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[Music]
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I'm Alan J McDonald and I am currently
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an aerospace consultant and author of a
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book called truth lies no- Rings inside
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the space shuttle Challenger disaster at
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the time of the Challenger disaster I
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was the director of the Space Shuttle
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solid rocket motor project for marttin
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thall the manufacturers of the large
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solid rocket boosters on the shuttle I'm
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going to discuss the Challenger accident
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how it the launch evolved what happened
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to the Challenger during its launch and
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some of the Inquisition that happened as
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a result of the investigation by a
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presidential commission on the accident
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the Challenger disaster happened on the
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morning of January 28th
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1986 it took place that uh on P 39b at
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the Kennedy Space Center in Florida I
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received a telephone call from a fellow
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that worked for me and he said Ali says
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we were just told that there was a
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weather forecaster I believe in Orlando
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that was forecasting a coal front in in
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the area of Florida that might drop
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temperatures low as 18 Dees Fahrenheit
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by tomorrow
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morning and uh we're really concerned
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about whether the O-ring seals and these
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field joints the solid rocket boost will
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operate at those
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temperatures properly and I said well
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I'm very concerned about that too uh
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they said out what you need to do for us
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is is get a hold of somebody at the cape
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there from NASA to find out what they're
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projecting hour by hour all through the
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night at the launch site not in Orlando
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so that we can calculate what the actual
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temperature will be on various parts of
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of our boosters by the opening of the
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launch window I says I will get that
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information
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and call it back to you but I said when
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you get it here's what I want you to do
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I want you to get the engineers together
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and have them make an assessment of
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their concerns of the cold temperatures
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on the seiling of those o-ring seals and
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I would like them to make a
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recommendation is what is the lowest
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safest temperature to launch that we can
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tolerate and I want that decision and
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recommendation to be made by the Vice
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President of engineering not program
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management I felt that that was a thorny
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technical issue and should be decided on
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its technical merits
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only and as a result I requested that
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the vice president of engineering make
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that recommendation so I called the NASA
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rep there and arranged for that
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teleconference that evening and it was a
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three-way teleconference between the
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engineers in Utah those in of NASA in
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Alabama and our management at Kennedy
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Space Center in Florida so it was not
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surprising to me that after the
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engineers presented their
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[Music]
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information the vice president Ving came
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on just as I requested and recommended
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that they do not launch the Challenger
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below 53° F which was primarily based on
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that observation of that flight a year
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earlier the NASA management really
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didn't accept that conclusion and felt
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that if we're going to change the launch
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criteria we needed to Anchor it in
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something better than just this
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qualitative OBS
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observation and here was a condition
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which we had claimed as in our opinion
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going in a direction that may well cause
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a failure a very catastrophic failure
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and so what happened is that my boss Mr
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Joe kilminster who was the vice
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president of space booster programs came
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on the telecon and asked for uh a f five
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minute offline caucus to make sure that
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we had presented everything that we had
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available to us and see if we could
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better uh uh analyze the joint to
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determine if there was a lower
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temperature that was safe to launch what
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really surprised me was that when the
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management of my company came back on a
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half hour later on the teleconference it
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wasn't the vice president of engineering
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anymore who made the recommendation not
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to launch bill 53° f it was my boss the
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vice president's base booster programs
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head of program management and he said
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that they had reassessed all of their
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data and they have concluded that it's
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okay to proceed with the launch as
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planned no restrictions at all no
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temperature uh requirement whatsoever
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well NASA reaction was is that well they
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accepted that without any question but
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they needed that recommendation put in
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writing and signed by a responsible thol
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official well I knew who that
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responsible thol official was that was
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me that's why I was there and I made the
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smartest decision I ever made in my
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lifetime I refused to sign it now I
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didn't think it was UN totally unethical
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that the NASA people questioned how we
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arrived at that decision and the data we
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presented what was unethical is they
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knew that that we had a moral obligation
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to always prove it was safe and what
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they had just done was put the
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engineering people in a position to
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prove that it would fail that's a
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totally different question you're never
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supposed to do that and in fact the
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final decision which I didn't know at
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the time I found out later was that the
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uh general manager uh uh decided not to
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listen listen to the engineers who still
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felt that it was too risky and tried to
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convince him not to change the decision
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even though he thought that NASA had
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some good questions and he kind of
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agreed with them uh he decided that he
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was going to pull his management team
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which ended up as only the vice
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presidents as to whether we should
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launch or not now this was at the time
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all unknown to me because I was uh back
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at the cape but I was so Disturbed with
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the change in the launch recommendation
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and we were waiting for the written
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recommendation to come back from our
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plant in Utah that I turned to the NASA
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management people and I said you know I
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said uh I really don't feel comfortable
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with that decision I don't agree with
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it but more importantly you cannot even
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accept that recommendation they says
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what do you mean Al I said you cannot
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accept it because you know and I know
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know that you're asking us to fly those
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solid rocket Motors outside a
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temperature it's been qualified to fly
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in and you can't do that you can't fly
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any of the shuttle Hardware outside of
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its qualification
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limits that's against protocol so you
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can't accept it I'm recommending
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launching not based on what I know but
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what I do not know and you're in exactly
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the same
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position they said well you know these
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shouldn't be your concerns but we'll
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pass them on into in an advisory
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capacity only and they said where is
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this fax that's
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signed uh by your
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official and so happened the fax machine
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was the other end of the building so I
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went down there and it took took a while
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to come in but I finally brought it back
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and when I brought it back they were in
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a teleconference with one of the people
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on the mission management team since I
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was gone for 15 20 minutes I presumed
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they talked about the O-ring issue
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earlier and uh I was shocked to find out
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later they never mentioned
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[Music]
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it well I uh remember getting up early
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that morning of the launch and I was
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carrying my briefcase in one hand and my
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headset and the other going to launch
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control center and I remember hearing on
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the radio was 20 2° fhe at the time I
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went into the launch control center and
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sat down at a console that I am supposed
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to be at to monitor all the data on the
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solid rocket
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boosters and uh in uh the corner of that
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uh TV uh monitor that I have they have
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uh access to various cameras that are on
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the vehicle that you can punch in and
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look at I remember I started looking at
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some of the cameras and I noticed there
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was Ice hanging on the vehicle there was
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Ice hanging on platforms next to it and
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I quickly concluded myself well they
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aren't going to launch this thing
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today and the next thing I noticed was
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uh several minutes later they decided to
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send an ice team out to the uh launch
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platform to knock down as much as the
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ice they possibly could and take it off
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the mobile launch platform because
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they're concern of of
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debris uh and they did that and after
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they did that they picked up the count
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again and uh they finally made another
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stop in the count to go back and send
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the ice team again to relook at the
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launch pad and they did came back and
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concluded that it was okay to proceed
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with the launch which really surprised
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me but they
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did now I really expected if the o-
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Rings would fail because the cold
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temperature they would do it right at
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ignition when you would light these
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solid rocket
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boosters strangely enough some 73
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seconds
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later the whole vehicle looked like it
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had exploded in the
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air and I was watching it on the TV
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camera with one eye on the pressure
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traces of solid rocket boosters and the
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data we were
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monitoring and it was absolutely
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shocking to everyone that was in their
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control control room uh I could hear
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some people actually sobbing in the
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background cuz they knew that this was
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unsurvivable I went to uh Huntsville
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Alabama at the Manassa Marshall space
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flight center next morning to be part of
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the failure analysis team the NASA was
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forming on the solid
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rockets and I was about convinced that
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yeah this was caused by in my opinion I
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thought it probably was a cracked turban
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blade and the space shuttle main engines
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finally came loose cuz they were having
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that problem problem and went through
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the tank and that caused the explosion
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or the tank structurally came apart and
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exploded and I was ready to leave and go
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home because I've been gone for about a
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week and I actually walked out the door
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and was heading out the door and this
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fellow from NASA that I argued with the
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night before by name lari Malloy said Al
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you need to get back in here I says why
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he says we've got Jim kingsberry the
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director of Science and Engineering for
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Marshall that's at the cape looking at
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some movies and films of the
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launch and he claims he can see some
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fire coming out of the sight of one of
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your solid rocket boosters just before
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the explosion my heart sank when I saw
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the actual launch film because I thought
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you know it probably did happen exactly
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for the reason we were concerned the
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night before the launch the O-rings were
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too
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cold and it wasn't an
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until President Reagan decided to form a
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presidential commission where the real
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answers came out and primarily from me
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not
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NASA what had happened as I stayed and
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worked on that failure team and within a
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few days I presented to NASA exactly how
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the Challenger
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failed and it was due to the cold old
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ring issue that we had addressed the
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night before it just manif passed itself
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in a final failure quite different than
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we expected but that's why it really
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failed it was clear they didn't want to
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hear that and what had happened
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was uh one of the NASA people in
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Washington who was a budget analyst had
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sent a memo he had written to the New
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York Times and it was about this problem
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that we had with this O-rings and the
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joints well at that time NASA had never
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briefed the president commission what on
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anything what had caused the accident at
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all they knew nothing about any and yet
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it was almost a week earlier i' briefed
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them exactly what caused it so they
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scheduled a closed hearing that
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afternoon with NASA well NASA wanted all
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my charts that I had given to
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headquarters the previous summer and I
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gave it to him I remember going up to
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this briefing and it was in the old
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executive office building next next to
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the White
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House and uh the NASA folks made it very
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clear they were going to give the entire
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briefing uh no one else need to make any
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comments unless they were specifically
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requested to do
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so and the fellow was briefing was a
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fellow I argued with and he was going
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through these charts and he' leave for
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about an hour and a half and the
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commission asked for a break they took a
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break they came back and I remember uh
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Dr Sally Ride before she sat down she
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was stumming through a bunch of pink
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telephones slip he says before we get
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back to the briefing cuz the guy was
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going to I'd like to uh ask you a
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question I I returned a few of my phone
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calls and one of them was some reporter
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here in Washington that asked me if it
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was really true they'd heard a rumor
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that one of the contractors may have
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been concerned about the cold
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temperatures affecting their
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Hardware may have even recommended not
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launching is that really true in fact he
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said we had a teleconference about their
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concerns of the projected temperatures
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on the field joints and
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O-rings uh and as a result of that
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teleconference we had all our engineers
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and communication with all our engineers
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in Alabama and the management Kennedy
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and reviewed all that and as a result of
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that conference uh Martin thol
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recommended that we proceed on with the
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launch has planed and they submitted a a
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written statement to that effect they
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went back to his
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briefing and I thought well I guess
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that's a true statement but that as
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about misleading as anything I ever saw
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and was certainly unethical and so I
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finally started walking down the stairs
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towards the conference table that the
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Commissioners were sitting
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at and Mr Larry Malloy was given this
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briefing was giving one of the charts
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that I'd given him in fact that morning
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he was being asked some questions about
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it and he said I think Al McDonnell has
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something to add here I said I think
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this commission should know that Martin
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thall was so concerned about the project
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at cold temperatures on our field joints
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and O-rings that we recommended not
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launching below 53 degrees
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fah I remember chairman William Rogers
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who was the head of the presidential
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commission and his vice chairman who was
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Neil
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Armstrong and Dr Richard fan they all
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kind of stood up and trying to peek at
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who this guy was coming down here and
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William Rogers was the ex Secretary of
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State and Nixon and attorney general
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Eisenhower and he looked at me and he
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says well who in the hell are you he
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said would you please come down here on
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the floor and repeat what I think I
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heard because if I heard what I think I
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heard this will be in litigation for
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years to
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come my life changed when he said that
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because I knew who was going to be in
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the middle of all of this litigation for
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years to come me looking
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back at all the decisions and things
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that
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happened there's two criteria I always
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look at with regard to ethics there's
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ethics that are associated with having
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to make tough
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decisions tough pressure time
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constraints in that environment and then
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there's those that aren't which I
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consider those frankly are the worst
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ethical issues and both of those
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occurred in the Challenger decision I'm
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proud of what I did but as far as ethics
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was concerned the biggest breach of
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Ethics was a fact that both my company
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and NASA attempted to cover up what
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really happened that night before the
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launch and there was OB obfuscation by
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NASA on what really caused the final
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accident which I went over with the
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presidential commission before they
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filed the report and they agreed with me
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and to me that was a bigger
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error than the pressure at the time to
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launch from breach of Ethics because
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they had time to think about it and
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deceive people one of the big
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disappointments I had after going
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through all that and uh uh a lot of the
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lessons that were learned from
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Challenger in were fairly well
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implemented immediately after but they
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carried over to a point where they
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finally were forgotten some 17 years it
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later when they launched the Columbia
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that year in 2003 they clearly saw on
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the film this huge piece of foam was
00:18:06
called ramp phone off the tank impact
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the Orbiter and it actually impacted the
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Leading Edge rather than under the tile
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and
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shattered uh they then ran some
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analysis of what that impact damage
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could be and they had the fanciest uh
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most upto-date computer mod model there
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was available at that time in 2003 and
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concluded that the damage wasn't
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significant enough that they couldn't uh
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return home
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safely there were some engineers at
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Langley that didn't feel comfortable
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that that was the case and said well we
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can find out for sure by asking the
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Department of Defense to turn one of
00:18:54
their spy
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satellites towards the Orbiter in orbit
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facing towards it and it will see it in
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Spades if it has significant damage that
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it would be a catastrophic re-entry so
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they made a specific request to the
00:19:09
mission management team to do
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that and it so happened that the mission
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management team declined that request on
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the basis that they'd had an analysis
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done by Boeing on this crater model
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computer program that was the most fancy
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thing in the world and that they don't
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feed feel that was adequate damage so
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they didn't need to go through the
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protocol and all to make a request to to
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make these pictures was the first time
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in the 50y year history of NASA that I
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saw they they went from a can do
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attitude to a can't do and that was the
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most serious mistake and the most
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unethical mistake I think they probably
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made in their entire history one of the
00:19:49
Lessons Learned I tell students also is
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this don't always believe in all your
00:19:53
big computer programs use your gut
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feeling and some back of the envelope
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test reasonableness checks on some of
00:20:01
those answers
00:20:03
because that will give you far more
00:20:05
confidence and I tell you some people
00:20:07
have better judgment just saying you
00:20:10
know it doesn't smell right and and you
00:20:13
need to do that and so that's the other
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lesson learned and and don't presume
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anything if you think it's important
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make sure that what you thought was
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important got to the right
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people so that's what I wished I would
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have done
