The Real Reason Yugoslavia Died | Prof. Susan L. Woodward

00:45:39
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p2hyevgXLDA

Resumen

TLDRThis interview with Professor Susan Woodward delves into the complex history of the Yugoslav wars, examining the factors that contributed to the dissolution of Yugoslavia after the Cold War. Key themes include the impact of economic crises, nationalist movements, and the role of international actors like the U.S. and NATO. Woodward argues that despite the violent breakup, Yugoslavia had a successful model of self-governance and neutrality that might serve as a lesson for contemporary conflicts in regions like Ukraine and the Balkans. The discussion also addresses ongoing issues in Bosnia and Kosovo, highlighting their precarious political situations and the influence of external powers on their stability.

Para llevar

  • 🧐 Yugoslavia was a functioning state until the Cold War ended, leading to its violent breakup.
  • 📉 Economic policies from the IMF created social unrest and contributed to the internal strife.
  • 🇺🇸 U.S. foreign policy shifted post-Cold War, reducing support for Yugoslavia, impacting its stability.
  • 🕊️ The concept of neutrality could apply to current geopolitical conflicts, such as Ukraine.
  • 📜 The decentralized political system in Yugoslavia allowed for strong regional identities but complicated governance.
  • 🤔 Yugoslavia's breakup highlights the complexities of nationalism and ethnic tensions in multi-ethnic states.
  • ⚖️ External forces play a significant role in both the stability and fragmentation of regions like the Balkans.
  • 🔄 Ongoing tensions in Bosnia and Kosovo result from historical grievances and external influences on governance.
  • 📚 Understanding past conflicts can inform current diplomatic strategies in fragile regions.
  • 💬 Open dialogue among conflicting parties is necessary for long-term peace and stability.

Cronología

  • 00:00:00 - 00:05:00

    The discussion begins with the historical context of the Serb minority in Croatia and the significance of the regions like Cryina in Croatia and Bosnia. It highlights the military borders during the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires and how the Serbs played a role in defending Europe against the Ottomans. The conversation transitions to the Yugoslav wars, with Pascal introducing Susan Woodward to discuss the breakup of Yugoslavia, its causes, and the 1990s conflicts.

  • 00:05:00 - 00:10:00

    Susan Woodward elaborates on the breakup of Yugoslavia post-Tito's death, emphasizing the internal dynamics and external factors leading up to it. She notes how the global debt crisis and IMF policies significantly impacted Yugoslavia, creating economic challenges and political decentralization. The special relationship with the U.S. faded with the end of the Cold War, further complicating the internal crisis.

  • 00:10:00 - 00:15:00

    Woodward explains the intricate decentralized political system in Yugoslavia, where consensus was key, but this hampered decision-making. The discussion introduces the notion of grievances rather than deadlock, and how the economic conditions, especially rising unemployment, fueled the push for independence in Slovenia and Croatia amidst growing tensions.

  • 00:15:00 - 00:20:00

    The conversation shifts to the role of the U.S. and international factors in Yugoslavia's stability and eventual fragmentation. U.S. support waned as Yugoslavia's strategic importance to NATO diminished, leading to growing domestic unrest. The IMF's austerity measures compounded the economic hardships faced by Yugoslav citizens, influencing political stability.

  • 00:20:00 - 00:25:00

    Woodward reflects on the dynamics of Yugoslavia's neutrality, drawing parallels to Ukraine's current geopolitical situation, suggesting that neutrality could have been a solution. This section underlines the historical aspect of neutrality in the Balkans and the potential lessons for contemporary conflicts such as Ukraine's.

  • 00:25:00 - 00:30:00

    The dialogue highlights the significance of the Balkans in European history while expressing uncertainty about the future trajectory of the region. The interplay of Middle Eastern politics, NATO, and the EU's role in Balkan stability is considered, revealing ongoing complexities in the geopolitical landscape.

  • 00:30:00 - 00:35:00

    Woodward contrasts the hope for European integration in the Balkans with the current stagnation regarding EU enlargement. She attributes this delay to internal EU dynamics while emphasizing the importance of stability in the Balkans for overall European security.

  • 00:35:00 - 00:40:00

    The assessment of the leaders during the breakup of Yugoslavia is discussed, particularly focusing on extreme nationalism and their roles in pushing for independence from Yugoslavia, with tensions rising as differing ambitions led to conflict amidst the Yugoslav wars.

  • 00:40:00 - 00:45:39

    In a discussion on Bosnia, Kosovo, and current political dynamics, Woodward notes the tenuous coexistence of different ethnic groups. The dialogues emphasize local grievances and external pressures hindering progress, with concerns regarding the balance of power and ongoing negotiations for peace and stability.

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Mapa mental

Vídeo de preguntas y respuestas

  • What led to the breakup of Yugoslavia?

    The breakup was influenced by a combination of internal political decay after Tito's death, economic crises exacerbated by international monetary policies, and rising nationalism in Slovenia and Croatia.

  • What role did NATO play in the Yugoslav wars?

    NATO was involved primarily in humanitarian efforts and later in military action during the Bosnia War and the Kosovo conflict, particularly under American leadership.

  • How did American policies affect Yugoslavia?

    The U.S. shifted its support away from Yugoslavia after the Cold War, impacting its economy and diplomatic standing, which contributed to instability.

  • What is the situation in Bosnia and Kosovo today?

    Both regions remain politically fragmented, with Bosnia facing a stalemate regarding governance and Kosovo struggling for international recognition and internal autonomy.

  • How can the lessons of Yugoslavia apply to Ukraine?

    The experience of Yugoslavia suggests that neutrality and a consociational system accommodating various ethnicities could help prevent conflict in Ukraine.

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Desplazamiento automático:
  • 00:00:00
    You remember I was talking about the
  • 00:00:02
    Serb minority in Croatia of being 11 or
  • 00:00:06
    12%. Um, and that area in Croatia is
  • 00:00:10
    called
  • 00:00:11
    Cryina and the northern part of Bosnia
  • 00:00:14
    is also called Bosanska Cryina. Cryena
  • 00:00:17
    means border in Slavic. So if you think
  • 00:00:21
    about Ukraine, it's the same word. Um,
  • 00:00:24
    and so in the case of Croatia and
  • 00:00:26
    Bosnia, that was the military border
  • 00:00:29
    between the AustroHungarian Empire and
  • 00:00:31
    the Ottoman Empire. And and the Serbs
  • 00:00:34
    were were required to be military to
  • 00:00:37
    defend Europe against the
  • 00:00:41
    Ottomans, the neutrality of Yugoslavia.
  • 00:00:45
    People I support who analyze the Ukraine
  • 00:00:48
    case say these are places that are
  • 00:00:51
    geopolitically must be
  • 00:01:00
    neutral. Hello everybody. This is Pascal
  • 00:01:03
    from Neutrality Studies and I've been
  • 00:01:04
    wrestling for a while with the question
  • 00:01:06
    of how to best approach the Yugoslav
  • 00:01:08
    wars and finally decided to ask someone
  • 00:01:10
    who's not from the region but studied it
  • 00:01:13
    for decades. Today I'm talking to Susan
  • 00:01:15
    Woodward, a professor of political
  • 00:01:17
    science at the City University of New
  • 00:01:19
    York. Professor Woodward is the author
  • 00:01:21
    of Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution
  • 00:01:24
    After the Cold War and also the more
  • 00:01:26
    recent work, The Ideology of Failed
  • 00:01:29
    States: Why Intervention Fails. Today we
  • 00:01:32
    want to discuss what happened in the
  • 00:01:33
    1990s and the legacy of the Balkan Wars.
  • 00:01:36
    Professor Woodward, welcome. Good
  • 00:01:38
    morning. Good evening or wherever. My
  • 00:01:41
    morning, your evening. Thank you very
  • 00:01:43
    much for taking the time today. And um
  • 00:01:45
    you wrote for many years about the
  • 00:01:48
    Balkans. You wrote about the way
  • 00:01:50
    Yugoslavia fell apart. And one of the
  • 00:01:53
    things that I always wanted to discuss
  • 00:01:55
    is this process. You know, Yugoslavia
  • 00:01:57
    was a functioning state after the Second
  • 00:02:01
    World War under its
  • 00:02:03
    long-term dictator leader uh Yseph
  • 00:02:07
    Protito. Um and then Tito dies and
  • 00:02:10
    Yugoslavia was very well integrated into
  • 00:02:12
    the international world. It was a
  • 00:02:13
    non-aligned state. It had friends on all
  • 00:02:15
    sides. Tito's funeral was in fact
  • 00:02:17
    visited by most heads of states and
  • 00:02:20
    leaders at the time. I think it was 82.
  • 00:02:22
    Um and and then and then comes this
  • 00:02:26
    breakup right after right when the cold
  • 00:02:29
    war ended or after the end of of the
  • 00:02:31
    cold war um and the very violent um
  • 00:02:33
    breakup. What were the internal and
  • 00:02:36
    external factors according to your
  • 00:02:37
    research that h that led to this?
  • 00:02:41
    Oh my goodness. Do you know how major a
  • 00:02:43
    question that is? There's no
  • 00:02:46
    um do you want to start with some more
  • 00:02:48
    specific ones? Um it's interesting you
  • 00:02:51
    asked me before we started this. Um I I
  • 00:02:55
    think you said um let me let me see if I
  • 00:02:58
    can say um why did it fall apart after
  • 00:03:01
    Tito's death? and you've phrased it
  • 00:03:04
    better just now that it it doesn't fall
  • 00:03:06
    apart until the end of the Cold War. Um,
  • 00:03:09
    but I also wanted to emphasize that Tito
  • 00:03:11
    died in 1980.
  • 00:03:13
    Um, and the beginning of the end of
  • 00:03:16
    Yugoslavia
  • 00:03:17
    um
  • 00:03:19
    is when the Slovenian and Croatian
  • 00:03:23
    leaderships in two of the federal units
  • 00:03:26
    of Yugoslavia declare independence. And
  • 00:03:29
    that's moving towards the end of 1989,
  • 00:03:32
    but it's not until June 1990. So you can
  • 00:03:35
    see all of a sudden it's 10 years. So
  • 00:03:38
    the question is what happens in those 10
  • 00:03:41
    years? But and equally I guess what
  • 00:03:43
    you're saying what what is the role of
  • 00:03:45
    the end of the cold war? Um and so I
  • 00:03:48
    guess I would have to start by saying I
  • 00:03:50
    do a political economy analysis. And to
  • 00:03:52
    me, what was really crucial about the
  • 00:03:54
    1980s is it begins in
  • 00:03:57
    1979 with what we called the global debt
  • 00:04:01
    crisis. And Yugoslavia was actually the
  • 00:04:04
    experiment for the International
  • 00:04:06
    Monetary Fund of what came to be called
  • 00:04:09
    standby stabilization agreements. So
  • 00:04:12
    these were three years and they were
  • 00:04:15
    what we now call austerity policies to
  • 00:04:18
    repay debt. And the reason I say
  • 00:04:22
    Yugosavia was an experiment that began
  • 00:04:24
    to apply these in lots of other places,
  • 00:04:26
    especially in Latin America, but it was
  • 00:04:28
    first in in Yugosavia. So during the
  • 00:04:31
    1980s, Yugosavia is having to do
  • 00:04:34
    policies to repay debt and you have a
  • 00:04:38
    context of a political system. So that's
  • 00:04:41
    let's say that's partly the
  • 00:04:43
    international story. Um, and I could
  • 00:04:46
    jump ahead to say by
  • 00:04:48
    1989, the very special relationship that
  • 00:04:51
    the United States had with Yugoslavia,
  • 00:04:54
    Yugoslavia had with the United States,
  • 00:04:57
    which I can talk about, ends because the
  • 00:05:00
    Americans say, "Oh, you don't matter to
  • 00:05:02
    us anymore because your role in
  • 00:05:06
    maintaining the safety of the southern
  • 00:05:08
    flank of NATO doesn't matter anymore
  • 00:05:12
    because that's ending." And so the kind
  • 00:05:14
    of special support including
  • 00:05:18
    financial that the United States was
  • 00:05:21
    giving to Yugosabia already starting in
  • 00:05:24
    1949 ends. Um and that had a
  • 00:05:28
    psychological effect I would say but
  • 00:05:29
    most important it had it was the almost
  • 00:05:33
    the end of a period of real austerity
  • 00:05:36
    for people. So that let's move
  • 00:05:39
    domestically and say that Yugoslavia was
  • 00:05:43
    um over and over again ever more
  • 00:05:47
    decentralized a political system. So
  • 00:05:51
    that by the by the late 70s even um the
  • 00:05:54
    leaders of the federal republics,
  • 00:05:56
    they're like states in the United
  • 00:05:58
    States. um the the leaders and let me
  • 00:06:01
    just interrupt to say the federal system
  • 00:06:04
    created after World War II
  • 00:06:07
    um was based on the right of national
  • 00:06:13
    selfdetermination for all the people
  • 00:06:16
    bringing together parts of the different
  • 00:06:18
    empires um to a federal system. And by
  • 00:06:23
    then the a and secondly the um decision
  • 00:06:27
    making at the at the center was by
  • 00:06:31
    consensus. So the combination of
  • 00:06:34
    decentralization where most policies are
  • 00:06:36
    taken by the people in the federal
  • 00:06:38
    republics and the consensus among them
  • 00:06:41
    at the center made decision-m very slow
  • 00:06:45
    very difficult and then in the context
  • 00:06:48
    of the
  • 00:06:49
    80s quite ownorous very quite um I
  • 00:06:54
    wouldn't say so well let me just say
  • 00:06:57
    very difficult because the
  • 00:07:00
    inequalities among the regions going
  • 00:07:03
    from the most rich in the northwest of
  • 00:07:06
    Slovenia to the very poorest um in
  • 00:07:10
    Bosnia and in Macedonia
  • 00:07:13
    um created a big conflict over um what
  • 00:07:17
    we would call tax policies. That is to
  • 00:07:20
    say, the Slovines especially
  • 00:07:23
    um were angry at having to pay so many
  • 00:07:26
    taxes through the federal government to
  • 00:07:28
    support the redistributive development
  • 00:07:31
    policies for the poor neighbors. So you
  • 00:07:34
    can I can play out lots of scenarios,
  • 00:07:37
    but you can see at the international
  • 00:07:39
    level um the dependence of the Yugoslavs
  • 00:07:43
    on international aid and lending and
  • 00:07:47
    American support economically on the one
  • 00:07:49
    hand and ever more difficult decision
  • 00:07:53
    decisions on redistribution and taxation
  • 00:07:56
    domestically in a political system
  • 00:07:59
    context of a political system where they
  • 00:08:00
    all have to agree before they can have
  • 00:08:02
    any policy.
  • 00:08:04
    led over time to this decision by
  • 00:08:07
    Slovenia and Croatia to leave. So you
  • 00:08:10
    would say Yugoslavia was internally
  • 00:08:12
    deadlocked and that and that led then to
  • 00:08:15
    these these unadressed grievances,
  • 00:08:18
    politically unadressed grievances then
  • 00:08:20
    to to
  • 00:08:21
    to the to the declaration of
  • 00:08:24
    independence for Slovenia and then
  • 00:08:25
    Croatia. Well, I wouldn't go so far. I
  • 00:08:29
    wouldn't say it was deadlocked. I was
  • 00:08:30
    just I would like to say it was
  • 00:08:32
    decisions were took a long time. Um
  • 00:08:35
    there were people disagreed a lot. So
  • 00:08:38
    there was almost by the end a
  • 00:08:41
    constitutional crisis about what kinds
  • 00:08:43
    of decisions could be made and and
  • 00:08:46
    secondly you I'm I'm very concerned not
  • 00:08:50
    to use the word grievances
  • 00:08:52
    because you know grievances that's what
  • 00:08:54
    democracy is all about. And even though
  • 00:08:56
    it was a one party system, uh it was
  • 00:08:59
    very more
  • 00:09:01
    democratic in decision-making, what we
  • 00:09:03
    call the worker self-management system,
  • 00:09:06
    um which I can describe if you want, but
  • 00:09:08
    it was in terms of decision-m it was
  • 00:09:11
    really very democratic, meaning you had
  • 00:09:13
    to get consensus, right? So there were
  • 00:09:15
    always going to be disagreements over
  • 00:09:18
    federal policy, policy at the center. Um
  • 00:09:22
    and yes, of course it's true that when
  • 00:09:24
    the austerity policies were making life
  • 00:09:28
    very difficult for people in
  • 00:09:30
    unemployment was getting very high,
  • 00:09:32
    inflation was very high. Um unemployment
  • 00:09:36
    was what to me was most important
  • 00:09:38
    because it always existed. U was hitting
  • 00:09:41
    the middle class and and the
  • 00:09:44
    administrative class. So you members of
  • 00:09:47
    the party and leaders of the party,
  • 00:09:48
    their sons and daughters didn't have
  • 00:09:50
    jobs. but also consumer goods because
  • 00:09:54
    the austerity policies of the IMF put
  • 00:09:57
    limits on what could be imported and
  • 00:10:00
    their production at home was so in US
  • 00:10:03
    was so dependent on intermediate goods
  • 00:10:06
    for local production that things like
  • 00:10:09
    laundry soap couldn't be produced
  • 00:10:11
    anymore because of the chemicals that
  • 00:10:13
    they were importing. So people's
  • 00:10:15
    material conditions were
  • 00:10:17
    really getting worse and worse. So to
  • 00:10:21
    use a general term
  • 00:10:23
    grievance easily could been mistaken and
  • 00:10:26
    the argument that's often said that this
  • 00:10:28
    is ethnic
  • 00:10:29
    hatreds ethnic grievances which I
  • 00:10:33
    disagree with entirely.
  • 00:10:35
    Thank you very much for setting that one
  • 00:10:37
    straight. Uh a a good friend of mine
  • 00:10:39
    from uh from Kosovo, a Serbian a Serb
  • 00:10:42
    from Kosovo once made the point, look,
  • 00:10:45
    the reason why this became so bloody is
  • 00:10:48
    because these communities, they were not
  • 00:10:50
    just living next to each other. They
  • 00:10:51
    were they were they were literal
  • 00:10:52
    neighbors and that worked for for for
  • 00:10:56
    hundreds of years and until it stopped
  • 00:10:58
    working. So the question is why did it
  • 00:11:00
    stop working and then and then you have
  • 00:11:02
    this ethnic ethnic hatred coming up and
  • 00:11:04
    and starting to turn against that. So
  • 00:11:06
    this is a wonderful observation that the
  • 00:11:08
    and I didn't know about this. So the IMF
  • 00:11:10
    and the um the the external debt in that
  • 00:11:14
    case of Yugoslavia and I suppose
  • 00:11:15
    Yugoslav debt was denominated in US
  • 00:11:17
    dollars and of course
  • 00:11:19
    and to interrupt you at the moment in
  • 00:11:22
    1979 not only the why is the debt crisis
  • 00:11:25
    it's because Vulkar raises the the
  • 00:11:28
    Federal Reserve the rate interest rates
  • 00:11:29
    in the United States enor up to like
  • 00:11:32
    28%. and everybody's holding dollars in
  • 00:11:36
    current in their you know well you know
  • 00:11:39
    the system so I won't go so that was
  • 00:11:41
    also what was that was actually what was
  • 00:11:43
    mainly causing the debt crisis and it
  • 00:11:45
    was especially difficult for Yugoslavia
  • 00:11:47
    so I I let you go back and so does the
  • 00:11:51
    the falling away of the um of the Soviet
  • 00:11:55
    sphere also have something to do with
  • 00:11:56
    that because I also remember you talk
  • 00:11:58
    about these intermediary goods and when
  • 00:12:00
    I was in Herzgoina two years ago I was
  • 00:12:02
    in this shed of this of this um
  • 00:12:05
    80-year-old uh um the grandfather of my
  • 00:12:08
    of my friend and I saw in that shed a
  • 00:12:10
    Sastava car which is of course a
  • 00:12:13
    licensed version of a Fiat model and on
  • 00:12:16
    the other hand there was a tra a tractor
  • 00:12:19
    a big machine imported from Bellarus uh
  • 00:12:23
    because those were the sturdiest ones
  • 00:12:24
    and you know they Yugoslavia was able to
  • 00:12:27
    access both sides of the of the cold
  • 00:12:30
    war. Did the end of that and the falling
  • 00:12:32
    away of the Soviet sphere also have
  • 00:12:33
    something to do with these economic uh
  • 00:12:36
    uh um difficulties that then resulted? I
  • 00:12:39
    don't think so. I mean, but first of
  • 00:12:41
    all, let's say not both sides but three
  • 00:12:42
    sides because as you already said,
  • 00:12:45
    Yugosabi was a founding member of the
  • 00:12:46
    non-alignment movement. And so it had
  • 00:12:49
    and it and I I would like to sort of now
  • 00:12:53
    one of the things I'm going to say about
  • 00:12:55
    Tito when we get to it is what's really
  • 00:12:58
    important about Tito is the way in which
  • 00:13:00
    he was ma able to manage Yugoslavia's
  • 00:13:03
    international position and one part of
  • 00:13:07
    it was this balance among three spheres
  • 00:13:09
    economically and politically and one
  • 00:13:11
    part of the balance was exactly in trade
  • 00:13:15
    that they they had arrangements with the
  • 00:13:17
    east the west and the third world in a
  • 00:13:20
    non-alignment block and they could could
  • 00:13:23
    um take advantage of the best way to do
  • 00:13:27
    it. But but then um and let me also add
  • 00:13:30
    just to give some flavor to this. If you
  • 00:13:32
    had a Yugoslav passport, you could
  • 00:13:35
    travel freely without a visa to more
  • 00:13:38
    countries in the world than anyone else
  • 00:13:41
    in the world. It was part of the
  • 00:13:43
    international position that Tito had
  • 00:13:45
    been able to negotiate and manufacture.
  • 00:13:48
    But back to the Soviet Union, no, I
  • 00:13:50
    think um I think they're simultaneous. I
  • 00:13:54
    think what Gorbach was introducing
  • 00:13:56
    starting in about 1985 in relation to
  • 00:13:58
    the um Eastern Europe um was affecting
  • 00:14:02
    Eastern Europe but but not so much
  • 00:14:05
    except perhaps as I had mentioned
  • 00:14:09
    earlier when you you talked about the
  • 00:14:11
    end of the cold war um the way in which
  • 00:14:14
    the American policies change and and no
  • 00:14:16
    longer is Yugoslavia in its special
  • 00:14:19
    position with us. So I guess in that
  • 00:14:21
    sense it's it's not directly from the
  • 00:14:23
    end the Soviet case but indirectly
  • 00:14:25
    through American policies.
  • 00:14:29
    Can you talk a little bit more about the
  • 00:14:30
    American policies? So on the one hand we
  • 00:14:32
    have the economic policies. Some of them
  • 00:14:34
    with the IMF policies let's say those
  • 00:14:37
    were were austerity polic policies by
  • 00:14:40
    design. The increase of the fed federal
  • 00:14:42
    rate by Fulkar. That one was certainly
  • 00:14:44
    in inspired domestically with with
  • 00:14:46
    little regard of what happens
  • 00:14:47
    externally. But what were the other
  • 00:14:50
    policies and also including NATO
  • 00:14:52
    policies that you see having had a a
  • 00:14:54
    role to play? Well, in
  • 00:14:57
    1948 June, the Stalin and the Eastern
  • 00:15:02
    Block chose to exclude expel Yugoslavia
  • 00:15:06
    from the Eastern Block. Um there's a lot
  • 00:15:10
    of debate about what the real causes
  • 00:15:12
    were. For me it was um Tito's foreign
  • 00:15:15
    policy in Greece and in Albania and
  • 00:15:18
    Bulgaria that was most important but
  • 00:15:20
    there was also a dispute about
  • 00:15:22
    agricultural policy and the whatever the
  • 00:15:25
    causes um they had they lost all of
  • 00:15:30
    those markets all that support both
  • 00:15:32
    political and economic um and I can go
  • 00:15:35
    on at length about what happened but by
  • 00:15:38
    January
  • 00:15:40
    1949 the American government decided
  • 00:15:44
    that they were maybe getting a great
  • 00:15:48
    opportunity to take advantage of a
  • 00:15:51
    country that was
  • 00:15:53
    um going against the Soviet Union. And
  • 00:15:56
    so they start with the policy called
  • 00:15:59
    keeping Tito
  • 00:16:01
    afloat for the whole year of 1949.
  • 00:16:05
    This policy slowly but surely moves with
  • 00:16:08
    the Americans persuading countries in
  • 00:16:10
    Western Europe, Belgium, the
  • 00:16:12
    Netherlands, Britain um to start trading
  • 00:16:15
    with Yugoslavia. Think about it. It was
  • 00:16:17
    not so long after World War II um to
  • 00:16:20
    trading with Yugoslavia um to help them
  • 00:16:23
    fund give loans and all. The Americans
  • 00:16:26
    weren't going to trade yet, but they
  • 00:16:27
    would persuade their partners. Um by the
  • 00:16:30
    end of 1948 they had persuaded the
  • 00:16:33
    International Monetary Fund and the
  • 00:16:35
    World Bank to start lending letting
  • 00:16:38
    Yugoslavia borrow from them. Um and from
  • 00:16:42
    and from then on the role of World Bank
  • 00:16:45
    loans and international monetary fund
  • 00:16:48
    loans was absolutely critical to
  • 00:16:50
    maintaining Yugoslavia and it's and its
  • 00:16:54
    excellent economy where as everyone says
  • 00:16:57
    people were really living beyond their
  • 00:16:58
    means because they do by borrowing. Um
  • 00:17:01
    then a part of this American policy
  • 00:17:04
    besides the economic component was to
  • 00:17:08
    say that the and to be honest with you
  • 00:17:10
    I've I've not spent time recently
  • 00:17:13
    thinking about or learning about how the
  • 00:17:15
    negotiations went but the result was
  • 00:17:19
    that
  • 00:17:20
    Yugoslavia's military and I'll say
  • 00:17:23
    something about that um would be would
  • 00:17:26
    defend NATO's southern flank. NATO had a
  • 00:17:30
    southern flank where the idea that um
  • 00:17:33
    the Soviet Union would um interfere in
  • 00:17:38
    Western Europe would go through then
  • 00:17:40
    through Yugoslavia into Italy. Its
  • 00:17:43
    northern flank would go through Poland,
  • 00:17:46
    what we're facing right now um with
  • 00:17:48
    Ukraine. Um and so this meant that part
  • 00:17:52
    of what Yugosav had to do was committing
  • 00:17:54
    to having a very um
  • 00:17:58
    sophisticated um federal army that would
  • 00:18:01
    be there to defend the country against
  • 00:18:03
    any internal any attack but also NATO's
  • 00:18:08
    um flag. Um and and then militarily the
  • 00:18:11
    Yugoslavs with this decentralized system
  • 00:18:13
    also had territorial defense forces
  • 00:18:16
    which would be local. So we don't need
  • 00:18:19
    to get into that at the moment. But but
  • 00:18:21
    so this was an exchange um in terms of
  • 00:18:24
    both supporting NATO and um getting aid
  • 00:18:28
    from the US. But you also asked me what
  • 00:18:30
    role it NATO plays later. Is that what
  • 00:18:33
    you were? Yes. Like in the in the entire
  • 00:18:36
    process is there does NATO of the
  • 00:18:38
    breakup the process of the breakup. Does
  • 00:18:40
    NATO have a role to play let's say
  • 00:18:42
    beyond of course the bombing of of of of
  • 00:18:45
    Serbia in 99 but before that?
  • 00:18:48
    Not until the wars
  • 00:18:50
    begin and not even in the Croatian case.
  • 00:18:54
    So once the war begins in Bosnia
  • 00:18:59
    um then NATO is deployed in order it had
  • 00:19:05
    several policies but deployed in support
  • 00:19:07
    of the humanitarian
  • 00:19:10
    um intervention by the UN which the UN
  • 00:19:13
    protection forces unperform
  • 00:19:16
    um and supporting a number of ways
  • 00:19:18
    including eventually a nofly zone and
  • 00:19:23
    and
  • 00:19:24
    um sanctions in the sea in the Adriatic
  • 00:19:27
    Sea. Um so but but you could only say
  • 00:19:30
    that was in
  • 00:19:31
    support of the humanitarian mission and
  • 00:19:35
    the negot international negotiations
  • 00:19:38
    that were going on chaired by the United
  • 00:19:40
    Nations and the European Union to end
  • 00:19:43
    the war in Bosnia.
  • 00:19:45
    Um it is true that once the Americans
  • 00:19:49
    decide in June July
  • 00:19:54
    1995 under President Clinton to get
  • 00:19:57
    involved in trying to end the wars that
  • 00:20:00
    they've been trying to negotiate for
  • 00:20:01
    four years. Um they then decide um with
  • 00:20:05
    a man named um Hullbrook, Richard
  • 00:20:08
    Hullbrook um to threaten the Bosnian
  • 00:20:11
    Serbs with bombing if they didn't
  • 00:20:14
    negotiate. Uh and now the problem is of
  • 00:20:16
    course this well I didn't say of course
  • 00:20:18
    to me it was of course is that the
  • 00:20:21
    Bosnian Serbs were negotiating all
  • 00:20:22
    along. The problem was trying to
  • 00:20:24
    persuade the Bosnian Muslims the
  • 00:20:26
    Bosnjaks to come to the bargaining
  • 00:20:29
    table. And so the NATO threat of bombing
  • 00:20:31
    was a gift to get them to the bargaining
  • 00:20:34
    table. But that then did lead to NATO
  • 00:20:37
    bombing in
  • 00:20:39
    1995. Um and then the use of NATO power
  • 00:20:43
    to bomb Serbia in order to end the
  • 00:20:46
    Kosovo war is separate from the Bosian
  • 00:20:49
    war. But this use of air power, what the
  • 00:20:52
    Americans call coercive diplomacy,
  • 00:20:56
    um, which I have lots of arguments
  • 00:20:59
    against, I don't think it works. Um, but
  • 00:21:02
    that's the only role that NATO was
  • 00:21:04
    playing. Whereas the eur the United
  • 00:21:06
    Nations and the European Union were
  • 00:21:08
    playing major roles.
  • 00:21:11
    Can you can you um sorry now I have two
  • 00:21:14
    two things that I want to ask but maybe
  • 00:21:16
    let me go back first because what you
  • 00:21:18
    said about Yugoslavia's role for NATO in
  • 00:21:21
    the Cold War of of guarding the southern
  • 00:21:23
    flank is very interesting because it it
  • 00:21:25
    it's a parallel of what Finland was
  • 00:21:28
    responsible to do for the Soviet Union.
  • 00:21:30
    Finland was was playing that role and
  • 00:21:33
    both of these states were neutral one or
  • 00:21:36
    the other way. I mean at least the fact
  • 00:21:38
    of what they were doing as a buffer zone
  • 00:21:39
    but they were neutral for one side
  • 00:21:42
    militarily in a sense
  • 00:21:45
    and considered Yugoslavia considered
  • 00:21:47
    itself neutral. Yeah. The this is uh
  • 00:21:51
    yeah this is this is very interesting.
  • 00:21:53
    Um okay then let's go back maybe to the
  • 00:21:56
    role of the EU and the Europeans of how
  • 00:21:59
    how they then intermixed with the with
  • 00:22:01
    the or their role in in in the break up
  • 00:22:04
    of Yugoslavia. is your assessment there.
  • 00:22:07
    Essential part of the problem with the
  • 00:22:09
    European Union is that um when Slovenian
  • 00:22:13
    Croatia um declare independence and
  • 00:22:15
    leave in June um
  • 00:22:18
    19 now I have to think
  • 00:22:21
    1990 we are six months before what's
  • 00:22:24
    called the Mastric Treaty. So it's still
  • 00:22:27
    the European community. It's not the
  • 00:22:30
    European Union. And so this is a period
  • 00:22:32
    of time when you need diplomatic
  • 00:22:35
    assistance to prevent war in
  • 00:22:38
    Yugosavia over the breakup and the
  • 00:22:42
    Europeans themselves busy with their own
  • 00:22:46
    change in who they were. And so which is
  • 00:22:48
    then the treaties of December of of that
  • 00:22:51
    year. However, in June and July in this
  • 00:22:56
    right after Slovenia and Croatia, I'm
  • 00:22:59
    I'm calling them by the name of their
  • 00:23:01
    republics and now their actual states um
  • 00:23:03
    declared independence. Um the Europeans
  • 00:23:06
    decide to rush in and see if they can
  • 00:23:08
    negotiate it. Um and and so they become
  • 00:23:11
    very involved diplomatically through
  • 00:23:13
    that. it doesn't work. But
  • 00:23:15
    that's another And then I guess I should
  • 00:23:19
    go on um in terms of the actual um
  • 00:23:23
    fighting in Bosnia, not in Croatia, but
  • 00:23:26
    in in Bosnia, the European Union is
  • 00:23:29
    along with the UN trying to help
  • 00:23:31
    negotiate an end for a long time and had
  • 00:23:35
    deployed um the British and the French
  • 00:23:38
    deployed lots of members of this UN
  • 00:23:41
    protection force and the um
  • 00:23:44
    The negotiation right at the very
  • 00:23:47
    beginning created something called the
  • 00:23:49
    European Union military monitors EU MM
  • 00:23:54
    and these were mostly um I think
  • 00:23:57
    probably retired but in military
  • 00:23:59
    officers, intelligence people who were
  • 00:24:01
    from European um Union um countries who
  • 00:24:05
    were on the ground to write reports and
  • 00:24:07
    send it back to to Brussels
  • 00:24:11
    um and in internally inside the the one
  • 00:24:16
    party system which as you said was way
  • 00:24:18
    more democratic than one would would
  • 00:24:20
    would think of a of an officially
  • 00:24:21
    communist state. Um there were these
  • 00:24:24
    strongman leaders um of course Mr. most
  • 00:24:28
    famous or infamous leader Mr. Milovich
  • 00:24:30
    on the Serbian side but also on the
  • 00:24:31
    crowd side very um uh figures that that
  • 00:24:34
    people that were very um or still
  • 00:24:37
    disputed I mean Mr. uh Tuchman
  • 00:24:40
    um what is your assessment about the
  • 00:24:43
    role of these strong man leaders on all
  • 00:24:46
    the on all the different sides
  • 00:24:48
    um because one one narrative is they are
  • 00:24:51
    I mean especially for the crowds that
  • 00:24:53
    this was Mr. Truchimma was a a liberator
  • 00:24:56
    of the of the Cros. On the other hand,
  • 00:24:58
    there were very big problems in terms of
  • 00:25:02
    uh of war crimes, but within the war,
  • 00:25:04
    but also with Could you maybe assess his
  • 00:25:06
    role in the process of the of the
  • 00:25:09
    breaking apart?
  • 00:25:12
    Um, Tuchman, Fran Tuchman had been a a
  • 00:25:16
    general in the Yugoslav
  • 00:25:18
    army and then he became a
  • 00:25:21
    nationalist working very hard with lots
  • 00:25:25
    of Croatian immigrants mainly in the
  • 00:25:27
    United States but also in Australia um
  • 00:25:30
    to make to make Croatia independent. So
  • 00:25:34
    it was even before the Soviets were
  • 00:25:36
    saying because the Soviets
  • 00:25:38
    um I argue starting with the beginning
  • 00:25:42
    of Yugoslavia after World War II, the
  • 00:25:44
    federal system under the vice president
  • 00:25:47
    Edvard Cardell had a plan already from
  • 00:25:51
    the 1920s to use Yugoslavia as a staging
  • 00:25:55
    ground for eventual independence.
  • 00:25:58
    But they were doing it in a very careful
  • 00:26:00
    way and they were also very supportive
  • 00:26:02
    of Yugosabia in itself. Um for that
  • 00:26:05
    reason they wanted to do it peacefully I
  • 00:26:07
    think. Um and so their disputes with the
  • 00:26:09
    federal government starting in the
  • 00:26:11
    middle of the 1980s um are slowly but
  • 00:26:14
    surely dismantling the country whereas
  • 00:26:17
    at this at at Tuchman in Croatia was
  • 00:26:20
    doing it on a nationalist ground and
  • 00:26:23
    very rightwing in terms of um mil
  • 00:26:28
    militia and
  • 00:26:30
    um well I I don't want I my own view is
  • 00:26:35
    that I should maybe What I'll tell you,
  • 00:26:38
    friends of mine in
  • 00:26:40
    Slovenia were very angry with Tuchman
  • 00:26:43
    from hijacking their strategy that once
  • 00:26:48
    Slovenia once Croatia tried or Tuchman
  • 00:26:51
    tried to to be part of this movement for
  • 00:26:54
    independence and declaring in a time
  • 00:26:57
    when when people knew that 11% of the
  • 00:27:00
    population in Croatia were of the
  • 00:27:02
    Serbian ethnicity and nationality that
  • 00:27:06
    this was going to be a problem that had
  • 00:27:07
    to be negotiated. Um, the Soviets were
  • 00:27:10
    really quite upset with with this and I
  • 00:27:13
    do feel that way myself. I'm not saying
  • 00:27:16
    whether I support what Slovenia was
  • 00:27:17
    doing, but it is true that the
  • 00:27:19
    right-wing nationalism and and a lot of
  • 00:27:21
    violence
  • 00:27:23
    um trying to think of what the term
  • 00:27:26
    would be any is coming from Croatia.
  • 00:27:30
    Now, Tutin also was negotiating with
  • 00:27:33
    Milosvich, who was the the the
  • 00:27:36
    equivalent of president of Serbia of the
  • 00:27:38
    Republic of Serbia, um that if Croatia
  • 00:27:42
    would win, they could negotiate the
  • 00:27:46
    boundaries of the new states. And Milo
  • 00:27:49
    was in a position, I'm not quite sure if
  • 00:27:51
    he ever believed it, but he
  • 00:27:53
    did. in my own view was mainly whether
  • 00:27:56
    one likes his tactics or not wanting to
  • 00:27:59
    keep Yugoslavia together and then being
  • 00:28:02
    forced by events to say well at least
  • 00:28:06
    we'll keep Serbs together and that meant
  • 00:28:09
    supporting Serbs in Croatia and Serbs in
  • 00:28:11
    in Bosnia and so but there was there
  • 00:28:15
    were periods in the before two years
  • 00:28:17
    before the war when Dutchman and
  • 00:28:18
    negotiate were and Milosvich were
  • 00:28:22
    negotiating about about the borders and
  • 00:28:25
    probably part of the problem that many
  • 00:28:26
    of us had at the time was the way in
  • 00:28:29
    which Duchan had decided that all of the
  • 00:28:31
    areas um in which in the east in the
  • 00:28:36
    western part of Bosnia where Croatians
  • 00:28:39
    Bosnian karats lived should belong to
  • 00:28:42
    Croatia. So he would break up Bosnia. So
  • 00:28:46
    while Milo was supporting the fight of
  • 00:28:50
    Bosnian Serbs for what they wanted
  • 00:28:52
    within the country that would become
  • 00:28:55
    Bosnia, he wasn't at the time doing
  • 00:28:58
    something that would necessarily break
  • 00:29:00
    up
  • 00:29:01
    Bosnia. That's we could say that in a
  • 00:29:04
    sense he was just reacting to events
  • 00:29:07
    rather than having a strategy whereas
  • 00:29:09
    Tutman had a strategy.
  • 00:29:11
    Thank you for that.
  • 00:29:13
    um what's your assessment about this
  • 00:29:17
    um about these two states that we have
  • 00:29:20
    now um the Jurente factor right and
  • 00:29:22
    Bosnia Herzgoina on the one hand and and
  • 00:29:25
    Kosovo on the other hand and Kosovo is
  • 00:29:27
    of course disputed Bosnia is not like in
  • 00:29:29
    international law right but when I was
  • 00:29:32
    there I got the feeling that the only
  • 00:29:34
    thing that that these three major
  • 00:29:36
    ethnicities uh uh agree upon is that
  • 00:29:38
    they don't really want to be together
  • 00:29:40
    which is very sad
  • 00:29:43
    Um what keeps it together is currently
  • 00:29:45
    the consensus of the European Union that
  • 00:29:47
    they have to remain together and um how
  • 00:29:50
    do you how do you see it and also the
  • 00:29:52
    Kosovo question. Yeah. I mean, it's both
  • 00:29:54
    the European Union and the United States
  • 00:29:57
    because in many ways the the United
  • 00:30:00
    States has been doing more interfering
  • 00:30:03
    um
  • 00:30:04
    with changes on proposals, diplomatic
  • 00:30:07
    proposals every couple of years to keep
  • 00:30:09
    Bosnia Herzgoina together. The EU is
  • 00:30:13
    then given the task of implementing all
  • 00:30:15
    of this stuff by the Americans. So, I
  • 00:30:17
    would I would blame the U. US more. Um,
  • 00:30:21
    at the moment it's not looking so
  • 00:30:24
    good. Um, it's not really clear to me. I
  • 00:30:28
    mean, the the
  • 00:30:30
    the negotiations that Richard Hullbrook
  • 00:30:34
    made at Dayton Accord to end the war by
  • 00:30:38
    accepting that Bosnia would remain all
  • 00:30:41
    three pieces would remain
  • 00:30:43
    together including Bosnian Serbs.
  • 00:30:46
    um is a highly
  • 00:30:49
    decentralized system that again has a
  • 00:30:52
    very similar problems that we were
  • 00:30:53
    talking about on Yugoslavia in the
  • 00:30:56
    1980s. Um but it also is that it divided
  • 00:30:59
    Bosnia between a Republic of Serbska the
  • 00:31:03
    Serb Republic in the east and the
  • 00:31:06
    Federation of Croats and Bosnjaks. to
  • 00:31:10
    the Crowats. Even though they're now
  • 00:31:12
    only about 7% and they were about 15% of
  • 00:31:16
    the population when the war ends, so
  • 00:31:18
    it's a very small amount, they still
  • 00:31:20
    feel that they didn't get there like a
  • 00:31:24
    republic within Bosnia. Um and so
  • 00:31:27
    there's the there's every once in a
  • 00:31:29
    while there is a a problem of the
  • 00:31:32
    Bosnian kat saying but we want to leave
  • 00:31:34
    and let's so that adds a bit of a
  • 00:31:36
    complication to these what what one
  • 00:31:39
    could say is the insistence on the
  • 00:31:41
    Bosnian Muslims the Bosnjaks to keep
  • 00:31:44
    Bosnia together and they are the
  • 00:31:46
    majority and therefore they should have
  • 00:31:48
    more power and the Bosnian Serbs who
  • 00:31:52
    want the very
  • 00:31:53
    decentralized system that that the
  • 00:31:56
    Dayton accord created and anytime the
  • 00:31:58
    Americans come in supporting the
  • 00:32:01
    Bosnjaks to to be make the central
  • 00:32:03
    government of Bosnia stronger the Bosian
  • 00:32:06
    Serbs react. So it's going back and
  • 00:32:08
    forth and back and forth. Um at the
  • 00:32:10
    moment it's not a very good
  • 00:32:12
    situation. What keeps it together it is
  • 00:32:15
    said and I don't know if I agree with
  • 00:32:17
    this. It's because it's something that
  • 00:32:18
    would be hard to demonstrate. um is
  • 00:32:21
    what's called the over the horizon force
  • 00:32:25
    of NATO and the European Union that that
  • 00:32:28
    should fighting start again um there's a
  • 00:32:31
    commitment on NATO's part and the
  • 00:32:33
    European Union to intervene immediately
  • 00:32:35
    to stop the fighting. So the idea is
  • 00:32:38
    people don't think of fighting because
  • 00:32:41
    of that threat. I think that people just
  • 00:32:45
    why would they want to go back to war?
  • 00:32:47
    But it is true that the polit the
  • 00:32:49
    constitutional issues it's it's a
  • 00:32:52
    stalemate. It's a ceasefire. It's not a
  • 00:32:55
    peace agreement in the sense of
  • 00:32:56
    something that could end at all. And and
  • 00:32:59
    who knows? I mean it's it's now been um
  • 00:33:02
    95 to 20. It's now been 30 years in in
  • 00:33:05
    November. Um
  • 00:33:08
    Kosovo it's I I
  • 00:33:12
    we can also skip it if it's I mean yeah
  • 00:33:14
    where even to start? Yeah. Well,
  • 00:33:17
    exactly. I mean, I think it's it's not
  • 00:33:19
    clear to me when or if Kosovo will be
  • 00:33:23
    admitted to the United Nations and
  • 00:33:25
    therefore have international relations.
  • 00:33:27
    That's the key. Um the current
  • 00:33:30
    leadership of the Alban Kosovo Albanians
  • 00:33:34
    in Kosovo um have not been very
  • 00:33:37
    supportive of the municipal autonomy
  • 00:33:41
    arrangements that have been given to the
  • 00:33:42
    Serbs, especially in the north. So, this
  • 00:33:46
    It's similar in a sense to the
  • 00:33:48
    constitutional conflict that I'm
  • 00:33:49
    mentioning in Bosnia that goes back and
  • 00:33:51
    forth and back and forth and every once
  • 00:33:53
    in a while in this case it's the
  • 00:33:54
    European Union that's more involved. um
  • 00:33:57
    we have some negotiations that um are
  • 00:34:00
    not being implemented and it's at a
  • 00:34:02
    stalemate and um my Serbian colleagues
  • 00:34:06
    from Serbia proper from Belgrade think
  • 00:34:09
    that for both President Vhuch of Serbia
  • 00:34:13
    and the leadership in co Albanian
  • 00:34:16
    leadership in Kosovo that it's in their
  • 00:34:18
    interest to keep it at a stalemate so
  • 00:34:21
    that they don't have to be challenged.
  • 00:34:23
    So who knows how long it's going to go
  • 00:34:25
    on. Yeah. The the thing is these um
  • 00:34:28
    conflict dynamics then also tend
  • 00:34:31
    to tend to empower certain people and
  • 00:34:34
    they gain from from the conflict and yes
  • 00:34:38
    and hence hence there is also on both
  • 00:34:40
    sides an internal uh uh um argument for
  • 00:34:43
    keeping certain things in a certain way.
  • 00:34:46
    Um the weird the strange
  • 00:34:50
    thing to me is still that uh overall the
  • 00:34:55
    this is clearly a region
  • 00:34:57
    linguistically culturally that
  • 00:35:01
    geographically naturally belongs
  • 00:35:03
    together but that that split into so
  • 00:35:05
    many into so many parts and belongs
  • 00:35:07
    together I don't mean necessarily as a
  • 00:35:10
    as a as a nation state I mean that of of
  • 00:35:12
    course there there needs to be
  • 00:35:13
    interconnection
  • 00:35:15
    Um do you plus of course the issue that
  • 00:35:18
    the Balkans are very highly important
  • 00:35:20
    for the whole of Europe. I mean the
  • 00:35:22
    first world war started right in Zara.
  • 00:35:25
    Um you cannot write a history of Europe
  • 00:35:27
    without the Balkans. Um right what do
  • 00:35:31
    you see um at the moment as the the
  • 00:35:33
    structural role of the Balkans for the
  • 00:35:36
    larger uh
  • 00:35:37
    European uh uh theater of of
  • 00:35:41
    geopolitics?
  • 00:35:43
    You know, I have a a de very dear
  • 00:35:45
    colleague who's an historian of
  • 00:35:46
    Southeast Europe. Um she's German. Her
  • 00:35:49
    name is Marie Janine Collague who writes
  • 00:35:51
    wonderful books and she has um one of
  • 00:35:54
    her books is about the great cauldron
  • 00:35:56
    which says you can't ignore the role of
  • 00:36:00
    the Balkans in the history of you of all
  • 00:36:03
    of Europe. It's a part of it to a lovely
  • 00:36:07
    part of what you're saying and I
  • 00:36:08
    recommend that to your listeners to
  • 00:36:10
    read. It's a wonderful book. Um and
  • 00:36:14
    um I but I do think I'm not sure now at
  • 00:36:17
    the
  • 00:36:19
    current state of situation in the
  • 00:36:22
    international system or at least in
  • 00:36:24
    Europe where things are going. I mean
  • 00:36:26
    the role that the Trump administration
  • 00:36:28
    is doing is changing throwing things way
  • 00:36:31
    up in their way to who knows what's
  • 00:36:32
    going to happen. I think particularly
  • 00:36:34
    important um for the Balkans is the
  • 00:36:38
    Middle East because the um Turkey on the
  • 00:36:41
    one hand, Saudi Arabia, Iran, they've
  • 00:36:44
    always had a lot of interest and
  • 00:36:45
    involvement during the wars even in in
  • 00:36:47
    Bosnia and in Kosovo. Um so what would
  • 00:36:52
    be the sort of relationship between the
  • 00:36:54
    instability that's going on right now in
  • 00:36:56
    the Middle East and what happens in the
  • 00:36:58
    Balkans and vice versa? Uh, I think it's
  • 00:37:01
    a moment where I have absolutely no idea
  • 00:37:04
    what's going to happen, but we certainly
  • 00:37:06
    don't see
  • 00:37:07
    organizations who are taking advantage
  • 00:37:11
    of what could be the stabilizing,
  • 00:37:13
    integrating role of of the Balkans. I I
  • 00:37:17
    don't know. I'm sorry. I wish I had an
  • 00:37:19
    idea. No, no. I I I don't see one
  • 00:37:22
    either. You know, there was this this
  • 00:37:23
    hope, especially I think in the early
  • 00:37:25
    2000s, that the the Balkan situation
  • 00:37:27
    could be resolved the way that the Irish
  • 00:37:30
    question was resolved basically through
  • 00:37:32
    Europeanization, right? Integration into
  • 00:37:34
    a larger thing into a larger uh
  • 00:37:36
    political structure and that will then
  • 00:37:37
    heal the wounds. And by now, this also
  • 00:37:40
    seems highly unlikely to happen because
  • 00:37:43
    of the the the frag the fragmentation.
  • 00:37:48
    But no, but then I will say here's the
  • 00:37:50
    really important issue you've raised
  • 00:37:52
    with the European Union because Serbia,
  • 00:37:56
    Macedonia, now called North Macedonia
  • 00:37:58
    and Bosnia have all been waiting line
  • 00:38:01
    filling out the conditionalities to get
  • 00:38:03
    in the European Union for how many more
  • 00:38:07
    than 20 years now and there it's
  • 00:38:09
    completely on hold. And so this idea
  • 00:38:12
    that that was supposed to work is being
  • 00:38:14
    held up by the European Union um
  • 00:38:16
    particularly France and who knows what
  • 00:38:19
    it keeps changing in in in German
  • 00:38:21
    depending upon who's u holds a majority
  • 00:38:24
    in Germany. So I would like to think
  • 00:38:26
    that they would see it in their interest
  • 00:38:28
    to follow through on their own rhetoric
  • 00:38:32
    that European Union integration is the
  • 00:38:34
    key to to stability in the Balkans and
  • 00:38:36
    therefore stability in Europe. But
  • 00:38:39
    that's not what their actual policies
  • 00:38:42
    are these days. Uh, no, not at all. But
  • 00:38:45
    the European Union has so many problems
  • 00:38:46
    at the moment that I I don't think that
  • 00:38:49
    this will be um an area where they
  • 00:38:51
    actually can help. Um, maybe a last
  • 00:38:53
    thing. Do you think that the the
  • 00:38:56
    experience of the Yugoslav experience
  • 00:38:58
    and the Balkan experience of this
  • 00:38:59
    breakup and and also maybe with the
  • 00:39:02
    Yugoslav uh uh the tribunal for the
  • 00:39:05
    former Yugoslavia and so on that we have
  • 00:39:07
    any kind of is there any kind of hopeful
  • 00:39:11
    um aspects to what what can be done or
  • 00:39:15
    how a war can how wars can be ended and
  • 00:39:18
    the fighting can end that can be somehow
  • 00:39:20
    applied to the situation between uh
  • 00:39:23
    Ukraine, Russia Russia, NATO, the United
  • 00:39:25
    States. Is there is there any parallel
  • 00:39:27
    that you're seeing?
  • 00:39:29
    Not many. What I would say is, you
  • 00:39:32
    remember I was talking about the Serb
  • 00:39:34
    minority in Croatia of being 11 or 12%.
  • 00:39:38
    Um, and that area in Croatia is called
  • 00:39:42
    Cryina. And the northern part of Bosnia
  • 00:39:45
    is also called Bosanska Cryina. Cryina
  • 00:39:49
    means border in Slavic. So if you think
  • 00:39:52
    about Ukraine, it's the same word. Um,
  • 00:39:56
    and so in the case of Croatia and
  • 00:39:58
    Bosnia, that was the military border
  • 00:40:00
    between the AustroHungarian Empire and
  • 00:40:03
    the Ottoman Empire. And and the Serbs
  • 00:40:05
    were were required to be military to
  • 00:40:09
    defend Europe against the Ottomans.
  • 00:40:13
    the neutrality of
  • 00:40:15
    Yugoslavia. People I support who analyze
  • 00:40:19
    the Ukraine case say these are places
  • 00:40:22
    that are geopolitically must be
  • 00:40:25
    neutral. And then and so if we don't
  • 00:40:28
    think entirely about negotiating
  • 00:40:31
    um Ukraine in terms of neutrality, but
  • 00:40:34
    then we're still not doing that in the
  • 00:40:35
    in the former Yugoslavia, the US keeps
  • 00:40:38
    playing games with it. So I don't know
  • 00:40:40
    when that lesson will be learned but I
  • 00:40:43
    think not only that but secondly what
  • 00:40:46
    was so special about Yugoslavia is this
  • 00:40:49
    idea of a it was really a consociational
  • 00:40:52
    system where everybody had their rights
  • 00:40:55
    according to their cultural and their
  • 00:40:57
    language um but they lived together um
  • 00:41:01
    and the political system could
  • 00:41:02
    accommodate that in many ways Ukraine
  • 00:41:06
    could be have the same thing although
  • 00:41:08
    Minsk too seems to be an effort at that
  • 00:41:10
    and that was rejected. But we could
  • 00:41:13
    still hope that
  • 00:41:15
    perhaps the sort of negot that lesson
  • 00:41:18
    from Yugosavia, what did keep it as you
  • 00:41:20
    started our conversation with would did
  • 00:41:23
    keep Yugoslavia alive for more than 50
  • 00:41:25
    years um successfully might still be
  • 00:41:29
    applied to to Ukraine. You know, that's
  • 00:41:32
    what I'm trying to to to wrap my head
  • 00:41:34
    around. like there are these borderlands
  • 00:41:36
    as you as you said and we have these
  • 00:41:38
    cases all over Europe everywhere and
  • 00:41:40
    actually Eurasia, Switzerland,
  • 00:41:42
    Switzerland could have been I mean
  • 00:41:44
    Bosnia is Switzerland, Switzerland is
  • 00:41:45
    Bosnia for all intents and purposes and
  • 00:41:47
    it was the fact that in 1815 this
  • 00:41:49
    neutrality was agreed upon and then was
  • 00:41:52
    kept that that allowed it to to work as
  • 00:41:54
    a buffer between the Austrians and the
  • 00:41:56
    French. We have that all over the place.
  • 00:41:59
    And then when you blow up neutrality or
  • 00:42:01
    you or not blow up neutrality if if
  • 00:42:04
    forces political forces start to work
  • 00:42:06
    that then work against this buffer idea
  • 00:42:08
    they also they create internal havoc or
  • 00:42:11
    through the internal havoc destroy the
  • 00:42:13
    external function. I I just I I I don't
  • 00:42:16
    have a concept of it now
  • 00:42:19
    agree with I agree with you. Yeah. Um so
  • 00:42:23
    the the question would be how to make
  • 00:42:25
    this work internally in order to
  • 00:42:26
    maintain the external function and vice
  • 00:42:28
    versa.
  • 00:42:30
    I mean my own experience with Yugoslavia
  • 00:42:32
    is that um whatever they can do
  • 00:42:35
    internally doesn't work unless the
  • 00:42:37
    external actors go along and support it.
  • 00:42:40
    I think they were to me they were more
  • 00:42:42
    influential unless they want it to work.
  • 00:42:44
    And we see it in both cases how external
  • 00:42:46
    forces lost interest maybe in Yugoslavia
  • 00:42:49
    and actually had different interests in
  • 00:42:50
    Ukraine in uh working against the the
  • 00:42:53
    the neutrality of Ukraine. In fact, I
  • 00:42:56
    mean look at I'm an American so I can
  • 00:42:58
    speak about my country and the Slovenia
  • 00:43:02
    and Croatia were granted independence by
  • 00:43:07
    Switzerland, Austria to a certain extent
  • 00:43:09
    Norway against the federal constitution
  • 00:43:12
    of Yugoslavia. they broke it right but
  • 00:43:16
    what are you and the Americans didn't
  • 00:43:17
    come along until many months later um so
  • 00:43:21
    at the beginning they knew what there
  • 00:43:23
    was what was the right thing but why do
  • 00:43:25
    I mention this because the Slovians and
  • 00:43:27
    the Kurats were very very clever in
  • 00:43:30
    terms of the narrative they used to to
  • 00:43:34
    say why you should support our right to
  • 00:43:37
    independent states and break up
  • 00:43:39
    Yugoslavia and that was anti-communism
  • 00:43:44
    So they've figured out how to call Milo
  • 00:43:47
    a communist as if Tman and Kuchan Kuchan
  • 00:43:51
    and Soviet weren't also members of the
  • 00:43:53
    communist league of communists. I mean
  • 00:43:55
    it's all the same thing. But they
  • 00:43:58
    succeeded feeding into American
  • 00:44:00
    anti-communism. And I know I have not a
  • 00:44:05
    second moment would support anything
  • 00:44:08
    that Putin is doing in his invasion in
  • 00:44:10
    Ukraine. But American policy also is
  • 00:44:13
    benefiting benefiting by anti-Russian
  • 00:44:15
    narrative. So what we're saying is if
  • 00:44:18
    instead you could get a
  • 00:44:20
    narrative of neutrality and peace and
  • 00:44:24
    stability. I mean it would have that's
  • 00:44:26
    where I think it has to happen because
  • 00:44:29
    then the the ideas are always there and
  • 00:44:31
    people on the ground willing to play I
  • 00:44:33
    think prefer them myself.
  • 00:44:37
    I think so too. I think so too. And uh
  • 00:44:39
    this is a wonderful it's a wonderful
  • 00:44:41
    analysis and I thank you for it. Uh uh
  • 00:44:44
    Susan if people want to uh read your
  • 00:44:47
    analysis um do is there a place where
  • 00:44:49
    you where you publish um um essays and
  • 00:44:52
    so on or where should people go to find
  • 00:44:53
    you? Oh no I mean I've just ended my um
  • 00:44:58
    I I had my my CV with all the documents
  • 00:45:01
    on a website
  • 00:45:03
    that there's a reason why it got taken
  • 00:45:06
    down. Um, and so I'm not I don't have
  • 00:45:09
    it. I mean, they can write me. They can
  • 00:45:11
    look at my CV on on the graduate center
  • 00:45:14
    of City University political science
  • 00:45:16
    department. It's there.
  • 00:45:19
    Um, I write a lot and and and of course
  • 00:45:23
    also buy your books because very good
  • 00:45:25
    analysis. Thank you. Thank you. Susan
  • 00:45:28
    Ward, thank you very much for your time
  • 00:45:30
    today. You're welcome.
Etiquetas
  • Yugoslav Wars
  • Political Science
  • Susan Woodward
  • International Relations
  • NATO
  • Balkans
  • Kosovo
  • Bosnia
  • Neutrality
  • Conflict Resolution