How to Make Apps Safe (On De-Googled Phones)

00:25:05
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HI82bOlT4Is

الملخص

TLDRThe video provides insights on how to safely install apps on smartphones, particularly focusing on third-party applications. It discusses the inherent risks associated with these apps, such as data tracking and location monitoring, and emphasizes the importance of managing app permissions. The video also highlights the advantages of using open-source apps from FDroid, which are considered safer due to their transparency. Additionally, it addresses the privacy concerns related to popular apps from Google and Meta, urging users to be cautious about their data and permissions. Overall, the video aims to educate viewers on maintaining privacy while using mobile applications.

الوجبات الجاهزة

  • 🔒 Always check app permissions before installation.
  • 📍 Disable location access for apps when not in use.
  • 🛡️ Use open-source apps from FDroid for better security.
  • 🚫 Uninstall apps you no longer use to reduce risks.
  • 📱 Be cautious with Google and Meta apps due to tracking.
  • 🧭 Fitness apps can pose privacy risks with location data.
  • 🔍 SE Linux helps manage app permissions effectively.
  • 🛑 Firewall apps can help but have limitations.
  • 📊 Data monetization is a key risk with free apps.
  • 👥 Contact list permissions can lead to privacy breaches.

الجدول الزمني

  • 00:00:00 - 00:05:00

    用户在安装手机应用时应确保其安全性，许多人会检查隐藏的系统应用并禁用可疑的应用。使用防火墙应用程序（如Netguard）可以阻止互联网访问并跟踪应用流量。更安全的选择是使用来自FDroid的应用。手机操作系统本身（如iOS和Android）具有潜在的危险功能，包括24/7位置跟踪和身份监控。视频将重点讨论第三方应用的风险，尤其是对于普通用户的隐私问题。

  • 00:05:00 - 00:10:00

    视频将深入探讨Android架构，强调Android框架和Linux的关系。Android应用在一个独立的虚拟机中运行，无法直接访问设备驱动程序。每个应用都需要声明其使用的设备和功能，用户可以选择授予或拒绝这些权限。SE Linux安全模型确保应用无法秘密访问设备功能，用户的隐私得以保护。

  • 00:10:00 - 00:15:00

    一些应用程序可能会追踪用户的位置并出售收集的数据，尤其是免费应用程序。位置数据和广告ID的结合使得用户身份容易被识别。用户应定期检查应用权限，尤其是位置权限，以防止数据泄露。使用VPN可以保护IP地址，减少被追踪的风险。

  • 00:15:00 - 00:25:05

    用户应谨慎使用健身应用、Google应用和Meta应用，因为这些应用可能会收集大量个人数据。特别是Meta应用需要用户登录，导致更高的隐私风险。相对安全的选择是使用FDroid商店中的应用，因为这些应用经过审核，源代码公开，降低了数据收集的风险。总之，用户应尽量减少应用安装，定期检查权限，并关注应用的隐私政策。

اعرض المزيد

الخريطة الذهنية

فيديو أسئلة وأجوبة

  • What are the risks of third-party apps?

    Third-party apps can track user data, including location, and may sell this information to data aggregators.

  • How can I protect my privacy when using apps?

    Check app permissions regularly, disable location access when not needed, and consider using open-source apps from FDroid.

  • Are Google and Meta apps safe to use?

    Google and Meta apps can track user activities and require login, making them riskier for privacy.

  • What is the benefit of using FDroid?

    FDroid apps are open-source, meaning their source code is publicly available and can be audited for safety.

  • How can I counter location tracking threats?

    Block location permissions for apps and use a VPN to protect your IP address.

  • What should I do if an app requires location access?

    Disable location permissions when not using the app and close the app when not in use.

  • Are fitness apps a privacy risk?

    Yes, fitness apps can track location and combine it with other data, posing a privacy risk.

  • What is SE Linux?

    SE Linux is a security model integrated into Linux that controls app permissions and access to device features.

  • Can firewall apps protect my data?

    Firewall apps can help prevent data exfiltration, but they have limitations and may not catch all traffic.

  • What should I do with apps that I no longer use?

    Uninstall apps that you are not using to minimize potential privacy risks.

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الترجمات
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التمرير التلقائي:
  • 00:00:00
    A common question among my followers is
  • 00:00:02
    how to make sure that they only install
  • 00:00:05
    safe apps on their phone. Some more
  • 00:00:08
    industrious users actually examine even
  • 00:00:10
    hidden system apps and disable some if
  • 00:00:13
    the name sounds suspicious. At other
  • 00:00:16
    times, users will run protective
  • 00:00:18
    firewall apps like Netguard to actually
  • 00:00:20
    block internet access or track the
  • 00:00:22
    amount of traffic for all apps while
  • 00:00:24
    manually deciding which app should be
  • 00:00:26
    given access to the network. Another
  • 00:00:29
    approach taken by more serious
  • 00:00:31
    security-minded people is to use only
  • 00:00:33
    apps that come from FDroid. Now to make
  • 00:00:36
    it clear, the most dangerous features of
  • 00:00:38
    a phone are actually built into the
  • 00:00:40
    operating system itself, meaning iOS and
  • 00:00:43
    Google Android.
  • 00:00:45
    These do 24/7 location tracking, contact
  • 00:00:48
    tracing, even notification monitoring,
  • 00:00:51
    and the identity of the phone is plainly
  • 00:00:53
    attached to you. These OSS can track
  • 00:00:56
    everything you do on the internet. Today
  • 00:00:59
    though, we will isolate the problem only
  • 00:01:02
    to third-party apps. If you're one of
  • 00:01:04
    the smart few that use a degled Android
  • 00:01:07
    phone, then the only realistic risks on
  • 00:01:10
    your phone come from third-party apps.
  • 00:01:13
    By the way, there's also the risk of the
  • 00:01:15
    cell network side with the carriers
  • 00:01:17
    interacting secretly with the salebased
  • 00:01:20
    momentum or OEM supply chain attacks.
  • 00:01:23
    Unfortunately, this potential risk
  • 00:01:24
    applies to all phones, but typically
  • 00:01:27
    this is something that would be used
  • 00:01:28
    against high-V value targets like the
  • 00:01:31
    Edward Snowden types or International
  • 00:01:33
    Spycraft. So, we will skip that as well
  • 00:01:36
    for now, though I will cover that in a
  • 00:01:38
    separate video. We will talk about
  • 00:01:41
    things that apply to average everyday
  • 00:01:43
    people who just want privacy in their
  • 00:01:45
    lives and teach you about things you can
  • 00:01:48
    control. Stay right there.
  • 00:01:57
    Once again, I will remind you that the
  • 00:01:59
    focus of this video will be third-party
  • 00:02:01
    apps. We will assume that neither Google
  • 00:02:05
    nor Apple nor the OEM has directly
  • 00:02:09
    inserted malware, spyware, or trackers
  • 00:02:12
    on an open-source phone. Let's look at
  • 00:02:15
    this chart of the Android architecture.
  • 00:02:18
    And though iPhones are not really part
  • 00:02:20
    of this explanation, you will find that
  • 00:02:22
    the architecture of iOS is actually
  • 00:02:24
    similar just using different
  • 00:02:26
    nomenclature.
  • 00:02:28
    And the very interesting detail about
  • 00:02:30
    this architecture is that the actual
  • 00:02:32
    nuts and bolts that operate the devices
  • 00:02:35
    like displays, touchscreen, speakers,
  • 00:02:37
    microphones, sensors, cellbased band
  • 00:02:39
    modes, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, GPS, and so on
  • 00:02:42
    are actually just running on Linux. By
  • 00:02:46
    the way, on iOS, the base OS is using
  • 00:02:48
    another Unix like OS. So, very similar
  • 00:02:51
    to Linux. Linux as used on Android
  • 00:02:54
    devices requires that the source code be
  • 00:02:57
    made public. This is why open-source
  • 00:02:59
    operating systems are deemed to be safer
  • 00:03:01
    because we can examine the code of both
  • 00:03:03
    the Android framework which gives you
  • 00:03:05
    the user interface and also the nuts and
  • 00:03:07
    bolts which are visible on Linux. In
  • 00:03:10
    this chart, you will see that the
  • 00:03:12
    Android code is in the layer called
  • 00:03:14
    Android framework in green and Linux is
  • 00:03:18
    the section colored in yellow. And
  • 00:03:21
    there's an intermediate translation
  • 00:03:23
    layer in purple which connects
  • 00:03:24
    communications between Android and Linux
  • 00:03:28
    called the hardware abstraction layer.
  • 00:03:33
    Android framework.
  • 00:03:36
    Now let's just focus on the Android
  • 00:03:38
    framework section which is grouped into
  • 00:03:41
    system apps and third-party apps. What
  • 00:03:44
    is interesting is that apps actually run
  • 00:03:48
    under a supervisory layer which in this
  • 00:03:51
    chart is called the Android runtime art.
  • 00:03:54
    The apps cannot run by themselves. They
  • 00:03:56
    cannot directly access any device
  • 00:03:58
    drivers. Only the art interacts with the
  • 00:04:02
    Linux side of things. The other
  • 00:04:03
    interesting detail is that each app
  • 00:04:05
    actually runs isolated in their own
  • 00:04:07
    individual virtual machine. So apps
  • 00:04:10
    cannot see other apps. Apps cannot
  • 00:04:12
    directly interact with other apps. They
  • 00:04:14
    do not share memory or resources outside
  • 00:04:17
    of what's provided to them in the
  • 00:04:19
    virtual machine. When things have to be
  • 00:04:22
    shared between apps, Android will be an
  • 00:04:25
    intermediary and provide a way to pass a
  • 00:04:27
    resource and Android will announce the
  • 00:04:30
    request so that any app can respond to
  • 00:04:33
    provide information
  • 00:04:38
    permissions.
  • 00:04:40
    Apps that you download from an app store
  • 00:04:43
    or are included with the OS cannot
  • 00:04:45
    perform functions outside of what's in
  • 00:04:47
    the Android open source project.
  • 00:04:50
    And as it is open source, it cannot be
  • 00:04:53
    hidden. So AOSP provides a limited set
  • 00:04:57
    of functions and this is further tied to
  • 00:04:59
    permissions that are built into Linux
  • 00:05:01
    itself.
  • 00:05:03
    There's a security model called SE Linux
  • 00:05:06
    which is integrated it into the access
  • 00:05:08
    of Linux functions and calls to device
  • 00:05:11
    drivers. Each app will declare publicly
  • 00:05:14
    what devices and features it will use on
  • 00:05:16
    the device and you the user will be able
  • 00:05:20
    to grant that permission or not. One
  • 00:05:23
    thing that is not possible is for an app
  • 00:05:25
    to secretly not declare that it needs to
  • 00:05:27
    use a device like a camera and then
  • 00:05:30
    without permission turn it on later. And
  • 00:05:33
    again this is locked down by the SE
  • 00:05:36
    Linux security policies and it is
  • 00:05:39
    available in open source so you can see
  • 00:05:40
    it. This design ensures that each app
  • 00:05:44
    cannot perform functions outside of what
  • 00:05:46
    is stated by the developer of the app
  • 00:05:49
    and again only if the user grants that
  • 00:05:52
    permission
  • 00:05:55
    location threat.
  • 00:05:59
    Some apps are very dangerous. As I've
  • 00:06:02
    already revealed in a recent video on
  • 00:06:04
    Fog Data Science and another on Anomaly
  • 00:06:07
    6, these companies actually track users
  • 00:06:10
    on their phones using apps you willingly
  • 00:06:13
    install. Just like you happily buying
  • 00:06:15
    your newest iPhone knowing that the
  • 00:06:17
    iPhone will know your activities and
  • 00:06:19
    locations 24/7.
  • 00:06:21
    But sticking to just apps, the main risk
  • 00:06:24
    of apps is that they sell the data they
  • 00:06:26
    collect. And this is important because
  • 00:06:28
    it is a monetization method.
  • 00:06:31
    The app may be free but you are the
  • 00:06:34
    product so they will take advantage of
  • 00:06:35
    that and make money with your data.
  • 00:06:39
    The primary piece of data tracked is
  • 00:06:41
    your location and some constant ID they
  • 00:06:44
    can use that could be created by the app
  • 00:06:47
    itself or use one allowed by the OS
  • 00:06:50
    which is typically the advertising ID.
  • 00:06:53
    Fortunately, open source phones do not
  • 00:06:55
    have an advertising ID. So this is one
  • 00:06:58
    of the biggest benefits. However, the
  • 00:07:00
    offending app can still create some
  • 00:07:02
    temporary ID and pass it with the
  • 00:07:05
    location data. Someone will always tell
  • 00:07:08
    me that the location data is anonymous
  • 00:07:10
    as these apps are not allowed to send
  • 00:07:13
    data like name of the user or a Google
  • 00:07:15
    ID.
  • 00:07:17
    But as fog data science has already
  • 00:07:19
    proven, this is not an issue. And this
  • 00:07:22
    particular service is used heavily by
  • 00:07:24
    law enforcement.
  • 00:07:26
    If you go to a protest and your location
  • 00:07:28
    is then registered by some app running
  • 00:07:31
    in the background, as long as all your
  • 00:07:33
    other locations are constantly being
  • 00:07:35
    captured by the app, then you are easily
  • 00:07:38
    identified just from seeing where you go
  • 00:07:40
    home to.
  • 00:07:42
    So, a series of location points
  • 00:07:44
    attributed to a particular user, even
  • 00:07:47
    anonymous ones, will yield the actual
  • 00:07:49
    identity. All that has to be done is to
  • 00:07:51
    match the home address to public
  • 00:07:53
    databases like driver's licenses, credit
  • 00:07:55
    reports, and property records, and
  • 00:07:57
    they've got you.
  • 00:08:00
    Location plus IP address threat.
  • 00:08:04
    There's a second layer of threats tied
  • 00:08:06
    to the location threat. This is when
  • 00:08:08
    data is captured in addition to
  • 00:08:10
    location. This is when the location is
  • 00:08:12
    sent together with an IP address to the
  • 00:08:14
    data aggregator company. This was a
  • 00:08:16
    technique used to create a very common
  • 00:08:18
    database called the reverse IP lookup.
  • 00:08:21
    What this does is attach a real fine
  • 00:08:23
    location to an IP address. Normally IP
  • 00:08:26
    addresses are only up to the level of
  • 00:08:29
    the ISB center in the area. In small
  • 00:08:32
    cities, this can be the entire city. In
  • 00:08:34
    larger areas like Los Angeles, the IP
  • 00:08:36
    address can be attributed to specific
  • 00:08:38
    neighborhoods.
  • 00:08:39
    At least this is what is publicly
  • 00:08:41
    available using free services like what
  • 00:08:44
    is my IP address.com.
  • 00:08:46
    But if you pay for access to the reverse
  • 00:08:49
    IP lookup database then you can possibly
  • 00:08:52
    get a precise location especially if you
  • 00:08:55
    are using your home network to within 6
  • 00:08:57
    ft. This is important data for financial
  • 00:09:00
    institutions for example. Often this
  • 00:09:02
    service is called verified location. and
  • 00:09:05
    they're able to get this more precise
  • 00:09:07
    location by creating a history of
  • 00:09:09
    location coordinates tied to an IP
  • 00:09:11
    address as captured by apps. This makes
  • 00:09:15
    the IP address a very dangerous piece of
  • 00:09:17
    data all of a sudden.
  • 00:09:21
    How to counter these location threats?
  • 00:09:24
    Currently, the surveillance in location
  • 00:09:26
    is a huge thing. Likely a big chunk of
  • 00:09:29
    the population shows up in these
  • 00:09:30
    location database if you're cavalier
  • 00:09:33
    about the use of apps. So, the first
  • 00:09:35
    thing to do is to go to your phone and
  • 00:09:38
    check app permissions. Depending on the
  • 00:09:40
    phone, you can even go to settings and
  • 00:09:42
    look specifically at those that you gave
  • 00:09:45
    location permissions too. This is the
  • 00:09:48
    easiest threat to counter since simply
  • 00:09:50
    blocking location permissions will stop
  • 00:09:53
    the exfiltration of your data. Without
  • 00:09:56
    location data, even the IP address could
  • 00:09:58
    prove meaningless on an open-source
  • 00:10:01
    phone. Now if you use a VPN you can
  • 00:10:04
    obviously protect your IP address from
  • 00:10:06
    being acquired. This is extremely
  • 00:10:08
    important when you are at home. It is
  • 00:10:11
    less important on sale data or Starlink
  • 00:10:14
    and the reason is that many people will
  • 00:10:16
    be sharing the IP address in these
  • 00:10:17
    cases. So these types of services will
  • 00:10:20
    not directly tie an IP address to a
  • 00:10:23
    particular individual. The harder
  • 00:10:25
    problem is that some apps will not run
  • 00:10:28
    without you giving them permissions for
  • 00:10:30
    location. An example here is Yelp,
  • 00:10:33
    Craigslist, Ways, and another one is the
  • 00:10:36
    Weather Channel app. And the average
  • 00:10:38
    person will give in. In my mind, these
  • 00:10:41
    are examples of ultra dangerous apps
  • 00:10:44
    that will exfiltrate your data to a
  • 00:10:46
    location database aggregator and will
  • 00:10:49
    end up on Fog Data Science and Anomaly
  • 00:10:51
    6. Can you still use these apps? If you
  • 00:10:55
    have to use them, I would always disable
  • 00:10:57
    location permissions when I'm not using
  • 00:11:00
    them. And for better peace of mind, I
  • 00:11:02
    would shut down the apps when not in use
  • 00:11:04
    so they're not running in the
  • 00:11:06
    background. Again, they force you to
  • 00:11:09
    give your permission. So, it is actually
  • 00:11:11
    your fault that you agree, but correct
  • 00:11:14
    it now by scanning through all the apps
  • 00:11:16
    with location permissions. So, mostly
  • 00:11:19
    they are all off. The clue is that the
  • 00:11:22
    apps are typically free and require
  • 00:11:24
    location.
  • 00:11:27
    Fitness apps.
  • 00:11:30
    Fitness apps are another kind of
  • 00:11:32
    location risk. Often they're tied to
  • 00:11:35
    locations as well because you're
  • 00:11:36
    recording things like 10,000 steps or
  • 00:11:39
    some such. But fitness apps have another
  • 00:11:41
    risk and that is to combine the location
  • 00:11:43
    history with gyro sensors. So as I said
  • 00:11:47
    earlier that knowing your gyro data like
  • 00:11:49
    every step will actually be enough to
  • 00:11:51
    roughly gauge your location even if you
  • 00:11:54
    turn your location data off. I recall
  • 00:11:57
    some Russian officer using fitness apps
  • 00:11:59
    extensively and of course this is common
  • 00:12:02
    for military personnel and then some
  • 00:12:04
    intelligence operatives were able to
  • 00:12:06
    track his jogging path and he was
  • 00:12:08
    assassinated on that route. I know so
  • 00:12:11
    many people using fitness apps. It's
  • 00:12:13
    likely better to use a Garmin watch that
  • 00:12:16
    has fitness data but not connected to
  • 00:12:18
    the internet and not connected to your
  • 00:12:20
    phone. I'm sure these watches can
  • 00:12:22
    connect to phone apps, but see if you
  • 00:12:24
    can use it without connecting to a
  • 00:12:26
    phone.
  • 00:12:29
    Google apps.
  • 00:12:32
    There's a category of apps primarily
  • 00:12:34
    those from Google that can monitor your
  • 00:12:36
    activities and IP addresses and connect
  • 00:12:38
    it to what you are doing on another
  • 00:12:40
    device like a desktop computer. This is
  • 00:12:43
    even with location off. The biggest
  • 00:12:46
    identifier here is the Google ID.
  • 00:12:49
    Examples of these apps are Gmail,
  • 00:12:52
    YouTube, Google Maps, Ways again, Google
  • 00:12:55
    Drive, Google Photos, and even Chrome.
  • 00:12:58
    These apps will send a constant
  • 00:13:00
    telemetry of your IP address and Google
  • 00:13:03
    ID to Google. Then this can be matched
  • 00:13:05
    to other devices you're logged onto.
  • 00:13:08
    This is called crossdevice tracking.
  • 00:13:11
    These apps can also store a cookie of
  • 00:13:14
    the Google ID on your mobile browser and
  • 00:13:16
    this is the instrument used to track
  • 00:13:19
    everything you do on any other platform.
  • 00:13:22
    Actually, the idea of having a Google ID
  • 00:13:24
    tracking your every move on the internet
  • 00:13:26
    is a big issue I frequently discussed
  • 00:13:29
    and is the main threat of big tech on
  • 00:13:31
    the internet. However, what is
  • 00:13:33
    interesting is that an open-source or
  • 00:13:36
    deoogle phone has no Google ID. Thus,
  • 00:13:39
    the risk comes only if you actually log
  • 00:13:42
    into a Google app and put in your
  • 00:13:44
    credentials.
  • 00:13:46
    Fortunately, it is not often necessary
  • 00:13:48
    to do that. I have a Bra 3 phone which
  • 00:13:51
    is open source running EOD OS and on
  • 00:13:54
    this I installed a Google app which has
  • 00:13:55
    search and voice search, YouTube, Google
  • 00:13:58
    Translate, Google Maps and Ways. Now, I
  • 00:14:02
    specifically chose these apps as
  • 00:14:04
    examples because none of these apps
  • 00:14:07
    require me to be logged into Google.
  • 00:14:11
    If you do the exact same steps of
  • 00:14:13
    denying location permissions and not
  • 00:14:15
    logging in, then these apps are not
  • 00:14:17
    really as dangerous as they sound. I
  • 00:14:20
    actually can't think of too many threats
  • 00:14:22
    with their use. Perhaps in this set, the
  • 00:14:25
    biggest threat potentially comes from
  • 00:14:27
    voice signatures or voice prints. And
  • 00:14:30
    when you use ways to take you home, it
  • 00:14:32
    will learn where home is and then sell
  • 00:14:34
    that data to Fog Data Science. But
  • 00:14:37
    otherwise, they're not that risky in
  • 00:14:39
    this particular use. And especially if
  • 00:14:42
    you use a VPN at home, this is even less
  • 00:14:44
    of an issue. Now, Google apps that
  • 00:14:47
    require you to log in are automatically
  • 00:14:49
    dangerous as they provide a constant
  • 00:14:52
    telemetry of IP addresses even if you
  • 00:14:55
    block location permission.
  • 00:14:57
    This include apps like Gmail, Google
  • 00:15:00
    Docs, Google Drive and so on since these
  • 00:15:02
    are impossible to run without logging
  • 00:15:04
    in. Just understand that their use opens
  • 00:15:08
    you up to tracking dangers.
  • 00:15:13
    Meta apps.
  • 00:15:16
    Meta apps meaning specifically Facebook,
  • 00:15:18
    Instagram and WhatsApp are very
  • 00:15:21
    dangerous apps. And that is because
  • 00:15:23
    unlike in other apps, Meta knows
  • 00:15:25
    precisely who you are. And this is
  • 00:15:27
    crowdverified by your friends. It also
  • 00:15:30
    knows all your location, retrieves your
  • 00:15:32
    contact list daily, and creates a
  • 00:15:35
    dynamic relationship map from this that
  • 00:15:38
    establishes who you know and who you
  • 00:15:40
    circulate with, including specific
  • 00:15:42
    activities you participate in. Meta does
  • 00:15:46
    not hide that it does this intense
  • 00:15:49
    collection of data. And unlike the
  • 00:15:51
    Google apps I mentioned earlier, it is
  • 00:15:53
    not possible to use meta without logging
  • 00:15:55
    in. Meta also clearly states that it
  • 00:15:58
    combines the information about you from
  • 00:15:59
    all its apps. So you cannot really use
  • 00:16:02
    WhatsApp anonymously.
  • 00:16:04
    And just like Google, the Facebook ID is
  • 00:16:06
    an internet identifier that is
  • 00:16:08
    recognized by any site that embeds a
  • 00:16:11
    Facebook login, Facebook ad or Facebook
  • 00:16:14
    like button. This means a lot of
  • 00:16:16
    websites can track you simply by using
  • 00:16:18
    Meta. This is a case where I can't
  • 00:16:20
    really find any safe solutions for. So
  • 00:16:23
    for privacy reasons, I cannot ever
  • 00:16:25
    recommend to anyone that you use any of
  • 00:16:27
    these apps. Once you join one, then
  • 00:16:30
    anyone you connect to is part of the
  • 00:16:32
    surveillance algorithm.
  • 00:16:36
    Contactless dangers.
  • 00:16:39
    While Facebook is number one when it
  • 00:16:41
    comes to taking contactless information
  • 00:16:43
    daily, others include Tik Tok, LinkedIn,
  • 00:16:45
    and many social media apps. Contact
  • 00:16:48
    lists collection allow the establishing
  • 00:16:51
    of these relationship maps and it can be
  • 00:16:54
    used to connect people by phone number.
  • 00:16:57
    Just in general, I always ban apps that
  • 00:16:59
    will send my contact list to some
  • 00:17:01
    external database like what most social
  • 00:17:04
    media apps do. However, some apps like
  • 00:17:07
    your contactless app or your phone app
  • 00:17:10
    does not connect to the internet per se
  • 00:17:12
    and thus there is no danger to giving it
  • 00:17:15
    contactless permissions. Remember that
  • 00:17:18
    contact list are downloaded daily. Once
  • 00:17:20
    I installed Tik Tok and did not give it
  • 00:17:22
    contactless permissions, but Tik Tok is
  • 00:17:25
    so suspiciously aggressive with contact
  • 00:17:27
    list that it asks you for permission
  • 00:17:30
    each time you launch it. One time I
  • 00:17:32
    accidentally accepted the permission and
  • 00:17:35
    it immediately uploaded my contact list.
  • 00:17:38
    At that moment I closed the account.
  • 00:17:43
    Foid apps.
  • 00:17:46
    For those of you with the Google phones,
  • 00:17:48
    you will find that you have the choice
  • 00:17:50
    of using the Froid store. I will tell
  • 00:17:53
    you now that these Foid apps are going
  • 00:17:55
    to be very safe and no secret data
  • 00:17:58
    collection can occur. The reason is that
  • 00:18:00
    to be listed in the Froid store, you
  • 00:18:03
    must submit your app source code to Foid
  • 00:18:05
    itself and Foid independently builds
  • 00:18:08
    your app from the source code and that's
  • 00:18:10
    what's made available in the store. And
  • 00:18:11
    these apps must not connect secretly to
  • 00:18:13
    Google. Foid can examine source code and
  • 00:18:16
    see if there's some hanky panky going on
  • 00:18:18
    with your data. So this is a case where
  • 00:18:20
    you can just automatically trust this
  • 00:18:22
    source. Foid apps may not have similar
  • 00:18:26
    versions on the Google Play Store, but
  • 00:18:28
    if they do, I would use the Foid version
  • 00:18:31
    as much as possible. For example, if you
  • 00:18:33
    want an ultra safe map app, instead of
  • 00:18:36
    using Google Maps or even Magic Earth,
  • 00:18:38
    you can find some app like Osmand on
  • 00:18:41
    Foid and it will be the safer option. An
  • 00:18:45
    example application of this is with
  • 00:18:47
    weather apps. Since location data is
  • 00:18:49
    frequently sold by weather apps, this is
  • 00:18:51
    a case where I would go to Foid itself
  • 00:18:54
    and find some app like Breezy weather.
  • 00:18:59
    Other possible threats.
  • 00:19:02
    Other potential threats that scare
  • 00:19:04
    people are apps that will just turn on
  • 00:19:06
    the camera or microphone. While these
  • 00:19:08
    are legitimate features when the app
  • 00:19:10
    captures photos and videos, these are
  • 00:19:13
    real possibilities. So, I would rarely
  • 00:19:15
    grant access to camera photos and
  • 00:19:17
    videos. But be careful here as these
  • 00:19:20
    permissions are often forgotten on the
  • 00:19:22
    browser. If you screw this part up, you
  • 00:19:25
    have to blame yourself since the cause
  • 00:19:27
    of this is bad permissions.
  • 00:19:30
    Another real threat is some thirdparty
  • 00:19:33
    app acquiring device identifiers like
  • 00:19:35
    MAC addresses, IMEI, MZ and so on. These
  • 00:19:38
    are identifiers that actually are unique
  • 00:19:41
    to your phone and thus can be used to
  • 00:19:42
    track particular users. These
  • 00:19:45
    identifiers reside in the Linux layer.
  • 00:19:48
    So a Linux executable code could read
  • 00:19:50
    these values. But this is no longer a
  • 00:19:52
    threat nowadays because for many years
  • 00:19:54
    now this information is now locked down
  • 00:19:56
    by permissions and not available to
  • 00:19:59
    thirdparty apps on a Google phone. No
  • 00:20:02
    Google system app can read it either
  • 00:20:04
    because they don't exist. A threat that
  • 00:20:07
    was recently identified was the
  • 00:20:08
    government starting monitoring
  • 00:20:10
    notifications. Notifications are not
  • 00:20:12
    encrypted and if your device can be
  • 00:20:14
    identified then it is possible that some
  • 00:20:16
    can read your notifications. My response
  • 00:20:19
    to this is to limit which apps can send
  • 00:20:22
    notifications. One particular conspiracy
  • 00:20:25
    theory is that apps will interact with
  • 00:20:27
    your body using WBAN WBAN using nanobots
  • 00:20:32
    injected via vaccine. This one I do not
  • 00:20:35
    bias risk. If such a radio transmission
  • 00:20:37
    exists, it should be easily detected
  • 00:20:40
    using common digital radio tools and
  • 00:20:42
    hidden communications should not be
  • 00:20:44
    possible on a third-party app. Not sure
  • 00:20:47
    why people worry about this when the
  • 00:20:49
    tracking of all your activities is done
  • 00:20:50
    in a more obvious manner using simpler
  • 00:20:53
    methods.
  • 00:20:57
    Firewalls.
  • 00:20:59
    Is it necessary to use an Android
  • 00:21:01
    firewall app like Netgard? And can this
  • 00:21:04
    even catch anything?
  • 00:21:07
    Unfortunately, I don't think firewall
  • 00:21:09
    apps are useful at tracking Linux level
  • 00:21:11
    traffic since that is beyond the control
  • 00:21:14
    of Android apps. So things happening at
  • 00:21:17
    the OS level in Linux may not be
  • 00:21:19
    visible. Meaning don't expect a
  • 00:21:22
    framework level app to record things
  • 00:21:24
    happening outside of the Android
  • 00:21:26
    framework. This is a big giant hole.
  • 00:21:29
    However, if you are experimenting with
  • 00:21:31
    some new app, you can make sure it will
  • 00:21:34
    not reach out with your data by
  • 00:21:36
    activating a firewall to stop it from
  • 00:21:38
    communicating.
  • 00:21:39
    Let me just warn you of limitations
  • 00:21:42
    though. While you may be able to stop
  • 00:21:44
    your data from being exfiltrated while
  • 00:21:46
    using the firewall, the problem is that
  • 00:21:48
    if you allow the app to transmit
  • 00:21:50
    eventually, there's always the risk that
  • 00:21:52
    the data has been accumulated and sent
  • 00:21:55
    in batch. So, it's okay to use these,
  • 00:21:59
    but they have limitations.
  • 00:22:02
    Summary.
  • 00:22:05
    In summary, although there are many
  • 00:22:08
    risky apps, you can control them so they
  • 00:22:10
    stay within their lane, but as a matter
  • 00:22:13
    of habit, I would recommend that you
  • 00:22:14
    install as few apps as possible. And if
  • 00:22:18
    you're not using an app, then delete it.
  • 00:22:20
    And be careful about login apps to
  • 00:22:23
    Google or Facebook.
  • 00:22:25
    On a privacy focused OS, I really
  • 00:22:27
    wouldn't worry about the system apps.
  • 00:22:30
    Those developers will have already
  • 00:22:32
    curated what can be found there. The
  • 00:22:35
    reality is that the biggest threats have
  • 00:22:37
    always been more inside Google and Apple
  • 00:22:40
    itself. Google, for example,
  • 00:22:42
    deliberately collects constant location
  • 00:22:44
    and other telemetry, and you cannot stop
  • 00:22:46
    it with permissions. They store it in
  • 00:22:49
    what is publicly called the Google
  • 00:22:51
    sensor vault. In case you think I made
  • 00:22:53
    this up, this is really an important
  • 00:22:55
    element. System apps installed by Google
  • 00:22:58
    itself can evade permission
  • 00:23:00
    requirements. They can talk to HQ and
  • 00:23:02
    hidden channels and have encrypted
  • 00:23:04
    traffic. And likely you will see more of
  • 00:23:07
    this with AI companion type apps. But
  • 00:23:09
    Google and Apple successfully limited
  • 00:23:12
    the risk of third-party apps and
  • 00:23:15
    open-source oss are immune from Google
  • 00:23:18
    and Apple's surveillance infrastructure.
  • 00:23:20
    So the risk left is often just at the
  • 00:23:24
    level of permissions. So, that's where
  • 00:23:26
    you need to raise your awareness,
  • 00:23:28
    granting permissions and making sure no
  • 00:23:30
    one has installed a Rogue app on your
  • 00:23:33
    device.
  • 00:23:37
    Folks, while other channels sustain
  • 00:23:39
    themselves via sponsorships, we are
  • 00:23:42
    actively sustained solely by this
  • 00:23:44
    community. Thank you to those who
  • 00:23:46
    provide financial support directly to us
  • 00:23:49
    through Patreon, locals, and YouTube
  • 00:23:51
    memberships. We have also taken the
  • 00:23:53
    approach of actually creating an
  • 00:23:55
    organization you can trust by creating
  • 00:23:58
    products that support your goal and ours
  • 00:24:00
    of achieving privacy and offering it
  • 00:24:03
    with the best possible service at a
  • 00:24:05
    reasonable price. And this is how we
  • 00:24:07
    chose to sustain this channel. For those
  • 00:24:10
    interested in the BRA 3 project that is
  • 00:24:13
    handled by the site bratec.net net and
  • 00:24:16
    you can see the current status of the
  • 00:24:18
    project there which currently started
  • 00:24:20
    shipping. We have other products that
  • 00:24:23
    you will find on our community area on
  • 00:24:26
    Braxme. There are over 120,000 users
  • 00:24:29
    that are part of our community that
  • 00:24:32
    discuss security and privacy issues in a
  • 00:24:35
    safe environment. Many of you believe in
  • 00:24:37
    us and so this community is growing.
  • 00:24:39
    Some of you have been involved for more
  • 00:24:41
    than 10 years. In our store, you will
  • 00:24:44
    find products like Pixel phones, Brax
  • 00:24:47
    virtual phone, Bra, and ViceVPN. These
  • 00:24:50
    are an essential base to build your
  • 00:24:52
    personal privacy and of course support
  • 00:24:54
    the creation of content on this channel.
  • 00:24:57
    Thank you for watching and see you next
  • 00:24:59
    time.
الوسوم
  • privacy
  • apps
  • third-party
  • permissions
  • FDroid
  • location tracking
  • Google
  • Meta
  • security
  • open-source