle starting ground is
  • 00:55:34
    interesting
  • 00:55:35
    we just need to realize that the war
  • 00:55:38
    wasn't won or lost
  • 00:55:40
    on the tactical level and hopefully this
  • 00:55:43
    video has put everything into
  • 00:55:44
    perspective
  • 00:55:45
    speaking of perspective if you haven't
  • 00:55:47
    seen my video on the oil crisis going on
  • 00:55:50
    in germany and why it is the most
  • 00:55:53
    you know important reason why germany
  • 00:55:55
    lost the war and why germany
  • 00:55:57
    he needed to take the caucuses in 1942
  • 00:56:00
    go watch it
  • 00:56:01
    link on the screen and in the pin
  • 00:56:03
    comment in the comment section
  • 00:56:05
    below thanks to my patrons for
  • 00:56:08
    supporting me
  • 00:56:09
    and thank you to all of you for watching
  • 00:56:11
    bye for now
标签
  • Operation Blau
  • World War II
  • German Army
  • Soviet Union
  • logistics
  • strategy
  • failure
  • Battle of Stalingrad
  • military history
  • Hitler