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well good morning and first I would like
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to apologize for not being with you
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today but I would like to share some
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thoughts with you about the future of
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competition policy as you all know there
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have been recent suggestion to reaffirm
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the primacy of politics in public
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decision-making so for example in the
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industrial domain have been proposals to
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be sure those proposals have stopped
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short of calling for return to all style
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ministerial decision making but they may
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put competition authorities on a tight
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leash by either conferring on politician
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the ability to overrule the competition
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authorities decisions or by excluding
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industries of firms from the scope of
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competition policy they may also grant
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broader missions to competition
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authorities like stakeholder protection
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take care of the employment environment
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may be to some industrial policy in
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Europe as you know we have lived through
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the apps aftermath of the Alstom Siemens
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melodrama they were pros of course to
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allow the merger the biggest company in
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China operates in a large and logic
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closed market and there was his worry
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that his Chinese firm will actually
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become dominant in Europe and by the way
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there is this issue about using
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competition policy or industrial policy
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as a second best instrument I mean if
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there is a prime with a storm and
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Siemens access to a Chinese market you
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will expect this to be dealt who the WTO
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dispute resolution mechanism I grant
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that it is very slow but you know you
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will seeing that actually that will be
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the right channel to actually deal with
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this issue and there was all this talk
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about rail bus in quotes by analogy with
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Airbus except that it has a very
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different rationale in the case of
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Airbus that was many about preventing
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Boeing from becoming a monopolist in the
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air manufacturing
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airplane manufacturing now the comm is
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of course that also means Siemens at
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least in the short run will have been
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totally dominant in signaling system and
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I speed rolling stocks in the open
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market I haven't studied in detail my
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gut feeling is that actually the
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Commissioner was right in preventing the
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murderer but again haven't studied that
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in detail what I would like to emphasize
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is my reaction to the french-german
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proposal giving the Member State the
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ability to overhaul the competition
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authority in for mergers or also
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decision and by the way the European
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Union doesn't really block many mergers
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actually very few and in some sort of
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manage probably should block more now
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let me put that into the broader context
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which is a populations disarray and we
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see now in every country the populist
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using narrative to exploit very
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effective narratives to exploit the
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frustration of the electorate that maybe
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about the financial crisis the eurozone
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crisis the rise of unemployment a
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slowdown of economic growth
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declining social status for the middle
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class inequality and so on
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and of course many people fear the
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future they are worried about climate
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change are worried about AI and robots
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actually taking their job and many other
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things maybe debt in some countries and
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unfounded pensions is a concern now
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politicians themself in disarray because
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they react of course to the electorate
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so people dismiss experts they won't
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change they look for someone was a plan
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and of course a political market is
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going to respond to this demand is
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responding to this demand
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now this revisionism as I call it you
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know the idea of you know installing
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back the primary primacy of politics is
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not specific to competition policy
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take central banks for example central
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bank independence is called into
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question in many countries like India
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the u.s. turkey in Europe and to be
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certain there is a fascinating
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facilitating factor central banks after
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2008 had no choice but engaging in
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unconventional money monetary policies
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which has a big financial impact and
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they got closer to the political
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decision-making in that way that's an
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issue and of course politician
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politicians have noticed and it's very
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tempting for that for them to use a
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central bank as a tool of of policy in
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some countries even the judiciary is
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actually its independence is actually
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questioned so what I'm saying is that
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the questioning of competition of
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authority in the parents is actually
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part of a broader movement in favor of
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the primacy of politics the politicians
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other responses are also problematic
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sometimes in some countries they pass it
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back so for example they ask cooperation
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to substitute for government of course
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there is nothing wrong with cooperation
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doing socially responsible investment we
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like that but in essence socially
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responsible investment is really the
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centralized approach and especially it's
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vain Congress for governments who do not
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dare to have any carbon price or very
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low carbon prices to ask businesses to
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to behave as if they were a carbon price
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sugan issue is that governments tend to
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pretend to act when they are not acting
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window-dressing greenwashing we add that
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with cop21 for example which had a lot
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of ambition but very little in terms of
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concrete actions vague promises and in
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the case of a green fund actually a
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collective promise which we know never
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works and now we have a pride
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counterpart to it which is a statement
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in 2019 of the Business Roundtable
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saying we should take into account other
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goals and just
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which is perfectly fine but if again if
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you look at the number of concrete
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actions there are very few now sometimes
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government acts and but when they act
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they may use an a mister approach on
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very complex systems so that's what we
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call in the case of the environment
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command and control it might be in this
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role policy in some countries
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administrative layoff control and so on
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and on principle there is nothing wrong
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with that
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except that all those policies rely on
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the government having information or the
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officials having information that they
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don't have so governments must be
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handled them as design policies which
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fit with a kind of information that
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officials have I think given the the
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recent trend is very important to stress
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rational functions independence and by
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the way independent agencies are never
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independent their mission the principles
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always controlled by the politicians and
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the Parliament can always intervene to
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overturn that the policies and Hall not
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in each and every instance and that's
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actually what we don't want we don't
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want the politicians having a lobby
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pushing behind intervening in a specific
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instance now politics and that's the
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role of politics and you are not blaming
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politicians but they are subject to
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every lobbying they pander to the
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electorate they want to be elected and
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that's why after all we had entre Banky
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independence in the first place we make
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central bank's independent because we
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wanted to tame inflation and later on
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because we wanted to have a tougher
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Prudential supervision West politicians
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are vaguer to be related and that's
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leads to credit booms and inflation same
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thing with regulating telecoms or
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electricity or railroads we have created
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in the independencies
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oh we have put churches in charge so in
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the in in the u.s. there was no
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precision because the utilities public
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utilities actually were private started
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in 1900 but of course it was very
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tempted for a politician to reduce a
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prices so as to be popular but that went
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again to investment by those utilities
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in infrastructure which are very big
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investment so what was done in the US
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was actually to have the church protect
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investments of the utilities against the
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pandering of politicians to the voters
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so that's the first reason about why we
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want to have agency independence as a
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second reason which which is a little
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bit more complicated but it's true that
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agencies often with more expertise just
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think about the number of economic PhDs
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or other PhDs in competition authorities
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they usually have more expertise than
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ministries it doesn't have to be the
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case but it's often the case now that's
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important for another reason I'm going
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to come to an agency a government agency
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must have a sense of mission the
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government is by sense the ultimate
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stakeholder Society that's its role
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there is nothing wrong with that but
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that makes incentives way they are to to
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set up because the mission is multiple
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and possibly fuzzy
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what is this agency trying to accomplish
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which makes it difficult for that the
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act or process to all officials
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accountable for their performance they
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of course issues with information of the
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voters they issue with the understanding
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by the voters but also if you have
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multiple mission what kind of mission
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was the government stressing it's
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difficult now agency in contrast sicán
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and the need to develop a sense of
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mission in my view conglomerate agencies
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don't do that well and actually a
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well-managed agency may actually resist
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being granted new tasks
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because it's going to lose its end of
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mission and then I come back to the idea
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that actually you need professionals and
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experts because those professionals was
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narrow specialists are instrumental in
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creating the sense of mission internally
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and externally at achieving Interpol
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consistency what other people who call
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legal certainty and you know we don't
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know that much about the missions of
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agencies but you know the agency series
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that exists such as that having a clear
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mission having advocates for certain
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causes actually creates a focus and
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accountability which is very much
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missing in the case of of governments
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and again that's not their fault because
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they are the ultimate stakeholder
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society now those missions should not be
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tainted by each and every consideration
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you don't want to pull you it an
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agency's mission through consideration
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that can be dealt with through other
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instruments proper instruments okay it
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may be complex in some cases but you
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know it's very important to realize that
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you you want to have this sense of
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mission and mission should not be
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polluted by other consideration if
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possible so for example inequality is a
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very big issue nowadays but if you start
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putting inequality consideration in
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every public policy choice then you
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completely lose the focus it's much
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better to deal with inequality through
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redistribution through better schools
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who good our system but when you talk
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about global warming sure the poor might
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be hurt by carbon tax but then you
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redistribute you have an energy check or
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something like that and you compensate
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those people so that they don't suffer
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too much but if you don't have a carbon
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price the planet is doomed same thing if
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you think about tobacco taxation lots of
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poor smoke so you might say we should
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not have a tax on tobacco but that's the
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wrong attitude we need a tax on
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to evacuate to discourage smoking and
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then we deal with inequality in other
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ways same thing you don't want to ever
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each and every decision to be based on
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the consequences on unemployment okay
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because again you don't have any sense
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of mission you don't know what you are
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doing anymore you'd rather take care of
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an employment in other ways through
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incentives have been ever advocating
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experience rating for example work you
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know worker protection when they fell
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unemployed but not adding a job
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protection mission in each and every
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public policy and so on and so forth I
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go could go on but you have to keep this
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sense of mission next let me talk a
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little bit about Industrial Policy
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because it's clearly making a comeback
00:14:07
nowadays and just to tell you what I
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mean by industrial policy I've used two
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types of interventions addressing market
00:14:17
failures the first is what I will call
00:14:21
humble interventions or non targeted
00:14:23
policies so the government is not trying
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to choose winners and losers you just
00:14:31
give incentives that's the example of a
00:14:33
carbon price that I was mentioning
00:14:35
earlier you don't presume you could
00:14:38
reduce pollution and we should not be
00:14:41
reducing pollution you just don't know
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you don't bet on a specific technology
00:14:47
for green technologies you just give a
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chance to every possibility and you just
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give a carbon price incentive same thing
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with R&D subsidies you know there are
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big speed over sovereignty so you're
00:15:00
encourage R&D through subsidies but they
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are kind of uniform or explains rating
00:15:05
where you tax firms that lay off the
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workers and you don't have a churchman
00:15:11
about whether this firm should do it or
00:15:13
should not do it industrial policy by
00:15:17
contrast is more ambitious but it's also
00:15:20
more fragile those are policies that are
00:15:23
gated towards specific sectors
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technology or even firms and that
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requires
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information that's going to be our
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challenge now in this world policy has
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good foundations that prose and are
00:15:38
strong arguments in flavor so think for
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example about a cluster a cluster is
00:15:45
going to allow startups in a given
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environment and universities to share
00:15:50
information if you have read Saxon Ian's
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book for example on Silicon Valley the
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sharing of information is very important
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all the stories about Steve Jobs going
00:16:02
to Xerox PARC and noticing all those
00:16:04
discoveries and it's true that much of
00:16:08
what you have on your iPad on your
00:16:09
iPhone actually comes from the research
00:16:12
at Xerox PARC so you share information
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there is some collective learning by
00:16:19
doing and very importantly something
00:16:22
that people often forget is that you
00:16:24
have a local labor market because
00:16:26
startups are meant to fail many startups
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should fail that's part of the dynamics
00:16:33
of the industry there's a risk to be
00:16:35
taken and if it doesn't work you you
00:16:37
should down but that means also that the
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entrepreneur and they're the
00:16:41
collaborators they lose their job and
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it's much nicer of course if they can
00:16:46
find a job locally and of course if
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you're a cluster that's much easier than
00:16:51
if you have only one firm in this
00:16:53
particular town doing this kind of
00:16:55
business then in terms of public R&D as
00:16:58
we have seen in the US for example you
00:17:01
have industry spillovers from public R&D
00:17:04
and of course that's good for the
00:17:05
industry as well and sometimes they also
00:17:07
are reasons I already mentioned the case
00:17:09
of Airbus where the primary reason to
00:17:11
start Airbus was actually to prevent
00:17:14
Boeing from becoming a monopolist and
00:17:17
that's a global public good now why is
00:17:20
that given that they are good reason to
00:17:23
do in the sole policy why is there so
00:17:25
little support from economists as a
00:17:27
whole on average so you can use a old
00:17:31
maxim the steak picks winners the losers
00:17:35
picks a state and in France we have had
00:17:39
lots of examples like this we have
00:17:42
plenty of example
00:17:43
of where this happened but this evidence
00:17:46
somehow is kind of in a total and you
00:17:50
know what should we conclude out of that
00:17:51
it's not very scientific and conversely
00:17:54
the people who are in favor of initial
00:17:56
policy they will they will cite one or
00:17:59
two success stories but that's not
00:18:00
scientific either now why don't they
00:18:05
work sometimes well I told you that
00:18:09
initial policy requires information if
00:18:12
you have an incumbent incompetent and
00:18:14
informed state it's going to choose the
00:18:15
wrong technology the wrong firms and
00:18:20
it's biased to so again in France we
00:18:23
have had lots of examples like that
00:18:24
where the choices in this world choices
00:18:27
which were made we're there to protect
00:18:29
incumbents as opposed to being the right
00:18:32
choices diesel for example is something
00:18:35
we are paying for now
00:18:37
and often boss so you go to - I've been
00:18:42
in those meetings where the minister has
00:18:45
said we need 34:12 industrial plans
00:18:48
priority programs tell us which ones and
00:18:51
of course all the lobbies come in
00:18:54
nobodies inform about anything except is
00:18:56
our specialty and it's just a lobbying
00:19:00
activity with absolutely no information
00:19:02
to assess what should be done but they
00:19:06
are success to success is - so an
00:19:09
interesting role model actually is the
00:19:11
u.s. you will not expect the u.s. to be
00:19:13
a role model for individual policy with
00:19:16
DARPA who is the NIH with NSF and you
00:19:21
know much of what has happened in
00:19:22
information technologies and biotech in
00:19:25
the u.s. whether their leaders actually
00:19:27
come from industrial policy so what is
00:19:31
that that it right in my book economics
00:19:34
for the common good I make eight
00:19:36
recommendation the first is kind of
00:19:38
obvious think about the market failure
00:19:41
we have to know what we are trying to do
00:19:43
and why we are intervening the second is
00:19:46
to use independent independent
00:19:49
high-level experts and you give them a
00:19:52
lot of discretion that's what DARPA has
00:19:54
done it's not easy because you have to
00:19:55
find I love our expert
00:19:57
also independent I by and large you give
00:20:00
them this question and that's also the
00:20:02
way peer reviewed panels work the third
00:20:06
recommendation is to look at both supply
00:20:09
and demand you often have a demand which
00:20:12
is legitimate
00:20:13
so municipality or region wants to have
00:20:17
a cluster in cancer in biotech or in
00:20:21
green energies but they rarely ask
00:20:24
whether they have what it takes to make
00:20:27
it happen so do I have the scientists
00:20:30
who are going to bring students we're
00:20:32
going to start startups and is it going
00:20:35
to happen it's not because you have a
00:20:37
building and and money that you'll be
00:20:40
successful that's what I call the field
00:20:43
of dream mentality the field of dream
00:20:45
mentality comes from this movie in which
00:20:48
giving Costner was playing and you know
00:20:51
voice saying that if he builds a
00:20:53
baseball field then the players will
00:20:56
come now in the middle of Iowa now in
00:21:00
the movie
00:21:01
Shoeless Joe Jackson comes of course and
00:21:03
the others come but in the real world
00:21:05
they don't so you need to have the
00:21:08
players who are going to make it happen
00:21:10
then you recommend a mesh recommendation
00:21:14
or before you adopt a competitively
00:21:15
neutral policy five you don't preach
00:21:19
Church a solution you set an objective
00:21:21
the Appa was also very good at doing
00:21:24
that you don't decide which green
00:21:27
technology is going to win six is
00:21:31
obvious but rarely done you a varied
00:21:33
programs exposed and when they don't
00:21:36
work you stop them it's very important
00:21:39
also to redistribute the money to more
00:21:42
successful on top taking so you have to
00:21:45
stop there is no shame in stopping you
00:21:50
involve the price sector in which taking
00:21:52
so as to avoid what elephant and since
00:21:54
I'm a lobby you strengthen universities
00:21:56
but I'm serious here too because if you
00:21:58
have strong universities you can also
00:22:01
have startups around those universities
00:22:04
so let me conclude with a few notes
00:22:05
about improving antitrust this is not
00:22:09
easy I'm not going to give you
00:22:11
deep inside we don't need new laws we
00:22:16
need more guidance so take an example
00:22:19
which is common ownership by
00:22:21
institutional investors as you all know
00:22:24
in the u.s. in particular Blackrock and
00:22:28
State Street and many others actually
00:22:32
are owning all the firms in an oligopoly
00:22:35
in the airline business in the banking
00:22:37
business and so on and of course there
00:22:39
is danger that because they are active
00:22:42
investors they actually intervene in
00:22:44
Garland's to prevent firms competing on
00:22:48
each other's territories or they they're
00:22:50
going to use absolute performance
00:22:52
evaluation instead of colleges balanced
00:22:54
evaluation which is conducive to more
00:22:56
competition and so on and so forth it's
00:22:59
called a cartel we already have the laws
00:23:03
starting with a harmonic starting with
00:23:06
section 7 of the Clayton Act we don't
00:23:11
need new laws what we need is guidelines
00:23:13
because Blackrock and fidelity and all
00:23:17
those institutional investors have to
00:23:19
know what they can do and cannot do they
00:23:21
want to diversify and that's why also
00:23:23
they buy shares in many firms or
00:23:26
securities in many fronts wont charlie
00:23:30
so one possibility is you tell them you
00:23:33
have to be passive that's no good
00:23:35
because precisely you count on them to
00:23:39
be active in governance and monitored
00:23:42
monitor management you can use legal
00:23:45
challenges but it's complicated because
00:23:47
whether you do guilty of being in a
00:23:49
cartel depends on what the other people
00:23:51
do as well like other investors too so
00:23:54
it's it's very hard to do
00:23:56
maybe impose some limits on
00:23:58
diversification so for example some have
00:23:59
proposed - you can invest on in one firm
00:24:02
car industry you lose a little bit in
00:24:04
terms of diversification but not that
00:24:06
much whatever what we need has an
00:24:10
economics profession is actually to
00:24:12
design better guidelines to help those
00:24:14
firms actually be active investor in the
00:24:17
industry without violating antitrust so
00:24:21
on example best price guarantee so M
00:24:24
offense
00:24:24
and most favored nation closes now we
00:24:27
all know now after a few years of
00:24:29
research that best price guarantees have
00:24:33
the potential to be anti-competitive so
00:24:36
they're love platforms to tax their
00:24:38
competitors through a single price of
00:24:40
fees pass through not only to the
00:24:43
customers of a platform but also to to
00:24:47
the customer for other platforms or
00:24:49
direct customer of of the hotels or the
00:24:51
Airlines and so on so we don't like best
00:24:54
price guarantees at the same time we
00:24:57
must recognize that they also have
00:24:59
virtues so for example there's what's
00:25:03
called showrooming you don't want me to
00:25:07
go to booking.com and find the hotel I
00:25:10
want and then because it's a little bit
00:25:12
cheaper on the hotel website then leave
00:25:15
booking.com and actually go to the hotel
00:25:19
website because then i expropriate
00:25:21
booking.com from its investment there
00:25:24
also that's when you have low search
00:25:26
across its lazy for me to switch
00:25:29
conversely if when you have a I search
00:25:30
costs most favored nation causes also
00:25:34
prevents our charging we have seen that
00:25:36
in credit cards so we need better
00:25:40
guidelines so so far what we have done
00:25:42
is structural interventions in France
00:25:45
and Germany in the UK in Sweden in
00:25:48
Europe more generally we have private in
00:25:51
narrow or broad M offense it's just a
00:25:56
rough policy in principle we would like
00:25:58
to set price gap it would be more
00:26:00
efficient but we don't have the
00:26:03
guidelines for that partly because
00:26:06
academics is lagging behind now in the
00:26:09
case of payment card in the Euro we
00:26:11
found a rule which is called a tourist
00:26:13
test which basically kept them the
00:26:15
merchants fee at the merchants
00:26:19
convenience benefit but that's only one
00:26:21
particular industry in which we are
00:26:24
found a way of dealing with a non
00:26:26
structural intervention example three
00:26:29
preemptive mergers so something we are
00:26:32
very worried about right now is
00:26:36
incumbents buying up all the
00:26:38
startups which in turn may actually lead
00:26:45
to entry for buyouts so basically the
00:26:47
startup and purchase to blackmail in
00:26:49
combat by me otherwise I will compete
00:26:52
and this is really something that
00:26:55
doesn't create social value so there's
00:27:00
been potential suppression of price
00:27:02
competition for example in the case of
00:27:04
the purchase of Instagram and whatsapp
00:27:05
by Facebook sometimes the product itself
00:27:09
may even be surprised so the that's
00:27:12
called a killer acquisition there is
00:27:13
some evidence of that in the
00:27:15
pharmaceutical industry and that
00:27:19
obviously is something that is
00:27:21
anti-competitive another cost of that is
00:27:25
that it directs innovation to what me to
00:27:28
innovation so me two innovations are
00:27:31
really can be quite profitable because
00:27:35
you are purchased by the incumbent and
00:27:37
you know you make money out of that
00:27:39
without creating social value
00:27:41
now-now-now it's impossible actually to
00:27:45
challenge such mergers because there is
00:27:46
no evidence Instagram and whatsapp had
00:27:49
already sold anything they were not
00:27:51
quite doing the same thing as Facebook
00:27:53
same thing some some of those drugs or
00:27:57
molecules actually haven't been tested
00:28:00
yet they may not have even gone through
00:28:02
the FDA approval process so any
00:28:05
competition just cannot tell whether
00:28:07
it's an anti-competitive merger so the
00:28:09
proposal which i think is really is
00:28:11
reasonable but has its own dangers is to
00:28:15
shift the burden of proof in that kind
00:28:17
of merger to incumbents so whenever you
00:28:21
have an incumbent buying someone with
00:28:23
actually doing something similar
00:28:26
early in the process so that you cannot
00:28:28
have any evidence of anti-competitive
00:28:30
behavior then it's up to the incumbent
00:28:34
actually to prove that's a good merger
00:28:35
but that requires a fair amount of trust
00:28:38
in the antitrust authorities but I don't
00:28:40
see any other way around so that will be
00:28:44
shifting the burden of proof to the main
00:28:47
firms early in the product life cycle we
00:28:49
may want to improve process
00:28:52
we all know the drawbacks of standard
00:28:55
approaches self-regulation is of course
00:28:59
self-serving competition policy is too
00:29:03
slow too late
00:29:04
utility regulation is mostly infeasible
00:29:07
for the tech industry because those
00:29:11
firms are global so they cannot be
00:29:14
regulated by a single regulator because
00:29:16
you don't follow them along the
00:29:18
lifecycle so it's completely different
00:29:21
you cannot just supply public utility
00:29:22
regulation to the big tech companies the
00:29:26
way we have done it for telecom
00:29:28
railroads or electricity companies and
00:29:30
then individual policy of course which
00:29:33
I've discussed at length so what we may
00:29:36
want to try to to achieve is some kind
00:29:38
of participative antitrust where the
00:29:42
industry and experts I should have added
00:29:44
expert here actually make proposal to
00:29:46
the competition authority and the
00:29:48
competition Authority reacts through
00:29:51
Business Review Letters evolving
00:29:53
guidelines rules but for that of course
00:29:56
the competition policy must admit that
00:29:58
it may be wrong so you know it is my gut
00:30:01
feeling is what I think at the T but at
00:30:04
the tip less then I'm an octopus wanna
00:30:07
may I make a change my mind that gives
00:30:11
more flexibility that minimizes legal
00:30:13
runs and seventy and you use industries
00:30:17
information and IDs but of course in an
00:30:20
independent way my favorite case of that
00:30:23
is pattern pools
00:30:24
I mean the work that do tree in the US
00:30:26
has done on pattern pools and then other
00:30:29
agencies as well is remarkable because
00:30:32
we know that pattern pool has a huge
00:30:35
potential actually be pro competitive
00:30:37
and reduce price but there can also be
00:30:38
anti-competitive and this competition
00:30:41
within the IP owner industry can be
00:30:46
dangerous so the idea of the DOJ which
00:30:49
which has been improved since is
00:30:50
basically say okay that's fine but you
00:30:53
do XY and Z and then that becomes
00:30:56
guidelines so that's a very good example
00:30:59
of what I think is a good policy let me
00:31:02
give you another example collective knee
00:31:04
goes
00:31:05
creation in mobile payments what had
00:31:08
providers they control the near-field
00:31:11
control so there are kind of bottleneck
00:31:14
and the card issuer in that case has
00:31:18
very little bargaining power
00:31:20
maybe the platform develops a reputation
00:31:22
for not negotiating
00:31:24
maybe this column will retry oming or
00:31:27
whatnot so the solution which has been
00:31:30
implemented in Canada or China is
00:31:33
basically collective negotiation it
00:31:36
makes sense but you I'm sure everybody
00:31:38
in the room feels uneasy about that why
00:31:41
because there is a possibility of
00:31:45
anti-competitive boycott which is of
00:31:47
course prohibited by section 1 of the
00:31:50
Sherman Act or article 101 in Europe the
00:31:53
process therefore must be approve and
00:31:56
supervise it just like for patent pools
00:31:58
it can be dangerous
00:32:00
but it can be also very useful
00:32:02
regulatory sandbox is another example
00:32:05
where we try thing we learn by doing I
00:32:07
think we have to be humble and this
00:32:11
approach I think is a better approach
00:32:12
but the of course it requires a lot of
00:32:15
trust in the expertise and the
00:32:17
independence of antitrust authorities so
00:32:20
let me conclude here and with a couple
00:32:22
of take-home points competition policy
00:32:26
independence is worth fighting for it
00:32:30
has to be earned and we have to improve
00:32:33
we the antitrust practitioners the
00:32:36
academics everyone has to try to
00:32:38
contribute to improve the economic
00:32:41
foundation and the procedures as for
00:32:45
individual policy it can be considered
00:32:46
there is nothing wrong theoretically
00:32:48
with that but if you want to do it you
00:32:51
must respect due process and this due
00:32:54
process by the way may require
00:32:56
independence thank you very much for
00:32:59
your attention I wish you a very very
00:33:02
productive conference thank you
