How Satellites Reveal China's Taiwan Invasion Plans

00:38:31
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1taDYPj8Sbc

الملخص

TLDRIn early 2025, satellite images revealed China's construction of new landing vessels, potentially for an invasion of Taiwan. These vessels, nicknamed 'cow class', are designed to create portable causeways for rapid offloading of military equipment during amphibious assaults. Analysts suggest that these barges could significantly increase the number of viable landing sites on Taiwan, complicating its defense strategy. The video draws parallels to the Normandy landings, highlighting the logistical challenges of establishing a sustainable beachhead. Additionally, China's military buildup includes mock-ups of U.S. warships for target practice, indicating a focus on countering U.S. naval power. The implications of these developments raise concerns about regional security and the potential for conflict in the Taiwan Strait, especially as China's military capabilities continue to evolve.

الوجبات الجاهزة

  • 🛰️ Satellite images reveal new Chinese landing vessels.
  • 🚢 'Cow class' barges designed for rapid military offloading.
  • ⚔️ Potential invasion strategy draws parallels to Normandy.
  • 🏖️ Taiwan's beaches heavily fortified against invasion.
  • 📦 New barges could expand landing sites beyond 14 red beaches.
  • 🎯 Mock-ups of U.S. warships used for target practice.
  • 🛡️ China's military buildup poses threats to U.S. forces.
  • 🌊 Geography of the Taiwan Strait complicates military operations.
  • 🇦🇺 Australia's navy feels vulnerable amid China's actions.
  • 🧠 Psychological impact of military developments on Taiwan.

الجدول الزمني

  • 00:00:00 - 00:05:00

    In January 2025, a satellite image revealed a peculiar ship being constructed in Guangha, China, which analysts speculated could be a landing vessel. By March 2025, this vessel, along with two others, was spotted conducting maneuvers off China's southern coast, forming a causeway to practice beach landings alongside civilian cargo ships.

  • 00:05:00 - 00:10:00

    Photos of the exercises surfaced online, showing the barges connected to a beach with an off-loading ramp suitable for heavy tanks. Analysts began to theorize that these vessels were part of China's strategy for a potential invasion of Taiwan, which China views as a breakaway province.

  • 00:10:00 - 00:15:00

    The challenges of invading Taiwan are significant, primarily due to its status as an island. China would need to execute a large-scale amphibious invasion, similar to D-Day, which involves establishing a beachhead and ensuring it is sustainable with supplies and reinforcements.

  • 00:15:00 - 00:20:00

    To secure a beachhead, the invading force typically needs to capture a nearby port. However, this is complicated by the fact that Taiwan's beaches are heavily fortified and the island has limited suitable landing sites, known as 'red beaches.'

  • 00:20:00 - 00:25:00

    China's new barges, dubbed 'cowo class' vessels, could potentially address these challenges. They are designed to operate in pairs, stabilizing themselves with retractable legs and creating a causeway to facilitate the rapid offloading of military vehicles onto the beach.

  • 00:25:00 - 00:30:00

    These barges could theoretically allow for the offloading of an entire heavy battalion within an hour, significantly increasing the number of potential landing sites for an invasion. Analysts suggest they could expand the number of viable beaches from 14 to around 54, complicating Taiwan's defense strategy.

  • 00:30:00 - 00:38:31

    China's military buildup includes mock-ups of US warships for target practice and extensive construction of military facilities, indicating a serious commitment to preparing for a potential conflict over Taiwan. The PLA's advancements in missile technology and naval capabilities pose a significant threat to US and allied forces in the region.

اعرض المزيد

الخريطة الذهنية

فيديو أسئلة وأجوبة

  • What are the new barges being developed by China?

    The new barges, referred to as 'cow class' vessels, are designed to facilitate amphibious assaults on Taiwan by creating portable causeways for rapid offloading of military vehicles.

  • How does China plan to overcome Taiwan's coastal defenses?

    China's new barges could potentially expand the number of beaches available for landing, allowing for assaults beyond the heavily fortified 'red beaches'.

  • What historical event is compared to China's potential invasion of Taiwan?

    The video compares China's potential invasion strategy to the Allied D-Day invasion of Normandy during World War II.

  • What challenges does China face in invading Taiwan?

    Challenges include Taiwan's fortified beaches, coral reefs, and the need for maritime and aerial supremacy before launching an invasion.

  • What is the significance of the mock-ups of U.S. warships in China's deserts?

    These mock-ups are used for target practice to simulate attacks on U.S. naval vessels, indicating China's military preparedness and capabilities.

  • How does China's military buildup affect U.S. and allied forces?

    China's military buildup poses a significant threat to U.S. and allied forces in the region, complicating potential intervention scenarios.

  • What is the psychological impact of China's military developments?

    The developments serve as a psychological weapon, signaling China's seriousness about a potential invasion and aiming to deter Taiwanese resistance.

  • What is the role of the Dinghin test and training base?

    The Dinghin base is used for weapons integration and tactics development, crucial for preparing the PLA for potential conflicts.

  • How does the geography of the Taiwan Strait affect military operations?

    The shallow waters of the Taiwan Strait make it easier to detect submarines, impacting the operational strategies of both Chinese and U.S. forces.

  • What is the current state of Australia's navy in relation to China's military actions?

    Australia's navy is currently small and outdated, making the country feel vulnerable to potential Chinese military actions.

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التمرير التلقائي:
  • 00:00:00
    In early January of 2025, a satellite
  • 00:00:02
    captured a curious image of something
  • 00:00:04
    happening in the Chinese mega city of
  • 00:00:06
    Guangha near the country's southern
  • 00:00:08
    coast. A dry dock in the city was busy
  • 00:00:10
    constructing this strange looking ship.
  • 00:00:13
    Something that a handful of foreign
  • 00:00:14
    intelligence analysts at the time
  • 00:00:16
    suggested could be a Chinese landing
  • 00:00:18
    vessel. And then only a couple of months
  • 00:00:20
    later in March of 2025, the completed
  • 00:00:22
    vessel and two other similar looking
  • 00:00:24
    ships were spotted by satellites again.
  • 00:00:26
    This time off of China's far southern
  • 00:00:27
    coastline practicing a series of
  • 00:00:29
    interesting maneuvers. This time the
  • 00:00:32
    satellite captured the three barges
  • 00:00:34
    connecting together to form a huge
  • 00:00:36
    costway from the rearmost barge and then
  • 00:00:38
    through the front barge directly towards
  • 00:00:40
    a beach with accompanying Chinese
  • 00:00:42
    civilian cargo ships and fairies
  • 00:00:44
    practicing right alongside them. And
  • 00:00:46
    then only a few weeks later after that,
  • 00:00:49
    a series of photos taken by the Chinese
  • 00:00:51
    themselves of the exercises began
  • 00:00:52
    spreading around on the internet,
  • 00:00:54
    showing the three barges from the
  • 00:00:56
    perspective of being down on the ground
  • 00:00:57
    on the beach itself, showing the long
  • 00:01:00
    crossway from the rear barge connecting
  • 00:01:01
    all the way to the front barge with an
  • 00:01:03
    off-loading ramp extending directly onto
  • 00:01:05
    the beach. Interestingly, just wide
  • 00:01:07
    enough to accommodate the offloading of
  • 00:01:09
    a heavy main battle tank. It didn't take
  • 00:01:12
    very long for many analysts to begin
  • 00:01:14
    recognizing that these new barges could
  • 00:01:16
    be a part of China's ever evolving
  • 00:01:18
    strategy to launch an allout invasion of
  • 00:01:20
    Taiwan at some point in the future. The
  • 00:01:23
    island that the government of China
  • 00:01:24
    regards as a rogue renegade province
  • 00:01:26
    that China's leader Xiinping has
  • 00:01:29
    repeatedly promised will be brought
  • 00:01:30
    under Chinese Communist Party rule some
  • 00:01:33
    way or another, either through diplomacy
  • 00:01:35
    or through force. Of course, one of the
  • 00:01:38
    biggest obstacles that has been standing
  • 00:01:39
    in the way of an all-out Chinese
  • 00:01:41
    invasion of Taiwan for decades has been
  • 00:01:43
    the fact that Taiwan is an island. And
  • 00:01:45
    in order to get their army over to that
  • 00:01:47
    island, China will need to transport
  • 00:01:49
    their soldiers, vehicles, and equipment
  • 00:01:51
    over the sea in a titanic amphibious
  • 00:01:53
    invasion, like a modern 21st century
  • 00:01:55
    version of the D-Day invasion of
  • 00:01:57
    Normandy during World War II. And China
  • 00:02:00
    is aware that any amphibious invasion of
  • 00:02:02
    an enemy consists of two different
  • 00:02:04
    steps. The first step is rather
  • 00:02:06
    straightforward and consists of actually
  • 00:02:08
    assaulting the beach, storming and
  • 00:02:09
    overcoming local enemy positions, and
  • 00:02:11
    establishing a localized beach head. The
  • 00:02:13
    second step is more complicated and is
  • 00:02:16
    likely what these new barges are
  • 00:02:17
    designed to help out with. After the
  • 00:02:19
    initial beach head is established, the
  • 00:02:21
    invading force has to make the beach
  • 00:02:23
    head sustainable in order to actually
  • 00:02:24
    hold on to it and to expand their
  • 00:02:26
    control even deeper into the enemy's
  • 00:02:28
    territory. The beach head has to be
  • 00:02:30
    logistically supplied with adequate
  • 00:02:31
    amounts of reinforcements, ammunition,
  • 00:02:33
    fuel, food, medical supplies, and other
  • 00:02:35
    materials to make sure that they don't
  • 00:02:36
    just run out of supplies surrounded by
  • 00:02:38
    hostile territory and implode in on
  • 00:02:40
    themselves. So, in order to make a beach
  • 00:02:42
    head sustainable, the invading force
  • 00:02:44
    usually has to take over a nearby port
  • 00:02:46
    that's ideally closely located to the
  • 00:02:48
    initial beach head through which they
  • 00:02:50
    can then begin bringing in all of their
  • 00:02:52
    necessary supplies and reinforcements
  • 00:02:54
    for the troops to hold the beach head
  • 00:02:55
    and then expand beyond it. But in most
  • 00:02:58
    cases, securing a nearby enemy harbor to
  • 00:03:01
    the beach head that's still perfectly
  • 00:03:02
    intact is no easy feat. During the
  • 00:03:05
    Allied amphibious invasion of Normandy
  • 00:03:07
    during World War II, the Allies solution
  • 00:03:09
    to this problem were the now famous
  • 00:03:11
    Malberry Harbors, which have no doubt
  • 00:03:13
    been studied extensively by Chinese
  • 00:03:15
    military planners for a possible Taiwan
  • 00:03:18
    amphibious invasion today. rather than
  • 00:03:20
    spending huge amounts of time and
  • 00:03:22
    resources trying to capture
  • 00:03:23
    well-defended enemy occupied ports that
  • 00:03:25
    would probably be sabotaged and damaged
  • 00:03:27
    anyway and take even more time to repair
  • 00:03:29
    and bring back online. The Allies
  • 00:03:32
    solution was to simply bring their own
  • 00:03:33
    temporary portable harbors to the coast
  • 00:03:35
    of Normandy instead. Merely hours after
  • 00:03:38
    the Allies had established their beach
  • 00:03:40
    heads in Normandy after the initial
  • 00:03:41
    D-Day amphibious assaults, the many
  • 00:03:44
    sections of the Malberry Harbors were
  • 00:03:45
    towed from England across the channel
  • 00:03:47
    and put into position in two different
  • 00:03:49
    beach head locations. Malberry A and
  • 00:03:51
    Malberry B. The Malberry Harbors
  • 00:03:54
    basically consisted of a series of
  • 00:03:56
    floating breakwaters, pontoons, peers,
  • 00:03:58
    and floating roadways that the Allies
  • 00:03:59
    were then able to stitch together and
  • 00:04:01
    used to rapidly offload reinforcements
  • 00:04:03
    and supplies through onto the beach
  • 00:04:05
    heads, which enabled them to become
  • 00:04:07
    sustainable and to be able to expand
  • 00:04:09
    deeper into the interior without the
  • 00:04:10
    need to spend crucial time and effort
  • 00:04:12
    capturing any of the sabotaged German
  • 00:04:14
    occupied ports in northern France
  • 00:04:16
    instead. Nonetheless, even during this
  • 00:04:19
    operation, Malberry Harbor A was
  • 00:04:21
    destroyed by a violent storm just a few
  • 00:04:23
    days after it had been established,
  • 00:04:25
    limiting the Allies to the use of only
  • 00:04:27
    Malberry Harbor B for the next several
  • 00:04:29
    months. Now, for China's modern
  • 00:04:32
    considerations for a 21st century
  • 00:04:34
    amphibious invasion of Taiwan, there are
  • 00:04:36
    many geographic facts about this part of
  • 00:04:38
    the world that will make it even harder
  • 00:04:40
    to pull off than the Allied invasion of
  • 00:04:42
    Normandy was. The distance that the
  • 00:04:44
    Chinese invasion fleet will have to
  • 00:04:45
    travel across the Taiwan Strait will be
  • 00:04:47
    roughly similar to the distance that the
  • 00:04:49
    Allied invasion fleet had to travel
  • 00:04:51
    across the English Channel. And just
  • 00:04:53
    like the Allies experienced in Normandy
  • 00:04:54
    in 1944, the Chinese can also expect
  • 00:04:57
    that Taiwan's defenders today would
  • 00:04:59
    likely sabotage their own ports rather
  • 00:05:02
    than risk them falling into Chinese
  • 00:05:03
    hands intact. Which means that the
  • 00:05:06
    Chinese will have to bring their own
  • 00:05:07
    ports with them in order to sustain
  • 00:05:09
    their initial beach heads. However, a
  • 00:05:12
    significant amount of the Taiwanese
  • 00:05:13
    coast is ringed by extensive coral reefs
  • 00:05:16
    that in some locations can stretch for
  • 00:05:17
    hundreds of meters off the beaches,
  • 00:05:20
    severely complicating the ability for an
  • 00:05:22
    invasion force to bring their own
  • 00:05:24
    malberry harbor style portable ports to
  • 00:05:26
    bear. Moreover, the island of Taiwan
  • 00:05:28
    just also has very few suitable beaches
  • 00:05:31
    that a traditional amphibious invasion
  • 00:05:32
    force can choose from to attack with any
  • 00:05:35
    good odds of success. The island only
  • 00:05:37
    has a total of 14 so-called red beaches
  • 00:05:40
    dotted around the island where
  • 00:05:41
    conditions are considered optimal for an
  • 00:05:43
    amphibious assault. where the coral
  • 00:05:45
    reefs extending from the shoreline are
  • 00:05:47
    either small or non-existent, where the
  • 00:05:49
    terrain is relatively flat and easier to
  • 00:05:51
    assault than the rugged towering cliffs
  • 00:05:53
    that are seen across most of the
  • 00:05:54
    island's east coast, and where the
  • 00:05:56
    beaches themselves are also located
  • 00:05:58
    nearby to strategically crucial targets
  • 00:06:00
    for the Chinese to capture, such as
  • 00:06:02
    Taiwan's capital and the largest city in
  • 00:06:04
    the north, Taipei, and Taiwan's
  • 00:06:06
    principal and largest maritime port down
  • 00:06:08
    in the south, Kaos. However, the
  • 00:06:11
    vulnerability of all 14 of these red
  • 00:06:13
    beaches are very well understood by
  • 00:06:14
    Taiwan. And so, they're consequently the
  • 00:06:17
    most heavily fortified and well-defended
  • 00:06:19
    beaches on the entire island, making any
  • 00:06:21
    traditional amphibious assaults on them
  • 00:06:23
    a difficult task. All of these problems,
  • 00:06:25
    though, can potentially be solved by
  • 00:06:27
    China's new invasion barges that have
  • 00:06:29
    been spreading around the internet these
  • 00:06:31
    past few months, which Western
  • 00:06:33
    intelligence sources have nicknamed the
  • 00:06:35
    cowo class of vessels, literally
  • 00:06:37
    Mandarin Chinese for waterbridge. When
  • 00:06:40
    hypothetically approaching the Taiwanese
  • 00:06:42
    coast, these Shu cow barges, which will
  • 00:06:44
    probably always operate in pairs of
  • 00:06:46
    three, will carefully position
  • 00:06:47
    themselves one after the other in a row
  • 00:06:50
    with the smaller barge of the trio in
  • 00:06:51
    the front, the medium-sized barge in the
  • 00:06:53
    center, and the largest sized barge back
  • 00:06:55
    in the rear. Each of the barges carries
  • 00:06:58
    a set of super heavy retractable legs
  • 00:07:00
    with them on board. When the barges are
  • 00:07:02
    still in transport, these legs will be
  • 00:07:04
    retracted and stowed above the ship. But
  • 00:07:06
    once they're in position near the beach
  • 00:07:08
    head, the legs will be lowered to pin
  • 00:07:10
    them down to the seabed beneath them and
  • 00:07:12
    to lift their holes out of the water,
  • 00:07:14
    giving them increased stability in the
  • 00:07:16
    choppy coastal waters, almost like
  • 00:07:18
    miniature offshore oil platforms. Each
  • 00:07:20
    of the barges also has a tower in their
  • 00:07:22
    front and a long bridge stored on their
  • 00:07:24
    decks while in transport. Once the legs
  • 00:07:27
    have stabilized the barges in place, the
  • 00:07:29
    towers at the front will telescope out
  • 00:07:31
    their bridges to create a giant portable
  • 00:07:33
    causeway extending out from the rear
  • 00:07:35
    barge to the center barge to the front
  • 00:07:37
    barge to the shore. Extending out nearly
  • 00:07:40
    825 m from the rear barge. It's also
  • 00:07:43
    been suggested by several other analysts
  • 00:07:46
    that these heavyduty bridges will be
  • 00:07:47
    capable of supporting and fitting heavy
  • 00:07:50
    vehicles such as armored personnel
  • 00:07:51
    carriers and even main battle tanks.
  • 00:07:54
    Together, the Schweinko barges
  • 00:07:56
    effectively function as both a movable
  • 00:07:57
    port and a movable bridge at the same
  • 00:07:59
    time. Working in unison with Chinese
  • 00:08:02
    civilian rollon rolloff or rorow fairies
  • 00:08:04
    commandeered for military service, the
  • 00:08:07
    People's Liberation Army can then
  • 00:08:09
    rapidly dock these rorow fairies
  • 00:08:11
    carrying vehicles with the larger rear
  • 00:08:13
    barge and disgorge their heavy vehicles
  • 00:08:15
    and equipment into it. They can then
  • 00:08:17
    rapidly storm ahead across the costway
  • 00:08:19
    and directly onto the beach head. Two
  • 00:08:22
    analysts affiliated with the China
  • 00:08:23
    Maritime Studies Institute, J. Michael
  • 00:08:25
    Dom and Thomas Schugart, argued in a
  • 00:08:28
    paper they wrote in March 2025 about
  • 00:08:30
    these barges, that they would likely be
  • 00:08:32
    capable of offloading onto the beach an
  • 00:08:34
    entire heavy combined arms battalion,
  • 00:08:36
    including roughly 150 vehicles, in only
  • 00:08:39
    about 40 to 60 minutes after they had
  • 00:08:42
    extended their costway. Over the course
  • 00:08:44
    of a full day, they could theoretically
  • 00:08:46
    unload several hundred armored vehicles,
  • 00:08:49
    all brought to them by any number of
  • 00:08:50
    China's dozens of civilian Rorow fairies
  • 00:08:53
    commandeered for military service, which
  • 00:08:55
    have all been intentionally designed for
  • 00:08:57
    dual use purposes in mind. With the
  • 00:08:59
    capability to handle unloading and
  • 00:09:01
    offloading heavyduty military vehicles
  • 00:09:03
    like tanks, with their long length far
  • 00:09:05
    out from the beach, the Rorow fairies
  • 00:09:07
    will be able to safely offload all of
  • 00:09:09
    their vehicles onto the rare Shwecow
  • 00:09:11
    barge without any fear of them running a
  • 00:09:12
    ground in the shallower waters closer to
  • 00:09:14
    the beach. With their very shallow draft
  • 00:09:17
    and distance out from the shoreline, the
  • 00:09:19
    Schwec barges also appear to be designed
  • 00:09:21
    to overcome Taiwan's coastal coral reefs
  • 00:09:24
    that ring most of the island, opening up
  • 00:09:26
    more potential beaches beyond the 14
  • 00:09:28
    well-known and well-defended red beaches
  • 00:09:31
    that the Chinese invasion force could
  • 00:09:33
    potentially assault. Going even further,
  • 00:09:35
    the Schwec barges could also
  • 00:09:37
    theoretically extend their costway to
  • 00:09:39
    connect directly to one of Taiwan's
  • 00:09:41
    coastal highways, discorgging their
  • 00:09:43
    vehicles directly to the island's
  • 00:09:44
    highway system and ignoring the beaches
  • 00:09:46
    altogether. This is potentially the
  • 00:09:49
    biggest threat that the new Shua barges
  • 00:09:51
    pose to Taiwan's defense. They've been
  • 00:09:54
    estimated by some analysts to
  • 00:09:55
    potentially expand the number of beaches
  • 00:09:57
    that the PLA could land at on Taiwan by
  • 00:09:59
    around 40 on top of the original 14 red
  • 00:10:03
    beaches, greatly expanding the number of
  • 00:10:06
    potential beaches that the Taiwanese
  • 00:10:07
    will now have to consider preparing for
  • 00:10:09
    their defense and risking them spreading
  • 00:10:11
    out their limited resources too thin and
  • 00:10:13
    leaving behind weaker, vulnerable
  • 00:10:15
    defenses at some beaches that the PLA
  • 00:10:17
    could find and exploit during an
  • 00:10:19
    invasion scenario. The PLA would likely
  • 00:10:22
    only utilize the Schwika barges after
  • 00:10:24
    their navy and air force had already
  • 00:10:25
    achieved maritime and aerial supremacy
  • 00:10:28
    and after the initial beach heads on the
  • 00:10:29
    shore have already been established by
  • 00:10:31
    the first wave of D-Day style amphibious
  • 00:10:33
    assaults, granting the PLA the ability
  • 00:10:36
    to then rapidly offload their heavy
  • 00:10:37
    equipment and supplies onto the island
  • 00:10:39
    to press on the assault deeper into the
  • 00:10:41
    island's interior. If the Schweink
  • 00:10:43
    barges arrive too early without PLA
  • 00:10:45
    maritime or aerial supremacy established
  • 00:10:47
    first, they'll just be sitting ducks
  • 00:10:49
    while trying to offload their equipment
  • 00:10:51
    and will be easy targets to defending
  • 00:10:53
    missiles, drones, and artillery.
  • 00:10:55
    Moreover, the satellite images that have
  • 00:10:57
    captured the bargers practicing have so
  • 00:11:00
    far only shown them operating within
  • 00:11:02
    calm waters, which might mean that they
  • 00:11:04
    could struggle in rougher weather
  • 00:11:05
    conditions that commonly happened within
  • 00:11:07
    the Taiwan Strait. Just like with the
  • 00:11:09
    Malberry Harbors experienced during the
  • 00:11:11
    Normandy landings when one of them was
  • 00:11:13
    destroyed by inclement weather within
  • 00:11:15
    only a matter of days, a second set of
  • 00:11:17
    Schwao barges have already been observed
  • 00:11:20
    by satellites to be under construction
  • 00:11:21
    in the same Guanghou shipyard in China
  • 00:11:24
    right now. And if China ends up building
  • 00:11:26
    enough of them, it's conceivable that
  • 00:11:28
    they could help China overcome one of
  • 00:11:30
    their greatest challenges of all when it
  • 00:11:32
    comes to an invasion of Taiwan, seizing
  • 00:11:35
    control of the island before anyone from
  • 00:11:37
    the outside world can intervene against
  • 00:11:38
    them and stop them, like the United
  • 00:11:40
    States, Japan, and Australia. If the
  • 00:11:43
    initial PLA amphibious assaults are
  • 00:11:45
    successful at establishing their beach
  • 00:11:46
    heads on Taiwan like the Normandy
  • 00:11:48
    landings were and then if the Chinese
  • 00:11:49
    can bring in their cow barges and their
  • 00:11:51
    commandeered civilian row fairies within
  • 00:11:54
    hours of that happening like the allies
  • 00:11:56
    were able to do with their Mulberry
  • 00:11:57
    harbors and Normandy. Thomas Schugart
  • 00:11:59
    wrote in his paper that I mentioned
  • 00:12:01
    earlier that it would be conceivable
  • 00:12:02
    that the PLA could unload up to eight
  • 00:12:04
    heavy brigades complete with all of
  • 00:12:06
    their vehicles, supplies, and around
  • 00:12:08
    60,000 troops on a Taiwan during just
  • 00:12:11
    the first wave of the attack within just
  • 00:12:13
    the first 24 hours with significant
  • 00:12:16
    reinforcements being delivered over the
  • 00:12:18
    following few days. If the PLA could
  • 00:12:20
    achieve a rapid takeover of Taiwan
  • 00:12:22
    before the outside world even had the
  • 00:12:23
    time to react to it, then would they?
  • 00:12:26
    Some other analysts argue that in this
  • 00:12:28
    light, the Schweencow barges are
  • 00:12:30
    designed as a psychological weapon just
  • 00:12:32
    as much as a real weapon. They serve as
  • 00:12:34
    a major symbol that China is very
  • 00:12:37
    serious about investing resources into
  • 00:12:39
    establishing their ability to actually
  • 00:12:41
    invade Taiwan, and they add a degree of
  • 00:12:43
    plausibility to Xiinping's frequent
  • 00:12:46
    threats of invasion. China naturally
  • 00:12:49
    would rather that Taiwan surrender
  • 00:12:50
    without a fight at all. and convincing
  • 00:12:52
    Taiwan's leadership that the invasion
  • 00:12:54
    will be both inevitable and successful
  • 00:12:56
    is the best way to do that. And these
  • 00:12:58
    new cow barges certainly send a message
  • 00:13:01
    that the odds of an invasion are at
  • 00:13:03
    least more plausible than they were
  • 00:13:05
    before. Regardless, in order to even use
  • 00:13:07
    the barges in the first place, the PLA
  • 00:13:10
    will have to face fierce resistance from
  • 00:13:12
    determined Taiwanese defenders while
  • 00:13:14
    crossing the Taiwan Strait and while
  • 00:13:16
    assaulting the beaches to establish the
  • 00:13:18
    initial preliminary beach heads. and
  • 00:13:20
    they could potentially face determined
  • 00:13:22
    American, Japanese, Filipino, and
  • 00:13:24
    Australian auxiliary defenses as well.
  • 00:13:26
    They could all work to deny them the
  • 00:13:28
    ability to even accomplish this first
  • 00:13:29
    phase of the amphibious assault
  • 00:13:31
    altogether and render the cow barges a
  • 00:13:34
    rather moot point. So, in order to
  • 00:13:36
    reinforce both the psychological and
  • 00:13:38
    real potential of the cow barges, China
  • 00:13:40
    has to be able to credibly threaten the
  • 00:13:43
    destruction of any Allied intervention
  • 00:13:44
    on Taiwan's behalf as well. In order to
  • 00:13:47
    try and deter any Allied intervention
  • 00:13:49
    from happening in the first place that
  • 00:13:50
    could slow their invasion down and
  • 00:13:52
    potentially defeat them. And in order to
  • 00:13:54
    understand how the PLA is doing that, we
  • 00:13:57
    actually have to travel very far away
  • 00:13:58
    from Taiwan in the seas around the
  • 00:14:00
    island to a very unlikely location, the
  • 00:14:04
    remote and sparsely populated deserts of
  • 00:14:06
    far northern and northwestern China,
  • 00:14:08
    thousands of kilometers away. This is
  • 00:14:11
    the Dinghin test and training base
  • 00:14:13
    located in China's section of the Gobi
  • 00:14:15
    Desert. a massive facility used by the
  • 00:14:18
    People's Liberation Army Air Force for
  • 00:14:19
    weapons integration, testing, training,
  • 00:14:21
    and tactics development. It is an ideal
  • 00:14:24
    location for them to do all of this
  • 00:14:25
    because it's in a very remote, sparsely
  • 00:14:28
    populated location with huge amounts of
  • 00:14:30
    wide open airspace, leading some
  • 00:14:32
    analysts to compare the importance of
  • 00:14:34
    Dinghen to China to Nellis Air Force
  • 00:14:36
    Base in the deserts of Nevada to the
  • 00:14:38
    United States.
  • 00:14:40
    And relatively nearby to the Dinghen
  • 00:14:42
    test and training base out in another
  • 00:14:43
    one of China's remote deserts known as
  • 00:14:45
    the Tacomicon. Satellite imagery has
  • 00:14:48
    recently captured a lot of things that
  • 00:14:50
    kind of seem to indicate what the
  • 00:14:51
    People's Liberation Army Air Force is
  • 00:14:53
    actively training for. On the 1st of
  • 00:14:55
    January of 2024, Planet Labs released an
  • 00:14:58
    image that one of their satellites had
  • 00:14:59
    captured in China's remote Taclomicon
  • 00:15:01
    desert showing what looks like a mockup
  • 00:15:03
    of an aircraft carrier. And not just any
  • 00:15:05
    aircraft carrier, but a nearly perfect
  • 00:15:08
    oneto-one identical mockup of one of
  • 00:15:10
    America's most advanced current
  • 00:15:12
    nuclearpowered super carriers, the
  • 00:15:14
    Gerald R. Ford class. There is a
  • 00:15:17
    structure in the mockup that's almost
  • 00:15:18
    precisely in the same location as the
  • 00:15:20
    Ford class's island. And there are
  • 00:15:22
    exactly four mocked up catapult launcher
  • 00:15:24
    tracks on the deck that are located
  • 00:15:26
    exactly where they appear on the real
  • 00:15:28
    Ford class carrier. Based on Planet Labs
  • 00:15:30
    data, it appears that the PLA began
  • 00:15:32
    constructing this mock-up US carrier in
  • 00:15:34
    the desert sometime in November of 2023,
  • 00:15:37
    fairly recently. However, going further
  • 00:15:40
    back in time, there's been a general
  • 00:15:41
    outline of an aircraft carrier here in
  • 00:15:43
    this exact location for a while since at
  • 00:15:45
    least 2021. And before it was completely
  • 00:15:48
    filled in with a full aircraft carrier
  • 00:15:50
    that we can see now, the PLA had built
  • 00:15:52
    two smaller aircraft carriers within the
  • 00:15:54
    overall silhouette. And interestingly,
  • 00:15:57
    this aircraft carrier is far from the
  • 00:15:59
    only American ship that the Chinese have
  • 00:16:01
    built a 1:1 replica of out here in the
  • 00:16:03
    desert. In fact, the area is almost
  • 00:16:06
    littered with them. Just 4 and 1/2 km
  • 00:16:08
    away to the northwest is another
  • 00:16:10
    full-scale replica of another US Ford
  • 00:16:12
    class aircraft carrier. And dotted all
  • 00:16:14
    around nearby are multiple 1:1 mock-ups
  • 00:16:17
    of what appear to be Arley Burke class
  • 00:16:19
    guided missile destroyers. One of the US
  • 00:16:21
    Navy's most modern and capable class of
  • 00:16:23
    destroyers at the present that are
  • 00:16:25
    typically used to escort carriers in a
  • 00:16:27
    strike group formation. But most
  • 00:16:29
    interestingly of all is this line that
  • 00:16:31
    snakes across the desert in between all
  • 00:16:33
    of these mock-ups of US warships. This
  • 00:16:36
    line appears to be a very large
  • 00:16:37
    railroad, roughly 6 m in width,
  • 00:16:40
    approaching four to five times as wide
  • 00:16:42
    as a usual railroad is. Interestingly,
  • 00:16:45
    this super wide railroad begins at what
  • 00:16:47
    appears to be a storage facility of some
  • 00:16:49
    sort and then extends for several
  • 00:16:51
    kilometers in a straight line before
  • 00:16:53
    curving rapidly through the desert and
  • 00:16:55
    then curving again to simply end in the
  • 00:16:57
    middle of nowhere. The railroad doesn't
  • 00:16:59
    curve to avoid any obstacles in the flat
  • 00:17:01
    desert. And the reason why it curves
  • 00:17:03
    this way starts to become apparent when
  • 00:17:05
    you see other photos of the railroad and
  • 00:17:07
    understand what its true purpose is.
  • 00:17:11
    Yeah, the PLA is using the railroad to
  • 00:17:13
    load up onetoone models of US warships
  • 00:17:16
    like the Ford class aircraft carrier and
  • 00:17:18
    then sends them down the railroad to
  • 00:17:20
    simulate a moving target for the Air
  • 00:17:22
    Force and rocket force to fire at. That
  • 00:17:24
    curve through the desert appears
  • 00:17:26
    designed to simulate a carrier's evasive
  • 00:17:28
    maneuvers through the ocean that it
  • 00:17:30
    would take to avoid an incoming missile.
  • 00:17:33
    There's other satellite photos of mocked
  • 00:17:34
    up carriers on this exact railroad blown
  • 00:17:37
    to bits after being targeted by missiles
  • 00:17:39
    and rockets. And there are satellite
  • 00:17:41
    photos of the stationary aircraft
  • 00:17:43
    targets blown to pieces as well. It's
  • 00:17:45
    pretty clear what the PLA is preparing
  • 00:17:47
    for here. But if it wasn't any more
  • 00:17:49
    clear, the location of all of these shim
  • 00:17:51
    mock-ups in the Tacomicon Desert isn't
  • 00:17:53
    just for the remoteness and clear open
  • 00:17:55
    skies. The location is also about 2600
  • 00:17:59
    km away from known People's Liberation
  • 00:18:01
    Army rocket force launch sites that are
  • 00:18:04
    located in China's Inner Mongolia
  • 00:18:05
    Autonomous Region, which is just about
  • 00:18:09
    the same distance to simulate long range
  • 00:18:12
    missile strikes from the interior of
  • 00:18:13
    central China into the South China Sea,
  • 00:18:16
    a region that China claims almost in its
  • 00:18:18
    entirety against the competing claims of
  • 00:18:20
    the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia.
  • 00:18:22
    Far away in the similarly remote deserts
  • 00:18:24
    of Inner Mongolia near to those PLA
  • 00:18:27
    rocket force launch sites is another
  • 00:18:29
    curious creation that the PLA built here
  • 00:18:31
    around the end of the year in 2022,
  • 00:18:33
    which might not look like very much at
  • 00:18:35
    first until you see this other satellite
  • 00:18:37
    image below it with the same roads
  • 00:18:39
    highlighted in red. This is an almost
  • 00:18:41
    exact one to one mockup of the area
  • 00:18:43
    around the presidential office in
  • 00:18:45
    downtown Taipei, the capital city of
  • 00:18:48
    Taiwan that is similar to the National
  • 00:18:50
    Mall in Washington DC. That's the site
  • 00:18:52
    of most of Taiwan's most critical and
  • 00:18:54
    sensitive government offices and
  • 00:18:56
    buildings. Conveniently located nearby
  • 00:18:58
    to a PLA Air Force aerial bombing and
  • 00:19:00
    gunnery practice range. This mockup is
  • 00:19:03
    likely being used by the PLA Air Force
  • 00:19:05
    to simulate aerial strikes on the most
  • 00:19:07
    sensitive part of the Taiwanese capital.
  • 00:19:10
    China's testing of aerial attacks here
  • 00:19:11
    and their testing of anti-ship missiles
  • 00:19:13
    at the site in the Tacoma desert on
  • 00:19:15
    onetoone mock-ups of US warships that
  • 00:19:18
    sometime even move and take simulated
  • 00:19:21
    evasive maneuvers is a clear indication
  • 00:19:24
    of China's evolving military
  • 00:19:25
    capabilities and their ability to target
  • 00:19:28
    US warships and to attack the US's
  • 00:19:30
    ability to project power into the
  • 00:19:31
    Western Pacific. And they're clearly not
  • 00:19:34
    even really trying to hide any of it.
  • 00:19:36
    Like the cow invasion barges, the
  • 00:19:38
    targeting of 1:1 mock-ups of US warships
  • 00:19:41
    in the Tclomicon Desert sends a clear
  • 00:19:43
    message from Beijing to Washington that
  • 00:19:45
    America's warships will be vulnerable
  • 00:19:47
    and potentially sunk if they choose to
  • 00:19:49
    intervene militarily on behalf of Taiwan
  • 00:19:52
    the day the invasion eventually comes.
  • 00:19:55
    And so they serve both a psychological
  • 00:19:57
    as well as a real purpose. Over the past
  • 00:19:59
    several years, China has embarked on the
  • 00:20:02
    largest military buildup ever witnessed
  • 00:20:04
    in human history. And it's been a
  • 00:20:06
    buildup that has largely been designed
  • 00:20:07
    to counter US strength in the Pacific
  • 00:20:09
    theater. China has poured resources into
  • 00:20:12
    the People's Liberation Army rocket
  • 00:20:14
    force to make it the largest land-based
  • 00:20:16
    missile force in the world today, giving
  • 00:20:18
    them somewhere in the ballpark of 3,100
  • 00:20:21
    conventionally armed ballistic and
  • 00:20:23
    cruise missiles of all different kinds
  • 00:20:25
    of ranges to work with during a conflict
  • 00:20:27
    over Taiwan. These missiles give China
  • 00:20:29
    the ability to launch enormous salvos of
  • 00:20:32
    attacks against military targets on
  • 00:20:34
    Taiwan itself before launching the main
  • 00:20:36
    amphibious invasion. And they also give
  • 00:20:39
    China the ability, if they so choose, to
  • 00:20:42
    attack US and allied military targets
  • 00:20:45
    throughout the Western Pacific from the
  • 00:20:46
    relative safety of the Chinese mainland
  • 00:20:48
    as well, with hundreds of their longer
  • 00:20:51
    range conventional missiles capable of
  • 00:20:53
    striking targets accurately as far away
  • 00:20:55
    as Guam. The fear on the American side
  • 00:20:58
    is that China is equipped with enough of
  • 00:20:59
    these anti-ship missiles to attack
  • 00:21:01
    virtually every US warship in the South
  • 00:21:03
    China Sea and nearby Taiwan with enough
  • 00:21:06
    firepower to overwhelm each individual
  • 00:21:09
    ship's own onboard missile defense
  • 00:21:11
    systems. The US of course is well aware
  • 00:21:14
    of the Chinese missile threat to their
  • 00:21:16
    surface warships which is a major part
  • 00:21:18
    of why the US military has shifted so
  • 00:21:21
    much to a strategy of countering China
  • 00:21:23
    by positioning air missile and rapid
  • 00:21:25
    amphibious response assets of their own
  • 00:21:27
    nearby to Taiwan on land bases in Japan
  • 00:21:30
    and the Philippines instead. But China
  • 00:21:33
    has been hard at work developing other
  • 00:21:34
    counters as well. China has a vastly
  • 00:21:37
    vastly larger capacity to construct new
  • 00:21:40
    ships than the US or any other country
  • 00:21:42
    in the world has. The US currently only
  • 00:21:44
    possesses four state-owned shipyards,
  • 00:21:47
    while China possesses dozens of them.
  • 00:21:50
    China possesses a whopping 230 times the
  • 00:21:53
    ship building capacity of the United
  • 00:21:55
    States right now. And to put it into
  • 00:21:57
    perspective for you, just one single
  • 00:22:00
    stateowned ship builder in China built
  • 00:22:01
    more vessels by tonnage last year in
  • 00:22:04
    2024 alone than the United States has
  • 00:22:07
    collectively built since the end of
  • 00:22:09
    World War II to the present. A fact that
  • 00:22:12
    has helped China seize the title of the
  • 00:22:14
    world's largest navy today. And the
  • 00:22:16
    types of ships that China is building
  • 00:22:18
    are not only designed to carry out an
  • 00:22:20
    invasion of Taiwan, like the cow barges
  • 00:22:22
    and the countless dual use civilian and
  • 00:22:24
    military row fairies, but some of them
  • 00:22:27
    are also designed specifically to
  • 00:22:29
    counter some of the US Navy's few
  • 00:22:31
    remaining strengths in this theater.
  • 00:22:33
    While the PLA rocket force has been
  • 00:22:34
    carefully calibrated to counter US
  • 00:22:36
    surface warships, that still leaves
  • 00:22:38
    behind the incredibly advanced and
  • 00:22:40
    capable US nuclear submarine fleet that
  • 00:22:43
    operates beneath the surface that the
  • 00:22:45
    rocket forces missiles will not be able
  • 00:22:47
    to reach. The US has by far the largest
  • 00:22:51
    and the most competent nuclear submarine
  • 00:22:52
    fleet in the world that could be brought
  • 00:22:54
    to bear on China's Taiwan invasion fleet
  • 00:22:57
    as it crosses the Taiwan Strait. But
  • 00:22:59
    China is working on counters to this
  • 00:23:01
    advantage as well. One of the ways that
  • 00:23:03
    the geography of the Taiwan Strait
  • 00:23:05
    actually benefits China in this way is
  • 00:23:07
    how relatively shallow it is. The
  • 00:23:10
    average depth throughout it is only
  • 00:23:11
    about 60 m, making it much easier to
  • 00:23:14
    find and attack submarines operating
  • 00:23:16
    there than in deeper waters. China's
  • 00:23:19
    newest class of guided missile stealth
  • 00:23:21
    frigot, the Type054B,
  • 00:23:23
    was just recently commissioned into the
  • 00:23:25
    People's Liberation Army Navy in January
  • 00:23:27
    of 2025. and it is purposebuilt to be an
  • 00:23:31
    anti-ubmarine warship. China has the
  • 00:23:34
    huge ship building capacity to begin
  • 00:23:36
    rapidly churning out a ton of these
  • 00:23:38
    anti-ubmarine stealth frigots over the
  • 00:23:40
    coming years. And if they can
  • 00:23:42
    concentrate enough of them in the Taiwan
  • 00:23:43
    Strait to escort the invasion fleet by
  • 00:23:45
    the time it happens, they can pose a
  • 00:23:48
    major threat to the operation of any US
  • 00:23:50
    nuclear submarine operating beneath the
  • 00:23:52
    Taiwan Strait. While the rocket force on
  • 00:23:54
    the Chinese mainland can pose a
  • 00:23:56
    similarly major threat to the operation
  • 00:23:58
    of any US service warships operating
  • 00:24:00
    nearby to Taiwan as well, greatly
  • 00:24:03
    raising the stakes for the US to decide
  • 00:24:05
    on intervening or not. And China is
  • 00:24:07
    attempting to use their massive military
  • 00:24:09
    buildup to make the potential cost of
  • 00:24:11
    intervention clear for other US allies
  • 00:24:14
    in the Pacific as well, most notably
  • 00:24:16
    Australia.
  • 00:24:18
    Earlier this year, on the 11th of
  • 00:24:19
    February of 2025, a Chinese People's
  • 00:24:22
    Liberation Army Navy frigot appeared off
  • 00:24:24
    of the northern coast of Australia and
  • 00:24:26
    then sailed through the Torres Strait
  • 00:24:28
    between Australia and Papu New Guinea.
  • 00:24:30
    This attracted only minor attention
  • 00:24:32
    until later on while off of Australia's
  • 00:24:34
    east coast. The initial frigot was
  • 00:24:36
    joined by two additional PLAN warships,
  • 00:24:40
    a cruiser and a replenishment tanker as
  • 00:24:42
    they collectively transited through the
  • 00:24:44
    Coral Sea and continued moving further
  • 00:24:46
    south before briefly entering into
  • 00:24:48
    Australia's exclusive economic zone near
  • 00:24:50
    Sydney. But the attention the PLN ships
  • 00:24:53
    were receiving in the Australian media
  • 00:24:55
    reached an almost full-on panic only a
  • 00:24:57
    few days later when the vessels began
  • 00:24:59
    issuing radio broadcast to airlines
  • 00:25:02
    warning them that they were conducting a
  • 00:25:03
    series of live fire exercises in between
  • 00:25:06
    Australia and New Zealand. The
  • 00:25:08
    Australian Civil Aviation Service was
  • 00:25:10
    forced into issuing an emergency alert
  • 00:25:12
    that caused almost 50 planes to divert
  • 00:25:15
    their course to avoid the area. From
  • 00:25:17
    there, the PLEN ships continue traveling
  • 00:25:20
    south of Tasmania, entering into and out
  • 00:25:22
    of Australia's exclusive economic zone
  • 00:25:24
    again, then traveled west to within only
  • 00:25:27
    170 nautical miles of Perth, just days
  • 00:25:30
    after a US nuclear submarine had visited
  • 00:25:32
    a nearby base before then heading up
  • 00:25:35
    north back towards China again after
  • 00:25:37
    having nearly spent a month completely
  • 00:25:39
    circumnavigating Australia in a new and
  • 00:25:42
    never-beforeseen show of force that has
  • 00:25:45
    left the Australians feeling
  • 00:25:46
    particularly vulnerable ever since. The
  • 00:25:49
    PLN's trip around Australia came at a
  • 00:25:52
    rather unique time in Australia's
  • 00:25:54
    history when the country's own navy has
  • 00:25:56
    been languishing away for years. And as
  • 00:25:58
    Australia's traditional alliance with
  • 00:25:59
    the United States is coming under
  • 00:26:01
    increasing strain with Donald Trump back
  • 00:26:03
    in the White House again. Australia's
  • 00:26:06
    modern navy is currently in a dismal
  • 00:26:08
    state and it's the smallest and most
  • 00:26:09
    outdated it's been since the Second
  • 00:26:11
    World War. The PLAN frig and cruiser
  • 00:26:14
    that circumnavigated the Australian
  • 00:26:15
    continent carried with them a combined
  • 00:26:17
    total of 144 vertical launch missile
  • 00:26:21
    cells. Interestingly, pretty close to
  • 00:26:23
    the entire Australian Navy's 10 warships
  • 00:26:26
    combined total of just 200 vertical
  • 00:26:29
    launch missile cells. It was also the
  • 00:26:31
    furthest south that the PLAN has so far
  • 00:26:34
    ever sailed, and the message it sent to
  • 00:26:36
    Australia was crystal clear. Even though
  • 00:26:39
    Beijing said that the warships were
  • 00:26:41
    constantly operating within
  • 00:26:43
    international waters and they had every
  • 00:26:45
    legal right to do so as every other navy
  • 00:26:47
    does all the time, the message that the
  • 00:26:49
    Australian homeland was vulnerable to
  • 00:26:51
    Chinese military action in the event of
  • 00:26:53
    Australia or US military bases in
  • 00:26:56
    Australia intervening to defend Taiwan
  • 00:26:58
    during an invasion scenario was clear as
  • 00:27:00
    day. And it came as China's navy has
  • 00:27:03
    continued expanding its reach in other
  • 00:27:05
    areas as well. The same month as the PLN
  • 00:27:08
    flotilla was busy circumnavigating
  • 00:27:10
    Australia, the Japanese defense minister
  • 00:27:13
    stated that PLN warships had passed
  • 00:27:15
    through the waters around the country's
  • 00:27:17
    southern Ryuku Islands between the
  • 00:27:18
    Japanese mainland and Taiwan a total of
  • 00:27:21
    68 times throughout 2024. A massive
  • 00:27:25
    increase in frequency from the only 21
  • 00:27:27
    reported times that they did so back in
  • 00:27:29
    2021. A few months later, in June of
  • 00:27:32
    2025, the same Japanese defense minister
  • 00:27:35
    said that one of the PLN's aircraft
  • 00:27:37
    carriers, the Lao Ning, was spotted out
  • 00:27:39
    in waters to the east of the island of
  • 00:27:41
    Ewima, marking the first known time that
  • 00:27:44
    a Chinese aircraft carrier has ever
  • 00:27:47
    sailed beyond the so-called second
  • 00:27:49
    island chain, the rear line of defense
  • 00:27:51
    the US employs against China that is
  • 00:27:53
    centered on Guam. And perhaps most
  • 00:27:56
    notably of all, there's the enormous
  • 00:27:58
    construction project that satellites
  • 00:27:59
    have recently captured going on just to
  • 00:28:01
    the southwest of China's capital city,
  • 00:28:04
    Beijing. Taking a closer look at the
  • 00:28:06
    site, this was what it looked like when
  • 00:28:08
    taken by satellite imagery on the 5th of
  • 00:28:10
    February, 2022, just a little over 3
  • 00:28:13
    years ago before this video's
  • 00:28:14
    production. It doesn't really look like
  • 00:28:16
    very much of notice happening yet. But
  • 00:28:19
    then simply fast forward the clock by a
  • 00:28:20
    year to the 25th of February of 2023 and
  • 00:28:23
    you'll see that the entire area has been
  • 00:28:26
    completely cleared out of everything
  • 00:28:28
    that used to exist there with all of the
  • 00:28:30
    previously existing residential
  • 00:28:31
    buildings flattened and erased. Then
  • 00:28:34
    fast forward the clock by a little over
  • 00:28:35
    another year to the 26th of June of 2024
  • 00:28:39
    and you'll see another huge change with
  • 00:28:41
    a massive new monumental construction
  • 00:28:43
    project taking shape in the area with
  • 00:28:46
    the whole place now looking basically
  • 00:28:48
    nothing like it used to back in early
  • 00:28:50
    2022. Fast forward just about another
  • 00:28:52
    year later to March of 2025, and you'll
  • 00:28:55
    notice a complex of buildings taking
  • 00:28:57
    shape in the center. And with dozens of
  • 00:28:59
    construction cranes still active, making
  • 00:29:01
    this appear to be a truly enormous
  • 00:29:03
    construction effort. Chinese government
  • 00:29:06
    websites have not publicly commented on
  • 00:29:08
    any of this construction to date. And
  • 00:29:10
    the Chinese government has refused to
  • 00:29:11
    answer any questions pertaining to the
  • 00:29:13
    construction site by journalists. That
  • 00:29:15
    has left a lot of speculation online as
  • 00:29:18
    to what exactly this huge construction
  • 00:29:20
    project going on actually is. And to
  • 00:29:23
    most outsiders, it certainly appears to
  • 00:29:25
    be something military related. The final
  • 00:29:28
    image of the construction site taken in
  • 00:29:30
    March of 2025 appears to show around a
  • 00:29:32
    100 construction cranes active at the
  • 00:29:34
    site that are busy building deep
  • 00:29:36
    subterranean tunnels, facilities, and
  • 00:29:39
    passageways that all seem to be being
  • 00:29:41
    reinforced by thick layers of concrete,
  • 00:29:44
    making whatever is going on here
  • 00:29:46
    appearing to be an extremely sensitive
  • 00:29:48
    military PLA site. The area is truly
  • 00:29:51
    huge, coming in at around 1,500 acres or
  • 00:29:55
    5 square kilometers in total, or in
  • 00:29:57
    other words, roughly 10 times the size
  • 00:30:00
    of the Pentagon near Washington DC. The
  • 00:30:02
    building that is usually regarded as the
  • 00:30:04
    world's largest office building
  • 00:30:06
    currently. Some highranking US defense
  • 00:30:09
    officials have voiced their belief that
  • 00:30:11
    the site is being constructed to offer
  • 00:30:13
    greater security for highlevel Chinese
  • 00:30:15
    officials from advanced US bunker buster
  • 00:30:18
    munitions during a time of war or even
  • 00:30:21
    from US nuclear weapons as evidenced by
  • 00:30:24
    all of the extensive and deep
  • 00:30:26
    subterranean construction going on at
  • 00:30:28
    the site and all of the secrecy
  • 00:30:29
    surrounding it. It's probable that with
  • 00:30:32
    the site being built so close by to
  • 00:30:34
    Beijing, this new complex captured in
  • 00:30:36
    satellite imagery could become the PLA's
  • 00:30:39
    new top military headquarters and serve
  • 00:30:41
    as China's wartime command center during
  • 00:30:44
    an invasion of Taiwan scenario. Serving
  • 00:30:46
    a highly similar role as the Pentagon
  • 00:30:48
    does for the United States military, but
  • 00:30:50
    on a vastly larger physical scale. As
  • 00:30:53
    often concerns the People's Republic of
  • 00:30:55
    China, however, matters of such
  • 00:30:57
    importance as massive subterranean
  • 00:30:59
    military fortresses, barges designed for
  • 00:31:02
    huge armored amphibious invasions, and
  • 00:31:04
    remote airfields designed for target
  • 00:31:06
    practicing of US warships in the
  • 00:31:07
    Taiwanese capital are rarely ever
  • 00:31:09
    mentioned or discussed publicly by the
  • 00:31:11
    country's government. While China has
  • 00:31:13
    spent the past several decades gradually
  • 00:31:15
    opening itself up to the world, China
  • 00:31:17
    has also continued growing even more
  • 00:31:19
    authoritarian and centralized around the
  • 00:31:21
    leadership and vision of Xihinping.
  • 00:31:24
    China is currently ranked as the third
  • 00:31:26
    least free country in the world in terms
  • 00:31:28
    of freedom of the press, just barely
  • 00:31:30
    behind the blatantly totalitarian states
  • 00:31:32
    of North Korea and Eratraa. There are
  • 00:31:35
    still many elements about China that
  • 00:31:37
    remain closely guarded and highly
  • 00:31:38
    sensitive subjects of the state. And
  • 00:31:41
    perhaps none of them are as
  • 00:31:42
    controversial, muddied by propaganda,
  • 00:31:44
    and misunderstood as the events that
  • 00:31:46
    took place 36 years ago at Tienaman
  • 00:31:49
    Square in Beijing in June of 1989.
  • 00:31:52
    You're probably already pretty familiar
  • 00:31:54
    with this event, and you've probably
  • 00:31:56
    heard of it by any number of different
  • 00:31:58
    names. that people with all kinds of
  • 00:32:00
    different agendas have attempted to
  • 00:32:01
    label it as the Tianaan Square massacre
  • 00:32:04
    as it is often referred to in the West,
  • 00:32:06
    the June 4th incident as it is usually
  • 00:32:08
    referred to in China, or the more vague
  • 00:32:11
    Tianaan Square incident or uprising.
  • 00:32:14
    Many of the images taken from the events
  • 00:32:15
    that took place around Tianan Square in
  • 00:32:17
    1989 have become some of the most famous
  • 00:32:20
    photographs ever taken in history. Like
  • 00:32:22
    the tank man photo that shows a lone,
  • 00:32:24
    never identified, unknown man standing
  • 00:32:27
    in front of a column of People's
  • 00:32:28
    Liberation Army tanks leaving from the
  • 00:32:31
    square merely hours after the army had
  • 00:32:34
    just violently cleared the square out of
  • 00:32:36
    tens of thousands of studentled
  • 00:32:38
    protesters. The details of what exactly
  • 00:32:40
    happened over the 48 hours before this
  • 00:32:42
    photograph was taken while the PLA
  • 00:32:44
    cleared Tienman Square out is one of the
  • 00:32:47
    most contentious subjects of the entire
  • 00:32:49
    21st century. The official Chinese
  • 00:32:52
    government story is that only 241 people
  • 00:32:55
    were killed during the army's 2-day
  • 00:32:57
    operation to clear out the square of
  • 00:32:59
    protesters. But multiple outside Western
  • 00:33:02
    sources at the time reported much higher
  • 00:33:04
    figures. The US ambassador to China at
  • 00:33:07
    the time who was present in Beijing
  • 00:33:08
    reported that a minimum of several
  • 00:33:10
    hundred people had been killed. Hospital
  • 00:33:12
    records from Beijing that were compiled
  • 00:33:14
    shortly afterwards recorded at least 478
  • 00:33:16
    deaths that were likely caused by the
  • 00:33:18
    events. Amnesty International initially
  • 00:33:20
    put their estimate for the dead at
  • 00:33:22
    between several hundred and close to a
  • 00:33:24
    thousand, while the Chinese Red Cross
  • 00:33:26
    initially gave a figure for around 2600
  • 00:33:28
    deaths during the incident before
  • 00:33:30
    withdrawing their claim under Chinese
  • 00:33:32
    government pressure. And the Swiss
  • 00:33:33
    ambassador to China at the time gave a
  • 00:33:35
    similar figure of around 2,700 deaths.
  • 00:33:38
    While there are also less credible
  • 00:33:40
    estimates from the British ambassador to
  • 00:33:42
    China at the time, who initially gave a
  • 00:33:44
    dramatically higher minimum figure of
  • 00:33:46
    10,000 deaths, but who then later
  • 00:33:49
    revised his estimate down to between
  • 00:33:51
    2,700 and 3,400 deaths instead. Finding
  • 00:33:54
    out the true scale of the violence that
  • 00:33:57
    happened at Tianaan Square in June of
  • 00:33:58
    1989 is difficult, if not even outright
  • 00:34:01
    impossible because A, China goes to
  • 00:34:04
    extreme lengths to enormously censor the
  • 00:34:07
    event in an attempt to bury any memory
  • 00:34:09
    and discussion about it. And B, Western
  • 00:34:12
    sources were and still are heavily
  • 00:34:14
    incentivized to embellish or
  • 00:34:16
    overexaggerate the brutality of it.
  • 00:34:18
    Searches for Tienman Square Massacre,
  • 00:34:20
    June 4th, Tankman, and sensitive numbers
  • 00:34:23
    like 64 for June 4th, or 8964 are all
  • 00:34:27
    blocked or returned no results on
  • 00:34:29
    Chinese search engines like BU to this
  • 00:34:32
    day. While posts about the events on
  • 00:34:34
    Chinese social media apps like WeChat
  • 00:34:36
    and Duian, China's native version of Tik
  • 00:34:38
    Tok, remain autodeed by algorithms or
  • 00:34:41
    shadowbanned. The events are entirely
  • 00:34:43
    omitted from all history textbooks in
  • 00:34:46
    mainland China. And even foreign
  • 00:34:48
    scholars who have published work about
  • 00:34:49
    the Tienman Square events will often be
  • 00:34:51
    denied visas or access to the Chinese
  • 00:34:53
    archives, collectively making the
  • 00:34:55
    Tienman Square events the most heavily
  • 00:34:57
    censored event in modern history and
  • 00:34:59
    probably the most difficult modern
  • 00:35:01
    historical subject to properly research.
  • 00:35:04
    Nonetheless, I still made an entire
  • 00:35:06
    video about my own investigation into
  • 00:35:08
    the TNMan Square June 1989 events in my
  • 00:35:10
    modern conflict series, which I create
  • 00:35:13
    new videos in every single month, taking
  • 00:35:15
    deeper dives into more recent,
  • 00:35:17
    controversial, and darker subject
  • 00:35:19
    material surrounding modern wars,
  • 00:35:21
    operations, and conflicts. Over the past
  • 00:35:23
    four years of doing this, I've created
  • 00:35:25
    around 50 total episodes in modern
  • 00:35:27
    conflicts, covering other topics as
  • 00:35:29
    diverse as the undeclared war and
  • 00:35:31
    skirmishes between North and South Korea
  • 00:35:33
    since 2000. China's policies of
  • 00:35:35
    repression against its Muslim weaguer
  • 00:35:37
    population in Shing Jang. The Myanmar
  • 00:35:39
    civil war and that regime's modern
  • 00:35:41
    genocide against its minority Rohinda
  • 00:35:43
    people. The border fights between China
  • 00:35:45
    and India across 2020 and 2021. And
  • 00:35:48
    dozens of other episodes with brand new
  • 00:35:50
    ones like this Tianaan Square 1989
  • 00:35:52
    episode coming out every single month,
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    all exclusively on Nebula. Because of
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    the inherently violent and controversial
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    details surrounding the discussion of
  • 00:36:01
    all of this, my episode investigating
  • 00:36:03
    what actually took place around Tianaan
  • 00:36:05
    Square in June of 1989 would never work
  • 00:36:07
    on YouTube because it would instantly
  • 00:36:10
    become demonetized and age restricted,
  • 00:36:12
    which means that YouTube's algorithm,
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    which is based around showing you ads,
  • 00:36:15
    would never be incentivized to actually
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    show the video to you or to promote it.
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    I deal with very large numbers of my
  • 00:36:21
    videos on YouTube getting demonetized
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    and age restricted as they are. And
  • 00:36:25
    that's why I upload all of my episodes
  • 00:36:27
    in modern conflicts exclusively to
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    Nebula and why signing up to Nebula is
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    the absolute best thing that you can do
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    to support me and my channel. And you'll
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    also get access to way more content than
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    just my own exclusive Modern Conflict
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    series there as well. Because the best
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    part about Nebula is that it's jointly
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    co-owned by myself and hundreds of other
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    projects that we're all actually deeply
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    excited about without any fear of being
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    censored or demonetized like we are on
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    YouTube. And that's why there's tons of
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    other new unique content on Nebula
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    that's coming out all the time too that
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    and so so many others. I also know that
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    You just pay once and then you'll get
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الوسوم
  • China
  • Taiwan
  • military
  • invasion
  • amphibious assault
  • satellite imagery
  • logistics
  • defense
  • U.S. Navy
  • regional security