Noam Chomsky - How the Elite controls you

00:16:15
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=twZLqlIAPLY

Résumé

TLDRThe video explores the concept of thought control in democratic societies, particularly in the U.S., arguing that while democracy ideally empowers ordinary citizens, elite groups have historically viewed it as a threat. The speaker discusses how elites use propaganda and indoctrination to manage public opinion and maintain their power, especially during times of social upheaval. Historical examples such as the Red Scare and McCarthyism illustrate the lengths to which elites will go to suppress dissent. The discussion highlights the role of intellectuals in justifying thought control and the paradox of increasing freedom leading to more sophisticated methods of public manipulation.

A retenir

  • 🗳️ Democracy is often seen differently by elites than by ordinary people.
  • 📜 Historical revolutions show that elites fear uncontrolled democracy.
  • 🧠 Thought control becomes necessary as state coercion decreases.
  • 📺 Media and propaganda are tools for managing public perception.
  • 📉 The 'crisis of democracy' arises when passive groups become politically active.
  • 👥 Intellectuals often justify thought control as necessary for the public good.
  • 🔍 The public relations industry plays a key role in shaping opinions.
  • ⚖️ The balance of power influences the methods of thought control used.
  • 📚 Historical examples highlight the recurring theme of elite control.
  • 🔄 Freedom can lead to more sophisticated forms of thought control.

Chronologie

  • 00:00:00 - 00:05:00

    The concept of thought control in a democratic society like the United States is explored, revealing a contradiction between the ideal of democracy as public participation and the reality of elite control. Historically, elites have viewed democracy as a threat to their power, leading to the need for controlling public thought to maintain their dominance. This has evolved from the 17th century, where the loss of coercive power necessitated the control of public opinion through various means, including indoctrination and propaganda.

  • 00:05:00 - 00:10:00

    The discussion highlights the role of intellectuals and the media in shaping public perception, often referred to as 'manufacturing consent.' Influential figures like Reinhold Niebuhr and Walter Lippmann have articulated the need for a controlled narrative to prevent the 'bewildered herd' from making uninformed decisions. This perspective aligns with a broader ideological framework that prioritizes elite decision-making over genuine democratic engagement, suggesting that the public's involvement in politics is often seen as a crisis rather than a democratic opportunity.

  • 00:10:00 - 00:16:15

    In modern contexts, particularly post-World War II, there has been a consistent concern among elites about the need to manage public opinion, especially during times of social upheaval. The Trilateral Commission's report on the 'crisis of democracy' illustrates how increased public engagement is viewed as a threat to stability, prompting calls for moderation and control to ensure that democracy does not empower the masses. This reflects a long-standing belief that the elite must guide the public, reinforcing the idea that true democracy is often undermined by the very mechanisms that claim to uphold it.

Carte mentale

Vidéo Q&R

  • What is thought control?

    Thought control refers to the methods used by elites to influence and manage public opinion and beliefs.

  • How does thought control manifest in a democracy?

    In a democracy, thought control can manifest through propaganda, media influence, and educational indoctrination.

  • Why do elites feel threatened by democracy?

    Elites often view democracy as a threat because it empowers ordinary people to challenge their authority and control.

  • What historical examples are mentioned regarding thought control?

    Historical examples include the Red Scare, McCarthyism, and the response to social movements in the 1960s.

  • What role do intellectuals play in thought control?

    Intellectuals often justify thought control as necessary for guiding the masses, whom they view as incapable of making informed decisions.

  • What is the 'crisis of democracy'?

    The 'crisis of democracy' refers to periods when previously passive groups begin to engage politically, which elites see as a threat.

  • How do elites maintain control without force?

    Elites maintain control through propaganda, public relations, and shaping the ideological landscape.

  • What is the relationship between freedom and thought control?

    As societies become freer, the need for sophisticated thought control mechanisms increases to manage public opinion.

  • What is the significance of the term 'necessary illusions'?

    'Necessary illusions' refers to the simplified narratives imposed by elites to keep the public aligned with their interests.

  • How does the public relations industry relate to thought control?

    The public relations industry is dedicated to shaping public perception and opinion, often through propaganda.

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Sous-titres
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Défilement automatique:
  • 00:00:00
    How can there be thought control in a
  • 00:00:01
    democratic society such as the United
  • 00:00:03
    States? Isn't that a contradiction?
  • 00:00:05
    Well, it depends what you mean by
  • 00:00:07
    democracy. Uh if you mean by democracy
  • 00:00:09
    that uh ordinary people should have a
  • 00:00:13
    play a meaningful role in controlling
  • 00:00:15
    public affairs and determining decisions
  • 00:00:19
    about how the system works and so on.
  • 00:00:21
    Yeah. And it's a total contradiction.
  • 00:00:23
    But the point is that elite elements,
  • 00:00:25
    privileged elite elements have never
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    meant that by democracy. They've always
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    regarded democracy as a threat uh which
  • 00:00:32
    has to be contained and controlled. And
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    this goes way back to the uh first
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    democratic revolutions in the 17th
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    century in England. Uh as soon as it
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    became clear that you're going to lose
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    the you know that there would no longer
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    be possible to control people by force
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    it immediately followed as an almost as
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    a corollary that you're going to have to
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    control what they think. uh if you have
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    a what we nowadays call a totalitarian
  • 00:00:56
    state or a militaryrun state or
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    whatever, you really don't care much
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    about what people think. They can think
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    anything they feel like uh because you
  • 00:01:03
    can control them with a bludgeon. But as
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    the state loses its capacity to coersse
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    through uh threats or terror, just one
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    or another form of force uh then other
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    means have to be found to ensure that
  • 00:01:18
    democracy doesn't work. uh that that
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    democratic forms in other words persist
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    but without interfering with the right
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    of the privileged uh uh elements to
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    rule. Now you know what the privileged
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    elements are may differ in different
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    societies. In modern capitalist
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    democracies the privileged sectors are
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    those who own are the corporate elite
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    basically they own the country more or
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    less. in fact more not less they
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    effectively own the country and uh the
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    and they basically control the political
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    system in the United States this really
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    a one party state it's a business party
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    with two factions uh and they control
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    the media the ideological system and
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    they impose very sharp constraints on
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    any form of policy any policy that's
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    formulated even even if the political
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    system ever got out of their control
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    which is unlikely it couldn't get very
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    far out because uh the weapons of
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    capital strike and disinvestment and
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    reduction of business confidence and so
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    on are sufficient to control policy. Uh
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    so there's there's lots of mechanisms
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    that ensure that those who own the
  • 00:02:26
    country govern it and we should bear in
  • 00:02:29
    mind that that was the principle of the
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    founding fathers that those who own the
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    country ought to govern it. That's in
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    fact a quote from John J, the president
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    of the constitutional convention. uh
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    that's the way the country's founded.
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    Now the problem is how do you deal with
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    all of this when people are free as they
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    are like the state they can't send in
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    the police to break up this
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    conversation. So how do you deal with
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    that? Well a lot of mechanisms are used
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    and one of them primary one is thought
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    control indoctrination. That's what the
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    phrase necessary illusions comes from.
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    It's uh not mine. It comes from Reinhold
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    Neber who's a
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    leading theologian. He's called the
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    theologian of the establishment. He was
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    the guru for the Kennedy intellectuals
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    and you know George Kennan and so on you
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    know a major figure in modern
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    intellectual history. Uh and he pointed
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    out once that uh the
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    ordinary people don't have the capacity
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    according to him to become involved in
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    public affairs. Uh so it's the task of u
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    the what he called the cool observers
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    meaning us smart guys. It's our task to
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    impose necessary illusions and
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    emotionally potent
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    oversimplifications to keep these poor
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    simpleans on course. Uh and it would be
  • 00:03:47
    kind of unfair to let ordinary people to
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    let the democratic process really work.
  • 00:03:53
    If you really let ordinary people make
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    decisions or, you know, think about
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    things or whatever, they don't get in
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    trouble. Uh it's like letting a
  • 00:04:02
    three-year-old cross the street. You
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    know, it's it's for the interests of the
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    three-year-old that you constrain them.
  • 00:04:08
    Uh and similarly, it's to the interests
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    of the general public that you
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    marginalize them and ensure that the
  • 00:04:13
    formal political system has not very
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    much substance. Uh because it's only the
  • 00:04:19
    smart guys, the cool observers uh who uh
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    are who uh have the capacity to make the
  • 00:04:26
    right decisions. And those now it turns
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    out that the cool observers who are in a
  • 00:04:30
    position to make the right decisions are
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    those who serve the interests of private
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    power. Uh other cool observers are not
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    cool observers because they have the
  • 00:04:39
    wrong decisions. He didn't bother
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    mentioning that part. Uh and and that's
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    a very typical view. It's not just his
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    view. In fact, it's probably the
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    dominant view. So for example, the uh
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    the book that I co-authored right before
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    this one is called manufacturing consent
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    which borrows a phrase from Walder
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    Lipman. It's a sort of dean of American
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    journalists and major foreign policy
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    critic. Uh and his view sort of the same
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    was that you have to that's a it's
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    crucial part of democracy he said is the
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    manufacturer of consent.
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    the population he referred to as the
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    bewildered herd and he said we have to
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    save ourselves from the rage and
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    trampling of the bewildered herd. Uh and
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    since unfortunately you can't do it by
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    force you have to do it by other means
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    uh the other means would be the
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    manufacturer of consent uh the United
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    States the public relations industry in
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    the United States which goes back to the
  • 00:05:33
    early part of the century is dedicated
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    to that. It's a that's a pure business
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    operation and they're dedicated to it.
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    Everything from you know advertising to
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    other mechanisms of influence in which
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    they openly call and there are more
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    honest days they openly call propaganda
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    and the same is true of much of the
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    intellectual class. U it's uh it's recog
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    the more sophisticated people recognize
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    that their job is thought control and
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    they have they argue that it's the right
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    thing because the bewildered herd will
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    only get into trouble if you let them
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    rage on by themselves. You'll notice of
  • 00:06:08
    course the close similarity to Leninist
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    ideology to bulcheism which also assumes
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    that the radical intellectuals are the
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    specialized class, the vanguard. They've
  • 00:06:18
    got to lead the stupid and ignorant
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    masses to a better society. In fact, the
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    two conceptions are very much alike. I
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    think that's probably one of the reasons
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    why there's been historically such an
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    easy transition from one to another. the
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    move from being a Leninist enthusiast to
  • 00:06:35
    a you know a passionate supporter
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    of state capitalism and you know working
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    for American Ames that takes place
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    overnight it's been going on for years
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    uh it's called the god that failed
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    transition uh and it happens very simply
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    and the transition is very easy I think
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    because there isn't much of a difference
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    in ideological change uh it's just a
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    matter of where you think power lies if
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    you think there's going going to be a
  • 00:07:02
    popular revolution and you can ride that
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    revolution to state power and then wield
  • 00:07:07
    the whip over the masses, you're a
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    Leninist enthusiast. If you see that
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    that's not going to happen and power
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    lies in the state capitalist
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    institutions which you have to serve as
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    a manager, an ideological manager, you
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    do that. But it's basically a very
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    similar position. And in fact uh in the
  • 00:07:23
    last century or so since there's been a
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    more or less identifiable secular
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    intelligencia
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    uh I think you find typically that they
  • 00:07:32
    fall into one or the other of these two
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    categories. They associate themselves
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    with one or the other system of power
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    and hierarchy uh and subordination. Uh
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    in fact what I just said is almost a
  • 00:07:46
    tautology. It's only if you submit to
  • 00:07:48
    those systems that you're counted as a
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    respectable intellectual for obvious
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    reasons. Well, coming up to more modern
  • 00:07:54
    times in the postc world war period, uh
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    car you find again deep concern over the
  • 00:08:01
    need to control and deceive the public
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    to control the public mind. uh
  • 00:08:06
    presidential historian Thomas Bailey
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    wrote in 1948 at the time when we were
  • 00:08:11
    sort of setting off on a new war, the
  • 00:08:13
    Cold War, he wrote, "Because the masses
  • 00:08:16
    are notoriously shortsighted and
  • 00:08:18
    generally cannot see danger until it's
  • 00:08:20
    at their throats, our statesmen are
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    forced to deceive them into an awareness
  • 00:08:25
    of their own long run interests.
  • 00:08:27
    deception of the people may in fact
  • 00:08:29
    become increasingly necessary unless
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    we're willing to give our leaders in
  • 00:08:33
    Washington a freer hand. And uh in 1981
  • 00:08:38
    as the United States was launching a new
  • 00:08:40
    crusade for freedom uh Samuel Huntington
  • 00:08:43
    the professor of government at Harvard
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    uh said in a private but published
  • 00:08:50
    discussion interchange you may have to
  • 00:08:52
    sell intervention or other military
  • 00:08:54
    action in such a way as to create the
  • 00:08:57
    misimpression that it is the Soviet
  • 00:08:59
    Union that you're fighting. That's what
  • 00:09:01
    the United States has been doing ever
  • 00:09:03
    since the Truman doctrine. which is
  • 00:09:05
    quite accurate and gives a certain
  • 00:09:07
    insight into the nature of the cold war
  • 00:09:10
    in particular into the nature of the war
  • 00:09:12
    against Nicaragua which is what he
  • 00:09:13
    specifically had in mind. Well, these
  • 00:09:16
    concerns over uh controlling the public
  • 00:09:19
    mind tend to rise to the surface
  • 00:09:22
    particularly uh after periods of wars
  • 00:09:25
    and turmoil like the 17th century
  • 00:09:28
    revolution, the civil war or like the
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    first world war when Woodro Wilson
  • 00:09:33
    launched the major red scare which is
  • 00:09:36
    the major example in modern American
  • 00:09:39
    history all of American history of state
  • 00:09:42
    repression that was really large scale
  • 00:09:43
    and effective in destroying unions and
  • 00:09:46
    uh uh destroying independent politics
  • 00:09:49
    and eliminating independent thought and
  • 00:09:52
    so on. And the same thing happened after
  • 00:09:54
    World War II uh with the u phenomenon
  • 00:09:58
    that's mislabeled McCarthyism. It's
  • 00:10:01
    mislabeled because it was actually
  • 00:10:02
    initiated by the liberal democrats in
  • 00:10:05
    the late 1940s. McCarthy just came along
  • 00:10:07
    at the tail end of it and vulgarized it
  • 00:10:10
    a little. Uh the reason for this is and
  • 00:10:13
    uh is that um periods of wars and
  • 00:10:16
    turmoil have a tendency to uh arouse
  • 00:10:20
    people from apathy and to make them
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    think and to make them organize often.
  • 00:10:25
    So that's why you get things like the
  • 00:10:26
    red scare and McCarthyism uh right after
  • 00:10:29
    periods of war and turmoil. And the same
  • 00:10:31
    thing happened after the Vietnam war
  • 00:10:33
    which had the same effect. uh after the
  • 00:10:35
    Vietnam war uh elites were concerned
  • 00:10:38
    about what they called a crisis of
  • 00:10:40
    democracy. In fact, one of the most
  • 00:10:42
    interesting books on this topic or one
  • 00:10:44
    of the most interesting books on most of
  • 00:10:46
    the insightful books I think on modern
  • 00:10:48
    uh on the modern democratic system is
  • 00:10:51
    called the crisis of democracy. It's a
  • 00:10:53
    study the only booklength study
  • 00:10:55
    published by the trilateral commission.
  • 00:10:58
    uh it's an important group put together
  • 00:10:59
    by David Rockefeller in
  • 00:11:01
    1973 and it represents the more or less
  • 00:11:04
    liberal internationalists from the three
  • 00:11:08
    major centers of modern capitalism
  • 00:11:10
    United States, Western Europe and Japan,
  • 00:11:13
    hence trilateral. And remember this is
  • 00:11:15
    the liberals. This is the group out of
  • 00:11:17
    which Jimmy Carter and most of his
  • 00:11:19
    administration came. Uh the c what's the
  • 00:11:22
    crisis of democracy that they're
  • 00:11:24
    concerned with in all of the democratic
  • 00:11:26
    societies? Well, the crisis is that uh
  • 00:11:29
    during the
  • 00:11:30
    1960s, large groups of people who are
  • 00:11:33
    normally passive and apathetic began to
  • 00:11:36
    try to enter the political arena to
  • 00:11:37
    press their demands. Uh and that's a
  • 00:11:40
    crisis which has to be overcome. The
  • 00:11:42
    naive might call that democracy, but
  • 00:11:44
    that's because they don't understand,
  • 00:11:45
    the sophisticated understand that that's
  • 00:11:47
    a crisis of democracy. Uh the American
  • 00:11:51
    spokesman again Samuel Huntington uh
  • 00:11:54
    wrote in his report that Harry Truman
  • 00:11:57
    had been able to govern the country with
  • 00:11:59
    the cooperation of a relatively small
  • 00:12:01
    number of Wall Street lawyers and
  • 00:12:03
    bankers. In those days there was no
  • 00:12:05
    crisis of democracy. Things were working
  • 00:12:07
    just right. But in the 1960s you got all
  • 00:12:10
    this turmoil. I mean young people and
  • 00:12:12
    women and you know labor. I mean all
  • 00:12:15
    kinds of weird people who were supposed
  • 00:12:16
    to be sitting quietly in the corners
  • 00:12:19
    began to get involved and caused this
  • 00:12:21
    crisis. I mean the same crisis that
  • 00:12:23
    arose in the 17th century and that
  • 00:12:25
    repeatedly arises uh when people begin
  • 00:12:28
    to try to take advantage of the uh uh
  • 00:12:31
    formal opportunities that exist. Uh
  • 00:12:35
    among the terrible things that were
  • 00:12:36
    happening during the 60s causing this
  • 00:12:38
    crisis they said was that you had this
  • 00:12:40
    group of people who they called
  • 00:12:41
    valueoriented intellectuals. uh people
  • 00:12:44
    who are concerned with things like truth
  • 00:12:46
    and justice and all that sort of
  • 00:12:47
    nonsense. Uh and they're opposed to the
  • 00:12:50
    good guys, the technocratic and policy
  • 00:12:52
    oriented intellectuals. They called them
  • 00:12:54
    the commaars, the ones who just do the
  • 00:12:57
    job, you know, which had these
  • 00:12:58
    valueoriented intellectuals and they
  • 00:13:00
    were doing all sorts of horrible things
  • 00:13:02
    like uh under delegitimizing the
  • 00:13:06
    institutions that are responsible for
  • 00:13:07
    the indoctrination of the young like
  • 00:13:10
    schools and universities. Remember this
  • 00:13:12
    is an internal discussion so they kind
  • 00:13:14
    of let their hair down. Uh their general
  • 00:13:17
    proposal at the end of all of this these
  • 00:13:19
    lengthy and thoughtful discussions was
  • 00:13:21
    that what we need is more moderation in
  • 00:13:23
    democracy to mitigate the excess of
  • 00:13:26
    democracy and to overcome the crisis. Uh
  • 00:13:29
    in plain terms, what that means is that
  • 00:13:31
    the public has to be reduced to their
  • 00:13:33
    proper state of apathy and obedience and
  • 00:13:36
    driven from the public arena if
  • 00:13:38
    democracy is to survive and the
  • 00:13:40
    appropriate sense with the specialized
  • 00:13:43
    class, you know, the cool observers, us
  • 00:13:45
    smart guys, u the technocratic and
  • 00:13:48
    policy oriented intellectuals doing our
  • 00:13:50
    job in the interests of the people who
  • 00:13:52
    have real power. Uh that's the liberal
  • 00:13:54
    side. I won't go into what the
  • 00:13:57
    reactionary side says about the matter.
  • 00:14:00
    The most prominent modern American
  • 00:14:03
    political scientist Harold Lasswell
  • 00:14:05
    who's a leading figure in communications
  • 00:14:08
    and such things uh he wrote the article
  • 00:14:11
    on propaganda in the international
  • 00:14:13
    encyclopedia of social sciences which
  • 00:14:15
    was published in 1933.
  • 00:14:18
    uh and in it he says that we should not
  • 00:14:20
    succumb to democratic dogmatisms about
  • 00:14:23
    men being the best judges of their own
  • 00:14:25
    interests. They are not. The best judges
  • 00:14:29
    are the elites, us smart guys, the cool
  • 00:14:32
    observers. And we must therefore be
  • 00:14:34
    insured the means to impose our will for
  • 00:14:38
    the common good. Of course, this he said
  • 00:14:40
    will require a whole tech new technique
  • 00:14:43
    of control largely through propaganda
  • 00:14:45
    because of the ignorance and
  • 00:14:47
    superstition of the masses. Same theme
  • 00:14:49
    all the way through. Uh the basic
  • 00:14:53
    problem is this. Uh the idea is that if
  • 00:14:56
    you have a society in which the voice of
  • 00:14:58
    the people is heard, you got to make
  • 00:15:00
    sure that that voice says the right
  • 00:15:01
    thing. In totalitarian societies, it's
  • 00:15:04
    not a big problem. You you got a club in
  • 00:15:07
    your hand. uh and if people don't behave
  • 00:15:09
    the right way, you hit them with a club
  • 00:15:10
    or threaten them with it. So it doesn't
  • 00:15:12
    really matter much what they think. What
  • 00:15:14
    matters is what they do and that you
  • 00:15:16
    control by force. But as the capacity of
  • 00:15:19
    the state to control by force erodess,
  • 00:15:22
    it's necessary to control what people
  • 00:15:24
    think. And in fact, I think you find
  • 00:15:26
    much more sophisticated concern uh for
  • 00:15:29
    thought control precisely as the society
  • 00:15:32
    becomes more free. I don't think it's
  • 00:15:35
    surprising that the sophisticated
  • 00:15:37
    discussion uh things like the public
  • 00:15:39
    relations industry and the academic u
  • 00:15:43
    side of it and you know the journalistic
  • 00:15:45
    side and all the kinds of things I've
  • 00:15:47
    been sampling uh I suspect if one did a
  • 00:15:49
    comparative study you'd find that they
  • 00:15:51
    develop primarily in relatively free
  • 00:15:53
    societies. Ours is a very free society
  • 00:15:56
    in the sense that the state has by
  • 00:15:58
    comparative standards very limited
  • 00:16:00
    resources to control by force and I
  • 00:16:03
    think it's undoubtedly in fact the most
  • 00:16:05
    sophisticated in the terms of in the
  • 00:16:08
    reliance on techniques of indoctrination
  • 00:16:10
    and control public relations industry in
  • 00:16:12
    particular as a an American creation
Tags
  • thought control
  • democracy
  • elite influence
  • propaganda
  • public opinion
  • indoctrination
  • historical examples
  • crisis of democracy
  • public relations
  • intellectuals