The Trump Presidency's Foreign Policy: Implications for the Middle East and Shifting Global Dynamics

00:59:34
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W2sfxJPSgp4

الملخص

TLDRThe panel explored the potential implications of the recent US elections, with a particular focus on what a Trump-led foreign policy might look like, particularly in the Middle East. The discussion covered the potential for continuity in US foreign policy toward the Middle East, especially regarding Israel and Iran, and considered the strategies of other global powers like China and Russia in the region. There was a consensus that while Trump may maintain pressure on Iran and push for stronger ties with Israel, his policies may also signal shifts in traditional diplomatic and strategic alignments. The potential for continued US withdrawal from the Middle East and its impacts on regional power dynamics was also examined. Overall, the panel highlighted how global and domestic politics could influence Trump's foreign policy decisions.

الوجبات الجاهزة

  • 🌍 Discussion on implications of US elections on global politics.
  • 💼 Exploration of Trump's potential foreign policy impacts.
  • 🇮🇱 Focus on US-Israel relations under a Trump administration.
  • 🇮🇷 Anticipation of return to maximum pressure on Iran.
  • 🤝 Russia and China's growing influence in the Middle East.
  • 💵 Economic opportunities and strategic shifts in the region.
  • 🛡️ Potential changes in US military presence and security dynamics.
  • 📈 Diverging strategies of global powers in economic and tech areas.
  • ♟️ Examination of strategic alignments among Middle Eastern actors.
  • 🔍 Insight into regional reactions to a Trump presidency.
  • 🗳️ Analysis of domestic impacts on foreign policy decisions.
  • 🔐 Discussions on security and alliance priorities.

الجدول الزمني

  • 00:00:00 - 00:05:00

    The panel discusses potential shifts in US foreign policy following a Republican election sweep and Trump's disdain for multilateralism. There's a focus on the Middle East, US relations with Russia and China, and regional alignments.

  • 00:05:00 - 00:10:00

    Matt discusses continuity in US foreign policy from Biden to Trump, including relationships with Saudi Arabia, the Iran nuclear deal, and the Abraham Accords. US focus on China as a major rival is also highlighted.

  • 00:10:00 - 00:15:00

    Nicole explores Russia's disappointment with the initial Trump Administration and its strategic recalibration towards Iran due to the Ukraine conflict, despite speculation about changes in relations.

  • 00:15:00 - 00:20:00

    There's a discussion about the potential constraints the Republican Congress might impose on Trump regarding Russia, and how sanctions and competition with China might play into this dynamic.

  • 00:20:00 - 00:25:00

    Tong discusses China's interests in the Middle East, highlighting economic ties and mediating roles. The US's retreat is viewed as an opportunity for China, amidst the competition with the US.

  • 00:25:00 - 00:30:00

    China's desire to expand influence in the Middle East's economic and political arenas is discussed. China's strategic rivalry with the US and Russia's traditional security role create a complex dynamic.

  • 00:30:00 - 00:35:00

    The Middle East's expectation of more Israeli annexation and the Trump Administration's likely lack of humanitarian concern is discussed. Challenges facing a ceasefire in Lebanon and Gaza include bilateral demands and developments.

  • 00:35:00 - 00:40:00

    Panelists express concern over potential US reversion to 'maximum pressure' on Iran under Trump and its ineffective history. Potential conflicts involving the US and regional security dynamics are assessed.

  • 00:40:00 - 00:45:00

    Discussions highlight how US-Iran tensions under a renewed Trump Administration might affect regional proxies and security alliances. The GCC's role amidst US-Iran tensions is considered linked to wider geopolitical strategies.

  • 00:45:00 - 00:50:00

    With China's deepening ties to Iran, Tong highlights how a confrontational US stance could impact China-Iran relations, particularly against the backdrop of maximum pressure policies from the US.

  • 00:50:00 - 00:59:34

    Nicole explains how Russia's relationship with Iran might influence its role in the region amidst US-Iran tensions, emphasizing how war and alliances could affect strategic decisions in the Middle East.

اعرض المزيد

الخريطة الذهنية

Mind Map

الأسئلة الشائعة

  • What potential shifts in US foreign policy were discussed?

    The panel discussed potential continuities and changes in US foreign policy under Trump, focusing on a possible return to maximum pressure on Iran, changes in relations with Russia and China, and implications for the Middle East.

  • How might Trump’s administration approach the Middle East differently?

    Trump’s administration may focus on furthering the Abraham Accords, supporting Israeli actions, and maintaining pressure on Iran while seeking economic opportunities.

  • What are the expected impacts of a Trump administration on US-China relations?

    It is expected that Trump's administration might pursue a more aggressive stance toward China, reinforcing economic and military influence in the Middle East to counteract China's growing presence.

  • How does the panel perceive Russia's role in the Middle East?

    Russia's role is seen as increasingly important, especially in the context of the Middle East's strategic shifts and Russia's military and political alliances in the region.

  • What might be the impact on Iran if Trump returns to power?

    A return to maximum pressure is expected, affecting Iran economically and politically, while Iran might continue to strengthen ties with Russia and China.

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التمرير التلقائي:
  • 00:00:06
    hi everyone and welcome to this panel um
  • 00:00:10
    we have a lot of ground to cover today
  • 00:00:12
    so I'm going to jump right into
  • 00:00:13
    questions but you can see we have an
  • 00:00:15
    excellent panel set of panelists here
  • 00:00:17
    today to discuss the issues at hand so
  • 00:00:19
    it's obviously been a seismic week in in
  • 00:00:21
    us and global politics with a republican
  • 00:00:23
    sweep of the elections on Tuesday so I
  • 00:00:25
    thought we'd treat this as a sort of
  • 00:00:27
    in-depth uh Trump foreign policy primer
  • 00:00:29
    since we have this hour so the panel is
  • 00:00:32
    is going to examine the election
  • 00:00:33
    outcomes and their implications for the
  • 00:00:34
    Middle East and we'll focus on
  • 00:00:36
    anticipated shifts in US relations with
  • 00:00:38
    Russia and China as well as the roles of
  • 00:00:40
    regional actors and we'll also be
  • 00:00:42
    exploring potential shifts in strategic
  • 00:00:44
    alignments and economic opportunities so
  • 00:00:46
    I'd like to start with a sort of broad
  • 00:00:48
    bigger picture question for Matt if we
  • 00:00:50
    can so what are the potential changes in
  • 00:00:52
    US foreign policy that we should be
  • 00:00:54
    anticipating globally and given Trump's
  • 00:00:56
    relative disdain for for multilateralism
  • 00:00:58
    I think that's something that we we
  • 00:00:59
    should explore from a sort of um broader
  • 00:01:02
    perspective and I'd like to also explore
  • 00:01:04
    how these shifts would resonate
  • 00:01:06
    specifically across the Middle East sure
  • 00:01:09
    and um thank you for inviting me to be
  • 00:01:10
    part of this it's great to be back with
  • 00:01:12
    uh Carnegie um and great to see you all
  • 00:01:15
    so I think what's going to be
  • 00:01:16
    interesting about Trump is actually how
  • 00:01:18
    much continuity we might see uh with
  • 00:01:21
    Biden because we saw unfortunately in my
  • 00:01:23
    view a lot of continuity from Trump to
  • 00:01:26
    Biden I think Biden campaigned um as a
  • 00:01:30
    human rights President he campaigned he
  • 00:01:32
    was very critical of Saudi Arabia the US
  • 00:01:35
    Saudi relationship he was critical of
  • 00:01:37
    trump for withdrawing from the Iran
  • 00:01:39
    nuclear deal which he promised
  • 00:01:41
    unequivocally uh to rejoin um all of
  • 00:01:44
    that changed uh when Biden took office
  • 00:01:47
    uh he you know he slow walked the the
  • 00:01:50
    return to the Iran nuclear agreement the
  • 00:01:52
    jcpoa and it eventually um was unable to
  • 00:01:55
    do that and it's all but dead now as he
  • 00:01:57
    has said um he within a few months
  • 00:02:00
    um started a a reproach with um Saudi
  • 00:02:04
    Arabia um and after initially kind of
  • 00:02:07
    holding the Abraham Accords at arms
  • 00:02:09
    length and saying well we can kind of
  • 00:02:11
    see what we can do with this is this a
  • 00:02:12
    framework for kind of regional stability
  • 00:02:14
    they embraced it um completely um and
  • 00:02:18
    and that's that's that's where we're at
  • 00:02:20
    um so I think what we'll see with Trump
  • 00:02:22
    is just a lot more of that I mean even
  • 00:02:24
    without the kind of nominal pressure
  • 00:02:27
    which I would barely even call pressure
  • 00:02:29
    we've seen from the Administration on
  • 00:02:31
    the Israeli government with regard to
  • 00:02:32
    the way they're waging the war in Gaza
  • 00:02:34
    and regionally I mean you know the
  • 00:02:36
    little cautions here and there we won't
  • 00:02:38
    really even uh get any of that um you
  • 00:02:42
    know Trump is the one who is credited
  • 00:02:44
    under his administration the Abraham
  • 00:02:45
    Accords were were signed he's going to
  • 00:02:47
    clearly keep pushing for that um you
  • 00:02:50
    know as a way of kind of building a
  • 00:02:51
    regional security alliance against Iran
  • 00:02:55
    um but also I think what's part of what
  • 00:02:56
    has been driving the US approach to the
  • 00:02:59
    region especially under Biden um is the
  • 00:03:01
    kind of new obsession with China uh in
  • 00:03:04
    in Washington now clearly this again
  • 00:03:06
    started this shift really began in in a
  • 00:03:09
    in a big way under Trump uh they named
  • 00:03:11
    China uh in the um National Security
  • 00:03:13
    strategy under the Trump Administration
  • 00:03:15
    China as the America's biggest rival and
  • 00:03:18
    the Trump Biden Administration has
  • 00:03:20
    referred to it as America's pacing
  • 00:03:21
    threat whatever term one wants to use
  • 00:03:24
    but a lot of the Biden administration's
  • 00:03:26
    policy has been Guided by this effort uh
  • 00:03:29
    to essentially try and box China um out
  • 00:03:32
    of the region um you know which I think
  • 00:03:34
    is misguided my view is that China has
  • 00:03:36
    no desire to supplant the United States
  • 00:03:38
    as kind of the regional security
  • 00:03:40
    guarantor they watched the United States
  • 00:03:42
    um you know tripping over itself for the
  • 00:03:44
    for the past several decades um why
  • 00:03:46
    would they want a piece of that but yet
  • 00:03:48
    this is kind of the new uh the new kind
  • 00:03:50
    of guiding Obsession for so many in
  • 00:03:52
    Washington and for this Administration
  • 00:03:54
    and I think we're going to see more of
  • 00:03:56
    that from Trump as well
  • 00:04:00
    thanks Matt and we'll delve more into
  • 00:04:02
    Iran and Gaza and Lebanon in a little
  • 00:04:04
    bit um I wanted to turn to Nicole first
  • 00:04:07
    I mean how do you think Russia could
  • 00:04:08
    respond to these potential US policy
  • 00:04:10
    shifts even though Matt seems to think
  • 00:04:11
    that there won't be a lot of them but um
  • 00:04:13
    but generally speaking given the
  • 00:04:15
    previous administr the the Trump
  • 00:04:16
    Administration in in 2017 how do you
  • 00:04:19
    sort of see um how do you see Russia as
  • 00:04:21
    being able to respond given a potential
  • 00:04:22
    shift in Dynamic compared to the Biden
  • 00:04:24
    Administration and I'm thinking
  • 00:04:26
    particularly about Iran and Israel but
  • 00:04:28
    also Syria
  • 00:04:30
    yeah I mean that's an interesting
  • 00:04:32
    question and I think we have to go back
  • 00:04:34
    to actually 2017 I mean there was a lot
  • 00:04:36
    of Hope initially in Russia that the
  • 00:04:38
    Trump Administration would allow Russia
  • 00:04:41
    to reap benefits um because of partially
  • 00:04:43
    uh Trump's inclination towards Putin but
  • 00:04:46
    then what we actually saw was a far more
  • 00:04:47
    forceful and actually um hostile
  • 00:04:50
    Administration to the Russians I mean
  • 00:04:52
    you see sanctions on Russia um secondary
  • 00:04:55
    sanctions that impacted its arms um
  • 00:04:57
    exports um there was imp on Ukraine with
  • 00:05:00
    the Trump Administration actually
  • 00:05:02
    providing Ukraine with weapons at the
  • 00:05:03
    very um beginning prior to the Russian
  • 00:05:06
    invasion in 2022 so there was this kind
  • 00:05:09
    of shift in in animosity towards Trump
  • 00:05:11
    and I think it led to a sense of
  • 00:05:12
    disappointment in Russia and that's
  • 00:05:13
    really reflected by the way that the
  • 00:05:15
    Russians are discussing the Trump uh
  • 00:05:17
    election right now I mean Putin has thus
  • 00:05:20
    far kind of um indicated that he's uh
  • 00:05:23
    open to dialogue with the Russians he he
  • 00:05:26
    articulated this yesterday at the valdi
  • 00:05:28
    discussion Club um and congratulated
  • 00:05:30
    Trump which is kind of a stark contrast
  • 00:05:32
    to Biden where it took him about like I
  • 00:05:34
    think two months or a month or so to
  • 00:05:36
    congratulate Biden or even mention this
  • 00:05:38
    but then you see statements coming out
  • 00:05:40
    of the Russian government saying that
  • 00:05:42
    you know this is not going to change um
  • 00:05:44
    the Russian priorities in Ukraine this
  • 00:05:46
    is not going to lead to substantial
  • 00:05:47
    shift in what Russia's goals are in the
  • 00:05:49
    in the battlefield and I think that
  • 00:05:51
    applies also to the Middle East I mean
  • 00:05:53
    there's been a massive transformation in
  • 00:05:55
    Russian foreign policy towards the
  • 00:05:56
    Middle East since Trump's last
  • 00:05:58
    presidency um and that's partly because
  • 00:06:00
    of the war in Ukraine but also because
  • 00:06:02
    of October 7 um there's this
  • 00:06:04
    recalibration towards Iran um away from
  • 00:06:06
    The Balancing Act that Russia used to
  • 00:06:08
    play with Iran and Israel um and then on
  • 00:06:11
    top of that is now you see this
  • 00:06:12
    increasing pressure that Russia is
  • 00:06:14
    facing from Israel um actually in Syria
  • 00:06:16
    and I think you alluded to this is um
  • 00:06:18
    there's been more strikes on assets
  • 00:06:21
    really in close proximity to Russian
  • 00:06:23
    interests and Tartus and laaka that um
  • 00:06:26
    would would have been a red red line in
  • 00:06:28
    um in the past and so maybe Russia might
  • 00:06:30
    try to do what they did in around 2018
  • 00:06:34
    and have this kind of grand bargain with
  • 00:06:35
    the Trump Administration but I don't see
  • 00:06:37
    it coming to the detriment of Iranian
  • 00:06:39
    interests um because Russia is so
  • 00:06:41
    entrenched and inwin intertwined with
  • 00:06:43
    the Iranians with its war in Ukraine um
  • 00:06:46
    and as long as the war in Ukraine
  • 00:06:47
    persists I think for the Russians its
  • 00:06:49
    priorities in the Middle East are also
  • 00:06:51
    going to be shaped by that um and that's
  • 00:06:53
    kind of the reality that they're facing
  • 00:06:54
    and and and I don't think that the
  • 00:06:56
    Russians have any disillusions when it
  • 00:06:58
    comes or illus when it comes to um the
  • 00:07:02
    US Administration I mean they understand
  • 00:07:04
    that the role of Congress is probably
  • 00:07:05
    going to play a pretty big role as well
  • 00:07:07
    and that any kind of ront between the US
  • 00:07:09
    and Russia is going to be constrained by
  • 00:07:11
    either allegations of R Russia's
  • 00:07:13
    internal interference or the war in
  • 00:07:15
    Ukraine so I I wouldn't say that the
  • 00:07:17
    Russians are actually viewing this as a
  • 00:07:19
    real big opportunity they're actually
  • 00:07:20
    quite cautious at the
  • 00:07:23
    moment that's really interesting
  • 00:07:25
    particularly regarding the the sort of
  • 00:07:26
    Syria Paradigm but do you think that
  • 00:07:28
    even with um both houses of Congress I
  • 00:07:30
    mean I know that the house hasn't been
  • 00:07:31
    determined yet but with both houses of
  • 00:07:33
    Congress seemingly going Republican do
  • 00:07:35
    you really think that that's going to be
  • 00:07:37
    seen as a constraint on
  • 00:07:39
    Trump I mean I think that there is a
  • 00:07:41
    domestic atmosphere even within the
  • 00:07:43
    Republican Party about uh the Russians
  • 00:07:45
    at the moment I don't think that the
  • 00:07:47
    Republican party is necessarily the one
  • 00:07:49
    that is at the moment as inclined as it
  • 00:07:51
    would have been in the past to pursue
  • 00:07:53
    kind of a reproach with the Russians and
  • 00:07:55
    then on top of that is sanctions are
  • 00:07:56
    quite difficult to remove and Russia's
  • 00:07:58
    under far more comprehensive sanction
  • 00:08:00
    regime than it was um in the first Trump
  • 00:08:03
    Administration so that's going to face a
  • 00:08:05
    diff difficulty as well and of course
  • 00:08:07
    there's a European side of this and I
  • 00:08:08
    think that's a whole another story
  • 00:08:10
    between Trump and the Europeans but I do
  • 00:08:12
    think that there will be constraints I
  • 00:08:13
    mean there will be opposition at least
  • 00:08:15
    within the House of Representatives it
  • 00:08:16
    might make it more difficult there could
  • 00:08:18
    be inquiries I mean I don't think that
  • 00:08:20
    the the the Trump Administration is
  • 00:08:22
    going to be so unhindered when it comes
  • 00:08:23
    to its engagement with the Russians and
  • 00:08:26
    I wonder how much R Russia is a priority
  • 00:08:28
    for the Trump administration at the
  • 00:08:29
    moment I mean if they're going on the
  • 00:08:31
    goals of kind of this competition with
  • 00:08:33
    China is Russia going to still maintain
  • 00:08:35
    a pretty big role in what their forign P
  • 00:08:37
    foreign policy priorities
  • 00:08:39
    are thanks Nicole I mean since China's
  • 00:08:42
    on on everyone's lips today Tong I'd
  • 00:08:44
    like to ask you about China's M Le
  • 00:08:46
    strategy specifically so do you see
  • 00:08:48
    China moving to deep in its economic and
  • 00:08:50
    diplomatic ties in the region um and
  • 00:08:52
    where might China strategy diverge or
  • 00:08:54
    overlap with Russia and the
  • 00:08:58
    US's well as uh Nicole mentioned I think
  • 00:09:01
    uh Beijing expects a tougher uh China
  • 00:09:04
    policy from the Trump
  • 00:09:06
    Administration um and China's own policy
  • 00:09:09
    will all be uh will all be uh also be
  • 00:09:13
    more anti anti the United States but the
  • 00:09:17
    uh on the other side uh I think China
  • 00:09:21
    sees an opportunity that the US uh L
  • 00:09:25
    coalision against China might be
  • 00:09:27
    weakened under Trump
  • 00:09:30
    um so that increases Chinese interests
  • 00:09:32
    to uh drave wedge um between us and US
  • 00:09:36
    allies traditional allies uh and
  • 00:09:39
    expanding China's own uh influence
  • 00:09:41
    geoeconomic and geopolitical influence
  • 00:09:44
    in other regions and Middle East is of
  • 00:09:47
    course increasingly important region for
  • 00:09:50
    China it's such a key Hub of China's B
  • 00:09:53
    and Road initiative the geopolitical
  • 00:09:56
    importance uh is obvious uh um and China
  • 00:10:00
    has made some recent progress in uh you
  • 00:10:04
    know playing the role of a mediator uh
  • 00:10:06
    in in the Middle East um and so far um
  • 00:10:11
    China sees uh us uh
  • 00:10:14
    largely has been retreating from the
  • 00:10:17
    region it is losing influence many
  • 00:10:19
    Chinese strategists pointed out that the
  • 00:10:23
    recent War the escalation of the
  • 00:10:25
    conflict uh is a strong evidence of
  • 00:10:28
    decline American influence in this
  • 00:10:31
    region uh I think China expects uh
  • 00:10:35
    president Trump
  • 00:10:36
    to uh more likely to want to end the war
  • 00:10:41
    in the Middle East
  • 00:10:43
    quickly uh and uh if the situation
  • 00:10:46
    stabilizes
  • 00:10:48
    afterwards uh China would see a greater
  • 00:10:51
    opportunity for it to expand its own
  • 00:10:55
    ambition in this region it's true that
  • 00:10:58
    traditionally China has been focusing on
  • 00:11:01
    enhancing its geoeconomic influence uh
  • 00:11:05
    in the region there is uh perceived a
  • 00:11:09
    need from many Regional countries for
  • 00:11:12
    Chinese Investments
  • 00:11:14
    Technologies uh China thinks it has real
  • 00:11:18
    Advantage uh in economic area
  • 00:11:20
    infrastructure building uh high tech um
  • 00:11:24
    and China believe that to help Boer
  • 00:11:28
    economic ties w the region to help
  • 00:11:30
    Regional countries develop uh will also
  • 00:11:33
    contribute to uh Stronger foundation for
  • 00:11:38
    regional uh peace and and security um
  • 00:11:41
    that said I think China also has um
  • 00:11:45
    growing geopolitical ambition uh in in
  • 00:11:49
    this region but how would China go about
  • 00:11:52
    it uh is a little uncertain China used
  • 00:11:55
    to be uh adopting a balanced uh approach
  • 00:12:00
    to develop uh relations with all major
  • 00:12:03
    powers in the region but now uh the
  • 00:12:06
    interest in undermining American
  • 00:12:09
    reputation has also influenced uh
  • 00:12:12
    China's relationship with uh Israel um
  • 00:12:17
    so uh in either case I think we are
  • 00:12:20
    likely to see China continuing its
  • 00:12:22
    current efforts to deepen relations with
  • 00:12:25
    Arab countries uh you know continue its
  • 00:12:28
    promotion of uh the China Arab states uh
  • 00:12:32
    cooperation Forum the gulf multilateral
  • 00:12:35
    security dialogue wanting to recruit
  • 00:12:38
    more Regional countries uh into the
  • 00:12:41
    bricks um group um and uh China sees
  • 00:12:47
    opportunity uh to further uh drive a
  • 00:12:50
    wedge uh between traditional us allies
  • 00:12:53
    in this region and United States China
  • 00:12:56
    thinks you know many Regional countries
  • 00:12:58
    want to diver I ify their
  • 00:13:00
    relationship um and um I think that
  • 00:13:03
    provides opportunity for China to
  • 00:13:05
    gradually expand its influence regarding
  • 00:13:09
    um Russia China uh relationship in the
  • 00:13:13
    region um I think in theory there would
  • 00:13:16
    be greater opportunity for Russia and
  • 00:13:18
    China to coordinate their policies but
  • 00:13:21
    this will be an uneasy process because
  • 00:13:25
    again traditionally Russia is the
  • 00:13:27
    security is taking taking the lead on
  • 00:13:30
    Regional security issues and China was
  • 00:13:33
    focused on economic issues but I think
  • 00:13:36
    in areas where Russia feels kind of
  • 00:13:38
    comfortable and where Regional countries
  • 00:13:40
    have a demand uh China would try to
  • 00:13:43
    expand its influence in security and
  • 00:13:47
    political issues as well including uh to
  • 00:13:50
    have uh you know joint military
  • 00:13:52
    exercises with Russia and Regional
  • 00:13:57
    countries thank thank you um mahend I'd
  • 00:14:01
    like to turn to you if you could give us
  • 00:14:02
    a view from the Middle East I mean
  • 00:14:04
    obviously a lot of people on this call
  • 00:14:05
    will have um the conflict in Gaza top of
  • 00:14:08
    mind and they also be thinking about
  • 00:14:10
    Lebanon and what the sort of prospects
  • 00:14:12
    are for a
  • 00:14:14
    ceasefire thank you the
  • 00:14:17
    the main expectation from the Trump
  • 00:14:20
    Administration in in the next phase is
  • 00:14:22
    basically more annexation of Palestinian
  • 00:14:25
    lands in the West Bank um perhaps um
  • 00:14:29
    even um beyond that you know whether
  • 00:14:32
    Israel has some um annexation plans in
  • 00:14:36
    the Gaza Strip for instance you know
  • 00:14:38
    we've heard one of the ministers make a
  • 00:14:40
    statement on that um that is definitely
  • 00:14:44
    an expectation in terms of the
  • 00:14:46
    humanitarian cost of the conflict we've
  • 00:14:48
    so um the Biden Administration put some
  • 00:14:51
    pressure and and give some warnings on
  • 00:14:53
    the humanitarian um side of the conflict
  • 00:14:56
    you know allowing uh Palestinians more
  • 00:14:59
    access to Aid vaccines Etc I think that
  • 00:15:03
    will not be the case under the Trump
  • 00:15:05
    Administration most likely will not be
  • 00:15:07
    the case on the Trump Administration um
  • 00:15:09
    he has little scres allowing
  • 00:15:11
    Israel um to continue the um conflict as
  • 00:15:15
    such I mean there has been an
  • 00:15:18
    announcement that he will seek a
  • 00:15:20
    ceasefire very quickly but there there
  • 00:15:23
    there's no discussion of what a
  • 00:15:24
    ceasefire agreement that's acceptable to
  • 00:15:26
    him uh looks like I mean Biden has a
  • 00:15:29
    plan which is now you know rejected or
  • 00:15:32
    brushed aside by Netanyahu but we don't
  • 00:15:35
    know exactly what Trump um is is going
  • 00:15:38
    to Endor endorse in his uh in his
  • 00:15:41
    attempt um to impose ceasefire and in
  • 00:15:44
    the Gaza Strip on on lebanon's side I
  • 00:15:48
    think it it's it's not um uh it's not
  • 00:15:53
    difficult to find um to reach a
  • 00:15:55
    ceasefire agreement now given that
  • 00:15:59
    hisbah accepts um the 1701 accepts a
  • 00:16:03
    separation between the Gaza Strip and
  • 00:16:05
    and Lebanon
  • 00:16:07
    fronts but is I think the differences
  • 00:16:10
    are on um the sovereignty issue whether
  • 00:16:14
    there Israel will be allowed uh to
  • 00:16:17
    conduct military operations after a
  • 00:16:19
    ceasefire agreement in case there's a
  • 00:16:21
    violation um you know Netanyahu is
  • 00:16:24
    asking for some sort of a mechanism that
  • 00:16:27
    would allow Israel to be some sort of of
  • 00:16:29
    a granter of of such an agreement and
  • 00:16:31
    that's unaccepted by hisbah so I I think
  • 00:16:35
    this requires some work and negotiations
  • 00:16:38
    and also uh from now until um January's
  • 00:16:42
    um inauguration you know we might see a
  • 00:16:44
    lot of developments on the ground
  • 00:16:47
    whether you know Israeli advances or
  • 00:16:49
    whether hisbah ullah's attempt to
  • 00:16:53
    achieve uh some sort of an attrition on
  • 00:16:56
    the battlefield leading the Israeli
  • 00:16:58
    decide to recalculate what they uh what
  • 00:17:01
    they expect or not from this conflict so
  • 00:17:03
    I think you know while the announcement
  • 00:17:06
    that you know Trump wants to cease fire
  • 00:17:08
    right now as he gets into office and you
  • 00:17:11
    know the reports that he has actually
  • 00:17:14
    asked Nan to wrap everything up before
  • 00:17:16
    he gets to office I think these will all
  • 00:17:19
    uh depend on how much um advances
  • 00:17:23
    Netanyahu can make on the
  • 00:17:25
    ground in in in Lebanon and at the same
  • 00:17:28
    same time you know what what what what
  • 00:17:31
    remains acceptable um for Hamas um and
  • 00:17:36
    its um allies in the Gaza Strip so you
  • 00:17:39
    know and all of that we have to put it
  • 00:17:42
    also in the context of what's going on
  • 00:17:44
    the escalation with Iran you know if
  • 00:17:45
    there's an
  • 00:17:47
    escalation um with Iran from now until
  • 00:17:50
    uh inauguration I think that will
  • 00:17:52
    further complicate um complicate the
  • 00:17:55
    situation so the view of the Middle East
  • 00:17:57
    is an expectation um of more annexation
  • 00:18:00
    in the West Bank a continuation of the
  • 00:18:03
    past po policies you know while there's
  • 00:18:06
    a continuation with uh the Biden
  • 00:18:08
    Administration in terms of pursuing the
  • 00:18:11
    uh the abrahamic Accords specifically
  • 00:18:12
    with Saudi Arabia I agree with that but
  • 00:18:15
    I think um under Trump there will be
  • 00:18:18
    perhaps more willingness um to engage
  • 00:18:20
    with that and give more concessions from
  • 00:18:22
    the US side to achieve to aieve to
  • 00:18:25
    achieve such an report and and continue
  • 00:18:28
    the course of of
  • 00:18:30
    overriding Palestinian statehood and
  • 00:18:32
    aspirations and Palestinian rights um
  • 00:18:36
    and also um on on the other hand in
  • 00:18:38
    terms of you know the relationship with
  • 00:18:41
    the gulf um you know the gulf is in a
  • 00:18:44
    totally different place now you know
  • 00:18:46
    it's has Diversified its relations it
  • 00:18:48
    has um more stable relations with um
  • 00:18:51
    stronger ties to Russia and to China um
  • 00:18:55
    I think these will be um difficult to
  • 00:18:58
    overturn
  • 00:18:59
    but I think you know Trump might have um
  • 00:19:04
    an interest specifically if he pursues
  • 00:19:07
    an an aggressive anti-china policy would
  • 00:19:10
    have an interest to negotiate uh
  • 00:19:12
    different Arrangements in in the Gulf
  • 00:19:15
    which will have um you know some more
  • 00:19:17
    cons security concessions um uh to uh to
  • 00:19:21
    give because I I don't think it will be
  • 00:19:23
    an easy deal as you know the campaign uh
  • 00:19:27
    has has
  • 00:19:29
    you know has seen uh him portray this as
  • 00:19:31
    an easy way forward you know and I think
  • 00:19:34
    I agree with what ni said about the
  • 00:19:36
    Ukraine uh context and I think not the
  • 00:19:38
    same the same context you know the
  • 00:19:40
    complications
  • 00:19:42
    institutional um uh hurdles you know all
  • 00:19:45
    of these apply as well to the Middle
  • 00:19:47
    East and you know one big uh question
  • 00:19:51
    that we all have about the Trump
  • 00:19:52
    Administration is that how much of an
  • 00:19:54
    Institutional push back will be in the
  • 00:19:57
    uh us against any Trump policy you know
  • 00:20:00
    we saw in in Trump um the first the
  • 00:20:04
    first time in
  • 00:20:06
    2016 we saw 2017 onwards we saw um a
  • 00:20:10
    push back against his attempt to
  • 00:20:13
    withdraw from Syria with all US forces
  • 00:20:15
    from Syria will that be the case and you
  • 00:20:17
    know with him controlling Congress and
  • 00:20:19
    with him having a majority of votes um
  • 00:20:23
    and a more confident Trump surrounded by
  • 00:20:26
    Loyalists and yes men um you know will
  • 00:20:29
    we see a different um a different policy
  • 00:20:32
    approach I think that's a that's a
  • 00:20:33
    question that we will see an answer to
  • 00:20:36
    very
  • 00:20:37
    soon thank you for that and you set us
  • 00:20:40
    up pretty well for the next uh segment
  • 00:20:42
    which will really look at Iran um and
  • 00:20:44
    the implications of of Trump's pivot on
  • 00:20:46
    on policy there so um Matt I mean top of
  • 00:20:49
    everyone's mind is as you know well we
  • 00:20:51
    see a rever like a sort of aggression
  • 00:20:53
    back to maximum pressure on Iran and and
  • 00:20:56
    more broadly what do we have an
  • 00:20:57
    indication of what Trump Trump's policy
  • 00:20:59
    will be on
  • 00:21:01
    Iran sure no I think we we can expect a
  • 00:21:03
    reversion to maximum pressure but I also
  • 00:21:06
    think it's you know worth noting you
  • 00:21:08
    know maximum pressure has never worked
  • 00:21:11
    um it is kind of one of these
  • 00:21:13
    unfalsifiable arguments if it's not
  • 00:21:15
    worked yet that that only means that we
  • 00:21:17
    need more pressure um but that's also
  • 00:21:19
    because it's not really a policy
  • 00:21:21
    argument it's a political and
  • 00:21:22
    ideological argument whose purpose is to
  • 00:21:25
    sustain kind of hostility um toward Iran
  • 00:21:29
    and to manage a political debate here
  • 00:21:31
    and to support a set of aggressive
  • 00:21:32
    policies toward Iran and you know and I
  • 00:21:34
    think my real concern here is we've seen
  • 00:21:37
    you know as I said I I expect continuity
  • 00:21:40
    from Biden to Trump because we saw
  • 00:21:42
    continuity in My View From Trump to
  • 00:21:43
    Biden but now that we're in this moment
  • 00:21:45
    where
  • 00:21:46
    Netanyahu clearly you know has made some
  • 00:21:49
    you know tact serious tactical gains
  • 00:21:52
    against obviously Hamas with enormous
  • 00:21:54
    human cost and then against Hezbollah um
  • 00:21:57
    and now kind of deals excuse me affirmed
  • 00:22:01
    um to kind of reshuffle the regional
  • 00:22:03
    security deck I expect he would
  • 00:22:05
    potentially have more support to
  • 00:22:07
    continue doing this um from Trump and
  • 00:22:10
    and the danger is um that the US gets
  • 00:22:13
    drawn uh into a larger conflict that
  • 00:22:15
    escalates out of control now even though
  • 00:22:18
    I think Trump's unpredictability and
  • 00:22:20
    recklessness have a tendency to bring
  • 00:22:22
    the United States to the brink of these
  • 00:22:24
    conflicts and have during his presidency
  • 00:22:27
    I mean let's remember we were closer I
  • 00:22:29
    think to war with North Korea than we
  • 00:22:31
    ever had been we were very close to an
  • 00:22:32
    open war with Iran in the wake of the
  • 00:22:34
    solomani assassination and Trump you
  • 00:22:37
    know when when he was at the brink um
  • 00:22:39
    kind of pulled back um I would also say
  • 00:22:41
    we we got a little lucky um that
  • 00:22:43
    adversaries didn't behave um in in a
  • 00:22:45
    more precipitous fashion um as well but
  • 00:22:48
    that is the real concern even though I
  • 00:22:50
    think Trump has shown some measure of
  • 00:22:52
    restraint when faced with open War um we
  • 00:22:55
    could get into a situation where it is
  • 00:22:57
    no longer our choice
  • 00:23:00
    which is interesting given a big plank
  • 00:23:01
    of his platform um during the campaign
  • 00:23:03
    has been that he would end all wars and
  • 00:23:05
    he's the sort of first president who
  • 00:23:07
    didn't start wars right if I could very
  • 00:23:10
    quickly I think that's a really
  • 00:23:11
    important point the fact that he saw
  • 00:23:13
    that lane he understood and Vance was
  • 00:23:15
    out there Vance's comments about Iran
  • 00:23:17
    were very important too I mean he said
  • 00:23:18
    you know Iran is up to a lot of bad
  • 00:23:20
    stuff but we don't want a war with Iran
  • 00:23:23
    um so again I I think that shows their
  • 00:23:27
    understanding that this is a con uency
  • 00:23:29
    of of undecided voters to be gotten and
  • 00:23:31
    that unfortunately was something the
  • 00:23:32
    Democrats did not get yeah although it's
  • 00:23:35
    interesting because a lot of their
  • 00:23:36
    people being floated as um leading his
  • 00:23:38
    foreign policy a lot of the same
  • 00:23:40
    characters who are there the first time
  • 00:23:41
    around so we we'll have to sort of wait
  • 00:23:43
    and see what that means um H I just
  • 00:23:45
    wanted to go back to you on that so so
  • 00:23:47
    what what do you think um that sort of
  • 00:23:50
    shift is going to mean for Iran's
  • 00:23:51
    network of proxies in the region I'm
  • 00:23:53
    thinking particularly if sanctions get
  • 00:23:55
    ramped up or if if you know Netanyahu is
  • 00:23:57
    given free AR to continue his his
  • 00:23:59
    campaign across the region I mean what
  • 00:24:00
    do you think that means for for the
  • 00:24:02
    so-called access of
  • 00:24:06
    resistance yeah I mean the the um the
  • 00:24:10
    different parts of the aess of
  • 00:24:11
    resistance I mean whether in Iraq for
  • 00:24:13
    instance which which is which has been
  • 00:24:16
    trying to dodge uh sanctions or try to
  • 00:24:18
    push push aside um sanctions and
  • 00:24:21
    negotiations with the US I think now
  • 00:24:23
    we'll see a um stronger push in that
  • 00:24:27
    direction and I I think um that will
  • 00:24:29
    have an impact um on on the pmf and will
  • 00:24:32
    have an impact on on Iran's um allies
  • 00:24:35
    but for the W um you know whether in in
  • 00:24:38
    in Yemen you know the um the hthi
  • 00:24:41
    movement and the
  • 00:24:44
    um perhaps a stronger push might we
  • 00:24:47
    might see in the direction of agonizing
  • 00:24:50
    the hoi movement um leading um to an
  • 00:24:54
    impact on uh the peace arrangement are
  • 00:24:59
    there in Yemen I mean just to go back to
  • 00:25:01
    the to the first Trump uh term when we
  • 00:25:04
    had the Aram attack we had major
  • 00:25:08
    destabilization across the Gulf region
  • 00:25:11
    and that's uh that was a dark phase and
  • 00:25:15
    uh in in that um in that sense and the
  • 00:25:19
    the gulf has moved beyond that with
  • 00:25:21
    security arrangements with new security
  • 00:25:23
    arrangements with the diversifications
  • 00:25:25
    of of their relationship with
  • 00:25:27
    normalizing
  • 00:25:29
    uh with the Iranian regime so there's a
  • 00:25:31
    maximum pressure campaign on Iran um a
  • 00:25:33
    grand push definitely um this will come
  • 00:25:37
    hand in hand with an attempt to secure
  • 00:25:40
    um a deal with with Saudi Arabia on
  • 00:25:43
    normalization within the abrahamic
  • 00:25:45
    Accords um all of this push is going to
  • 00:25:49
    face um a big mountain of huddles um
  • 00:25:54
    starting with um the uh arrangements are
  • 00:25:57
    already in place and working unlike
  • 00:26:00
    Trump's um policy in in
  • 00:26:03
    2017 which didn't yield security results
  • 00:26:08
    Saudi Arabia is requesting an alliance
  • 00:26:11
    um and security relationship with the US
  • 00:26:14
    which would see the US um uh going into
  • 00:26:18
    conflict in case Saudi Arabia is
  • 00:26:19
    threatened I'm not sure Trump who does
  • 00:26:22
    who's trying to keep the us out of
  • 00:26:24
    conflicts with you know secure such a
  • 00:26:27
    deal he he he might give in on the
  • 00:26:30
    nuclear file um and uh but also here the
  • 00:26:34
    question of institutional hurdles and
  • 00:26:36
    the push back from these institutions in
  • 00:26:39
    the US uh will will arise I think the
  • 00:26:43
    um you know within within um the arms of
  • 00:26:47
    Iran you know the the bigger um uh
  • 00:26:50
    impact might be on on the pmf I mean the
  • 00:26:54
    rest the rest of the um Iran allies are
  • 00:26:58
    already under sanctions and we're
  • 00:26:59
    already under pressure hisbah is in
  • 00:27:01
    battle um a crushing uh battle which is
  • 00:27:05
    saying vast um areas of Lebanon uh
  • 00:27:09
    destroyed so I'm not
  • 00:27:12
    sure how much um of a uh great uh
  • 00:27:17
    strides ahead in his previous policies
  • 00:27:21
    can Trump now resume he won't be
  • 00:27:24
    starting from where he stopped in the
  • 00:27:26
    last term I I think he'll be starting u
  • 00:27:30
    a fresh and in in more difficult and
  • 00:27:33
    challenging
  • 00:27:35
    conditions Tong to switch to you I mean
  • 00:27:38
    China has recently deepened its
  • 00:27:39
    relationship with Iran so how might the
  • 00:27:41
    country navigate um its Iran strategy if
  • 00:27:44
    the US were to take this more
  • 00:27:45
    confrontational
  • 00:27:47
    approach um I I think uh regardless of
  • 00:27:51
    us approach China will
  • 00:27:54
    likely uh continue strengthening its Ty
  • 00:27:58
    with Iran uh simply because of uh the
  • 00:28:02
    Strategic importance of of the country
  • 00:28:05
    and China has made uh impressive success
  • 00:28:09
    in building comprehensive partnership
  • 00:28:12
    with Iran Iran has become important
  • 00:28:16
    strategic uh foothold for China in this
  • 00:28:20
    region um if Trump adopts maximum
  • 00:28:24
    pressure against Iran uh of course that
  • 00:28:27
    would
  • 00:28:28
    threaten uh the booming economic ties
  • 00:28:31
    between China and Iran uh China may have
  • 00:28:35
    greater difficulty importing oil from
  • 00:28:38
    the country and it will need to
  • 00:28:40
    diversify um its oil import um but the
  • 00:28:46
    question is um under that scenario uh
  • 00:28:50
    whether or how much will
  • 00:28:53
    China try to actively undermine and
  • 00:28:57
    challenge
  • 00:28:58
    us maximum pressure on Iran including to
  • 00:29:02
    challenge us sanctions more openly so
  • 00:29:06
    far China has maintained a rather uh uh
  • 00:29:10
    pragmatic
  • 00:29:12
    approach uh despite the uh for example
  • 00:29:15
    the the 25e cooperation agreement
  • 00:29:18
    framework with Iran uh China has uh
  • 00:29:23
    limited its uh investments in Iran uh in
  • 00:29:26
    uh infrastructure its energy sector
  • 00:29:31
    Etc um Chinese companies have genuine
  • 00:29:35
    concerns about the impact of us
  • 00:29:39
    sanctions the secondary impact on
  • 00:29:42
    China um um I think whether you know how
  • 00:29:47
    China makes that decision uh regarding
  • 00:29:50
    whether it will accept the consequences
  • 00:29:53
    of Greater us sanction on Iran or try to
  • 00:29:56
    more actively challenge it will also be
  • 00:30:00
    influenced by um the reactions from
  • 00:30:03
    other Regional countries and also the
  • 00:30:06
    international response uh Arab State you
  • 00:30:10
    know Arab states um is an important uh
  • 00:30:14
    consideration for China um you know to
  • 00:30:19
    maintain uh its relationship with those
  • 00:30:23
    countries perhaps that is an incentive
  • 00:30:25
    for China to uh um dial down its efforts
  • 00:30:30
    to explicitly support Iran
  • 00:30:35
    um and but if the maximum pressure
  • 00:30:40
    policy uh appears to really increase uh
  • 00:30:44
    Regional tensions and uh and raising
  • 00:30:47
    International concerns about uh crisis
  • 00:30:51
    uh and
  • 00:30:52
    escalation uh China might feel less
  • 00:30:56
    constrainted uh to uh challenge the US
  • 00:30:59
    approach and uh and support Iran
  • 00:31:02
    economically and
  • 00:31:04
    geopolitically um I think a slight
  • 00:31:07
    different approach from Russia is uh
  • 00:31:11
    China is more sensitive uh and more uh
  • 00:31:15
    careful on U strategic uh military
  • 00:31:19
    technology cooperation with Iran
  • 00:31:21
    especially when it comes to uh nuclear
  • 00:31:25
    technologies um to prevent uh Iran from
  • 00:31:29
    becoming a nuclear another nuclear
  • 00:31:31
    weapon state to uh prevent uh more
  • 00:31:34
    countries in in the region uh to follow
  • 00:31:38
    Iran's suit uh to prevent the uh the
  • 00:31:42
    domino effect of nuclear
  • 00:31:44
    proliferation uh in and Beyond this
  • 00:31:47
    region is still in China's own long-term
  • 00:31:50
    interests and this is I think slightly
  • 00:31:53
    different from Russia given recent
  • 00:31:56
    developments
  • 00:31:58
    um and also to uh support uh
  • 00:32:02
    nonproliferation um and oppose nuclear
  • 00:32:06
    weapon development is also important for
  • 00:32:09
    China's own International reputation and
  • 00:32:12
    for its own campaign to win the hearts
  • 00:32:15
    and the mans of the BR broader Global
  • 00:32:17
    sou countries so in this regard we see I
  • 00:32:21
    think uh China might not significantly
  • 00:32:24
    change its position on the Iranian
  • 00:32:26
    nuclear issue uh last year China
  • 00:32:29
    published a key document about this
  • 00:32:32
    Global Security initiative uh in which
  • 00:32:36
    it uh have a it has a fiveo uh
  • 00:32:40
    Initiative for achieving uh peace and
  • 00:32:43
    stability in the Middle East and in in
  • 00:32:46
    that uh initiative China really
  • 00:32:48
    highlights the principle of nuclear
  • 00:32:50
    ntion um and in addition to uh you know
  • 00:32:54
    rhetorical U support to such Norms China
  • 00:32:58
    is also building its uh coercive
  • 00:33:01
    leverage um uh to um diversify it's uh
  • 00:33:06
    its um uh ways to influence uh uh this
  • 00:33:11
    uh uh development for example we know
  • 00:33:13
    that uh China has provided Saudi Arabia
  • 00:33:17
    with um more missile Technologies and is
  • 00:33:21
    working with Saudi Arabia on some uh on
  • 00:33:25
    developing the front end of Sou
  • 00:33:28
    nuclear cycle technology mining uh
  • 00:33:32
    uranium mining Etc um so in case there
  • 00:33:36
    is need I think China can also use these
  • 00:33:39
    leverages to shape Iran's future
  • 00:33:44
    choices thank you for that that was very
  • 00:33:46
    interesting I mean Nicole to go to you I
  • 00:33:49
    mean earlier you mentioned Iran and
  • 00:33:50
    Russia's relationship I was wondering if
  • 00:33:52
    you could expand a little bit on that um
  • 00:33:54
    now I mean given given Russia's closer
  • 00:33:55
    relationship with Iran how is it going
  • 00:33:57
    to shape um well how how will it shape
  • 00:34:00
    its response if the US does does go back
  • 00:34:02
    to maximum
  • 00:34:03
    pressure well Russia's response to
  • 00:34:05
    maximum pressure I think should be
  • 00:34:07
    viewed in the context of kind of what
  • 00:34:09
    emerged in the early Trump
  • 00:34:10
    Administration with maximum pressure I
  • 00:34:13
    mean the Russian's actually coordinated
  • 00:34:14
    with the Europeans and the Chinese on
  • 00:34:17
    countering Maxim maximum pressure and
  • 00:34:19
    this included within the United Nations
  • 00:34:21
    security Council um when it came to
  • 00:34:23
    efforts actually to um increase
  • 00:34:25
    diplomatic pressures such as prolonging
  • 00:34:27
    the UN arms embargo the Russians and the
  • 00:34:29
    Chinese coordinated on this and in in
  • 00:34:32
    concert with also the Europeans um
  • 00:34:34
    that's going to be different now I think
  • 00:34:35
    the Russian response to maximum pressure
  • 00:34:37
    won't be this kind of Coalition building
  • 00:34:39
    within the P5 plus1 or the P4 plus one
  • 00:34:43
    since the US withdrew from the nuclear
  • 00:34:45
    agreement but it will be within I think
  • 00:34:47
    the chin with the Chinese and also the
  • 00:34:49
    global South and also the Arab states I
  • 00:34:51
    think the fundamental difference um with
  • 00:34:54
    this incoming Trump Administration is
  • 00:34:56
    that the South and the UAE are not this
  • 00:34:59
    kind of hostile actor towards Iran
  • 00:35:01
    anymore I mean there is some kind of
  • 00:35:02
    movement on normalization Russia has
  • 00:35:04
    fairly good relations with both
  • 00:35:05
    countries and so you could see them kind
  • 00:35:08
    of playing this role of um at least
  • 00:35:09
    trying to mitigate some of the pressure
  • 00:35:12
    but more broadly the Russia Ron
  • 00:35:13
    relationship is really crucial for
  • 00:35:15
    Iran's defenses um you know the recent
  • 00:35:18
    attacks that the Israelis launched on
  • 00:35:20
    Iran destroyed some of Iranian um s300
  • 00:35:24
    Radars um also other early warning
  • 00:35:26
    Radars which the Russians supplied so
  • 00:35:28
    there's a c crucial question is whether
  • 00:35:30
    Russia will resupply or if they have the
  • 00:35:32
    ability to do that or if they will
  • 00:35:34
    provide technology transfer which is
  • 00:35:36
    kind of what Tong alluded to when it
  • 00:35:38
    came to the nuclear issue I mean there's
  • 00:35:39
    been allegations coming out from the
  • 00:35:41
    United States that the Russians are
  • 00:35:43
    potentially uh supporting Iran's nuclear
  • 00:35:45
    Ambitions or nuclear program um through
  • 00:35:48
    Tech transfer that's that's different
  • 00:35:50
    than before I you wouldn't have seen
  • 00:35:51
    this prior to the war in Ukraine and so
  • 00:35:53
    the Trump Administration is going to
  • 00:35:55
    face a Russia that's no longer really um
  • 00:35:57
    tied to an agreement on the Iranian
  • 00:35:59
    nuclear issue they're actually more tied
  • 00:36:01
    to their own Survival this war in
  • 00:36:03
    Ukraine Iran's support for it and so
  • 00:36:06
    they're not going to have the Russians
  • 00:36:07
    going to play this role of kind of
  • 00:36:09
    resolving the Iran nuclear issue and I
  • 00:36:10
    think the Trump Administration might
  • 00:36:12
    want to see that I mean there's one kind
  • 00:36:15
    of view is you know whereas Trump I
  • 00:36:17
    think might surround himself with people
  • 00:36:19
    who are very hostile towards Iran you
  • 00:36:21
    know people like Brian hook who kind of
  • 00:36:23
    implemented this maximum pressure policy
  • 00:36:25
    Trump himself kind of wants to see him
  • 00:36:27
    you know maybe obtain a Nobel Prize
  • 00:36:29
    maybe obtain some kind of agreement kind
  • 00:36:31
    of akin to the North Koreans and the
  • 00:36:33
    Iran nuclear issue is an opportunity
  • 00:36:36
    there um and there are there's ways you
  • 00:36:38
    know of getting around this I think some
  • 00:36:39
    of the issues with weaponization but
  • 00:36:41
    it's not to be with Russian
  • 00:36:43
    participation I don't see the Russians
  • 00:36:44
    playing a big role in that and that's a
  • 00:36:46
    contrast to um the prior Administration
  • 00:36:48
    where Russia probably would have wanted
  • 00:36:50
    to play a bigger role in this and and
  • 00:36:52
    and I think it's an extension of the
  • 00:36:53
    kind of hostility between the US and
  • 00:36:55
    Russia and the you know war in Ukraine
  • 00:36:58
    and also the increasing ties between
  • 00:37:00
    Russia and Iran I mean both Russia and
  • 00:37:01
    Iran are so embedded with each other
  • 00:37:03
    they're so tied together at the moment I
  • 00:37:05
    mean of course there's tensions there's
  • 00:37:06
    always going to be tensions in this
  • 00:37:08
    relationship but there is this kind of
  • 00:37:10
    mutual Reliance that has really come to
  • 00:37:12
    the for and that even extends to
  • 00:37:14
    Russia's support with a lot of Iran's um
  • 00:37:17
    you know non-state allies and partners
  • 00:37:18
    in the region from the houthis and also
  • 00:37:20
    to the pmu I mean the Russians also have
  • 00:37:22
    had experience working with them in the
  • 00:37:24
    Syrian campaign and you might see Russia
  • 00:37:26
    actually coming in there and supporting
  • 00:37:28
    Iran um and its proxies and you
  • 00:37:30
    non-state allies um to uh kind of
  • 00:37:34
    mitigate some of this
  • 00:37:37
    pressure I was going to sort of P it to
  • 00:37:40
    security Now specifically but we've had
  • 00:37:41
    a couple of comments um come in from
  • 00:37:43
    from viewers that I wanted to sort of
  • 00:37:45
    wrap in because I think it ties into
  • 00:37:47
    what we're discussing at the moment so
  • 00:37:49
    one um one of the comments is that you
  • 00:37:51
    know is asking if Trump decides to pull
  • 00:37:52
    the us out of NATO what will be the
  • 00:37:54
    implications for European us and World
  • 00:37:56
    security and we've had another one um
  • 00:37:59
    that I want to sort of tie that into
  • 00:38:01
    which is um from Bruce Rosen asking is
  • 00:38:04
    there a sense of what the expanded
  • 00:38:05
    bricks stands for within this region
  • 00:38:07
    it's added Iran the UAE Saudi Arabia
  • 00:38:09
    Egypt and Ethiopia so so given those two
  • 00:38:11
    sort of paradigms I'm wondering if um if
  • 00:38:13
    Matt you could sort of give us a sense
  • 00:38:15
    of of what you think sure um I mean I'll
  • 00:38:18
    take the first one I mean I don't expect
  • 00:38:20
    Trump would just precipitously withdraw
  • 00:38:22
    from NATO out of the gate I think his
  • 00:38:24
    he'll continue with his argument of you
  • 00:38:26
    know the Europeans need to pay more I
  • 00:38:29
    mean I don't I think he still has has
  • 00:38:32
    this understanding of how NATO works is
  • 00:38:34
    that the European allies pay us because
  • 00:38:36
    his his understanding of all this stuff
  • 00:38:38
    is that of a a mob boss where you pay up
  • 00:38:40
    to the Dawn and and that then you get to
  • 00:38:42
    be part of the protection racket um but
  • 00:38:46
    I do hope that you know you know rather
  • 00:38:49
    than during the first Trump
  • 00:38:51
    Administration um I do hope that
  • 00:38:53
    European allies will take this as a sign
  • 00:38:55
    that no you actually do need need to
  • 00:38:57
    start taking much more serious steps um
  • 00:39:00
    to develop your own you know Strategic
  • 00:39:02
    Defense capabilities you know the word
  • 00:39:03
    strategic autonomy is thrown around is
  • 00:39:05
    kind of this you know the the kind of
  • 00:39:07
    Holy Grail for a lot of people in
  • 00:39:09
    Washington yet it never happens but I
  • 00:39:11
    think this is a moment when a European
  • 00:39:13
    allies really need to take this
  • 00:39:15
    seriously and I think how they are seen
  • 00:39:17
    by Trump as responding to that um
  • 00:39:20
    whether they are paying their quote
  • 00:39:21
    unquote fair share will determine um how
  • 00:39:24
    he continues uh to kind of with NATO I
  • 00:39:28
    mean it's not just going to be that
  • 00:39:29
    there will be all kinds of other things
  • 00:39:31
    where if European allies displease him
  • 00:39:34
    over things completely unrelated um to
  • 00:39:36
    Nato to Russia to Ukraine um that he
  • 00:39:39
    could you know use the NATO threat um
  • 00:39:41
    but I don't think he'll that'll be his
  • 00:39:42
    first
  • 00:39:43
    move well Matt since I have you um you
  • 00:39:47
    know speaking about NATO specifically
  • 00:39:49
    Victoria coot Fe former senior official
  • 00:39:51
    on Trump's National Security Council
  • 00:39:53
    spoke to my colleague recently in the
  • 00:39:54
    past few days and said it was 100%
  • 00:39:57
    correct quote to believe the second
  • 00:39:59
    Trump presidency would end the area in
  • 00:40:00
    which the US was seen as the guarantor
  • 00:40:02
    of Western the Western World security so
  • 00:40:05
    so with that I mean do you see a
  • 00:40:06
    scenario where the US reduces its
  • 00:40:08
    military presence in the Middle East and
  • 00:40:09
    and if so how do you think Regional
  • 00:40:11
    actors would respond to that change in
  • 00:40:12
    the security landscape and thinking
  • 00:40:14
    specifically about when Trump threatened
  • 00:40:15
    to withdraw troops from Syria and Iraq
  • 00:40:16
    last time right so
  • 00:40:18
    right no I think yes I mean I think we
  • 00:40:21
    we will see Trump make those moves I
  • 00:40:23
    think we'll see some of the other people
  • 00:40:25
    he might bring in also help resist that
  • 00:40:28
    maybe in different ways um but I think
  • 00:40:31
    he will succeed to some extent in doing
  • 00:40:33
    that and this is where it's really
  • 00:40:34
    interesting to go back um to look at the
  • 00:40:37
    Abraham Accords because in my view the
  • 00:40:39
    Abraham Accords were kind of sold to
  • 00:40:41
    Trump as a formula for slowly
  • 00:40:44
    withdrawing the United States from the
  • 00:40:45
    Middle East when in fact I think for our
  • 00:40:47
    clients and partners like Israel like
  • 00:40:49
    the amadis it was seen as a way to
  • 00:40:52
    essentially lock in um us commitments um
  • 00:40:56
    in the region maybe in a different way
  • 00:40:58
    qualitatively than we had the role we
  • 00:41:00
    had played in the past but I think the
  • 00:41:02
    way it was sold to Trump is actually
  • 00:41:03
    different from the way it's working from
  • 00:41:05
    the view of our partners and in clients
  • 00:41:07
    in the region so I'll see it'll be
  • 00:41:08
    interesting to see um if that tension is
  • 00:41:11
    is brought to the for when he takes some
  • 00:41:12
    of those steps as I expect he
  • 00:41:15
    will Nicole if if the US does scale back
  • 00:41:19
    um could Russia increase its influence
  • 00:41:20
    in the in Regional security um you know
  • 00:41:23
    regarding Syria or
  • 00:41:25
    Libya I highly doubt that I I think that
  • 00:41:28
    the Russians have you know they've come
  • 00:41:30
    up with this collective security concept
  • 00:41:31
    for the Middle East in
  • 00:41:33
    2019 I believe but this was a
  • 00:41:35
    long-standing policy and it was all
  • 00:41:38
    about the removal of foreign forces from
  • 00:41:40
    the region pretty much directed at the
  • 00:41:41
    United States I mean the Russians don't
  • 00:41:43
    really have the they've never had a
  • 00:41:45
    large footprint in Syria um they've
  • 00:41:47
    never really had a official footprint in
  • 00:41:49
    Libya that's mostly through private
  • 00:41:50
    military contractors um but in Syria I
  • 00:41:53
    mean the Russians have never you know
  • 00:41:55
    they have the Air Force and they have
  • 00:41:57
    some pad's troops and forces but it's
  • 00:41:59
    not this major contingent or deployment
  • 00:42:02
    and I don't think Russia really wants to
  • 00:42:03
    have that I mean if anything Russia's
  • 00:42:05
    strategy in Syria has been kind of
  • 00:42:07
    fostering connections with uh you know
  • 00:42:10
    former opposition figures and trying to
  • 00:42:12
    integrate them into the Syrian Army so
  • 00:42:14
    and you've seen that a lot in the south
  • 00:42:16
    of um Syria so I think the Russians are
  • 00:42:18
    more focused on actually courting
  • 00:42:20
    Regional Partners um in the region
  • 00:42:22
    rather than providing security
  • 00:42:24
    themselves that doesn't suggest that
  • 00:42:26
    Russia won't provide weapons or like
  • 00:42:28
    arms to these um kind of forces but I
  • 00:42:31
    don't see Russia coming in and providing
  • 00:42:33
    the kind of level of security of the
  • 00:42:35
    United States and I think that'd be very
  • 00:42:38
    difficult to do that I mean no State can
  • 00:42:39
    really have such a large deployment of
  • 00:42:41
    advanced Weaponry to the region the way
  • 00:42:43
    the United States does and even in just
  • 00:42:46
    in terms of like the basing uh
  • 00:42:47
    agreements I mean the US has by far the
  • 00:42:49
    largest like network of bases throughout
  • 00:42:51
    the region so to replace that I think
  • 00:42:53
    that' be quite a lofty Endeavor and the
  • 00:42:55
    Russians don't really see benefit to
  • 00:42:59
    that mad we sort of the main difference
  • 00:43:02
    between between this Trump
  • 00:43:04
    Administration and the previous one is
  • 00:43:06
    that you have this hushon between Iran
  • 00:43:08
    and the gulf um I'm wondering how how
  • 00:43:11
    you sort of see that shaping I mean they
  • 00:43:13
    have we sort of gotten an indication
  • 00:43:14
    from the Gulf rulers about how they
  • 00:43:16
    their sort of feeling about a trump a
  • 00:43:18
    second Trump presidency um and what how
  • 00:43:20
    do you anticipate those relationships
  • 00:43:21
    sort of affecting the
  • 00:43:24
    Dynamics yes I think the the
  • 00:43:26
    normalization has paid off there are um
  • 00:43:29
    consultations that are happen on a
  • 00:43:31
    regular basis we saw the Iranian foreign
  • 00:43:33
    minister doing some of these in contacts
  • 00:43:36
    across the region I I I see these
  • 00:43:40
    difficult to roll back um at least not
  • 00:43:42
    in the fashion that you know we're we're
  • 00:43:44
    being sold in in in the media in terms
  • 00:43:47
    of rhetoric um and and part of this is
  • 00:43:50
    related to the peace in Yemen um the
  • 00:43:53
    peace in Yemen came as a result of
  • 00:43:55
    negotiations and as um of um a Saudi and
  • 00:44:01
    amirati um uh line of thinking that they
  • 00:44:05
    need uh to move forward uh away and
  • 00:44:09
    aside from um the
  • 00:44:12
    usion on on that on that uh on that
  • 00:44:15
    front so I I see these as difficult uh
  • 00:44:18
    to roll back uh from but at the same
  • 00:44:21
    time you know there are areas in which
  • 00:44:24
    you know I see um I see perhaps um some
  • 00:44:28
    convergence between what the Trump
  • 00:44:30
    Administration will bring forward and
  • 00:44:32
    what um the gulf is is interested in for
  • 00:44:35
    instance um the UAE Russia um um are are
  • 00:44:40
    both uh interested in uh pursuing some
  • 00:44:43
    sort of normalization um path between
  • 00:44:47
    Syria and the Western world that I think
  • 00:44:49
    the Trump Administration might buy into
  • 00:44:52
    for some reason you know we're hearing
  • 00:44:53
    that the um that the Israelis might look
  • 00:44:57
    into guarantees by the Syrian regime and
  • 00:45:00
    and Russia in uh in Syria um um as part
  • 00:45:05
    of a package deal with Lebanon to
  • 00:45:07
    implement 171 and and prevent weapons
  • 00:45:10
    from going into Lebanon I mean that if
  • 00:45:13
    that that's really the case and that's a
  • 00:45:15
    trump policy you know policy U moving
  • 00:45:19
    ahead I think they will um go forward
  • 00:45:22
    with that and and work together on this
  • 00:45:24
    but I just failed to see um a a quick
  • 00:45:28
    switch from uh the current architecture
  • 00:45:32
    which is being put in place and it works
  • 00:45:35
    and it works if you look at the 2017
  • 00:45:37
    2018 turmoil across the region you know
  • 00:45:40
    the solution was this of course it's not
  • 00:45:43
    the perfect solution that Saudi Arabia
  • 00:45:46
    hopes for but I think um it it did
  • 00:45:50
    respond to the security challenges and I
  • 00:45:52
    see it difficult to roll back at least
  • 00:45:55
    in a in a quick fashion so I think um in
  • 00:45:58
    the in the first in the first months of
  • 00:46:00
    the Trump um Administration we'll see uh
  • 00:46:04
    we'll see a lot of these uh
  • 00:46:06
    challenges um and and we'll see whether
  • 00:46:09
    the Trump Administration will reconcile
  • 00:46:11
    with these will try to push forward the
  • 00:46:14
    policy um that will face many challenges
  • 00:46:17
    in the
  • 00:46:19
    region i' like actually we just had I
  • 00:46:22
    was about to Pivot to the economy but we
  • 00:46:23
    just had an interesting question so um
  • 00:46:26
    the there's a question about are we
  • 00:46:28
    entering a new era of permanent low
  • 00:46:29
    intensity sometimes high-intensity
  • 00:46:31
    conflict fundamentally different from
  • 00:46:33
    previous eras um and you know the middle
  • 00:46:35
    Easter would have certainly been prone
  • 00:46:37
    to that in previous eras so I'm
  • 00:46:38
    wondering mandad what you think of
  • 00:46:42
    that yes I mean precise precisely that I
  • 00:46:45
    think that's netanyahu's vision of um
  • 00:46:48
    solution to his conflict he rejects a
  • 00:46:51
    ceasefire he doesn't want a ceasefire he
  • 00:46:53
    wants uh deals in the interm and which
  • 00:46:57
    the conflict would be ongoing he would
  • 00:46:59
    have a Syria um Battlefield or Playfield
  • 00:47:02
    in front of him to launch a strikes um
  • 00:47:06
    whenever he feels a need to do that in
  • 00:47:09
    the Gaza Strip in in Lebanon as well um
  • 00:47:13
    and I think that applies you know to a
  • 00:47:15
    wider context to um other Arenas across
  • 00:47:20
    the region you know we're talking about
  • 00:47:21
    Yemen um Libya in which there's no real
  • 00:47:25
    end or final solution to the um to the
  • 00:47:29
    conflicts but more of an uh interm deals
  • 00:47:33
    that secure some sort of a low intensity
  • 00:47:35
    uh Conflict at least for our region
  • 00:47:38
    we're seeing that we're living that I
  • 00:47:40
    think that's you know that that decade
  • 00:47:42
    is all about these low intensity
  • 00:47:44
    conflicts in Syria and in Iraq and um
  • 00:47:48
    also in in Libya and in
  • 00:47:50
    Yemen and I think that's you know Sudan
  • 00:47:54
    is is heading in that direction
  • 00:47:55
    certainly and specifically you know if
  • 00:47:58
    we see some sort of a deal um there will
  • 00:48:01
    be a low intensity conflict um ongoing
  • 00:48:05
    on on that front um you know and I also
  • 00:48:09
    don't see the Trump Administration as a
  • 00:48:12
    as an Administration which is capable of
  • 00:48:14
    changing that reality and I think you
  • 00:48:17
    know that from from the looks of it it's
  • 00:48:20
    also another set of trial and error um
  • 00:48:25
    as as it was in in the
  • 00:48:27
    uh Administration that might you know
  • 00:48:30
    lead to more blunders and perhaps more
  • 00:48:33
    battlefields you know it was um the the
  • 00:48:37
    the Trump the first Trump administration
  • 00:48:39
    led to a lot of turmoil um across uh the
  • 00:48:43
    region and I think uh the second one um
  • 00:48:46
    you know might not be far off from
  • 00:48:50
    that thank you um I think we'll switch
  • 00:48:53
    you know we've only got about 12 minutes
  • 00:48:55
    remaining on the clock so I to switch to
  • 00:48:57
    a little bit about um economic Dynamics
  • 00:48:59
    and competition so Tong with the belon
  • 00:49:01
    road initiative expanding across the
  • 00:49:03
    region how do you think us China
  • 00:49:05
    competition might evolve in Middle
  • 00:49:07
    Eastern infrastructure Tech and
  • 00:49:10
    trade uh well firstly I think uh China's
  • 00:49:14
    own B and Road initiative is also
  • 00:49:17
    evolving um you know partially because
  • 00:49:19
    of China's own internal economic
  • 00:49:22
    challenges the government simply uh
  • 00:49:24
    doesn't have uh as much resources uh to
  • 00:49:29
    spend
  • 00:49:31
    overseas um and China needs to uh react
  • 00:49:35
    to uh International
  • 00:49:37
    criticisms on creating so-called debt uh
  • 00:49:41
    debt traps uh in uh developing
  • 00:49:45
    countries um China also faces uh you
  • 00:49:50
    know increasing challenges from
  • 00:49:52
    alternative um uh initiatives including
  • 00:49:56
    the India middle east Europe economic
  • 00:49:59
    Corridor uh China is also very concerned
  • 00:50:02
    about the influence of uh you know the
  • 00:50:05
    quadrilateral cooperation between us
  • 00:50:08
    India uh UAE and
  • 00:50:11
    Israel um so we see uh now the Chinese
  • 00:50:16
    government emphasizing a new approach
  • 00:50:19
    for Bon road which is to focus on
  • 00:50:22
    so-called uh small and beautiful uh
  • 00:50:26
    projects
  • 00:50:28
    um that you know uh and also the
  • 00:50:31
    government uh tries to mobilize uh
  • 00:50:33
    greater Investments uh from uh private
  • 00:50:37
    economic sectors in China to expand
  • 00:50:40
    their business uh and economic uh
  • 00:50:42
    influence in the region um I think U
  • 00:50:46
    China certainly in this uh readjusted
  • 00:50:49
    approach wants to highlight China's own
  • 00:50:52
    advantages uh in addition to uh its uh
  • 00:50:56
    obvious disadvantage in infrastructure
  • 00:50:59
    projects uh China really wants to make
  • 00:51:02
    uh the most out of its uh uh you know uh
  • 00:51:06
    increasing advantages in clean energy
  • 00:51:10
    including uh solar uh uh energy and and
  • 00:51:14
    wind uh energy uh this can also help uh
  • 00:51:18
    resolve China's own over production over
  • 00:51:22
    capacity uh problem um China is also
  • 00:51:25
    Keen to promote uh nuclear energy
  • 00:51:28
    cooperation uh with regional
  • 00:51:32
    countries Nicole I mean given both
  • 00:51:35
    Russia and the US are major players in
  • 00:51:37
    global energy uh could we see a more
  • 00:51:39
    competitive or cooperative stance on
  • 00:51:40
    energy Partnerships in the Middle East
  • 00:51:42
    particularly in the
  • 00:51:44
    Gulf um I mean I think this actually
  • 00:51:46
    goes back to the max part of the maximum
  • 00:51:48
    pressure discussion is I mean if you see
  • 00:51:50
    Russia I mean if you see the United
  • 00:51:52
    States really imposing stringent um oil
  • 00:51:54
    sanctions on Iran and imposing these oil
  • 00:51:57
    sanctions without waivers you might see
  • 00:51:59
    Russia benefiting from that and I mean
  • 00:52:00
    Russia cooperates within OPEC plus I
  • 00:52:03
    mean us has not really been as involved
  • 00:52:05
    in this as the Russians but the Russians
  • 00:52:07
    have benefited from higher oil prices
  • 00:52:09
    and higher volatility at times in the
  • 00:52:11
    oil Market um in general I mean they I
  • 00:52:13
    think that they're more averse to any
  • 00:52:15
    kind of attacks like you saw in 2019 on
  • 00:52:17
    like aramco or Saudi oil infrastructure
  • 00:52:20
    but there will be this competition and
  • 00:52:21
    the US has you know tried to at least
  • 00:52:23
    minimize Russia's access to certain
  • 00:52:25
    markets but then you see seen with the
  • 00:52:27
    sanctions since Ukraine is Russia really
  • 00:52:28
    using kind of these black market um
  • 00:52:31
    vessels you know that actually that Iran
  • 00:52:33
    used to use um to export to kind of like
  • 00:52:35
    teapot um refineries in in in East Asia
  • 00:52:39
    um and so Russia's probably going to
  • 00:52:41
    continue to do that and I don't think
  • 00:52:43
    that you're going to see the removal or
  • 00:52:44
    at least like the restrictions on some
  • 00:52:46
    of the the limitations to Russia's
  • 00:52:48
    exports to the European countries or to
  • 00:52:50
    the EU um as kind of a way to minimize
  • 00:52:54
    Russia's um influence more broadly I
  • 00:52:56
    think Russia is going to continue to
  • 00:52:57
    kind of view the Middle East and OPEC
  • 00:52:59
    plus as a really fundamental part of its
  • 00:53:01
    foreign policy because of its ability to
  • 00:53:04
    at least um increase its revenues for
  • 00:53:06
    its budget um which is really crucial
  • 00:53:08
    right now for its war effort but also
  • 00:53:10
    because Russia does see it's kind of
  • 00:53:12
    like access to e of the Suz is a really
  • 00:53:14
    important Vector when it comes to um
  • 00:53:16
    both its Black Market exports but also
  • 00:53:19
    some of the above ground exports to
  • 00:53:20
    countries like China as
  • 00:53:22
    well I'd like to just ask Matt so so
  • 00:53:26
    given um how might a you a new Trump
  • 00:53:29
    Administration stance on energy
  • 00:53:30
    Independence affect its traditional
  • 00:53:32
    alliances with with the Gulf States I
  • 00:53:33
    mean are there other areas that could
  • 00:53:35
    come into play for us Partnerships in
  • 00:53:36
    the in the Middle East like Tech or
  • 00:53:38
    renewable energy no I mean I think you
  • 00:53:40
    know obviously Trump has has really
  • 00:53:42
    touted his role you know in in you know
  • 00:53:45
    continuing to build America's energy
  • 00:53:46
    Independence drill baby drill and all of
  • 00:53:48
    that um I mean so that will remove some
  • 00:53:52
    potential leverage um from from you know
  • 00:53:54
    the Gulf States but all you know but
  • 00:53:56
    given that it's a global market that
  • 00:53:58
    will still have their ability to impact
  • 00:54:00
    the US economy uh will remain um so
  • 00:54:04
    Trump will remain interested um in in
  • 00:54:07
    what goes on there um you know in terms
  • 00:54:09
    of tech you know I definitely expect him
  • 00:54:12
    to to continue to lean in uh to that
  • 00:54:14
    part of the relationship and I also want
  • 00:54:16
    you know I don't want to have to keep
  • 00:54:17
    coming back to the Abraham Accords but I
  • 00:54:19
    also feel like I should mention that you
  • 00:54:20
    know the provision of Israeli Tech uh to
  • 00:54:23
    other governments in the region um
  • 00:54:25
    unfortunately of um for purposes of
  • 00:54:28
    repression um is a big kind of
  • 00:54:30
    underlying driver um of of these
  • 00:54:33
    agreements and again I think Trump will
  • 00:54:34
    be Allin behind
  • 00:54:38
    that I think that'll be it for our
  • 00:54:40
    questions given we only have about five
  • 00:54:42
    minutes left on the clock but I was
  • 00:54:43
    wondering if I could turn to each one of
  • 00:54:45
    you and give me sort of ask you for your
  • 00:54:47
    thoughts so so specifically on what um a
  • 00:54:49
    multi-polar Middle East could look like
  • 00:54:51
    in the coming years so so what should we
  • 00:54:53
    be watching most closely as these sort
  • 00:54:55
    of global Powers Jo for influence in the
  • 00:54:57
    region um so I'd like to start with
  • 00:54:59
    Nicole
  • 00:55:01
    please I mean I would look into not
  • 00:55:04
    buying in too much into the notion of
  • 00:55:06
    multipolarity um I think that it's been
  • 00:55:09
    you might we might just continue to see
  • 00:55:11
    us hemony in the Middle East or external
  • 00:55:13
    Chemin in the Middle East going
  • 00:55:17
    forward thank
  • 00:55:20
    you I think it goes back to the question
  • 00:55:23
    of um you know how much we see you of an
  • 00:55:26
    in institutional continuity from from
  • 00:55:28
    the first uh from the Biden
  • 00:55:30
    Administration before that from the
  • 00:55:31
    Trump Administration and I think that uh
  • 00:55:34
    will rely a lot on um how much
  • 00:55:37
    resilience and um and and kind of uh um
  • 00:55:43
    strength Within These institution
  • 00:55:45
    remains Independence given um you know
  • 00:55:48
    the unique moment that this is I mean
  • 00:55:51
    this is a trump Administration which has
  • 00:55:53
    won a majority of votes a very clear
  • 00:55:57
    uh win in the elections with a congress
  • 00:56:01
    um on his on his side so this is a um I
  • 00:56:05
    think um you know these circumstances
  • 00:56:08
    are to be noted when looking at kind of
  • 00:56:12
    impact his policies and I think that's a
  • 00:56:15
    more power to the human agency Visa V
  • 00:56:18
    whatever structure uh remains in the
  • 00:56:20
    United
  • 00:56:23
    States um Tong
  • 00:56:27
    um I think we are broadly observing uh
  • 00:56:30
    Chinese transition from its traditional
  • 00:56:32
    focus on GE economic influence in the
  • 00:56:35
    region to a greater interest in
  • 00:56:36
    expanding its geopolitical influence
  • 00:56:39
    China wants to you know provide a
  • 00:56:41
    security Alternatives uh you know step
  • 00:56:44
    by step um um to Regional countries uh
  • 00:56:49
    the real question is will China really
  • 00:56:52
    invest and really put its own stake uh
  • 00:56:55
    into this
  • 00:56:56
    ambition for example will
  • 00:56:59
    China take substantive measures to
  • 00:57:02
    promote uh two-state solution uh or are
  • 00:57:06
    does they have you know a grand design
  • 00:57:09
    for uh Regional security uh regime and
  • 00:57:13
    wants to really invest genuine political
  • 00:57:16
    and economic resources to promote that
  • 00:57:19
    Vision um and related when China does
  • 00:57:22
    this and tries to expand this you know
  • 00:57:24
    overall geostrategic influence
  • 00:57:27
    will we see genuine uh cooperation with
  • 00:57:30
    Russia in this area or will will will we
  • 00:57:33
    see actual increasing uh competition
  • 00:57:37
    with Russia given that Russia's you know
  • 00:57:40
    traditional uh uh sphere are we influenc
  • 00:57:43
    in this
  • 00:57:44
    region thank you and Matt I just wanted
  • 00:57:47
    to end with you and if you could address
  • 00:57:49
    Nicole's comments regarding us uh
  • 00:57:51
    Germany in the region I mean that's you
  • 00:57:53
    know given given everything that the
  • 00:57:55
    Trump um ad Administration has been well
  • 00:57:56
    the Trump campaign has been saying over
  • 00:57:58
    the last year and also given the
  • 00:58:00
    patterns that we're seeing emerge from
  • 00:58:01
    the electorate in this election you know
  • 00:58:03
    that the priorities were demestic they
  • 00:58:04
    were not foreign so so how do you sort
  • 00:58:07
    of see that um shaping policy in the
  • 00:58:08
    next few years right I mean I pretend to
  • 00:58:11
    agree with Nicole I don't think we're
  • 00:58:12
    going to see kind of a a real shift to
  • 00:58:14
    multipolarity in the region the United
  • 00:58:16
    States is still the most you know
  • 00:58:18
    powerful outside military actor by far
  • 00:58:21
    and I also as I indicated earlier in my
  • 00:58:24
    view while China is clearly building um
  • 00:58:26
    you know its economic relationships it's
  • 00:58:28
    its cultural and soft power
  • 00:58:29
    relationships in the region um I think
  • 00:58:32
    it perceives a benefit from the United
  • 00:58:34
    States playing the role it's playing and
  • 00:58:36
    the Damage actually that this is doing
  • 00:58:38
    to the United States to its Global
  • 00:58:40
    appeal especially to many of these
  • 00:58:42
    audiences in the developing world the
  • 00:58:44
    global South whatever term one wants to
  • 00:58:46
    use that China is also seeking uh to
  • 00:58:49
    appeal to now this may change at at some
  • 00:58:51
    point um now how in terms of how Trump
  • 00:58:55
    would like to relate to it clearly Trump
  • 00:58:56
    I think you know doesn't want to get
  • 00:58:58
    ripped off that's kind of the guiding
  • 00:59:00
    you know you know imperative for
  • 00:59:02
    everything domestic and foreign um so I
  • 00:59:04
    think the question will be how does he
  • 00:59:06
    perceive and who who gets in his ear uh
  • 00:59:08
    and convinces him about how how America
  • 00:59:11
    is or is not being ripped off in any of
  • 00:59:13
    these
  • 00:59:15
    circumstances well thank you so much to
  • 00:59:17
    our panelists this was an excellent and
  • 00:59:19
    very thorough chat um I'd also like to
  • 00:59:21
    thank all of the viewers for their
  • 00:59:23
    really informed questions um and
  • 00:59:25
    attentiveness sou s thank you everyone
  • 00:59:28
    thank you thank you
الوسوم
  • US elections
  • Trump foreign policy
  • Middle East
  • US-Russia relations
  • US-China relations
  • Iran
  • Israel
  • Abraham Accords
  • global politics
  • economic shifts