(M8E12) [Microeconomics] First and Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics.

00:28:52
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IrSgLJBqCSo

Résumé

TLDRThe video explains three important theorems regarding Walrasian equilibrium and welfare economics. The first theorem states that a strictly increasing utility function for each consumer leads to efficient Walrasian equilibrium allocations. The second theorem addresses the existence of such equilibria, which require continuous, strictly increasing, and concave utility functions with positive endowments. The third theorem discusses that under certain conditions, a Pareto efficient allocation can indeed be a Walrasian equilibrium. The speaker provides examples to show what happens when the assumptions fail, illustrating the potential absence of a Walrasian equilibrium in these cases, primarily focusing on the implications of utility functions and endowments.

A retenir

  • 📈 The first theorem states if utility functions are strictly increasing, allocations are efficient.
  • 📉 The second theorem discusses the conditions for the existence of Walrasian equilibrium.
  • 🔄 The third theorem relates Pareto efficiency to Walrasian equilibrium outcomes.
  • 🔍 Strictly positive endowments are crucial for ensuring a Walrasian equilibrium exists.
  • 💡 Continuous and concave utility functions are needed alongside positive endowments.
  • 🚫 If initial endowments are zero, Walrasian equilibrium may not be achieved.
  • ⏳ Market inefficiencies can arise from information asymmetry and other complications.
  • 📊 The necessity of trade among agents to reach equilibrium is highlighted.

Chronologie

  • 00:00:00 - 00:05:00

    In this video, the speaker introduces three important theorems related to Walrasian equilibrium in economics: the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics, the Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium, and the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics. The first theorem states that if each consumer's utility function is strictly increasing, every Walrasian equilibrium allocation is efficient, meaning that allowing free trade will lead to efficient outcomes without intervention based on the strict increase of utility with consumption.

  • 00:05:00 - 00:10:00

    The speaker raises the question of whether a Walrasian equilibrium exists in every economy and identifies necessary conditions for its existence. These conditions include continuous and strictly increasing concave utility functions and strictly positive endowments for each consumer. He notes that without these assumptions, a Walrasian equilibrium may not exist, particularly in cases where initial endowments are zero or utility functions may not be concave.

  • 00:10:00 - 00:15:00

    The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics states that if consumers have strictly increasing, concave, and continuous utility functions with strictly positive endowments, then any Pareto efficient allocation can be achieved as a Walrasian equilibrium under some price ratio. This theorem emphasizes the relationship between efficient allocations and price vectors in exchange economies, again noting that production factors complicate these assumptions further.

  • 00:15:00 - 00:20:00

    Two examples are given to illustrate situations where the necessary assumptions for a Walrasian equilibrium fail. The first example has strictly positive endowments but fails the concavity assumption, resulting in no equilibrium. The second example has initial endowments that are not strictly positive, leading to a failure in establishing a Walrasian equilibrium due to similar reasons presented in the first example.

  • 00:20:00 - 00:28:52

    The speaker concludes by revisiting the concept of market clearance conditions and emphasizes that a Walrasian equilibrium can only exist if both markets for goods clear at positive prices. If conditions fail, such as resulting in prices of goods being zero, the necessary condition for a Walrasian equilibrium is violated, ultimately concluding that no Walrasian equilibrium can arise under those circumstances.

Afficher plus

Carte mentale

Vidéo Q&R

  • What is the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics?

    It states that if each consumer's utility function is strictly increasing, then every Walrasian equilibrium allocation is efficient.

  • What conditions ensure the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium?

    Consumers must have continuous and strictly increasing concave utility functions with strictly positive endowments.

  • What does the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics state?

    It states that any Pareto efficient allocation can be achieved as a Walrasian equilibrium under certain conditions.

  • What happens if initial endowments are not strictly positive?

    If initial endowments are not strictly positive, a Walrasian equilibrium may not exist.

  • What is a key characteristic of strictly increasing utility functions?

    They indicate that as consumers consume more, their utility increases.

  • Why can't the price be zero in a Walrasian equilibrium?

    If the price is zero, the demand becomes infinite, leading to market imbalances.

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Défilement automatique:
  • 00:00:00
    okay so in this video i'm going to talk
  • 00:00:02
    about three very important theorem about
  • 00:00:05
    what rising equilibrium
  • 00:00:06
    the first one is called uh first
  • 00:00:08
    fundamental theorem of welfare economics
  • 00:00:11
    the second one is the existence of
  • 00:00:14
    walrus in equilibrium and then the third
  • 00:00:16
    one is called the second fundamental
  • 00:00:19
    theorem of welfare economics so let's
  • 00:00:21
    start with the first one
  • 00:00:23
    its statement is actually very basic
  • 00:00:26
    and it requires a very mild assumption
  • 00:00:28
    so here it goes if each
  • 00:00:31
    consumer's utility function ui is
  • 00:00:34
    strictly increasing well then every
  • 00:00:37
    walrus in equilibrium allocation is
  • 00:00:40
    pretty efficient so here strictly
  • 00:00:43
    increasing utility function for every
  • 00:00:45
    consumer is key
  • 00:00:47
    however it's a mild assumption in the
  • 00:00:49
    sense that almost all the examples we
  • 00:00:51
    work in this course are having
  • 00:00:54
    increasing utility function and strictly
  • 00:00:56
    increasing utility function which by the
  • 00:00:58
    way basically says the more agents
  • 00:01:00
    consume the higher utility they should
  • 00:01:02
    be getting so if this assumption is true
  • 00:01:05
    then the walrasian equilibrium
  • 00:01:07
    allocation is pretty efficient
  • 00:01:09
    meaning if we just let these agents
  • 00:01:12
    trade with each other as freely as they
  • 00:01:14
    like
  • 00:01:16
    nobody needs to intervene to this market
  • 00:01:18
    because eventually they're going to
  • 00:01:20
    reach to an walrasian equilibrium
  • 00:01:22
    outcome which is pretty efficient and so
  • 00:01:25
    there's going to be no inefficiency let
  • 00:01:27
    them trade obviously in real life in the
  • 00:01:30
    markets there are a bunch of other
  • 00:01:31
    inefficiencies not but because not
  • 00:01:33
    because of the utility functions are not
  • 00:01:36
    not increasing but you know there's
  • 00:01:38
    informational asymmetry and and bunch of
  • 00:01:41
    other complications so in a simple world
  • 00:01:45
    uh we do have uh this very nice property
  • 00:01:49
    well
  • 00:01:50
    the question is before jumping to the
  • 00:01:52
    second fundamental theorem of welfare
  • 00:01:54
    economics the question is obviously uh i
  • 00:01:58
    mean are we sure that every economy has
  • 00:02:02
    a walrus in equilibrium i mean maybe in
  • 00:02:05
    some economies there isn't any while
  • 00:02:07
    rising equilibrium outcome
  • 00:02:10
    so the existence so when can we sure
  • 00:02:14
    that a while rising equilibrium outcome
  • 00:02:16
    exists this is a very important theorem
  • 00:02:18
    especially if you're solving a numerical
  • 00:02:20
    example you may actually end up a an
  • 00:02:24
    outcome a solution where you can't come
  • 00:02:27
    up with a price while resident
  • 00:02:28
    equilibrium price where the markets are
  • 00:02:32
    clear
  • 00:02:34
    so you may wonder am i doing something
  • 00:02:36
    wrong mathematically algebraically or is
  • 00:02:39
    this because there is no wall resin
  • 00:02:41
    equilibrium in this market well it may
  • 00:02:43
    be the the the
  • 00:02:44
    not the former but the latter all right
  • 00:02:46
    so the walrus in equilibrium outcome may
  • 00:02:49
    not even exist well for this we need
  • 00:02:51
    assumptions so if
  • 00:02:54
    every utility fund not every youtube
  • 00:02:57
    every consumer
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    has a continuous utility function
  • 00:03:04
    increasing strictly increasing utility
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    function and that's not enough concave
  • 00:03:11
    uh utility strictly concave utility
  • 00:03:13
    function all right
  • 00:03:15
    and then
  • 00:03:17
    each individual has an endowment
  • 00:03:21
    which is strictly positive meaning for
  • 00:03:24
    every good that is available in this
  • 00:03:26
    market each agent has a positive
  • 00:03:29
    endowment
  • 00:03:31
    uh well then by the way i'm giving this
  • 00:03:34
    theorem for the case
  • 00:03:36
    of no production when we have production
  • 00:03:39
    we have to make
  • 00:03:41
    further assumptions about the technology
  • 00:03:44
    of the firms or the production
  • 00:03:45
    possibility set so i'm going to ignore
  • 00:03:48
    that because those assumptions are
  • 00:03:50
    slightly bit complicated and requires
  • 00:03:52
    additional assumption
  • 00:03:53
    notations
  • 00:03:55
    so i'm going to skip that
  • 00:03:57
    but
  • 00:03:58
    just for um
  • 00:04:00
    economies where there's no production
  • 00:04:03
    or
  • 00:04:04
    assuming that the firm's production
  • 00:04:06
    functions are nice code encode nice
  • 00:04:08
    behaving so if the utility functions are
  • 00:04:11
    continuous increasing and concave well
  • 00:04:13
    then you know what and if the initial
  • 00:04:16
    endowments are positive well then we
  • 00:04:18
    will certainly have
  • 00:04:20
    a while rising equilibrium outcome
  • 00:04:22
    otherwise if one of those assumptions
  • 00:04:24
    fail to hold and in fact i am planning
  • 00:04:27
    to talk about some examples where
  • 00:04:29
    initial endowments are zero uh although
  • 00:04:33
    preferences are continued utilities are
  • 00:04:35
    continuous increasing and concave we may
  • 00:04:36
    fail to reach
  • 00:04:38
    a while rising equilibrium outcome or we
  • 00:04:41
    may have for example non-concave utility
  • 00:04:44
    function and even though the other
  • 00:04:45
    assumptions hold we may not get uh while
  • 00:04:48
    rising equilibrium outcomes so those
  • 00:04:50
    examples are coming up
  • 00:04:53
    now the so we we
  • 00:04:55
    we know that uh while there's an
  • 00:04:57
    equilibrium
  • 00:04:59
    outcome may exist under certain
  • 00:05:01
    assumptions
  • 00:05:03
    well the second fundamental theorem of
  • 00:05:05
    welfare economics is basically about
  • 00:05:08
    what we discussed in the first welfare
  • 00:05:10
    theorem in the first welfare theorem
  • 00:05:12
    remember if uh utility functions are
  • 00:05:15
    continuous fine well then any walrus in
  • 00:05:18
    equilibrium is pretty efficient there's
  • 00:05:20
    no inefficiency but can i say any
  • 00:05:22
    predator efficient allocation is a valve
  • 00:05:25
    rising equilibrium outcome for some
  • 00:05:26
    price ratio can i say something like
  • 00:05:29
    this uh well
  • 00:05:31
    in a sense uh this is the uh the second
  • 00:05:35
    welfare theorem of welfare economics uh
  • 00:05:38
    uh says this can be true this the the
  • 00:05:41
    inverse of this statement or the
  • 00:05:43
    converse of this state converse the
  • 00:05:45
    inverse of this statement can be true
  • 00:05:47
    under a a stronger set of assumptions
  • 00:05:50
    so suppose that each consumer has oh by
  • 00:05:53
    the way again i'm giving the second
  • 00:05:55
    fundamental theorem of welfare economics
  • 00:05:58
    for economies without production because
  • 00:06:00
    if we have production we need further
  • 00:06:02
    assumptions about the production
  • 00:06:05
    possibility sets or the production
  • 00:06:07
    functions or technologies so let's leave
  • 00:06:09
    production aside so suppose that each
  • 00:06:12
    consumer has strictly increasing concave
  • 00:06:16
    and continuous utility function
  • 00:06:18
    and every consumer has strictly positive
  • 00:06:21
    endowments wi for every good
  • 00:06:24
    well if the initial endowments wi uh
  • 00:06:29
    if the initial endowments are pretty
  • 00:06:31
    efficient so this is an allocation right
  • 00:06:34
    if it is predator efficient well then
  • 00:06:36
    there exists some price vector p
  • 00:06:41
    such that p and w p is the price vector
  • 00:06:44
    price of good 1 good 2 good 3 etc and w
  • 00:06:47
    is the
  • 00:06:48
    initial endowment for each consumer for
  • 00:06:52
    each good so this
  • 00:06:54
    uh uh uh you know allocation and and
  • 00:06:59
    price and
  • 00:07:00
    an initial endowment is a wall rosin
  • 00:07:03
    equilibrium of this exchange economy all
  • 00:07:06
    right so if the endowments are uh pretty
  • 00:07:10
    efficient well yes we can actually find
  • 00:07:13
    some price ratio so that or the price
  • 00:07:16
    vector so that this initial endowment is
  • 00:07:20
    a well-rounded equilibrium of this
  • 00:07:22
    economy
  • 00:07:23
    if all these assumptions hold which is
  • 00:07:26
    important again in order to guarantee
  • 00:07:29
    that while well rosin equilibrium does
  • 00:07:31
    exist all right um so that's it
  • 00:07:35
    okay so
  • 00:07:37
    i have now two examples
  • 00:07:40
    um and in in both of these examples the
  • 00:07:43
    assumptions
  • 00:07:45
    uh that i
  • 00:07:46
    underlined for the existence of walrus
  • 00:07:49
    in equilibrium
  • 00:07:51
    i mean at least one of the assumptions
  • 00:07:54
    failed to hold fails to hold so here in
  • 00:07:57
    the first example
  • 00:07:59
    uh the utility functions are increasing
  • 00:08:01
    the utility functions are continuous but
  • 00:08:04
    they're not concave i mean the utility
  • 00:08:06
    function of the agent b is in fact
  • 00:08:09
    a convex
  • 00:08:10
    all right the endowments are are are
  • 00:08:13
    strictly positive but uh we we fail the
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    assumptions of concavity fails to hold
  • 00:08:19
    in the second and i'm going to show that
  • 00:08:21
    there is no
  • 00:08:23
    walrasian equilibrium in this example
  • 00:08:26
    okay here
  • 00:08:28
    we have again increasing utility
  • 00:08:30
    functions strictly increasing oh i'm
  • 00:08:32
    sorry it is not strictly increasing all
  • 00:08:35
    right so here the agent a's utility
  • 00:08:37
    function increases with x but it's the
  • 00:08:40
    it doesn't increase with y all right uh
  • 00:08:43
    so the uh the agent b's utility function
  • 00:08:46
    however is increasing um and concave
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    however these are also not really
  • 00:08:51
    strictly concave
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    nevertheless here the key thing
  • 00:08:56
    that is going to uh fail the existence
  • 00:08:59
    of walrus in equilibrium is that the
  • 00:09:01
    initial endowments are not strictly
  • 00:09:03
    positive so agent a has zero endowment
  • 00:09:06
    for the second good agent b has the zero
  • 00:09:08
    endowment for the first good well in our
  • 00:09:11
    previous example
  • 00:09:13
    the initial endowments were not strictly
  • 00:09:15
    positive but we had a walrus in
  • 00:09:17
    equilibrium well yes that was by chance
  • 00:09:20
    all right so don't forget when i say
  • 00:09:23
    if the assumptions like concavity
  • 00:09:26
    strictly increasing uh utility functions
  • 00:09:29
    and
  • 00:09:30
    uh concave strictly increasing what else
  • 00:09:35
    continuous and then positive endowments
  • 00:09:38
    well then we
  • 00:09:40
    definitely we sure have uh
  • 00:09:43
    we surely have a while rising
  • 00:09:45
    equilibrium if any one of those
  • 00:09:48
    assumptions fail we may or may not have
  • 00:09:52
    a while rising equilibrium all right so
  • 00:09:53
    these are two examples where we don't
  • 00:09:56
    have a well risen equilibrium so let's
  • 00:09:58
    show this i mean
  • 00:10:00
    these are also good exercises to check
  • 00:10:03
    how we calculate the walrasian
  • 00:10:06
    equilibrium well
  • 00:10:08
    there's no production by the way in both
  • 00:10:10
    of those examples
  • 00:10:12
    well how do i start well simple remember
  • 00:10:15
    the
  • 00:10:16
    consumer's problem is maximize utility
  • 00:10:19
    subject to budget constraint which is
  • 00:10:21
    xpx
  • 00:10:22
    ypy equals the income which is basically
  • 00:10:26
    uh one and one for each good so i'm
  • 00:10:28
    going to write px plus py therefore okay
  • 00:10:32
    well so here
  • 00:10:34
    these are not differentiable utility
  • 00:10:36
    functions so marginal rate of
  • 00:10:37
    substitution equals price ratio negative
  • 00:10:39
    price ratio is not going to help me but
  • 00:10:42
    what i know is because this is
  • 00:10:44
    uh the min function remember our
  • 00:10:47
    uh utility maximization lecture videos
  • 00:10:51
    so if you don't remember please go back
  • 00:10:53
    to those videos and and and and and we
  • 00:10:56
    sort of refresh your mind how we
  • 00:10:59
    calculate the optimal demands
  • 00:11:01
    for those utility functions so whenever
  • 00:11:03
    you have a minimum of two things well
  • 00:11:05
    the optimal allocation will always
  • 00:11:07
    satisfy the first term equal the second
  • 00:11:09
    term
  • 00:11:10
    so therefore agent a is going to consume
  • 00:11:13
    equal amount of good x and good y
  • 00:11:16
    all right so once i plug this to his uh
  • 00:11:19
    budget constraint that basically means 2
  • 00:11:22
    x a p x right y p y is going to be oh
  • 00:11:25
    i'm sorry
  • 00:11:26
    that's my
  • 00:11:29
    mistake so this is x p x plus
  • 00:11:32
    y is equal to x p y so in x a
  • 00:11:36
    parenthesis i must have p x plus p y
  • 00:11:39
    equals p x plus p y so therefore x a is
  • 00:11:43
    equal to one and because y a is equal to
  • 00:11:46
    x a it is also equal to one so the
  • 00:11:49
    consumer a is actually uh
  • 00:11:53
    does not want to trade any good all
  • 00:11:56
    right
  • 00:11:57
    well what about
  • 00:11:58
    agent b same problem maximize utility
  • 00:12:01
    subject to budget constraint
  • 00:12:03
    because he also has the same initial
  • 00:12:05
    endowments his income is also the same
  • 00:12:09
    well here however when you have a max
  • 00:12:12
    utility function remember
  • 00:12:15
    for good x for good y i'm dropping in
  • 00:12:17
    different squares the indifference
  • 00:12:19
    curves like min
  • 00:12:21
    x y
  • 00:12:23
    are always going to move along the 45
  • 00:12:26
    degree line they're going to have kink
  • 00:12:28
    points there and as they move in this
  • 00:12:30
    direction it means higher indifference
  • 00:12:32
    curve when it is however max of x y
  • 00:12:36
    well this time those curves will
  • 00:12:39
    flipped
  • 00:12:40
    okay meaning when i have
  • 00:12:43
    max
  • 00:12:44
    x y
  • 00:12:45
    again those indifference curves are
  • 00:12:46
    going to move along 45 degree line but
  • 00:12:49
    the indifference curve are going to move
  • 00:12:51
    in this fashion and so as we move to the
  • 00:12:54
    north east direction it it means higher
  • 00:12:57
    indifference curve but it is convex
  • 00:13:02
    for that reason so when we have an
  • 00:13:04
    optimal uh i'm sorry when we have a
  • 00:13:07
    budget constraint well the optimal is
  • 00:13:10
    not going to be the king point because
  • 00:13:12
    for example if this is my budget line
  • 00:13:15
    this king point is no longer optimal
  • 00:13:18
    because
  • 00:13:19
    higher indifference occurs can be
  • 00:13:21
    attained by consuming uh the boundaries
  • 00:13:25
    well
  • 00:13:27
    if the graph is confusing you forget
  • 00:13:30
    about it look at the utility function
  • 00:13:32
    it's a maximum of x and y
  • 00:13:34
    it basically tells me just consume on
  • 00:13:37
    one good uh consuming the other good is
  • 00:13:39
    not gonna bring you any utility as long
  • 00:13:41
    as you consume x more than one so spend
  • 00:13:44
    your entire money on just one specific
  • 00:13:47
    good well obviously if the price of good
  • 00:13:49
    x and good y are different than one you
  • 00:13:52
    will invest answer not in that you will
  • 00:13:54
    consume
  • 00:13:55
    only the cheaper good if px is less than
  • 00:13:59
    py you're gonna spend your entire income
  • 00:14:01
    on good x
  • 00:14:03
    okay so
  • 00:14:06
    therefore
  • 00:14:07
    the demand is bit tricky here
  • 00:14:11
    x
  • 00:14:12
    b
  • 00:14:14
    equals
  • 00:14:15
    zero
  • 00:14:17
    and yb equals your entire income which
  • 00:14:21
    is p x plus p y
  • 00:14:24
    divided by you know this is the price of
  • 00:14:26
    good good y
  • 00:14:28
    uh if however px is uh greater than py
  • 00:14:32
    so good y is cheaper so in that case
  • 00:14:36
    this should be the optimal demand
  • 00:14:38
    however oops
  • 00:14:40
    xb you're gonna spend your entire income
  • 00:14:43
    i mean
  • 00:14:45
    revenue that you can generate by selling
  • 00:14:48
    your endowment on good x
  • 00:14:51
    and consumes oops
  • 00:14:54
    zero good y if
  • 00:14:56
    price of good y is higher than price of
  • 00:14:58
    good x if they're equal well both of
  • 00:15:01
    them either one of these two are
  • 00:15:03
    equilibrium all right so if you like you
  • 00:15:05
    can put greater than or equal to
  • 00:15:08
    so if if px and py are equal this one is
  • 00:15:11
    equilibrium optimal this one is also
  • 00:15:13
    optimal all right when i say either one
  • 00:15:16
    of them i mean both of them are optimal
  • 00:15:19
    um so what does that mean uh that means
  • 00:15:22
    the following
  • 00:15:23
    so
  • 00:15:25
    here i want to uh so i found the demands
  • 00:15:28
    optimal demands right so the optimal
  • 00:15:30
    demands let's
  • 00:15:32
    uh generate the uh market demand
  • 00:15:36
    market demand
  • 00:15:38
    for good x and then market demand
  • 00:15:45
    for
  • 00:15:47
    good y
  • 00:15:48
    well for remember the market demand for
  • 00:15:51
    good x depends on the price ratio
  • 00:15:53
    because consumer b's uh demand depends
  • 00:15:57
    on the price ratio so for that reason
  • 00:16:00
    i'm going to have a market demand for
  • 00:16:02
    good x if p x is greater than or equal
  • 00:16:05
    to p y
  • 00:16:06
    um and otherwise okay same here if px is
  • 00:16:11
    greater than or equal to py and
  • 00:16:13
    otherwise so if px is greater than or
  • 00:16:16
    equal to py
  • 00:16:17
    the demand for good x for agent b is
  • 00:16:21
    zero agent a however is always one so
  • 00:16:24
    the total demand for good x is one
  • 00:16:27
    otherwise i mean if the price of good y
  • 00:16:30
    is higher than p x well the the the
  • 00:16:32
    agent uh uh agent one still agent a i'm
  • 00:16:36
    sorry still demands one all right
  • 00:16:39
    agent b however demands this much p x
  • 00:16:42
    plus p y divided by p x
  • 00:16:46
    now the market demand for good y similar
  • 00:16:48
    reasoning if the price of good x is
  • 00:16:50
    higher than price of good y uh well
  • 00:16:54
    remember a always wants to demand one
  • 00:16:58
    the question is what's the demand for
  • 00:17:00
    agent b
  • 00:17:01
    agent b's demand here in this case is
  • 00:17:04
    going to be p x plus p y over p y and
  • 00:17:07
    here it's going to be zero all right so
  • 00:17:10
    these are the market demands
  • 00:17:12
    all right now the final step
  • 00:17:15
    the
  • 00:17:16
    market clearing conditions i mean the
  • 00:17:19
    market demand for good x must be equal
  • 00:17:21
    to market supply for good x
  • 00:17:24
    and at the same time market demand for
  • 00:17:26
    good y must be equal to market supply
  • 00:17:28
    for good y
  • 00:17:30
    market supply for good x is one plus one
  • 00:17:34
    two because each agent has one unit of
  • 00:17:36
    good x same for good one
  • 00:17:39
    so therefore
  • 00:17:41
    uh market clearing
  • 00:17:44
    clearing
  • 00:17:46
    uh for good x
  • 00:17:49
    well here you go
  • 00:17:51
    uh
  • 00:17:51
    demand is one
  • 00:17:55
    and the supply is two
  • 00:17:58
    if px is greater than or equal to py
  • 00:18:01
    right i mean don't forget the demand is
  • 00:18:03
    one only if this is the price
  • 00:18:05
    uh well clearly one is not equal to two
  • 00:18:07
    so therefore if we have a wall rods in
  • 00:18:09
    equilibrium price
  • 00:18:11
    should not be greater than price of good
  • 00:18:13
    x should not be greater than price of
  • 00:18:15
    good y all right otherwise
  • 00:18:18
    uh we have a demand one
  • 00:18:21
    plus
  • 00:18:22
    p x plus p y over p x
  • 00:18:25
    and has to be equal to two all right so
  • 00:18:27
    let's work with this uh what does that
  • 00:18:29
    mean that means
  • 00:18:31
    uh
  • 00:18:32
    px plus py over px equals 1. i should
  • 00:18:36
    just send this one to the other side i
  • 00:18:38
    do the cross product p x plus p y equals
  • 00:18:42
    p x
  • 00:18:43
    uh well p x's will cancel out p y is
  • 00:18:46
    equal to zero
  • 00:18:47
    okay look if p y is zero
  • 00:18:52
    okay what's going to happen
  • 00:18:54
    uh well yes
  • 00:18:57
    p y is zero and p x
  • 00:19:00
    uh well remember p x has to be i mean if
  • 00:19:03
    p x is greater than p y the market
  • 00:19:05
    doesn't clear so the p x must be less
  • 00:19:08
    than or equal to py prices can never be
  • 00:19:12
    negative i mean forget about negative
  • 00:19:14
    prices okay so therefore px should also
  • 00:19:17
    be zero so zero price good x zero price
  • 00:19:20
    for good y
  • 00:19:21
    in this case the market demand is going
  • 00:19:24
    to be i'm sorry the market for good x is
  • 00:19:27
    going to be clear
  • 00:19:29
    uh not really if px is zero if py is
  • 00:19:32
    zero well then this is infinite i mean
  • 00:19:35
    uh consumer b is going to demand
  • 00:19:39
    infinite amount very large i mean
  • 00:19:41
    infinite amount of good x and so
  • 00:19:44
    therefore market will not clear all
  • 00:19:46
    right so again p y equals zero implies p
  • 00:19:50
    x is also zero because uh remember we
  • 00:19:53
    are in the otherwise condition meaning p
  • 00:19:56
    x has to be less than or equal to p y
  • 00:19:58
    and so if p y is zero p x must also be
  • 00:20:01
    zero it can't be negative but if p x is
  • 00:20:03
    zero well then the demand for good x is
  • 00:20:06
    going to be infinite not for consumer a
  • 00:20:08
    he's going to demand one only but for uh
  • 00:20:11
    consumer b so as a result of this
  • 00:20:14
    the demand i'm sorry the market for good
  • 00:20:16
    x will never clear
  • 00:20:19
    well
  • 00:20:20
    uh should i look at market for good y
  • 00:20:23
    and its clearance no because remember
  • 00:20:25
    while rising equilibrium says
  • 00:20:28
    there must exist a price ratio p x p y
  • 00:20:31
    or a price vector p x p y in so that uh
  • 00:20:35
    both
  • 00:20:36
    uh market for good x and good y uh sh
  • 00:20:39
    will clear
  • 00:20:40
    however we can't find a price
  • 00:20:43
    where the market for the market for good
  • 00:20:46
    x will clear hence
  • 00:20:51
    no
  • 00:20:52
    uh walrus in equilibrium while russian
  • 00:20:55
    equilibrium
  • 00:20:57
    if these are the utility functions all
  • 00:20:59
    right
  • 00:21:00
    now very quickly uh look at the second
  • 00:21:02
    example where we don't have strictly
  • 00:21:05
    positive
  • 00:21:07
    uh initial endowments
  • 00:21:09
    uh well what is the optimal demand for
  • 00:21:12
    agent a and b once again
  • 00:21:15
    we have the maximize utility subject to
  • 00:21:18
    budget constraint here it is xpx plus
  • 00:21:22
    ypy so i'm talking about agent a so his
  • 00:21:26
    endowment is 10 and 0 so it's 10 times
  • 00:21:29
    px plus 0 times py so i ignore that
  • 00:21:33
    well
  • 00:21:34
    for agent b however his problem is
  • 00:21:37
    maximize utility subject to
  • 00:21:40
    xb px plus x oops y b
  • 00:21:44
    p y equals 0 times p x times 10 plus 10
  • 00:21:49
    times p y all right well how do i solve
  • 00:21:52
    the maximization problem for agent a
  • 00:21:55
    well don't don't try to take any
  • 00:21:58
    derivative or anything because you know
  • 00:22:00
    it's it's very simple
  • 00:22:01
    this guy doesn't care about good y so he
  • 00:22:05
    should not spend any money on good y so
  • 00:22:08
    therefore the optimal
  • 00:22:10
    uh why this agent is going to consume is
  • 00:22:13
    zero and so he's going to spend his
  • 00:22:15
    entire money on good x well what is his
  • 00:22:18
    entire money is 10 times px what is the
  • 00:22:22
    price per good x it's px so therefore
  • 00:22:25
    he's going to consume 10 units of good
  • 00:22:27
    eye a good x meaning he's not going to
  • 00:22:30
    uh and he's not willing to make any
  • 00:22:32
    trade okay
  • 00:22:35
    uh well but the same thing in the
  • 00:22:38
    previous example the agent wasn't
  • 00:22:40
    willing to uh sort of uh trade and move
  • 00:22:44
    somewhere other than his initial
  • 00:22:46
    endowment because of this we couldn't
  • 00:22:49
    find a well rising equilibrium price all
  • 00:22:51
    right so that's kind of a key
  • 00:22:53
    dynamic here well what about agent b on
  • 00:22:56
    the other hand well for agent b
  • 00:22:59
    it's simple marginal rate of
  • 00:23:01
    substitution this is perfectly
  • 00:23:02
    differentiable concave
  • 00:23:05
    utility function so i can use mrs
  • 00:23:08
    because the solution will always be
  • 00:23:10
    interior how do i know that again go
  • 00:23:12
    back to the utility maximization
  • 00:23:14
    lecture videos i already worked on this
  • 00:23:18
    type of utility functions
  • 00:23:20
    all right so the marginal rate of
  • 00:23:21
    substitution for agent b must be equal
  • 00:23:23
    to the negative price ratio what is uh
  • 00:23:26
    his marginal rate of substitution it's
  • 00:23:29
    minus marginal utility with respect to
  • 00:23:31
    good x which is
  • 00:23:33
    uh
  • 00:23:34
    x to the power minus one half divided by
  • 00:23:37
    just one uh marginal utility with
  • 00:23:40
    respect to good y which is equal to
  • 00:23:42
    minus px over py the minus terms will
  • 00:23:45
    cancel out
  • 00:23:46
    uh so this is basically equivalent to
  • 00:23:49
    saying
  • 00:23:50
    um
  • 00:23:51
    1 over 2 squared of x equals p x over p
  • 00:23:55
    y alright so therefore x is equal to
  • 00:23:59
    p y squared over 4 p x squared this is
  • 00:24:03
    what x is well what about y
  • 00:24:07
    well simple here we don't have any
  • 00:24:09
    relationship between x and y
  • 00:24:11
    that's okay but we didn't use his budget
  • 00:24:14
    constraint right so let's use his budget
  • 00:24:16
    constraint this is xb by the way let me
  • 00:24:19
    put it now
  • 00:24:20
    xb is this guy so py
  • 00:24:23
    square divided by
  • 00:24:25
    4px squared times px so 4px
  • 00:24:29
    plus
  • 00:24:30
    y b
  • 00:24:32
    p y must be equal to 10 p y right so
  • 00:24:35
    therefore y b is equal to
  • 00:24:38
    uh equal to
  • 00:24:40
    10 p y minus this term p y squared
  • 00:24:43
    divided by 4 p x and everything is
  • 00:24:46
    divided by py
  • 00:24:49
    which basically means
  • 00:24:51
    10 minus py divided by 4px so this is
  • 00:24:54
    how much
  • 00:24:56
    agent b is going to demand for good y so
  • 00:25:00
    market clearance condition market
  • 00:25:05
    clearance
  • 00:25:07
    uh four good x
  • 00:25:10
    and then i will also do the same thing
  • 00:25:12
    for good y if i can't reach a
  • 00:25:13
    contradiction here
  • 00:25:15
    well good x
  • 00:25:17
    agent a
  • 00:25:18
    is going to demand 10 units of good x
  • 00:25:21
    and agent b is going to demand this much
  • 00:25:24
    p y squared divided by 4 p x squared
  • 00:25:29
    so this is the market demand what is the
  • 00:25:31
    market supply
  • 00:25:33
    for good x uh it's 10 coming from the
  • 00:25:35
    first individual zero coming from the
  • 00:25:37
    second individual so 10.
  • 00:25:40
    so that means
  • 00:25:42
    uh p y square over four oops p x square
  • 00:25:47
    is equal to zero once again uh i can't
  • 00:25:50
    have this
  • 00:25:52
    i cannot have
  • 00:25:54
    p x p y positive
  • 00:25:57
    and satisfy this equality right if
  • 00:26:00
    they're positive this should be positive
  • 00:26:02
    number cannot be zero for this to be uh
  • 00:26:06
    zero well p y must be zero right
  • 00:26:11
    so
  • 00:26:12
    this
  • 00:26:14
    condition can hold
  • 00:26:16
    only if and only if price of good y is
  • 00:26:19
    zero yes we are looking for
  • 00:26:22
    positive prices but let's suppose py
  • 00:26:26
    equals zero is a well-roused in
  • 00:26:28
    equilibrium uh can it be well it can't
  • 00:26:32
    be i mean if you plug this py here
  • 00:26:36
    you're gonna see the market for
  • 00:26:38
    good x will clear the market for good y
  • 00:26:41
    will clear and so it must be while
  • 00:26:43
    rising equilibrium but there's a huge
  • 00:26:45
    mistake you're making you cannot plug
  • 00:26:48
    this py into those demand curves why
  • 00:26:51
    well because remember when i was doing
  • 00:26:53
    all this calculation right i divided
  • 00:26:56
    both sides by py for example to get yb
  • 00:27:00
    and when i did this i assumed that py is
  • 00:27:04
    zero because you cannot divide some
  • 00:27:07
    number by zero and say this is you see
  • 00:27:10
    what i mean so you can do this division
  • 00:27:12
    you can you can divide both sides by py
  • 00:27:17
    and the equality doesn't change only if
  • 00:27:20
    only if p y is non-zero positive
  • 00:27:24
    negative doesn't matter but it must be
  • 00:27:27
    non-zero okay so that was an assumption
  • 00:27:31
    so when you say of if we're looking for
  • 00:27:34
    a walrus in equilibrium it must be zero
  • 00:27:37
    but can it really be zero i mean can it
  • 00:27:39
    really be well right in equilibrium it
  • 00:27:40
    can't be another way of saying uh seeing
  • 00:27:43
    this is if the price of good y is zero
  • 00:27:47
    look at the agent b's i mean agent a yes
  • 00:27:49
    he doesn't care i mean uh because he
  • 00:27:52
    doesn't care about good y but agent b he
  • 00:27:55
    values good y and as he consumes more
  • 00:27:58
    good y
  • 00:27:59
    right he is going to willing to buy more
  • 00:28:03
    and the thing is what is the optimal
  • 00:28:05
    demand for good y for agent b well it's
  • 00:28:08
    infinite
  • 00:28:09
    but the thing is this is demand
  • 00:28:12
    do we have that much supply infinite
  • 00:28:15
    supply well hell no we have only 10
  • 00:28:17
    units of supply for good y so therefore
  • 00:28:20
    zero prices again once again can never
  • 00:28:24
    be
  • 00:28:25
    while rise in equilibrium and hence
  • 00:28:27
    here i'm sorry
  • 00:28:29
    we say market for good x will clear only
  • 00:28:32
    if price one of the prices is zero
  • 00:28:35
    hence the conclusion so we don't really
  • 00:28:38
    need to look at uh market clearance for
  • 00:28:40
    good y
  • 00:28:41
    hence
  • 00:28:42
    no walrasian
  • 00:28:44
    equilibrium
  • 00:28:47
    okay
  • 00:28:50
    that's it
Tags
  • Walrasian Equilibrium
  • Welfare Economics
  • Utility Functions
  • Pareto Efficiency
  • Economic Theorems
  • Market Clearing
  • Endowments
  • Concavity
  • Trade
  • Demand