Why The US WIll NEVER Beat China In A Trade War

00:31:28
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pJ70COym3MQ

Resumen

TLDRThe video explores the dynamics of the US-China trade war, emphasizing how the US has lost its economic leverage due to past decisions, particularly its encouragement of China's entry into the WTO in 2001. This led to a significant trade deficit and reliance on Chinese manufacturing, weakening the US's position in the trade war. The escalating tariffs have resulted in price increases for US consumers and businesses, while China has shown resilience and diversified its trade relationships. The video suggests that the US is unlikely to win the trade war and may need to seek common ground with China to avoid further economic and geopolitical consequences.

Para llevar

  • 💼 The US once held economic dominance but has lost leverage in the trade war with China.
  • 📉 Encouraging China's WTO entry led to a significant trade deficit for the US.
  • 📊 The US is facing price spikes and inflation due to increased tariffs on Chinese goods.
  • 🔄 China has diversified its trade relationships, reducing reliance on the US.
  • ⚖️ The trade war could lead to a reordering of global trade dynamics favoring China.
  • 🛠️ US manufacturing has been hollowed out, making it difficult to bring jobs back.
  • 🌍 The US's fragile supply chains are heavily reliant on Chinese goods.
  • 📉 The trade war may result in a significant reduction in US-China trade.
  • 🤝 Finding common ground may be essential to avoid further economic and geopolitical issues.

Cronología

  • 00:00:00 - 00:05:00

    The speaker discusses the current trade war between the US and China, likening it to a dominant player in a game who suddenly realizes they no longer hold all the cards. The US, once seen as the global economic leader, has lost leverage due to its past decisions, particularly encouraging China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which has led to significant trade deficits and job losses in the US.

  • 00:05:00 - 00:10:00

    The impact of China joining the WTO is examined, highlighting the increase in US imports from China and the resulting trade deficit. The US outsourced manufacturing to China, leaving it vulnerable in a trade war. This situation, referred to as the 'China shock', resulted in millions of American jobs being lost, particularly in manufacturing, while certain regions suffered more than others, leading to political ramifications.

  • 00:10:00 - 00:15:00

    The speaker emphasizes the difficulty of bringing manufacturing jobs back to the US, noting that automation will likely replace many of these jobs. The US's trade deficit with China is persistent, compounded by issues like currency manipulation and unfair subsidies for Chinese companies, which have made it challenging for US businesses to compete.

  • 00:15:00 - 00:20:00

    The trade war initiated by Trump in 2018 is discussed, where the US imposed tariffs on China, leading to retaliatory measures from China. The escalating tariffs have resulted in significant trade disruptions, with estimates suggesting an 80% reduction in trade between the two nations. The speaker highlights the collateral damage to various industries, including agriculture and manufacturing, as a result of this trade conflict.

  • 00:20:00 - 00:25:00

    As tariffs increase, the speaker notes that the US consumer will bear the brunt of the economic impact, facing higher prices and inflation. Small businesses and farmers are particularly vulnerable, with many likely to go out of business due to rising costs and reduced access to markets. The speaker also mentions the US government's recent decision to retract tariffs on electronics, indicating a shift in strategy as the trade war escalates.

  • 00:25:00 - 00:31:28

    The speaker concludes by discussing the long-term implications of the trade war, suggesting that the US's reliance on Chinese goods and the fragility of its supply chains could lead to significant economic challenges. In contrast, China has diversified its trade relationships and built a strong manufacturing base, positioning itself as a more reliable trading partner. The potential for a new global trade order is highlighted, with the US's dominance being questioned as other countries seek alternatives.

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Mapa mental

Vídeo de preguntas y respuestas

  • What led to the US losing its dominance in the trade war with China?

    The US lost its dominance due to encouraging China's entry into the WTO, which led to a significant trade deficit and reliance on Chinese manufacturing.

  • How did the trade war affect US consumers?

    US consumers faced price spikes and inflation due to increased tariffs on Chinese goods, making everyday products more expensive.

  • What is the 'China shock'?

    The 'China shock' refers to the significant job losses in the US manufacturing sector due to outsourcing to China after its WTO entry.

  • What are the potential long-term effects of the trade war?

    The trade war could lead to a reordering of global trade, with countries seeking alternatives to US goods and potentially diminishing US influence.

  • Can the US win the trade war with China?

    The video suggests that the US is unlikely to win the trade war and may need to find common ground with China.

  • What are the implications of the tariffs imposed by the US?

    The tariffs have led to reduced trade between the US and China, with estimates of an 80% decrease in trade.

  • How has China's economy been affected by the trade war?

    China's economy has shown resilience, with a smaller impact from tariffs compared to the US, and it has diversified its trade relationships.

  • What is the significance of the US trade deficit with China?

    The trade deficit indicates that the US relies heavily on Chinese goods while China has been able to diversify its exports.

  • What role do supply chains play in the trade war?

    The US has fragile supply chains reliant on China, while China has a robust manufacturing base and diversified supply chains.

  • What could happen if the US and China decouple economically?

    Decoupling could lead to significant challenges for the US, including supply chain disruptions and increased consumer prices.

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Desplazamiento automático:
  • 00:00:00
    So, this is crazy. Imagine you're the
  • 00:00:03
    most dominant player in the game. You're
  • 00:00:05
    so dominant that nobody even questions
  • 00:00:07
    it. Nobody's willing to challenge you
  • 00:00:09
    because they know that if they do,
  • 00:00:11
    they're going to lose. But one day, you
  • 00:00:13
    wake up and you decide, "Hey, just for
  • 00:00:14
    fun, I'm not only going to challenge the
  • 00:00:17
    number two player, but I'm going to
  • 00:00:19
    challenge everybody. Not only am I going
  • 00:00:21
    to challenge them, I'm going to bully
  • 00:00:23
    them into playing the game the way I
  • 00:00:25
    want it to be played." But you realize
  • 00:00:27
    quickly that there's a catch. All the
  • 00:00:29
    cards that you thought you held, it
  • 00:00:31
    turns out you don't actually hold. And
  • 00:00:33
    at the same time that you're realizing
  • 00:00:36
    that you don't have the dominance that
  • 00:00:37
    you thought you did, everybody else is
  • 00:00:39
    realizing it as well. This is exactly
  • 00:00:41
    what's happening right now with the US
  • 00:00:43
    and the trade war that it's fighting
  • 00:00:45
    with China. And in a scenario where just
  • 00:00:47
    a few months ago the US seemed to have
  • 00:00:50
    all the global economic cards, it turns
  • 00:00:52
    out they don't. Because over the last 20
  • 00:00:55
    years they gave up an important thing
  • 00:00:57
    and that was their leverage. And even
  • 00:00:59
    though nobody asked if the US actually
  • 00:01:01
    still had that leverage, they made a
  • 00:01:03
    fatal mistake that showed everybody
  • 00:01:05
    their hand and could reshape the global
  • 00:01:08
    economic order as we know it. Because it
  • 00:01:10
    turns out that the US is never going to
  • 00:01:13
    beat China in a trade war. And I'm going
  • 00:01:15
    to reveal why the US has played all its
  • 00:01:18
    cards and why China now has the upper
  • 00:01:20
    hand, making it potentially the next
  • 00:01:22
    global superpower. But in order to
  • 00:01:24
    understand how we got here, we need to
  • 00:01:26
    take a little bit of a look at history.
  • 00:01:27
    Because there was a beginning to the
  • 00:01:29
    end, a significant mistake that the US
  • 00:01:32
    made that essentially rolled out the red
  • 00:01:34
    carpet, so to speak, for China to
  • 00:01:37
    establish, at least in theory, global
  • 00:01:40
    dominance. And while nobody thought that
  • 00:01:42
    this would play out so soon and so
  • 00:01:43
    quickly, the US made a fatal mistake
  • 00:01:45
    going to war in a trade war with China
  • 00:01:49
    where it turns out China actually holds
  • 00:01:51
    all the cards primarily because of
  • 00:01:53
    something that the US encouraged China
  • 00:01:55
    to do and that was to join the World
  • 00:01:57
    Trade Organization in 2001. Now, at the
  • 00:02:00
    time, encouraging China to join the WTO
  • 00:02:02
    seemed like a good idea. The US hoped
  • 00:02:04
    that it would create economic
  • 00:02:05
    integration and political reform, making
  • 00:02:08
    China a little less communist and maybe
  • 00:02:11
    a little bit more democratic. You see
  • 00:02:13
    that they thought opening up China from
  • 00:02:15
    a trade perspective would also open them
  • 00:02:17
    up politically, but it didn't. And this
  • 00:02:19
    was a turning point that would
  • 00:02:20
    eventually lead the US to a perilous
  • 00:02:22
    position. One where they thought they
  • 00:02:24
    had all the cards, but obviously didn't.
  • 00:02:27
    One where they would pick a fight that
  • 00:02:28
    they couldn't win. where China could
  • 00:02:30
    just retaliate and retaliate and
  • 00:02:33
    retaliate with almost zero concern for
  • 00:02:36
    their own economic well-being while at
  • 00:02:38
    the same time putting the US at a
  • 00:02:40
    significant disadvantage which I'll talk
  • 00:02:42
    about in a few minutes. But before we
  • 00:02:44
    talk about that, we need to talk about
  • 00:02:46
    the impact that China joining the WTO
  • 00:02:49
    had on trade with America. Because in
  • 00:02:51
    the early 2000s, the US only imported
  • 00:02:54
    about hundred billion worth of goods.
  • 00:02:56
    But over the next 20 years, that number
  • 00:02:59
    would increase to over $500 billion
  • 00:03:01
    worth of goods. But while the US
  • 00:03:03
    outsourced manufacturing to China and
  • 00:03:05
    started importing a significant amount
  • 00:03:06
    of goods, China didn't buy as much from
  • 00:03:09
    the US as the US was buying from them,
  • 00:03:12
    which led ultimately to a pretty
  • 00:03:14
    significant trade deficit. But it also
  • 00:03:16
    led to one other major problem. And that
  • 00:03:18
    was the fact that the US, having
  • 00:03:20
    outsourced most of its manufacturing to
  • 00:03:22
    China, now was kind of in a position
  • 00:03:25
    where they didn't have the tools they
  • 00:03:27
    needed to produce the things that they
  • 00:03:29
    potentially needed at home, putting them
  • 00:03:31
    at the mercy of China without even
  • 00:03:33
    realizing it. At this point, they
  • 00:03:35
    essentially gave away all of their
  • 00:03:36
    leverage if they were ever to get into
  • 00:03:38
    any sort of war or trade war with the
  • 00:03:41
    nation that was across the Pacific. And
  • 00:03:44
    this has become known as the China shock
  • 00:03:46
    where Chinese exports exploded after
  • 00:03:48
    2001. And at the same time, it's
  • 00:03:50
    estimated that somewhere between 500,000
  • 00:03:53
    and 2.4 million jobs were erased from
  • 00:03:56
    the American economy. Now, these were
  • 00:03:58
    manufacturing jobs. And unfortunately,
  • 00:04:00
    while the overall impact of more trade
  • 00:04:03
    with China was a net benefit to the
  • 00:04:05
    entirety of the United States, there
  • 00:04:07
    were certain areas of the country that
  • 00:04:09
    were more impacted than others by jobs
  • 00:04:12
    moving overseas. So most of this new
  • 00:04:14
    trade that had a net benefit to the US
  • 00:04:16
    as a whole was at the expense of certain
  • 00:04:18
    local markets. And by the way, those
  • 00:04:20
    certain local markets, well, they kind
  • 00:04:22
    of have a pretty big say when it comes
  • 00:04:24
    to voting. And even though most of the
  • 00:04:26
    rest of the world doesn't remember that
  • 00:04:28
    these jobs were lost and certain
  • 00:04:30
    industries were impacted, the people
  • 00:04:32
    that were impacted, well, they certainly
  • 00:04:34
    have a memory that goes back 10 to 20
  • 00:04:36
    years. Which when all of this China
  • 00:04:39
    stuff started getting politicized in
  • 00:04:41
    2016 was the reason why Donald Trump on
  • 00:04:45
    his first and second term, well, was
  • 00:04:47
    able to get voted in by those states
  • 00:04:48
    that had been affected by the China
  • 00:04:50
    shock. And all it took was the
  • 00:04:52
    suggestion that jobs needed to come back
  • 00:04:54
    to the US in order to make that happen.
  • 00:04:57
    But the question is, how easy is it for
  • 00:04:59
    those jobs to return? And the answer is,
  • 00:05:01
    well, it's highly unlikely. You could
  • 00:05:04
    probably bring the manufacturing back to
  • 00:05:06
    the US, but if you bring it back to the
  • 00:05:08
    US, it's probably going to be automated
  • 00:05:10
    in such a way that those jobs will never
  • 00:05:13
    reexist. The onshoring of manufacturing
  • 00:05:16
    might be something that's possible in 3
  • 00:05:18
    to 5 years, but the return of the jobs,
  • 00:05:21
    well, it's highly unlikely. But
  • 00:05:23
    nonetheless, China joining the WTO
  • 00:05:25
    showed that there were significant
  • 00:05:26
    cracks in the system. The first was that
  • 00:05:29
    there was persistently a US trade
  • 00:05:30
    deficit with China, which makes sense in
  • 00:05:33
    a lot of ways. When you are the world's
  • 00:05:35
    most prosperous country and you have the
  • 00:05:37
    most money to spend and you're consuming
  • 00:05:39
    the most, you're probably going to be
  • 00:05:41
    consuming goods from other suppliers and
  • 00:05:43
    other countries. But there was more to
  • 00:05:44
    it than just that. There was also the
  • 00:05:47
    accusations of currency manipulation.
  • 00:05:49
    China making its goods cheaper by
  • 00:05:51
    manipulating its own currency. There was
  • 00:05:53
    the unfair subsidies that were being
  • 00:05:55
    given to Chinese companies to make them
  • 00:05:57
    more competitive in the international
  • 00:05:58
    market. And there was the fact that
  • 00:06:00
    state-owned enterprises dominated the
  • 00:06:03
    Chinese manufacturing world, which made
  • 00:06:05
    it really hard for countries elsewhere
  • 00:06:07
    to compete, whether they were American
  • 00:06:09
    or otherwise. So even though China
  • 00:06:12
    joining the WTO and significantly more
  • 00:06:14
    trade with China was a net benefit to
  • 00:06:16
    Americans, the memories were still
  • 00:06:18
    there. And that combined with Americans
  • 00:06:20
    taking exception to Chinese
  • 00:06:22
    manufacturers breaking the rules led the
  • 00:06:24
    US to do something that they probably
  • 00:06:26
    shouldn't have done. and that was fight
  • 00:06:28
    back to challenge the second place
  • 00:06:30
    player at a game where they were already
  • 00:06:33
    dominant were already winning and
  • 00:06:35
    potentially if they made the wrong move
  • 00:06:38
    could show the entire world that they
  • 00:06:39
    weren't the dominant player that
  • 00:06:41
    everybody thought they were. And this
  • 00:06:42
    started in 2018 with Trump's first trade
  • 00:06:45
    war with China. And as Trump took up a
  • 00:06:47
    fight with US manufacturers, China
  • 00:06:49
    turned around and took up a fight with
  • 00:06:51
    US farmers. Meaning that an industry, a
  • 00:06:53
    group of people that weren't in a fight
  • 00:06:55
    were all of a sudden brought into a
  • 00:06:56
    fight. And that should have been the
  • 00:06:58
    first sign that picking a fight with
  • 00:07:00
    China was not a good idea because it
  • 00:07:02
    could lead to collateral damage. In
  • 00:07:04
    industries that had nothing to do with
  • 00:07:06
    the trade war to begin with,
  • 00:07:07
    manufacturing jobs get destroyed. US
  • 00:07:09
    goes to war with China, China destroys
  • 00:07:12
    farmers. Now you've got two industries
  • 00:07:14
    that are destroyed instead of just one.
  • 00:07:16
    Now, this was mostly settled, but fast
  • 00:07:18
    forward 5 years and here we are once
  • 00:07:20
    again. This all starts in February 2025
  • 00:07:23
    with a 10% tariff being reintroduced to
  • 00:07:26
    multiple countries. Then in March it
  • 00:07:28
    increases to 20%. And this is all framed
  • 00:07:31
    as a fentinel issue. It's a drug issue.
  • 00:07:33
    It's national security. But it's not.
  • 00:07:36
    It's a attempt to reshape the world
  • 00:07:39
    order. a world order where the US is the
  • 00:07:41
    dominant country and expects to continue
  • 00:07:43
    to be, but uses that power to bully
  • 00:07:46
    other nations only to find out that the
  • 00:07:48
    power it thought it had, well, it wasn't
  • 00:07:51
    actually there. And that's where we end
  • 00:07:53
    up in April of 2025. The US realizing
  • 00:07:56
    that it doesn't have the power it
  • 00:07:57
    thought it did and that other countries,
  • 00:07:59
    especially China, aren't backing down.
  • 00:08:02
    Because as this is all happening, China
  • 00:08:04
    starts to realize that it actually holds
  • 00:08:06
    a lot more cards than it originally
  • 00:08:08
    thought it did. And as this tit fortat
  • 00:08:10
    war plays out, you see the US impose 10%
  • 00:08:13
    tariffs. Then it increases them to 20.
  • 00:08:16
    And China just sits on the sidelines and
  • 00:08:17
    goes, "Okay, whatever." But then all of
  • 00:08:20
    a sudden, the US raises tariffs, another
  • 00:08:22
    34%. And China goes, "Okay, you know
  • 00:08:25
    what? We've had enough. We're going to
  • 00:08:26
    retaliate." So they put 34% tariffs on
  • 00:08:30
    the US. The US, Donald Trump says,
  • 00:08:33
    "Don't do that. You're going to regret
  • 00:08:35
    it. If you don't pull back those
  • 00:08:37
    tariffs, you're going to be in trouble
  • 00:08:39
    and we're going to increase tariffs
  • 00:08:40
    another 50%. Well, China doesn't back
  • 00:08:42
    down. So tariffs go up another 50%. And
  • 00:08:45
    at the end of the day, we end up in a
  • 00:08:46
    situation where the US now has 145%
  • 00:08:50
    tariffs on Chinese goods and China has
  • 00:08:53
    125% tariffs on US goods. And they
  • 00:08:57
    basically said this is as far as we're
  • 00:08:59
    going to go, at least with respect to
  • 00:09:00
    tariffs, because there's no point in it
  • 00:09:03
    going any further. the amount that we
  • 00:09:05
    have increased tariffs against each
  • 00:09:07
    other has pretty much destroyed all
  • 00:09:09
    trade that we're going to do. They've
  • 00:09:11
    basically said to the US, increase the
  • 00:09:13
    tariffs as much as you want because
  • 00:09:15
    there's a point where it doesn't matter.
  • 00:09:17
    And when we get to that point, what
  • 00:09:19
    you're going to realize is that you need
  • 00:09:21
    us more than we need you. And this is
  • 00:09:24
    where you see the breaking point. We're
  • 00:09:25
    at allout war with one of our biggest
  • 00:09:27
    trading partners and without a doubt one
  • 00:09:29
    of the most significant suppliers of
  • 00:09:31
    goods to the US consumer. And the WTO
  • 00:09:34
    estimates that this is going to reduce
  • 00:09:36
    trade between the US and China by up to
  • 00:09:38
    80%. But worse than that, it's going to
  • 00:09:41
    fragment trade along geopolitical lines.
  • 00:09:44
    Meaning that China and the East is
  • 00:09:47
    probably going to take its ball and go
  • 00:09:48
    home and leave the West to figure out
  • 00:09:50
    stuff on their own. And there's a huge
  • 00:09:53
    problem with this, which I'll talk about
  • 00:09:54
    a little bit later on, but it has to do
  • 00:09:57
    with a control that China has of some
  • 00:10:00
    pretty important products. and also some
  • 00:10:03
    pretty important resources. But before
  • 00:10:05
    we talk about that, let's talk about the
  • 00:10:07
    impacts that these tariffs are going to
  • 00:10:09
    have to the Chinese economy. Because
  • 00:10:11
    when tariffs went up by 50%, it meant
  • 00:10:14
    that China's economy was probably going
  • 00:10:15
    to shrink about 1.5%. But then when the
  • 00:10:18
    tariffs went up to 125%. Well, the
  • 00:10:21
    amount of damage that the additional
  • 00:10:22
    tariffs did was not quite as
  • 00:10:24
    significant, leading to only a 2.2%
  • 00:10:27
    reduction in GDP. In economics, this is
  • 00:10:30
    called diminishing returns. So the first
  • 00:10:32
    50 basis points in tariffs did a
  • 00:10:34
    significant amount of damage or
  • 00:10:36
    potentially did a significant amount of
  • 00:10:37
    damage, but every additional 50 basis
  • 00:10:39
    points from there does less and less
  • 00:10:42
    damage because the damage is already
  • 00:10:43
    done. And while it seems like going from
  • 00:10:46
    145% to 300% would be damaging, the
  • 00:10:49
    reality is you can't kill something
  • 00:10:51
    that's already dead. The US by imposing
  • 00:10:53
    the tariffs basically killed trade with
  • 00:10:56
    China and increasing them any further
  • 00:10:59
    has pretty much no effect. Except for
  • 00:11:01
    the fact that it gets significantly
  • 00:11:03
    harder for the US consumer to get the
  • 00:11:05
    goods that they want to buy at the
  • 00:11:06
    prices they want to buy them at. But
  • 00:11:08
    that's not even the biggest problem
  • 00:11:09
    because China has an upper hand. And
  • 00:11:12
    nobody realized this until Donald Trump
  • 00:11:14
    went to war with China. And that upper
  • 00:11:17
    hand actually has very little to do with
  • 00:11:19
    China and has more to do with the
  • 00:11:22
    weakness of the US economy that nobody
  • 00:11:24
    even realized was there. And that
  • 00:11:26
    structural weakness was three-fold.
  • 00:11:28
    First, it's how much people
  • 00:11:30
    underestimated the US consumer's
  • 00:11:32
    reliance on cheap goods from overseas,
  • 00:11:34
    especially from China. Two, it is the
  • 00:11:37
    US's hollowedout manufacturing base.
  • 00:11:39
    Donald Trump is absolutely correct in
  • 00:11:41
    suggesting that the US needs to bring
  • 00:11:44
    manufacturing back home. Unfortunately,
  • 00:11:46
    what he doesn't realize is that it needs
  • 00:11:48
    to be done gradually because if you lose
  • 00:11:51
    your biggest supplier pretty much
  • 00:11:52
    overnight, but it takes three to five
  • 00:11:54
    years to build out the factories that
  • 00:11:56
    you need to build the products that you
  • 00:11:58
    want to build, well, you're going to
  • 00:12:00
    have a pretty significant amount of pain
  • 00:12:02
    over several years. And the third was
  • 00:12:04
    the dependency that US companies have on
  • 00:12:07
    foreign supply chains because a lot of
  • 00:12:09
    what's made in USA is also made abroad
  • 00:12:12
    before it's assembled in the USA. But
  • 00:12:14
    that's not even China's biggest
  • 00:12:16
    advantage here. It's the reordering of
  • 00:12:18
    global trade that is going to be so
  • 00:12:20
    important. But before we talk about
  • 00:12:21
    that, let's talk about who is actually
  • 00:12:23
    going to get hurt in the US. Because for
  • 00:12:25
    the most part, it's going to be first
  • 00:12:28
    and foremost consumers. There's going to
  • 00:12:30
    be price spikes. There's going to be
  • 00:12:31
    inflation as a result of higher tariffs,
  • 00:12:34
    higher costs, and having to buy goods
  • 00:12:36
    from countries that aren't China that,
  • 00:12:38
    by the way, are going to see the writing
  • 00:12:40
    on the wall and the opportunity to raise
  • 00:12:42
    prices on US consumers primarily because
  • 00:12:44
    they'll be able to. If you can't buy
  • 00:12:47
    Chinese goods for the same prices you
  • 00:12:49
    used to, in fact, you're going to have
  • 00:12:51
    to buy them for 145% more than you did
  • 00:12:53
    previously, well, that gives other
  • 00:12:55
    countries around the world the ability
  • 00:12:56
    to increase prices. And they don't even
  • 00:12:59
    have to increase them the full 145%.
  • 00:13:01
    They can increase them 100% and it'll
  • 00:13:03
    still be a better deal than the Chinese
  • 00:13:05
    products, but the price for US consumers
  • 00:13:07
    still goes up. Then there's the impact
  • 00:13:09
    to US small businesses who don't have
  • 00:13:11
    the ability to trade with pretty much
  • 00:13:14
    anybody. They're going to see prices
  • 00:13:15
    rise as well. In fact, what you're
  • 00:13:17
    probably going to see because of the
  • 00:13:19
    higher prices if they do happen is a lot
  • 00:13:22
    of small businesses going out of
  • 00:13:23
    business because they won't be able to
  • 00:13:25
    compete with bigger manufacturers or
  • 00:13:27
    foreign manufacturers from countries
  • 00:13:29
    that aren't China. And here's the big
  • 00:13:31
    one. The people that are going to feel
  • 00:13:33
    the most impact are probably the farmers
  • 00:13:35
    who at this point have pretty much lost
  • 00:13:38
    all access to the Chinese market. This
  • 00:13:40
    is going to be devastating to local
  • 00:13:42
    farmers who relied on that market for
  • 00:13:44
    trade. Oh, and don't even get me started
  • 00:13:46
    on manufacturers who aren't going to be
  • 00:13:48
    able to pivot fast enough. The idea that
  • 00:13:51
    Apple, for example, is going to be able
  • 00:13:53
    to bring the production of iPhones back
  • 00:13:55
    to the US in a quick manner is
  • 00:13:58
    ridiculous. No. Instead, what they're
  • 00:14:00
    probably going to do is they're probably
  • 00:14:02
    going to ramp up the production in India
  • 00:14:04
    instead or move production to Vietnam or
  • 00:14:07
    to other countries that aren't China.
  • 00:14:09
    They aren't going to onboard them and
  • 00:14:11
    bring them back to the US. They're just
  • 00:14:13
    going to move them to other countries
  • 00:14:14
    that have the capacity that aren't in a
  • 00:14:17
    trade war with the US. And the US
  • 00:14:18
    government has already realized that
  • 00:14:20
    this is a problem. As of this filming,
  • 00:14:22
    just hours before, the US pulled back
  • 00:14:25
    all the tariffs on computers and
  • 00:14:28
    electronics. Primarily because they
  • 00:14:30
    realized that something like the iPhone
  • 00:14:32
    would go up in price by up to 3x if they
  • 00:14:35
    continued down the path that they were
  • 00:14:36
    on. But that doesn't mean that China is
  • 00:14:38
    going to back down just because the US
  • 00:14:41
    lowered the tariffs on electronics. No,
  • 00:14:44
    China has made it very clear that they
  • 00:14:45
    are willing to fight till the bitter
  • 00:14:47
    end. And importantly, what they've
  • 00:14:48
    realized is that they've actually got
  • 00:14:51
    some leverage that they didn't realize
  • 00:14:52
    that they had because China's
  • 00:14:54
    essentially built an economic fortress.
  • 00:14:57
    Now, whether it was because they did
  • 00:14:58
    shady things when it came to trade that
  • 00:15:00
    other countries couldn't do or not, it
  • 00:15:02
    doesn't matter. They're the world's
  • 00:15:03
    number one manufacturer. That gives them
  • 00:15:05
    leverage. They are the dominant player
  • 00:15:08
    in global exports. That gives them
  • 00:15:10
    leverage. They have a massive domestic
  • 00:15:13
    industrial base. In other words, all the
  • 00:15:15
    factories, all the machinery,
  • 00:15:17
    everything's already there. That gives
  • 00:15:19
    them leverage. And they've also got one
  • 00:15:21
    of the biggest populations, if not the
  • 00:15:23
    biggest population in the world. Sorry,
  • 00:15:24
    I should probably have that data on hand
  • 00:15:26
    as I'm making this video, but I don't.
  • 00:15:28
    But nonetheless, their internal demand
  • 00:15:30
    is definitely a significant benefit. And
  • 00:15:33
    there's things that they can do in order
  • 00:15:35
    to increase the internal domestic demand
  • 00:15:37
    as well by doing things like, I don't
  • 00:15:39
    know, printing money and stimulating the
  • 00:15:41
    economy, which puts them at an even
  • 00:15:44
    greater advantage when it comes to this
  • 00:15:46
    trade war. But on top of that, they've
  • 00:15:47
    also got supply chain control. A lot of
  • 00:15:49
    goods that are made in other countries
  • 00:15:51
    have some sort of tie to the Chinese
  • 00:15:53
    economy. There are 80 plus product
  • 00:15:55
    categories that rely on China. And a lot
  • 00:15:57
    of those categories, a lot of the most
  • 00:15:59
    significant categories are things that
  • 00:16:02
    the world needs to move forward in order
  • 00:16:05
    to lessen their reliance on oil. Things
  • 00:16:08
    like rare earth metals, electric
  • 00:16:10
    vehicles, solar panels. These are all
  • 00:16:12
    areas where China has a near monopoly.
  • 00:16:16
    And not only that, the production of
  • 00:16:18
    things that go into these types of goods
  • 00:16:22
    is already integrated in global
  • 00:16:23
    production lines. There isn't a single
  • 00:16:25
    vehicle on the planet that doesn't get
  • 00:16:27
    some sort of product that comes directly
  • 00:16:30
    from China. Whether it's made in the
  • 00:16:32
    USA, made in Canada, made in Mexico,
  • 00:16:34
    made in Germany, made elsewhere. Every
  • 00:16:36
    single one of these production lines has
  • 00:16:38
    some sort of component that relies on
  • 00:16:41
    Chinese exports. And that's true not
  • 00:16:43
    just for cars, but for a lot of goods
  • 00:16:45
    that are produced and consumed by, you
  • 00:16:47
    guessed it, US consumers and global
  • 00:16:49
    consumers alike. But here's where it
  • 00:16:51
    gets really scary, cuz we're already
  • 00:16:52
    seeing regional alliances change.
  • 00:16:55
    There's talks of strengthening a free
  • 00:16:57
    trade agreement between South Korea,
  • 00:16:59
    Japan, and China. We've already seen two
  • 00:17:01
    of the US's most significant allies in
  • 00:17:05
    Japan and South Korea, at least in Asia,
  • 00:17:09
    start to have further conversations with
  • 00:17:10
    China about how they can work together.
  • 00:17:13
    So, two partners of the US, who the US
  • 00:17:16
    thought was its allies in these games,
  • 00:17:18
    are starting to have conversations with
  • 00:17:19
    the competitor. And these three
  • 00:17:21
    countries alone have a combined GDP that
  • 00:17:24
    is 22% of the global economy. And they
  • 00:17:27
    combined for a total of 18.3% of world
  • 00:17:30
    trade. And while these talks were
  • 00:17:32
    happening prior to this, they literally
  • 00:17:34
    hadn't had conversations about it in 5
  • 00:17:36
    years. But when the US decided to play
  • 00:17:39
    this game and test its dominance, guess
  • 00:17:41
    who started talking again? Now, Chinese
  • 00:17:43
    state media suggested that China, Japan,
  • 00:17:46
    and South Korea would jointly respond to
  • 00:17:47
    US tariffs. And obviously, South Korea
  • 00:17:50
    and Japan came back quickly and said
  • 00:17:51
    this isn't true. But they did have a
  • 00:17:54
    joint response, a joint press release
  • 00:17:56
    from their meetings, which suggested
  • 00:17:58
    that they were open to having more trade
  • 00:18:01
    as the US seemed to want to go into an
  • 00:18:04
    isolationist stance. Basically, the US
  • 00:18:07
    doing what it did led Japan and South
  • 00:18:10
    Korea to go, "Hold on a second. We're
  • 00:18:13
    not sure if our partner is going to be
  • 00:18:14
    our partner, so maybe we should start
  • 00:18:17
    talking to the other guy." And this is
  • 00:18:18
    happening around the world. We're seeing
  • 00:18:20
    Canada start to talk to the European
  • 00:18:22
    Union about strengthening its trade
  • 00:18:24
    relationships. We're seeing once
  • 00:18:26
    reliable Asian trading partners start to
  • 00:18:29
    talk to each other about how they can
  • 00:18:30
    circumvent the US. And China's already
  • 00:18:34
    the single biggest trading partner with
  • 00:18:35
    Africa. And by the way, back when Donald
  • 00:18:38
    Trump got elected, China saw all this
  • 00:18:40
    coming. And guess what? They opened
  • 00:18:43
    their doors. They opened their borders
  • 00:18:45
    to these small nations, undeveloped
  • 00:18:47
    nations, and said, "Hey, if you want a
  • 00:18:50
    really reliable trading partner, we'll
  • 00:18:52
    be that for you." Which is essentially
  • 00:18:54
    China opening up to the world and
  • 00:18:55
    saying, "You know what? We're open for
  • 00:18:56
    business." And it seems like the other
  • 00:18:59
    big superpower, well, they're not. So,
  • 00:19:02
    would you like to deal with them or
  • 00:19:04
    would you like to deal with us? And this
  • 00:19:06
    is how the world order gets rearranged.
  • 00:19:09
    Now, as I mentioned, China saw this all
  • 00:19:11
    coming. In 2018, the writing was on the
  • 00:19:13
    wall. They realized really quickly in
  • 00:19:15
    2018 that they didn't want to have all
  • 00:19:17
    their eggs in the US basket. So, they
  • 00:19:20
    spent the last 7 years preparing for
  • 00:19:22
    something that really shouldn't have
  • 00:19:23
    happened, but did. So, let me show you
  • 00:19:26
    how. First of all, there was a clear
  • 00:19:27
    diversification of trade. The US said,
  • 00:19:30
    "We don't want to be trading only with
  • 00:19:31
    China." So, they reduced the amount of
  • 00:19:34
    goods that they were importing. Well, at
  • 00:19:36
    the same time, China reduced the amount
  • 00:19:38
    that they were importing from the US as
  • 00:19:39
    well. But, as you'll see in a minute,
  • 00:19:41
    China's trade actually went up
  • 00:19:43
    significantly. Well, it stayed pretty
  • 00:19:46
    much even with the US, meaning that they
  • 00:19:48
    just diversified who they were trading
  • 00:19:50
    with, which becomes a major problem for
  • 00:19:52
    the United States. You'll see why in a
  • 00:19:54
    second. And it turns out that the US
  • 00:19:56
    needs Chinese exports more than China
  • 00:19:59
    needs US imports. Over the last 20
  • 00:20:01
    years, China's share of US imports has
  • 00:20:04
    gone up substantially. But the
  • 00:20:06
    percentage of goods that are being
  • 00:20:08
    bought by the US that China produces has
  • 00:20:11
    gone down. Meaning that China is
  • 00:20:13
    exporting more and more to other
  • 00:20:15
    countries that aren't the USA. And this
  • 00:20:18
    becomes problematic for the US because
  • 00:20:20
    China doesn't rely on the US to buy its
  • 00:20:23
    goods. But the US very much relies on
  • 00:20:26
    China to buy some pretty significant
  • 00:20:29
    consumer products, which gives China an
  • 00:20:31
    upper hand in this trade war. And where
  • 00:20:33
    this gets really interesting is when you
  • 00:20:35
    look at the difference in trade between
  • 00:20:37
    2018 and 2023. Because in 2018, the US
  • 00:20:42
    bought 19.8% of Chinese exports. In
  • 00:20:46
    2023 they bought only 12.8%. Now what's
  • 00:20:50
    interesting is that the total amount of
  • 00:20:52
    exports in 2018 from China was 2.76
  • 00:20:56
    trillion. In 2023 it was 3.42 trillion.
  • 00:21:00
    So China exported significantly more but
  • 00:21:03
    the US's share of what they exported
  • 00:21:05
    went down. And when we look at the
  • 00:21:07
    nominal amount of this, what you can see
  • 00:21:10
    is that in 2018, the United States
  • 00:21:14
    imported from China about $547 billion
  • 00:21:16
    in goods. In
  • 00:21:18
    2023, they only imported $436 billion
  • 00:21:22
    worth of goods, which is about a hundred
  • 00:21:24
    billion reduction in the amount that
  • 00:21:26
    they've imported. But if the US is
  • 00:21:28
    importing less from China, but China is
  • 00:21:31
    exporting more to the global economy,
  • 00:21:34
    what that means is that China is
  • 00:21:36
    becoming an even bigger player, one that
  • 00:21:38
    is way less reliant on the US than the
  • 00:21:42
    US believes it is. And ironically, while
  • 00:21:44
    all of this was happening, while the US
  • 00:21:46
    was reducing the amount that it imports
  • 00:21:48
    from China, Canada and Mexico were both
  • 00:21:51
    increasing the amount that they imported
  • 00:21:53
    from China, getting their hands on some
  • 00:21:55
    of those cheap Chinese goods that
  • 00:21:57
    Americans were importing less of. And as
  • 00:21:59
    we get further and further into this US
  • 00:22:02
    tariff issue, that's going to happen
  • 00:22:04
    globally. Everyone is going to start
  • 00:22:06
    buying goods from China that are cheaper
  • 00:22:09
    because the US is no longer demanding
  • 00:22:11
    them. And that is going to give China
  • 00:22:13
    even more leverage on a global stage
  • 00:22:15
    because the US is becoming isolationist.
  • 00:22:19
    They're becoming erratic. In fact, by
  • 00:22:21
    the time you watch this video, half of
  • 00:22:22
    what I said could be totally different
  • 00:22:24
    from the perspective of what the tariffs
  • 00:22:26
    are. I mean, even this morning as I was
  • 00:22:29
    looking at the news right before filming
  • 00:22:31
    this, Trump had gone ahead and changed
  • 00:22:33
    it so that electronics and computers
  • 00:22:35
    weren't going to be tariffed anymore.
  • 00:22:37
    Which is essentially Donald Trump
  • 00:22:39
    blinking in this whole trade war. Going,
  • 00:22:42
    you know what? China called my bluff and
  • 00:22:44
    now what am I going to do? I have to get
  • 00:22:46
    rid of these tariffs on electronics
  • 00:22:47
    because if I don't, well, prices are
  • 00:22:50
    going to go up and the US consumer is
  • 00:22:51
    going to hate me when they can't get
  • 00:22:52
    their hands on that Samsung or that
  • 00:22:55
    iPhone that they've always wanted or
  • 00:22:57
    that they expect to be able to buy for X
  • 00:22:59
    number of dollars, but it now costs
  • 00:23:01
    three times that. And not only that, in
  • 00:23:04
    the face of all this erratic behavior,
  • 00:23:07
    China seems to be, at least on a global
  • 00:23:09
    stage, the more reliable trading
  • 00:23:11
    partner, which is causing the world
  • 00:23:14
    order to realign. We're starting to see
  • 00:23:17
    Asian countries that once had a very
  • 00:23:19
    strong relationship with the US and not
  • 00:23:22
    so much of a strong relationship with
  • 00:23:24
    China start to rethink, you know, their
  • 00:23:27
    relationships with the Chinese
  • 00:23:29
    government. And we're also seeing places
  • 00:23:32
    like Canada rethink their relationship
  • 00:23:34
    with the US and other potential trading
  • 00:23:36
    partners around the world. And this
  • 00:23:38
    leads us to a conversation around what
  • 00:23:39
    would happen if the US and the China
  • 00:23:41
    really did decouple. Who would face the
  • 00:23:43
    biggest challenges and the most pain?
  • 00:23:45
    Well, the US has fragile supply chains.
  • 00:23:48
    We've already established this. Their
  • 00:23:49
    manufacturing went to China, which means
  • 00:23:51
    the supply chains are relying on China.
  • 00:23:53
    And if China goes away, well, we've got
  • 00:23:56
    a 3 to 5year problem of bringing
  • 00:23:58
    manufacturing back home, which is
  • 00:24:01
    probably something that doesn't make a
  • 00:24:03
    lot of sense in the first place,
  • 00:24:05
    especially when you start to realize the
  • 00:24:08
    US's thought process around immigration
  • 00:24:11
    and what you would need from an
  • 00:24:12
    immigration perspective to fill all the
  • 00:24:14
    jobs to manufacture all the things. And
  • 00:24:16
    then on top of that, you've got this
  • 00:24:17
    massive consumer impact. It's the
  • 00:24:19
    consumer goods that are going to be most
  • 00:24:21
    impacted by tariffs on China. Now, flip
  • 00:24:23
    this around and look at the Chinese
  • 00:24:25
    impact and they've got resilient supply
  • 00:24:28
    chains. They can make whatever they want
  • 00:24:29
    for whoever they want. And on top of
  • 00:24:32
    that, they've diversified their exports
  • 00:24:34
    to other countries already. So, yeah,
  • 00:24:37
    our 12% trading partner might buy less,
  • 00:24:40
    but we can just sell those goods to
  • 00:24:42
    other countries for less. And well,
  • 00:24:44
    there's some argument that that's not
  • 00:24:46
    good for the world economy. The reality
  • 00:24:48
    is China can survive. And when we put
  • 00:24:51
    this into a applesto apples comparison,
  • 00:24:53
    it looks like this. The manufacturing
  • 00:24:56
    base in the US is weak and it's strong
  • 00:24:58
    in China. Supply chains in the US are
  • 00:25:00
    fragile and self-sufficient in China.
  • 00:25:03
    Consumer impact in the US is going to be
  • 00:25:05
    high. In China, it's probably going to
  • 00:25:07
    be pretty low. And the export
  • 00:25:09
    diversification in the US where we can
  • 00:25:11
    send our goods is well not that great.
  • 00:25:15
    While in China, it's quite significant.
  • 00:25:18
    And not only that, when you look at the
  • 00:25:19
    goods that the US exports to China
  • 00:25:21
    versus what China exports to the US, it
  • 00:25:24
    becomes really clear that most of what
  • 00:25:26
    China buys from the US is not for
  • 00:25:29
    consumer use. Soybeans being the one
  • 00:25:33
    that's closest to that, but it's mostly
  • 00:25:35
    aircrafts and engines, integrated
  • 00:25:37
    circuits, pharmaceuticals, and
  • 00:25:39
    petroleum. On the other hand, what China
  • 00:25:41
    exports to the US is things that people
  • 00:25:43
    want to buy that when they become more
  • 00:25:45
    expensive are going to create pain for
  • 00:25:48
    American consumers. Things like
  • 00:25:50
    smartphones, laptops, batteries, not
  • 00:25:53
    just for the things you use every day,
  • 00:25:55
    but for things like electric vehicles
  • 00:25:57
    that are becoming so popular. And then
  • 00:25:59
    toys and telecom equipment. All of these
  • 00:26:02
    things when they go up in price are
  • 00:26:04
    going to affect the amount of money that
  • 00:26:06
    you have available in your pocket to
  • 00:26:08
    spend on a daily basis. These tariffs,
  • 00:26:11
    believe it or not, are going to hurt you
  • 00:26:13
    as a consumer more than they're going to
  • 00:26:15
    hurt anybody else. And then when it
  • 00:26:17
    comes to the sticker shock, this is
  • 00:26:19
    where it gets really interesting because
  • 00:26:22
    China exports pretty much everything
  • 00:26:24
    that they export to the US to a
  • 00:26:27
    significantly greater scale to other
  • 00:26:29
    countries. The amount that China exports
  • 00:26:31
    to the US is denoted by the black parts
  • 00:26:33
    of the line. The amount that China
  • 00:26:35
    exports elsewhere is the blue. There
  • 00:26:37
    isn't a single product that China
  • 00:26:39
    exports to the US that they don't export
  • 00:26:43
    significantly more of to other
  • 00:26:44
    countries. And when it comes to what the
  • 00:26:47
    US exports to China, well, there's only
  • 00:26:50
    one thing, one item that China relies on
  • 00:26:54
    the US for, and that's jet engines.
  • 00:26:56
    everything else they import at a greater
  • 00:26:59
    scale from other countries than they
  • 00:27:00
    import from the US. So, China just like
  • 00:27:03
    an individual looked at this whole
  • 00:27:04
    scenario in 2018 and said, "Hey, we need
  • 00:27:07
    to diversify." And they did. And because
  • 00:27:10
    they diversified, they were able to
  • 00:27:11
    insulate themselves from this global
  • 00:27:14
    competitor, this bully, this dominant
  • 00:27:17
    player that other countries are now
  • 00:27:19
    realizing as China stands up to them
  • 00:27:22
    isn't as dominant as everybody thought.
  • 00:27:24
    So, let's talk about the winners versus
  • 00:27:26
    losers in this whole trade war because
  • 00:27:29
    it's very clear that the US consumers
  • 00:27:32
    are the people who are going to suffer
  • 00:27:33
    the most. When China retaliates, it's US
  • 00:27:37
    businesses that are going to feel the
  • 00:27:39
    pain, not Chinese businesses, which in a
  • 00:27:41
    lot of cases are governmentowned or
  • 00:27:43
    government subsidized anyways. And China
  • 00:27:46
    holds the keys to industrial inputs for
  • 00:27:49
    things like solar panels, electric cars,
  • 00:27:51
    batteries that the US needs. And there's
  • 00:27:55
    not much of a chance the US is going to
  • 00:27:57
    be able to get them if China's not
  • 00:28:00
    exporting to them. So the question is,
  • 00:28:01
    can this be reversed? I mean, reshoring
  • 00:28:04
    the idea that jobs are going to come
  • 00:28:05
    back to the US and manufacturing is
  • 00:28:07
    going to come back to the US, that's a 5
  • 00:28:09
    to 10ear project. And more than likely,
  • 00:28:12
    it's my guess that most American
  • 00:28:14
    companies are just going to wait four
  • 00:28:15
    years until there's a new president to
  • 00:28:17
    see what happens. And if they do end up
  • 00:28:19
    reshoring the manufacturing of a lot of
  • 00:28:21
    these products, guess what? They're
  • 00:28:23
    probably going to use automation rather
  • 00:28:25
    than people in order to do it. Meaning
  • 00:28:27
    that the amount of jobs that are going
  • 00:28:28
    to return to the US is nowhere close to
  • 00:28:31
    the amount of jobs that were lost during
  • 00:28:33
    the China shock. And don't even get me
  • 00:28:35
    started on US industrial policy and how
  • 00:28:38
    fragmented that is. and how we've pretty
  • 00:28:41
    much just lost touch with what it means
  • 00:28:43
    to be a producer. But here's the real
  • 00:28:46
    consequence. A new global trade map. The
  • 00:28:48
    US once being the epicenter, the biggest
  • 00:28:51
    consumer, the customer that everybody
  • 00:28:54
    wanted because they could spend the
  • 00:28:55
    most. Now, in this crazy world where
  • 00:28:59
    they've uncovered that they're no longer
  • 00:29:01
    the dominant player and that some other
  • 00:29:03
    countries hold some cards, well, all the
  • 00:29:06
    other countries are going to look to
  • 00:29:08
    this one player that's no longer
  • 00:29:09
    reliable and say, "Maybe we don't want
  • 00:29:13
    to get too invested with them and
  • 00:29:14
    instead start trading around them."
  • 00:29:16
    Canada could go to Europe and Australia,
  • 00:29:19
    maybe even China and some other Asian
  • 00:29:21
    countries to get their goods. They could
  • 00:29:23
    even start exporting the goods that they
  • 00:29:25
    export to the US to those countries as
  • 00:29:27
    well if it's mutually beneficial. China
  • 00:29:30
    obviously has the entire world that they
  • 00:29:32
    can export to. So, they're probably not
  • 00:29:34
    concerned. There might be a little bit
  • 00:29:36
    of a short-term pain, but in the end,
  • 00:29:38
    it's probably going to be long-term
  • 00:29:40
    gain, especially if they start to rise
  • 00:29:43
    to a dominant position. And the only
  • 00:29:45
    people that end up losing in this entire
  • 00:29:48
    situation are the American citizens
  • 00:29:50
    because the dominant player, the one
  • 00:29:53
    that didn't have to prove that they were
  • 00:29:55
    dominant. All they had to do was keep
  • 00:29:57
    playing the game and let everyone else
  • 00:29:59
    be afraid of them. Well, they went too
  • 00:30:01
    far. And when you go too far, you play
  • 00:30:04
    your cards and you start to show people
  • 00:30:07
    that maybe there's some flaws in your
  • 00:30:09
    thinking. And you start to realize that
  • 00:30:11
    maybe some of those flaws were things
  • 00:30:13
    you didn't even realize were there, like
  • 00:30:15
    your inability to manufacture goods for
  • 00:30:17
    yourself, which makes it so that you are
  • 00:30:19
    at the mercy of the country you're going
  • 00:30:20
    to pick a fight with. Well, maybe that
  • 00:30:22
    ends up being the thing that cementss
  • 00:30:25
    your legacy as the last great global
  • 00:30:28
    superpower. But nonetheless, this is all
  • 00:30:31
    real interesting. I don't think the US
  • 00:30:33
    can win this trade war with China. I
  • 00:30:35
    think the only thing that is possible is
  • 00:30:38
    that they both back down and try to find
  • 00:30:41
    some common ground once again like they
  • 00:30:43
    did in the early 2000s. And if they can
  • 00:30:45
    do that, then everything will mostly go
  • 00:30:48
    back to normal, although not entirely.
  • 00:30:50
    But if they don't and the US China trade
  • 00:30:53
    relationship is severed, well, it could
  • 00:30:56
    get significantly worse and the problem
  • 00:30:59
    could no longer be economic, but it
  • 00:31:01
    could end up being military or worse.
  • 00:31:03
    So, let's hope that everybody comes to
  • 00:31:06
    their senses on this whole thing, puts
  • 00:31:08
    away their economic weapons, and
  • 00:31:10
    ultimately finds a way to trade freely
  • 00:31:13
    and constructively instead of doing
  • 00:31:16
    whatever the heck it is they're doing
  • 00:31:17
    right now. Oh, and by the way, if you
  • 00:31:19
    want to see what always happens before a
  • 00:31:21
    superpower falls, make sure you check
  • 00:31:23
    out this video right here.
Etiquetas
  • US-China trade war
  • WTO
  • trade deficit
  • China shock
  • tariffs
  • global trade
  • economic dominance
  • manufacturing
  • supply chains
  • consumer impact