00:00:00
okay so in this video i'm going to talk
00:00:02
about three very important theorem about
00:00:05
what rising equilibrium
00:00:06
the first one is called uh first
00:00:08
fundamental theorem of welfare economics
00:00:11
the second one is the existence of
00:00:14
walrus in equilibrium and then the third
00:00:16
one is called the second fundamental
00:00:19
theorem of welfare economics so let's
00:00:21
start with the first one
00:00:23
its statement is actually very basic
00:00:26
and it requires a very mild assumption
00:00:28
so here it goes if each
00:00:31
consumer's utility function ui is
00:00:34
strictly increasing well then every
00:00:37
walrus in equilibrium allocation is
00:00:40
pretty efficient so here strictly
00:00:43
increasing utility function for every
00:00:45
consumer is key
00:00:47
however it's a mild assumption in the
00:00:49
sense that almost all the examples we
00:00:51
work in this course are having
00:00:54
increasing utility function and strictly
00:00:56
increasing utility function which by the
00:00:58
way basically says the more agents
00:01:00
consume the higher utility they should
00:01:02
be getting so if this assumption is true
00:01:05
then the walrasian equilibrium
00:01:07
allocation is pretty efficient
00:01:09
meaning if we just let these agents
00:01:12
trade with each other as freely as they
00:01:14
like
00:01:16
nobody needs to intervene to this market
00:01:18
because eventually they're going to
00:01:20
reach to an walrasian equilibrium
00:01:22
outcome which is pretty efficient and so
00:01:25
there's going to be no inefficiency let
00:01:27
them trade obviously in real life in the
00:01:30
markets there are a bunch of other
00:01:31
inefficiencies not but because not
00:01:33
because of the utility functions are not
00:01:36
not increasing but you know there's
00:01:38
informational asymmetry and and bunch of
00:01:41
other complications so in a simple world
00:01:45
uh we do have uh this very nice property
00:01:49
well
00:01:50
the question is before jumping to the
00:01:52
second fundamental theorem of welfare
00:01:54
economics the question is obviously uh i
00:01:58
mean are we sure that every economy has
00:02:02
a walrus in equilibrium i mean maybe in
00:02:05
some economies there isn't any while
00:02:07
rising equilibrium outcome
00:02:10
so the existence so when can we sure
00:02:14
that a while rising equilibrium outcome
00:02:16
exists this is a very important theorem
00:02:18
especially if you're solving a numerical
00:02:20
example you may actually end up a an
00:02:24
outcome a solution where you can't come
00:02:27
up with a price while resident
00:02:28
equilibrium price where the markets are
00:02:32
clear
00:02:34
so you may wonder am i doing something
00:02:36
wrong mathematically algebraically or is
00:02:39
this because there is no wall resin
00:02:41
equilibrium in this market well it may
00:02:43
be the the the
00:02:44
not the former but the latter all right
00:02:46
so the walrus in equilibrium outcome may
00:02:49
not even exist well for this we need
00:02:51
assumptions so if
00:02:54
every utility fund not every youtube
00:02:57
every consumer
00:02:59
has a continuous utility function
00:03:04
increasing strictly increasing utility
00:03:07
function and that's not enough concave
00:03:11
uh utility strictly concave utility
00:03:13
function all right
00:03:15
and then
00:03:17
each individual has an endowment
00:03:21
which is strictly positive meaning for
00:03:24
every good that is available in this
00:03:26
market each agent has a positive
00:03:29
endowment
00:03:31
uh well then by the way i'm giving this
00:03:34
theorem for the case
00:03:36
of no production when we have production
00:03:39
we have to make
00:03:41
further assumptions about the technology
00:03:44
of the firms or the production
00:03:45
possibility set so i'm going to ignore
00:03:48
that because those assumptions are
00:03:50
slightly bit complicated and requires
00:03:52
additional assumption
00:03:53
notations
00:03:55
so i'm going to skip that
00:03:57
but
00:03:58
just for um
00:04:00
economies where there's no production
00:04:03
or
00:04:04
assuming that the firm's production
00:04:06
functions are nice code encode nice
00:04:08
behaving so if the utility functions are
00:04:11
continuous increasing and concave well
00:04:13
then you know what and if the initial
00:04:16
endowments are positive well then we
00:04:18
will certainly have
00:04:20
a while rising equilibrium outcome
00:04:22
otherwise if one of those assumptions
00:04:24
fail to hold and in fact i am planning
00:04:27
to talk about some examples where
00:04:29
initial endowments are zero uh although
00:04:33
preferences are continued utilities are
00:04:35
continuous increasing and concave we may
00:04:36
fail to reach
00:04:38
a while rising equilibrium outcome or we
00:04:41
may have for example non-concave utility
00:04:44
function and even though the other
00:04:45
assumptions hold we may not get uh while
00:04:48
rising equilibrium outcomes so those
00:04:50
examples are coming up
00:04:53
now the so we we
00:04:55
we know that uh while there's an
00:04:57
equilibrium
00:04:59
outcome may exist under certain
00:05:01
assumptions
00:05:03
well the second fundamental theorem of
00:05:05
welfare economics is basically about
00:05:08
what we discussed in the first welfare
00:05:10
theorem in the first welfare theorem
00:05:12
remember if uh utility functions are
00:05:15
continuous fine well then any walrus in
00:05:18
equilibrium is pretty efficient there's
00:05:20
no inefficiency but can i say any
00:05:22
predator efficient allocation is a valve
00:05:25
rising equilibrium outcome for some
00:05:26
price ratio can i say something like
00:05:29
this uh well
00:05:31
in a sense uh this is the uh the second
00:05:35
welfare theorem of welfare economics uh
00:05:38
uh says this can be true this the the
00:05:41
inverse of this statement or the
00:05:43
converse of this state converse the
00:05:45
inverse of this statement can be true
00:05:47
under a a stronger set of assumptions
00:05:50
so suppose that each consumer has oh by
00:05:53
the way again i'm giving the second
00:05:55
fundamental theorem of welfare economics
00:05:58
for economies without production because
00:06:00
if we have production we need further
00:06:02
assumptions about the production
00:06:05
possibility sets or the production
00:06:07
functions or technologies so let's leave
00:06:09
production aside so suppose that each
00:06:12
consumer has strictly increasing concave
00:06:16
and continuous utility function
00:06:18
and every consumer has strictly positive
00:06:21
endowments wi for every good
00:06:24
well if the initial endowments wi uh
00:06:29
if the initial endowments are pretty
00:06:31
efficient so this is an allocation right
00:06:34
if it is predator efficient well then
00:06:36
there exists some price vector p
00:06:41
such that p and w p is the price vector
00:06:44
price of good 1 good 2 good 3 etc and w
00:06:47
is the
00:06:48
initial endowment for each consumer for
00:06:52
each good so this
00:06:54
uh uh uh you know allocation and and
00:06:59
price and
00:07:00
an initial endowment is a wall rosin
00:07:03
equilibrium of this exchange economy all
00:07:06
right so if the endowments are uh pretty
00:07:10
efficient well yes we can actually find
00:07:13
some price ratio so that or the price
00:07:16
vector so that this initial endowment is
00:07:20
a well-rounded equilibrium of this
00:07:22
economy
00:07:23
if all these assumptions hold which is
00:07:26
important again in order to guarantee
00:07:29
that while well rosin equilibrium does
00:07:31
exist all right um so that's it
00:07:35
okay so
00:07:37
i have now two examples
00:07:40
um and in in both of these examples the
00:07:43
assumptions
00:07:45
uh that i
00:07:46
underlined for the existence of walrus
00:07:49
in equilibrium
00:07:51
i mean at least one of the assumptions
00:07:54
failed to hold fails to hold so here in
00:07:57
the first example
00:07:59
uh the utility functions are increasing
00:08:01
the utility functions are continuous but
00:08:04
they're not concave i mean the utility
00:08:06
function of the agent b is in fact
00:08:09
a convex
00:08:10
all right the endowments are are are
00:08:13
strictly positive but uh we we fail the
00:08:16
assumptions of concavity fails to hold
00:08:19
in the second and i'm going to show that
00:08:21
there is no
00:08:23
walrasian equilibrium in this example
00:08:26
okay here
00:08:28
we have again increasing utility
00:08:30
functions strictly increasing oh i'm
00:08:32
sorry it is not strictly increasing all
00:08:35
right so here the agent a's utility
00:08:37
function increases with x but it's the
00:08:40
it doesn't increase with y all right uh
00:08:43
so the uh the agent b's utility function
00:08:46
however is increasing um and concave
00:08:49
however these are also not really
00:08:51
strictly concave
00:08:54
nevertheless here the key thing
00:08:56
that is going to uh fail the existence
00:08:59
of walrus in equilibrium is that the
00:09:01
initial endowments are not strictly
00:09:03
positive so agent a has zero endowment
00:09:06
for the second good agent b has the zero
00:09:08
endowment for the first good well in our
00:09:11
previous example
00:09:13
the initial endowments were not strictly
00:09:15
positive but we had a walrus in
00:09:17
equilibrium well yes that was by chance
00:09:20
all right so don't forget when i say
00:09:23
if the assumptions like concavity
00:09:26
strictly increasing uh utility functions
00:09:29
and
00:09:30
uh concave strictly increasing what else
00:09:35
continuous and then positive endowments
00:09:38
well then we
00:09:40
definitely we sure have uh
00:09:43
we surely have a while rising
00:09:45
equilibrium if any one of those
00:09:48
assumptions fail we may or may not have
00:09:52
a while rising equilibrium all right so
00:09:53
these are two examples where we don't
00:09:56
have a well risen equilibrium so let's
00:09:58
show this i mean
00:10:00
these are also good exercises to check
00:10:03
how we calculate the walrasian
00:10:06
equilibrium well
00:10:08
there's no production by the way in both
00:10:10
of those examples
00:10:12
well how do i start well simple remember
00:10:15
the
00:10:16
consumer's problem is maximize utility
00:10:19
subject to budget constraint which is
00:10:21
xpx
00:10:22
ypy equals the income which is basically
00:10:26
uh one and one for each good so i'm
00:10:28
going to write px plus py therefore okay
00:10:32
well so here
00:10:34
these are not differentiable utility
00:10:36
functions so marginal rate of
00:10:37
substitution equals price ratio negative
00:10:39
price ratio is not going to help me but
00:10:42
what i know is because this is
00:10:44
uh the min function remember our
00:10:47
uh utility maximization lecture videos
00:10:51
so if you don't remember please go back
00:10:53
to those videos and and and and and we
00:10:56
sort of refresh your mind how we
00:10:59
calculate the optimal demands
00:11:01
for those utility functions so whenever
00:11:03
you have a minimum of two things well
00:11:05
the optimal allocation will always
00:11:07
satisfy the first term equal the second
00:11:09
term
00:11:10
so therefore agent a is going to consume
00:11:13
equal amount of good x and good y
00:11:16
all right so once i plug this to his uh
00:11:19
budget constraint that basically means 2
00:11:22
x a p x right y p y is going to be oh
00:11:25
i'm sorry
00:11:26
that's my
00:11:29
mistake so this is x p x plus
00:11:32
y is equal to x p y so in x a
00:11:36
parenthesis i must have p x plus p y
00:11:39
equals p x plus p y so therefore x a is
00:11:43
equal to one and because y a is equal to
00:11:46
x a it is also equal to one so the
00:11:49
consumer a is actually uh
00:11:53
does not want to trade any good all
00:11:56
right
00:11:57
well what about
00:11:58
agent b same problem maximize utility
00:12:01
subject to budget constraint
00:12:03
because he also has the same initial
00:12:05
endowments his income is also the same
00:12:09
well here however when you have a max
00:12:12
utility function remember
00:12:15
for good x for good y i'm dropping in
00:12:17
different squares the indifference
00:12:19
curves like min
00:12:21
x y
00:12:23
are always going to move along the 45
00:12:26
degree line they're going to have kink
00:12:28
points there and as they move in this
00:12:30
direction it means higher indifference
00:12:32
curve when it is however max of x y
00:12:36
well this time those curves will
00:12:39
flipped
00:12:40
okay meaning when i have
00:12:43
max
00:12:44
x y
00:12:45
again those indifference curves are
00:12:46
going to move along 45 degree line but
00:12:49
the indifference curve are going to move
00:12:51
in this fashion and so as we move to the
00:12:54
north east direction it it means higher
00:12:57
indifference curve but it is convex
00:13:02
for that reason so when we have an
00:13:04
optimal uh i'm sorry when we have a
00:13:07
budget constraint well the optimal is
00:13:10
not going to be the king point because
00:13:12
for example if this is my budget line
00:13:15
this king point is no longer optimal
00:13:18
because
00:13:19
higher indifference occurs can be
00:13:21
attained by consuming uh the boundaries
00:13:25
well
00:13:27
if the graph is confusing you forget
00:13:30
about it look at the utility function
00:13:32
it's a maximum of x and y
00:13:34
it basically tells me just consume on
00:13:37
one good uh consuming the other good is
00:13:39
not gonna bring you any utility as long
00:13:41
as you consume x more than one so spend
00:13:44
your entire money on just one specific
00:13:47
good well obviously if the price of good
00:13:49
x and good y are different than one you
00:13:52
will invest answer not in that you will
00:13:54
consume
00:13:55
only the cheaper good if px is less than
00:13:59
py you're gonna spend your entire income
00:14:01
on good x
00:14:03
okay so
00:14:06
therefore
00:14:07
the demand is bit tricky here
00:14:11
x
00:14:12
b
00:14:14
equals
00:14:15
zero
00:14:17
and yb equals your entire income which
00:14:21
is p x plus p y
00:14:24
divided by you know this is the price of
00:14:26
good good y
00:14:28
uh if however px is uh greater than py
00:14:32
so good y is cheaper so in that case
00:14:36
this should be the optimal demand
00:14:38
however oops
00:14:40
xb you're gonna spend your entire income
00:14:43
i mean
00:14:45
revenue that you can generate by selling
00:14:48
your endowment on good x
00:14:51
and consumes oops
00:14:54
zero good y if
00:14:56
price of good y is higher than price of
00:14:58
good x if they're equal well both of
00:15:01
them either one of these two are
00:15:03
equilibrium all right so if you like you
00:15:05
can put greater than or equal to
00:15:08
so if if px and py are equal this one is
00:15:11
equilibrium optimal this one is also
00:15:13
optimal all right when i say either one
00:15:16
of them i mean both of them are optimal
00:15:19
um so what does that mean uh that means
00:15:22
the following
00:15:23
so
00:15:25
here i want to uh so i found the demands
00:15:28
optimal demands right so the optimal
00:15:30
demands let's
00:15:32
uh generate the uh market demand
00:15:36
market demand
00:15:38
for good x and then market demand
00:15:45
for
00:15:47
good y
00:15:48
well for remember the market demand for
00:15:51
good x depends on the price ratio
00:15:53
because consumer b's uh demand depends
00:15:57
on the price ratio so for that reason
00:16:00
i'm going to have a market demand for
00:16:02
good x if p x is greater than or equal
00:16:05
to p y
00:16:06
um and otherwise okay same here if px is
00:16:11
greater than or equal to py and
00:16:13
otherwise so if px is greater than or
00:16:16
equal to py
00:16:17
the demand for good x for agent b is
00:16:21
zero agent a however is always one so
00:16:24
the total demand for good x is one
00:16:27
otherwise i mean if the price of good y
00:16:30
is higher than p x well the the the
00:16:32
agent uh uh agent one still agent a i'm
00:16:36
sorry still demands one all right
00:16:39
agent b however demands this much p x
00:16:42
plus p y divided by p x
00:16:46
now the market demand for good y similar
00:16:48
reasoning if the price of good x is
00:16:50
higher than price of good y uh well
00:16:54
remember a always wants to demand one
00:16:58
the question is what's the demand for
00:17:00
agent b
00:17:01
agent b's demand here in this case is
00:17:04
going to be p x plus p y over p y and
00:17:07
here it's going to be zero all right so
00:17:10
these are the market demands
00:17:12
all right now the final step
00:17:15
the
00:17:16
market clearing conditions i mean the
00:17:19
market demand for good x must be equal
00:17:21
to market supply for good x
00:17:24
and at the same time market demand for
00:17:26
good y must be equal to market supply
00:17:28
for good y
00:17:30
market supply for good x is one plus one
00:17:34
two because each agent has one unit of
00:17:36
good x same for good one
00:17:39
so therefore
00:17:41
uh market clearing
00:17:44
clearing
00:17:46
uh for good x
00:17:49
well here you go
00:17:51
uh
00:17:51
demand is one
00:17:55
and the supply is two
00:17:58
if px is greater than or equal to py
00:18:01
right i mean don't forget the demand is
00:18:03
one only if this is the price
00:18:05
uh well clearly one is not equal to two
00:18:07
so therefore if we have a wall rods in
00:18:09
equilibrium price
00:18:11
should not be greater than price of good
00:18:13
x should not be greater than price of
00:18:15
good y all right otherwise
00:18:18
uh we have a demand one
00:18:21
plus
00:18:22
p x plus p y over p x
00:18:25
and has to be equal to two all right so
00:18:27
let's work with this uh what does that
00:18:29
mean that means
00:18:31
uh
00:18:32
px plus py over px equals 1. i should
00:18:36
just send this one to the other side i
00:18:38
do the cross product p x plus p y equals
00:18:42
p x
00:18:43
uh well p x's will cancel out p y is
00:18:46
equal to zero
00:18:47
okay look if p y is zero
00:18:52
okay what's going to happen
00:18:54
uh well yes
00:18:57
p y is zero and p x
00:19:00
uh well remember p x has to be i mean if
00:19:03
p x is greater than p y the market
00:19:05
doesn't clear so the p x must be less
00:19:08
than or equal to py prices can never be
00:19:12
negative i mean forget about negative
00:19:14
prices okay so therefore px should also
00:19:17
be zero so zero price good x zero price
00:19:20
for good y
00:19:21
in this case the market demand is going
00:19:24
to be i'm sorry the market for good x is
00:19:27
going to be clear
00:19:29
uh not really if px is zero if py is
00:19:32
zero well then this is infinite i mean
00:19:35
uh consumer b is going to demand
00:19:39
infinite amount very large i mean
00:19:41
infinite amount of good x and so
00:19:44
therefore market will not clear all
00:19:46
right so again p y equals zero implies p
00:19:50
x is also zero because uh remember we
00:19:53
are in the otherwise condition meaning p
00:19:56
x has to be less than or equal to p y
00:19:58
and so if p y is zero p x must also be
00:20:01
zero it can't be negative but if p x is
00:20:03
zero well then the demand for good x is
00:20:06
going to be infinite not for consumer a
00:20:08
he's going to demand one only but for uh
00:20:11
consumer b so as a result of this
00:20:14
the demand i'm sorry the market for good
00:20:16
x will never clear
00:20:19
well
00:20:20
uh should i look at market for good y
00:20:23
and its clearance no because remember
00:20:25
while rising equilibrium says
00:20:28
there must exist a price ratio p x p y
00:20:31
or a price vector p x p y in so that uh
00:20:35
both
00:20:36
uh market for good x and good y uh sh
00:20:39
will clear
00:20:40
however we can't find a price
00:20:43
where the market for the market for good
00:20:46
x will clear hence
00:20:51
no
00:20:52
uh walrus in equilibrium while russian
00:20:55
equilibrium
00:20:57
if these are the utility functions all
00:20:59
right
00:21:00
now very quickly uh look at the second
00:21:02
example where we don't have strictly
00:21:05
positive
00:21:07
uh initial endowments
00:21:09
uh well what is the optimal demand for
00:21:12
agent a and b once again
00:21:15
we have the maximize utility subject to
00:21:18
budget constraint here it is xpx plus
00:21:22
ypy so i'm talking about agent a so his
00:21:26
endowment is 10 and 0 so it's 10 times
00:21:29
px plus 0 times py so i ignore that
00:21:33
well
00:21:34
for agent b however his problem is
00:21:37
maximize utility subject to
00:21:40
xb px plus x oops y b
00:21:44
p y equals 0 times p x times 10 plus 10
00:21:49
times p y all right well how do i solve
00:21:52
the maximization problem for agent a
00:21:55
well don't don't try to take any
00:21:58
derivative or anything because you know
00:22:00
it's it's very simple
00:22:01
this guy doesn't care about good y so he
00:22:05
should not spend any money on good y so
00:22:08
therefore the optimal
00:22:10
uh why this agent is going to consume is
00:22:13
zero and so he's going to spend his
00:22:15
entire money on good x well what is his
00:22:18
entire money is 10 times px what is the
00:22:22
price per good x it's px so therefore
00:22:25
he's going to consume 10 units of good
00:22:27
eye a good x meaning he's not going to
00:22:30
uh and he's not willing to make any
00:22:32
trade okay
00:22:35
uh well but the same thing in the
00:22:38
previous example the agent wasn't
00:22:40
willing to uh sort of uh trade and move
00:22:44
somewhere other than his initial
00:22:46
endowment because of this we couldn't
00:22:49
find a well rising equilibrium price all
00:22:51
right so that's kind of a key
00:22:53
dynamic here well what about agent b on
00:22:56
the other hand well for agent b
00:22:59
it's simple marginal rate of
00:23:01
substitution this is perfectly
00:23:02
differentiable concave
00:23:05
utility function so i can use mrs
00:23:08
because the solution will always be
00:23:10
interior how do i know that again go
00:23:12
back to the utility maximization
00:23:14
lecture videos i already worked on this
00:23:18
type of utility functions
00:23:20
all right so the marginal rate of
00:23:21
substitution for agent b must be equal
00:23:23
to the negative price ratio what is uh
00:23:26
his marginal rate of substitution it's
00:23:29
minus marginal utility with respect to
00:23:31
good x which is
00:23:33
uh
00:23:34
x to the power minus one half divided by
00:23:37
just one uh marginal utility with
00:23:40
respect to good y which is equal to
00:23:42
minus px over py the minus terms will
00:23:45
cancel out
00:23:46
uh so this is basically equivalent to
00:23:49
saying
00:23:50
um
00:23:51
1 over 2 squared of x equals p x over p
00:23:55
y alright so therefore x is equal to
00:23:59
p y squared over 4 p x squared this is
00:24:03
what x is well what about y
00:24:07
well simple here we don't have any
00:24:09
relationship between x and y
00:24:11
that's okay but we didn't use his budget
00:24:14
constraint right so let's use his budget
00:24:16
constraint this is xb by the way let me
00:24:19
put it now
00:24:20
xb is this guy so py
00:24:23
square divided by
00:24:25
4px squared times px so 4px
00:24:29
plus
00:24:30
y b
00:24:32
p y must be equal to 10 p y right so
00:24:35
therefore y b is equal to
00:24:38
uh equal to
00:24:40
10 p y minus this term p y squared
00:24:43
divided by 4 p x and everything is
00:24:46
divided by py
00:24:49
which basically means
00:24:51
10 minus py divided by 4px so this is
00:24:54
how much
00:24:56
agent b is going to demand for good y so
00:25:00
market clearance condition market
00:25:05
clearance
00:25:07
uh four good x
00:25:10
and then i will also do the same thing
00:25:12
for good y if i can't reach a
00:25:13
contradiction here
00:25:15
well good x
00:25:17
agent a
00:25:18
is going to demand 10 units of good x
00:25:21
and agent b is going to demand this much
00:25:24
p y squared divided by 4 p x squared
00:25:29
so this is the market demand what is the
00:25:31
market supply
00:25:33
for good x uh it's 10 coming from the
00:25:35
first individual zero coming from the
00:25:37
second individual so 10.
00:25:40
so that means
00:25:42
uh p y square over four oops p x square
00:25:47
is equal to zero once again uh i can't
00:25:50
have this
00:25:52
i cannot have
00:25:54
p x p y positive
00:25:57
and satisfy this equality right if
00:26:00
they're positive this should be positive
00:26:02
number cannot be zero for this to be uh
00:26:06
zero well p y must be zero right
00:26:11
so
00:26:12
this
00:26:14
condition can hold
00:26:16
only if and only if price of good y is
00:26:19
zero yes we are looking for
00:26:22
positive prices but let's suppose py
00:26:26
equals zero is a well-roused in
00:26:28
equilibrium uh can it be well it can't
00:26:32
be i mean if you plug this py here
00:26:36
you're gonna see the market for
00:26:38
good x will clear the market for good y
00:26:41
will clear and so it must be while
00:26:43
rising equilibrium but there's a huge
00:26:45
mistake you're making you cannot plug
00:26:48
this py into those demand curves why
00:26:51
well because remember when i was doing
00:26:53
all this calculation right i divided
00:26:56
both sides by py for example to get yb
00:27:00
and when i did this i assumed that py is
00:27:04
zero because you cannot divide some
00:27:07
number by zero and say this is you see
00:27:10
what i mean so you can do this division
00:27:12
you can you can divide both sides by py
00:27:17
and the equality doesn't change only if
00:27:20
only if p y is non-zero positive
00:27:24
negative doesn't matter but it must be
00:27:27
non-zero okay so that was an assumption
00:27:31
so when you say of if we're looking for
00:27:34
a walrus in equilibrium it must be zero
00:27:37
but can it really be zero i mean can it
00:27:39
really be well right in equilibrium it
00:27:40
can't be another way of saying uh seeing
00:27:43
this is if the price of good y is zero
00:27:47
look at the agent b's i mean agent a yes
00:27:49
he doesn't care i mean uh because he
00:27:52
doesn't care about good y but agent b he
00:27:55
values good y and as he consumes more
00:27:58
good y
00:27:59
right he is going to willing to buy more
00:28:03
and the thing is what is the optimal
00:28:05
demand for good y for agent b well it's
00:28:08
infinite
00:28:09
but the thing is this is demand
00:28:12
do we have that much supply infinite
00:28:15
supply well hell no we have only 10
00:28:17
units of supply for good y so therefore
00:28:20
zero prices again once again can never
00:28:24
be
00:28:25
while rise in equilibrium and hence
00:28:27
here i'm sorry
00:28:29
we say market for good x will clear only
00:28:32
if price one of the prices is zero
00:28:35
hence the conclusion so we don't really
00:28:38
need to look at uh market clearance for
00:28:40
good y
00:28:41
hence
00:28:42
no walrasian
00:28:44
equilibrium
00:28:47
okay
00:28:50
that's it