Scott Horton: Provoked - How Washington Started the New Cold War

00:57:34
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B7J5oIhomp4

Ringkasan

TLDRIn this discussion, Scott Horton elaborates on his book "Provoked," which critiques the prevailing narrative that the war in Ukraine was unprovoked. He argues that U.S. foreign policy, particularly NATO expansion and military actions, significantly contributed to escalating tensions with Russia. Horton emphasizes the importance of understanding the historical context of U.S.-Russia relations and how American actions have shaped the current conflict. He advocates for a more nuanced approach to negotiations, suggesting that recognizing the U.S.'s role in provoking the war is crucial for finding a path to peace. Horton also discusses the consequences of the war for Ukraine, highlighting the tragedy of loss and destruction that could have been avoided with different diplomatic choices.

Takeaways

  • 📚 Scott Horton's book "Provoked" critiques the narrative of an unprovoked war.
  • 🗣️ The U.S. foreign policy played a significant role in escalating tensions with Russia.
  • 🔍 Understanding historical context is crucial for peace negotiations.
  • 🤝 Horton advocates for recognizing the U.S.'s role in provoking the conflict.
  • ⚔️ The war has led to significant loss and destruction for Ukraine.
  • 📈 Interoperability refers to Ukraine's military integration with NATO forces.
  • 🕊️ Acknowledging past mistakes is essential for a peaceful resolution.
  • 💡 Horton emphasizes the need for long-term strategic thinking in U.S.-Russia relations.
  • 📉 The consequences of the war could have been avoided with different diplomatic choices.
  • 🌍 U.S.-Russia relations are crucial for global stability.

Garis waktu

  • 00:00:00 - 00:05:00

    The discussion begins with an introduction of Scott Horton, a libertarian critic of US foreign policy, and his book titled 'Provoked', which argues that the war in Ukraine was provoked by US actions rather than being unprovoked as commonly claimed. Horton emphasizes the importance of recognizing the role of the US in the conflict to understand the situation better.

  • 00:05:00 - 00:10:00

    Horton explains that the title 'Provoked' is a direct contradiction to the narrative that the war was unprovoked. He argues that the US has played a significant role in escalating tensions with Russia, and he aims to highlight this in his book by referencing the words of foreign policy experts and officials who warned against certain actions that led to the current conflict.

  • 00:10:00 - 00:15:00

    The conversation touches on the consequences of labeling the war as unprovoked, as it eliminates the possibility of finding a reasonable compromise. Horton argues that acknowledging the provocation could lead to a more constructive dialogue and potential solutions to the conflict.

  • 00:15:00 - 00:20:00

    Horton discusses the historical context of US-Russia relations, starting from the end of the Cold War. He highlights the failures of US foreign policy, particularly regarding NATO expansion and the lack of support for Russia's transition to capitalism, which contributed to the current tensions.

  • 00:20:00 - 00:25:00

    The discussion continues with Horton detailing how the US has consistently ignored warnings from experts about the potential consequences of its actions, particularly regarding NATO expansion and military interventions in Eastern Europe.

  • 00:25:00 - 00:30:00

    Horton emphasizes the importance of understanding the incremental nature of NATO's expansion and how it has been perceived as a threat by Russia. He argues that the US's approach has been characterized by a lack of foresight and a disregard for Russia's security concerns.

  • 00:30:00 - 00:35:00

    The conversation shifts to the role of key political figures in shaping US foreign policy towards Russia, particularly Joe Biden and his administration. Horton critiques their approach and the lack of a coherent strategy to address the escalating tensions with Russia.

  • 00:35:00 - 00:40:00

    Horton discusses the missed opportunities for negotiation and compromise, particularly in the lead-up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. He argues that the US could have taken steps to prevent the war by engaging in good faith negotiations with Russia.

  • 00:40:00 - 00:45:00

    The discussion highlights the consequences of the US's aggressive stance towards Russia, including the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the humanitarian crisis resulting from the war. Horton stresses the need for a reevaluation of US foreign policy to avoid further escalation.

  • 00:45:00 - 00:50:00

    Horton concludes by emphasizing the importance of fostering a cooperative relationship between the US and Russia to prevent future conflicts. He argues that the current trajectory is dangerous and could lead to catastrophic consequences for both nations and the world.

  • 00:50:00 - 00:57:34

    The conversation wraps up with a call to action for listeners to read Horton's book 'Provoked' for a deeper understanding of the issues discussed and the historical context of US-Russia relations.

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Video Tanya Jawab

  • What is the main argument of Scott Horton's book "Provoked"?

    The book argues that the war in Ukraine was provoked by U.S. foreign policy, particularly NATO expansion and military actions.

  • Why does Horton believe the narrative of an unprovoked war is problematic?

    He believes it prevents reasonable discussions and compromises necessary for peace, as it ignores the historical context and U.S. actions that contributed to the conflict.

  • What role does Horton attribute to U.S. foreign policy in the Ukraine conflict?

    He attributes a significant role to U.S. foreign policy decisions, including NATO expansion and military provocations, in escalating tensions with Russia.

  • How does Horton suggest the U.S. could have approached the situation differently?

    He suggests that the U.S. could have engaged in honest negotiations with Russia to address security concerns and prevent the war.

  • What does Horton say about the consequences of the war for Ukraine?

    He describes the war as a tragedy for Ukraine, leading to significant loss of life and territory, and argues that it could have been avoided.

  • What does Horton mean by 'interoperability' in the context of NATO and Ukraine?

    Interoperability refers to the integration of Ukraine's military with NATO forces, which Russia perceives as a threat, even without formal NATO membership.

  • What does Horton believe about the future of U.S.-Russia relations?

    He believes that the relationship is crucial for global stability and that efforts should be made to foster cooperation rather than enmity.

  • What historical events does Horton link to the current conflict?

    He links the conflict to NATO expansion post-Cold War, U.S. military interventions, and the failure to negotiate effectively with Russia.

  • How does Horton view the role of American political leaders in the escalation of the conflict?

    He criticizes American political leaders for prioritizing short-term political gains over long-term strategic thinking regarding U.S.-Russia relations.

  • What does Horton suggest is necessary for a peaceful resolution to the conflict?

    He suggests that acknowledging the U.S.'s role in provoking the conflict is essential for finding a reasonable compromise and achieving peace.

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Gulir Otomatis:
  • 00:00:00
    Hi everyone and welcome. We are joined
  • 00:00:02
    today by Scott Horton, a renowned author
  • 00:00:06
    and a libertarian critic of US foreign
  • 00:00:10
    policy. So yeah, welcome to the program.
  • 00:00:12
    It's yeah, great privilege to finally
  • 00:00:14
    have you on. Well, thank you very much
  • 00:00:17
    for having me and likewise as well. It's
  • 00:00:18
    great to be with you here.
  • 00:00:20
    So, uh, your most recent book is called,
  • 00:00:24
    uh, Provoked, uh, how Washington started
  • 00:00:27
    a new cold war with Russia and, uh, the
  • 00:00:30
    catastrophe in Ukraine. And I thought
  • 00:00:33
    this was a great title provoked uh,
  • 00:00:36
    because um, well, if if one would go to
  • 00:00:40
    the look at the narratives around this
  • 00:00:42
    war and all the premise is built on,
  • 00:00:45
    it's the notion that the war was
  • 00:00:47
    unprovoked. And uh this seems to be also
  • 00:00:50
    at the heart of the war propaganda we
  • 00:00:52
    see uh within the west. And uh as long
  • 00:00:56
    as people buy into the premise that the
  • 00:00:58
    war was unprovoked uh it kind of shapes
  • 00:01:01
    all opinions and conclusions and
  • 00:01:03
    policies which should follow. So I
  • 00:01:06
    thought this really struck to the heart
  • 00:01:08
    of it. Uh yeah provoked but I was
  • 00:01:10
    wondering if you perhaps can explain or
  • 00:01:14
    yeah the title or elaborate some on the
  • 00:01:16
    thoughts. Sure. Yes. Mhm. Well, okay.
  • 00:01:20
    So, just first thing for for any honest
  • 00:01:22
    critic out there who doesn't know me, uh
  • 00:01:25
    the title of the book is not justified,
  • 00:01:28
    right? The title of the book is provoked
  • 00:01:30
    because it's a direct contradiction of
  • 00:01:32
    the claim of the war party at the time
  • 00:01:34
    in and outside of government as you just
  • 00:01:36
    said that this war was unprovoked. And
  • 00:01:38
    for people, if you go back and remember
  • 00:01:40
    three years ago, this was a real mantra.
  • 00:01:43
    This was the propaganda scop of the
  • 00:01:45
    moment. They said it a 100,000 times in
  • 00:01:47
    a row. Unprovoked attack. Unprovoked
  • 00:01:49
    attack. Unprovoked attack. The point
  • 00:01:51
    being to try to just beat you over the
  • 00:01:54
    head. And to me is counterproductive to
  • 00:01:56
    me. It's so obvious. Like, well, why do
  • 00:01:58
    you protest so much? Like, what role
  • 00:02:01
    might the most powerful
  • 00:02:04
    uh country in history have played in all
  • 00:02:06
    of this, you know? Um, and so it's the
  • 00:02:09
    obvious thing. And in fact, when I was
  • 00:02:11
    writing it, it took me forever. I didn't
  • 00:02:14
    get it done until last November and I
  • 00:02:16
    was terrified that somebody else was
  • 00:02:18
    going to beat me to the punch and
  • 00:02:19
    publish a book with the same title
  • 00:02:21
    because it's the most obvious and
  • 00:02:23
    awesome title for a book about what
  • 00:02:25
    happened here and which is not as the
  • 00:02:28
    critics say to deny the agency of
  • 00:02:30
    Vladimir Putin and his men for all of
  • 00:02:33
    the things that they have done. They're
  • 00:02:34
    over 18 years old. They're responsible
  • 00:02:36
    for their actions. That's not the point
  • 00:02:38
    here. But the question is, what role did
  • 00:02:42
    America play in helping to cause this to
  • 00:02:45
    happen? And the answer is a hell of a
  • 00:02:48
    big one. And the way I demonstrated in
  • 00:02:51
    the book is through the words and the
  • 00:02:54
    the criticisms not of people on the
  • 00:02:57
    outside, but of the foreign policy
  • 00:02:59
    establishment and its leaders themselves
  • 00:03:02
    all the way through inside and outside
  • 00:03:03
    the administration at the biggest think
  • 00:03:05
    tank saying, "Boy, we better not do this
  • 00:03:08
    stupid thing we're about to do or it's
  • 00:03:09
    going to lead to these terrible
  • 00:03:10
    consequences that we can easily
  • 00:03:12
    predict." And then they keep doing it
  • 00:03:13
    again and again and again since the end
  • 00:03:15
    of the last cold war. And in my eyes,
  • 00:03:19
    it's a clear path from the the hubris of
  • 00:03:22
    the defense planning guidance and the
  • 00:03:24
    unipolar world order doctrine of the
  • 00:03:26
    neoconservatives at the end of Iraq War
  • 00:03:29
    I to the war in Ukraine today.
  • 00:03:33
    Yeah, like you said, uh it was the
  • 00:03:35
    book's called Provoked, not justified
  • 00:03:37
    because this is another I thought it was
  • 00:03:39
    very clever by building the the whole
  • 00:03:43
    war narrative around the notion that
  • 00:03:44
    this was unprovoked because any descent
  • 00:03:48
    then of saying it is provoked can be
  • 00:03:51
    people can then you know label it, oh
  • 00:03:54
    it's an effort to justify it instead.
  • 00:03:56
    And this is because as you said, what's
  • 00:03:59
    important here is that when they deny
  • 00:04:01
    that there was any uh antecedants that
  • 00:04:04
    are worth mentioning, it precludes the
  • 00:04:07
    possibility of moving forward on a
  • 00:04:10
    reasonable basis. If the first premise
  • 00:04:12
    of the whole war from the West's point
  • 00:04:14
    of view is a damn lie, well, how are you
  • 00:04:16
    ever supposed to figure out a proper
  • 00:04:18
    compromise when it comes down to trying
  • 00:04:20
    to solve the thing? And so, it's a it's
  • 00:04:23
    a big deal, right? It's not an academic
  • 00:04:25
    exercise here. If this is pure naked
  • 00:04:28
    aggression by the Russians, it's a lot
  • 00:04:30
    easier to argue that, well, we better
  • 00:04:32
    just help our friends defend themselves.
  • 00:04:34
    But gez, if this is kind of all the
  • 00:04:36
    Democrats fault in the first place,
  • 00:04:38
    maybe there's a way that we can come to
  • 00:04:40
    an accommodation here, accept a little
  • 00:04:42
    bit of responsibility for our role in
  • 00:04:44
    the thing, and find a way to come to a
  • 00:04:47
    peaceful arrangement. If we had had a
  • 00:04:49
    honest premise for the thing, we could
  • 00:04:51
    have figured out a way. it would have
  • 00:04:52
    been much easier at least to to
  • 00:04:54
    negotiate an end to the war.
  • 00:04:57
    Yeah. No, I think this is one of the
  • 00:04:59
    consequences by banning or criminalizing
  • 00:05:02
    the argument that this was provoked as
  • 00:05:05
    an effort to justify what the Russia has
  • 00:05:07
    done. Uh yeah, we we remove all pathways
  • 00:05:10
    to a peaceful solution because as you
  • 00:05:12
    say, if it was unprovoked, you have to
  • 00:05:14
    just send weapons and you know, you
  • 00:05:16
    can't reward it. But uh uh but that's
  • 00:05:19
    how we ended up in this position where
  • 00:05:21
    negotiations become a peacement and uh
  • 00:05:23
    the only path to peace is more war or
  • 00:05:26
    weapons as NATO secretary general
  • 00:05:28
    Stolberg suggested. But uh yeah, this is
  • 00:05:31
    the I think the irony of the people who
  • 00:05:33
    argue that they're taking the side of
  • 00:05:34
    Ukraine. They removed all possible paths
  • 00:05:38
    to peace and the only ways to continue
  • 00:05:41
    to ask the Ukrainians to fight in the
  • 00:05:43
    war they can't win. So they have ensured
  • 00:05:45
    Ukraine's destruction by insisting that
  • 00:05:49
    uh it was unprovoked simply because well
  • 00:05:52
    there's no other solutions anymore. But
  • 00:05:54
    uh in terms of provocation though when
  • 00:05:57
    you go back as you said to the yeah
  • 00:06:01
    beginning of the postcold war era so
  • 00:06:03
    with the first Iraq war how do you why
  • 00:06:07
    do you start at this point to look at
  • 00:06:09
    the provocations
  • 00:06:11
    uh towards Russia?
  • 00:06:13
    Well, so like just a little bit of
  • 00:06:15
    background basically for me is what I
  • 00:06:16
    mostly am rather than an author is an
  • 00:06:18
    interview host and I've done 6,000
  • 00:06:21
    interviews over the years and basically
  • 00:06:23
    my my um comparative advantage there was
  • 00:06:27
    I worked for anti-war.com. I was the
  • 00:06:29
    editor and you know completely immersed
  • 00:06:32
    in the stuff. So for an interviewer I
  • 00:06:34
    knew a lot of stuff where interviewers
  • 00:06:36
    usually don't know that much. They're
  • 00:06:37
    just interviewers were so that was kind
  • 00:06:38
    of what I was doing for a very long
  • 00:06:40
    time. And then after many years of this,
  • 00:06:43
    it turned out that actually what I've
  • 00:06:46
    been working on in the case of the
  • 00:06:48
    Middle East and in the case of Eastern
  • 00:06:49
    Europe is building my own timeline in my
  • 00:06:53
    head of essentially trying to fill in
  • 00:06:56
    enough of the gaps in the story of the
  • 00:06:58
    cause and effect through the years to
  • 00:07:01
    where I think I really do have a
  • 00:07:02
    coherent story here. And that was so
  • 00:07:04
    that was what came out in my book on the
  • 00:07:06
    Middle East is sort of Jimmy Carter
  • 00:07:08
    through Donald Trump. here's how every
  • 00:07:10
    stupid thing caused the next stupid
  • 00:07:12
    thing and all the way through and then
  • 00:07:14
    so when it came to the Eastern European
  • 00:07:17
    story it's basically the same thing. I
  • 00:07:18
    had a pretty good, you know, checklist
  • 00:07:21
    in my head of all of the things that HW
  • 00:07:23
    Bush and Bill Clinton and W. Bush and
  • 00:07:26
    Obama and Trump's government, at least
  • 00:07:28
    the last time, if not him, had done to
  • 00:07:30
    causes and of course Joe Biden had done
  • 00:07:32
    to make matters worse. And I know a lot
  • 00:07:35
    of experts who and a lot of whom like
  • 00:07:38
    yourself and John Mirshimer and and
  • 00:07:40
    Jeffrey Sachs and others know a lot more
  • 00:07:43
    than me certainly and especially about
  • 00:07:46
    certain parts of the story. But I
  • 00:07:48
    thought I have a pretty good 30,000 foot
  • 00:07:51
    view here of more or less what everybody
  • 00:07:54
    did on this side of the story to blunder
  • 00:07:58
    into this thing. And so that was
  • 00:08:00
    essentially what I decided no one else
  • 00:08:02
    was going to tell. I wanted to tell it
  • 00:08:03
    from the end of the last cold war. I
  • 00:08:06
    knew already the story of the promises
  • 00:08:08
    not to expand NATO. And in fact, as Bush
  • 00:08:10
    Senior said, to not take advantage at
  • 00:08:12
    all of the Soviet retreat from Eastern
  • 00:08:15
    Europe. So long as you guys will do the
  • 00:08:16
    right thing, we promise not to push our
  • 00:08:19
    luck and and be a jerk about uh taking
  • 00:08:21
    and take advantage of our victory here.
  • 00:08:23
    And that was in Malta in '89 before
  • 00:08:25
    James Baker ever made a single promise.
  • 00:08:27
    And I know and I'm sure your viewers are
  • 00:08:29
    well aware that the war party likes to
  • 00:08:32
    say they've debunked this and that these
  • 00:08:34
    promises were never made or they never
  • 00:08:35
    were agreements or none of it ever
  • 00:08:37
    mattered. Well, I've rebunked it.
  • 00:08:38
    they're completely wrong and I beat that
  • 00:08:40
    dead horse beyond any reason and
  • 00:08:42
    explaining exactly what those promises
  • 00:08:44
    were and and how the withdrawal from
  • 00:08:47
    East Germany especially was based on
  • 00:08:49
    them uh and and for the rest of the
  • 00:08:51
    time. And then there's the um it's not
  • 00:08:56
    directly related, but it's it's in the
  • 00:08:58
    spirit of the whole thing is the
  • 00:09:00
    catastrophe of the shock therapy policy,
  • 00:09:02
    which I won't get into the arguments uh
  • 00:09:05
    all about it, but that was a huge part
  • 00:09:06
    of it was how America did not do a very
  • 00:09:09
    dang good job of helping Russia
  • 00:09:11
    transform from communism to capitalism
  • 00:09:14
    and really, you know, made things much
  • 00:09:16
    worse for many people. Um, and then the
  • 00:09:18
    Balkan wars were of course at the
  • 00:09:20
    expense of the Russians close friends
  • 00:09:22
    and allies and ethnic and religious kin,
  • 00:09:25
    the Serbs in the Balkans, and over their
  • 00:09:27
    dead body and over their helplessness to
  • 00:09:30
    prevent it and in large measure to
  • 00:09:32
    establish the dominance to reestablish
  • 00:09:35
    the dominance of America as the primary
  • 00:09:39
    security force in Europe. And u so that
  • 00:09:42
    was a huge part of all of that. And Bill
  • 00:09:44
    Clinton and on the NATO expansion,
  • 00:09:47
    the Bush government and Bush senior that
  • 00:09:49
    is and um Bill Clinton both essentially
  • 00:09:53
    lied to the Soviets and then the
  • 00:09:56
    Russians that look, we're not going to
  • 00:09:59
    expand NATO and even if we did, it
  • 00:10:00
    wouldn't matter because NATO is now
  • 00:10:02
    going to be more of a political
  • 00:10:04
    organization. They were selling it like
  • 00:10:05
    it would be the EU plus the United
  • 00:10:07
    States basically that it would be more
  • 00:10:09
    political and economic and this and that
  • 00:10:11
    because hey we don't need an alliance
  • 00:10:14
    because there are no enemies. So what
  • 00:10:15
    we're going to do is we're going to
  • 00:10:16
    replace the alliance with a partnership
  • 00:10:19
    and first they sold it as the CSCE which
  • 00:10:23
    was basically the OCE but it was used to
  • 00:10:25
    just be called a conference which
  • 00:10:26
    already existed in which all the Eastern
  • 00:10:28
    European states were already members of
  • 00:10:30
    and they said we're going to make this
  • 00:10:31
    the principal security organization.
  • 00:10:33
    That way for example Ukraine and the
  • 00:10:36
    Baltic states and anybody in controversy
  • 00:10:38
    here their neutrality is baked in. They
  • 00:10:40
    and Russia and everybody are already
  • 00:10:42
    part of it together with us and our
  • 00:10:43
    Western European friends from the
  • 00:10:45
    get-go. And so there's nothing to fight
  • 00:10:47
    about there. And the Clinton's Clinton
  • 00:10:49
    administration pushed the same kind of
  • 00:10:51
    propaganda under the Partnership for
  • 00:10:53
    Peace, the PFP, which still exists, but
  • 00:10:55
    it exists really as a halfway house to
  • 00:10:58
    NATO membership, but they sold it as the
  • 00:11:01
    alternative to NATO expansion and
  • 00:11:04
    essentially just to put the Russians at
  • 00:11:05
    ease as they took advantage. But they
  • 00:11:08
    knew they were lying all the time. And I
  • 00:11:10
    show people that say, "Oh, Russian
  • 00:11:11
    talking points." All this stuff comes
  • 00:11:13
    from US government documents, national
  • 00:11:17
    security advisors memo to the boss.
  • 00:11:20
    Like, sorry, I don't know what to tell
  • 00:11:21
    you, but I have it in their own words.
  • 00:11:23
    It's all the national security archive.
  • 00:11:24
    I just spent the time really digging
  • 00:11:26
    through that stuff at George Washington
  • 00:11:27
    University. So much of this stuff has
  • 00:11:29
    been declassified. and I just took my
  • 00:11:31
    time and and and I have a grudge. So, I
  • 00:11:34
    went and showed all the worst stuff I
  • 00:11:35
    could find in there about just how
  • 00:11:37
    disingenuous uh all these people are.
  • 00:11:39
    And and I'm not taking original credit
  • 00:11:41
    for that. I think Joshua Shiffren, the
  • 00:11:43
    great scholar from Texas A&M, who's now
  • 00:11:45
    at KO, he's the one who it was really in
  • 00:11:48
    his um journal articles that I read
  • 00:11:50
    where he is the one who really
  • 00:11:51
    demonstrated that, hey man, this isn't
  • 00:11:54
    just a matter of changing their mind.
  • 00:11:56
    This is a matter of leading the Russians
  • 00:11:58
    to believe one thing while in fact we
  • 00:12:00
    were planning to do something else at
  • 00:12:01
    their expense over the long term. And
  • 00:12:03
    then the Democrats and the Republicans
  • 00:12:06
    and so many of them said all along and
  • 00:12:07
    the grand strategist said listen we know
  • 00:12:10
    this going to this kind of thing
  • 00:12:11
    especially NATO expansion is going to
  • 00:12:13
    provoke a reaction from the Russians but
  • 00:12:17
    hey at least there's NATO. That was the
  • 00:12:19
    way Maline Albbright put it. if
  • 00:12:21
    expanding our military alliance causes
  • 00:12:23
    them to want to fight us, well, we have
  • 00:12:25
    a bigger alliance than ever to fight
  • 00:12:26
    them with, so who cares? And it was
  • 00:12:29
    essentially, I wouldn't even call it,
  • 00:12:31
    from what I can tell, I don't really see
  • 00:12:33
    like a seething hatred of the Russians
  • 00:12:35
    as much as just a total disdain for them
  • 00:12:37
    and and lack of regard for them.
  • 00:12:41
    Essentially paraphrasing over and over
  • 00:12:43
    again, yeah, what are they going to do
  • 00:12:45
    about it? Right? Like America's just the
  • 00:12:47
    bully on the playground. we already
  • 00:12:49
    proved that we can punch them in the
  • 00:12:51
    stomach and they won't get up so we can
  • 00:12:53
    just keep doing that and and and then
  • 00:12:56
    they criticize each other and themselves
  • 00:12:58
    for that attitude too but then they
  • 00:13:01
    continue acting that way.
  • 00:13:04
    Yeah. Another uh an important thing if
  • 00:13:06
    you want to shape a narrative around the
  • 00:13:08
    war is uh pick the starting date of
  • 00:13:11
    analysis as you said one thing leads to
  • 00:13:13
    another leads to another but uh this
  • 00:13:16
    applies to most conflicts. For example,
  • 00:13:18
    if you look now in the Middle East, uh
  • 00:13:20
    you know, the genocide and all, uh it's
  • 00:13:22
    it's often popular to choose the
  • 00:13:25
    starting point when you start in year
  • 00:13:26
    zero. And Middle East, it's you know,
  • 00:13:29
    October 7th, this is when everything
  • 00:13:31
    began because then you have clearly the
  • 00:13:33
    aggressor, you have the victim, and then
  • 00:13:36
    you know what is just, what is not just,
  • 00:13:38
    everything drives from this. But it's
  • 00:13:40
    the same with the war in Ukraine. It's
  • 00:13:42
    as if the war began on uh in February of
  • 00:13:46
    2022 when the Russians invaded. Mhm. But
  • 00:13:48
    I think it's a good I like that with the
  • 00:13:50
    book as well, the the the starting point
  • 00:13:53
    after the cold war because to a large
  • 00:13:55
    extent this was the beginning almost of
  • 00:13:57
    a social experiment because you had you
  • 00:14:00
    know this uh cold war two major blocks
  • 00:14:02
    and then the Russians uh you know
  • 00:14:06
    abandoned the Soviet Union. They abandon
  • 00:14:09
    communism and their main foreign policy
  • 00:14:12
    was effectively to join the west to
  • 00:14:16
    democratize
  • 00:14:18
    embrace capitalism and become a part of
  • 00:14:21
    greater Europe and the collective west.
  • 00:14:23
    So this was the main foreign policy and
  • 00:14:26
    uh and this is why it's it's interesting
  • 00:14:28
    to see it's very harden to to argue that
  • 00:14:32
    it was all Russia's fault that we ended
  • 00:14:35
    up in this situation and as you say as
  • 00:14:37
    well uh the de debates about NATO
  • 00:14:41
    expansion in the '90s or often between
  • 00:14:43
    the people who said you know the canons
  • 00:14:46
    and the the bakers who were you know
  • 00:14:49
    worried that you know this would provoke
  • 00:14:52
    Russia into a very negative response.
  • 00:14:55
    And the on the other side, you had power
  • 00:14:57
    from people like as Madlin saying, "Yes,
  • 00:15:00
    of course, going to provoke Russia, but
  • 00:15:01
    you know, they're weak and we're going
  • 00:15:03
    to have them. We're going to have so
  • 00:15:04
    much NATO, it doesn't matter anymore."
  • 00:15:06
    And as uh yeah, William Perry argued as
  • 00:15:09
    well. I thought about him when he was
  • 00:15:12
    just speaking, also made the point,
  • 00:15:14
    well, uh, everyone recognizes in the
  • 00:15:16
    Clinton administration, this is going to
  • 00:15:18
    provoke Russia. is going to destroy the
  • 00:15:20
    relationship, but they're weak. They're
  • 00:15:22
    getting weaker. Our foreign policy
  • 00:15:24
    should be, you know, is to manage their
  • 00:15:26
    decline. So, this is uh yeah, to flick
  • 00:15:29
    this over now and say, "No, no, there
  • 00:15:32
    was never this never happened. It's it's
  • 00:15:34
    Russian talking points." I mean, it's
  • 00:15:36
    really magnificent propaganda, and it
  • 00:15:38
    could only work if all descent is
  • 00:15:42
    labeled as uh almost treason. Uh, you
  • 00:15:45
    know, it's it's really easy to
  • 00:15:47
    understand though, Glenn, if you just
  • 00:15:48
    pretend that you're from Washington DC
  • 00:15:50
    and that this is your way of thinking is
  • 00:15:52
    just getting our way in the world. They
  • 00:15:54
    would invoke the Bush administration and
  • 00:15:56
    the Clinton administration both the
  • 00:15:57
    first two after the end of the old Cold
  • 00:15:59
    War. They would invoke the lessons of
  • 00:16:01
    Versailles. And you know, I'm not
  • 00:16:04
    exactly sure what they teach about this
  • 00:16:05
    in your neck of the woods, but around
  • 00:16:07
    here, if you go to government school, or
  • 00:16:09
    at least if you went to government
  • 00:16:10
    school in the 1980s, they teach you the
  • 00:16:12
    basic story. It's funny because they
  • 00:16:15
    they're admitting a little bit of fault
  • 00:16:17
    here, but only because their lesson in
  • 00:16:19
    the end is America should have joined
  • 00:16:20
    the League of Nations and that would
  • 00:16:22
    have prevented Hitler, whatever. That's
  • 00:16:23
    where they're going with it. But what
  • 00:16:24
    they say is that, you know, they forget
  • 00:16:26
    that it's all Woodrow Wilson's fault
  • 00:16:28
    that he gave them the ability to, but
  • 00:16:30
    they say the British and the French,
  • 00:16:31
    they just beat up on the Germans so bad,
  • 00:16:33
    the war reparations and um, you know,
  • 00:16:36
    stripping them of their outlying
  • 00:16:38
    territories and all of these things and
  • 00:16:40
    that their humiliation and destruction
  • 00:16:42
    of their economy that this is what
  • 00:16:44
    helped lead to the rise of the Nazis,
  • 00:16:46
    helped lead to the rise of the commies
  • 00:16:48
    in the east and the Nazis somewhat in
  • 00:16:50
    reaction to that, but also in reaction
  • 00:16:51
    to just the punishing terms
  • 00:16:53
    of the western countries and but America
  • 00:16:58
    is not like Britain and France and after
  • 00:17:00
    World War II we were the boss and we
  • 00:17:03
    decided to befriend and rebuild our
  • 00:17:05
    enemies Germany and Japan and that's the
  • 00:17:08
    real model that's how you're supposed to
  • 00:17:10
    do it not like Lord Clemenso or whatever
  • 00:17:14
    the crap with his stupid u you know just
  • 00:17:17
    punishment and hedgemonic designs this
  • 00:17:19
    is the way real mature democracy acts
  • 00:17:22
    and this kind of
  • 00:17:23
    So they all said that after the end of
  • 00:17:26
    the cold war, hey, we better heed the
  • 00:17:28
    lessons of Versailles and we better
  • 00:17:30
    befriend our new uh, you know, Russian
  • 00:17:33
    compadres and and not alienate them and
  • 00:17:36
    not push them into right-wing reaction
  • 00:17:38
    and nationalist reaction. We should do
  • 00:17:40
    everything we can to be good to them.
  • 00:17:43
    But of course, we occupied
  • 00:17:47
    Western Germany and all of Japan and we
  • 00:17:50
    had the Soviet Union to hold over their
  • 00:17:52
    heads. Oh, you prefer Joe Stalin occupy
  • 00:17:54
    you, huh? And they said, "No, actually
  • 00:17:56
    we prefer MacArthur and Eisenhower.
  • 00:17:58
    Thank you very much." Right. So, we
  • 00:18:00
    didn't have that with Russia. When the
  • 00:18:02
    Soviet Union fell apart, you know,
  • 00:18:04
    America had a lot of influence in
  • 00:18:06
    Moscow, more than they should have, but
  • 00:18:08
    they surely did not have a MacArthur,
  • 00:18:10
    the viceroy, and a detachment of troops
  • 00:18:12
    there willing to enforce American
  • 00:18:14
    control. Nothing like that. So, as a
  • 00:18:17
    consequence, they weren't willing to
  • 00:18:19
    truly befriend and rebuild their
  • 00:18:22
    defeated enemy because they wouldn't
  • 00:18:24
    really have control the way that they
  • 00:18:26
    did in Germany and Japan at the end of
  • 00:18:28
    World War II. So instead where and and
  • 00:18:31
    Jeffrey Saxs talks about this and he was
  • 00:18:33
    sure and and I criticize him a little
  • 00:18:34
    bit in the book for the some of the
  • 00:18:36
    shock therapy stuff but
  • 00:18:39
    he quit because he thought and he quit
  • 00:18:42
    early on I think just I believe one year
  • 00:18:43
    into Bill Clinton. Um and he had tried
  • 00:18:46
    to get his thing going to help Russia in
  • 00:18:48
    the transformation to capitalism in the
  • 00:18:50
    late HW Bush years and he concluded that
  • 00:18:54
    hey the Americans don't want to help
  • 00:18:56
    Russia. The Americans idea, Washington's
  • 00:18:59
    idea is kick them while they're down or
  • 00:19:02
    certainly don't help them up. Why give
  • 00:19:04
    them a boost when they're outside of our
  • 00:19:06
    control? But the problem with that, of
  • 00:19:08
    course, is as William Perry said, "Hey,
  • 00:19:11
    the Russians are on the receiving end of
  • 00:19:13
    that attitude and they read you loud and
  • 00:19:16
    clear, right? Oh, you don't like us
  • 00:19:19
    still and you're never going to be fair
  • 00:19:21
    to us and you're never going to treat us
  • 00:19:22
    with a decent amount of respect." Over
  • 00:19:25
    and out. You know, Roger, gotcha. You
  • 00:19:27
    know what I mean? That they understand
  • 00:19:29
    exactly our disdain. And then but so
  • 00:19:31
    what does that mean for the near-term
  • 00:19:32
    future? Means everything gets worse. And
  • 00:19:35
    by the way, here's a fun one to ruin the
  • 00:19:36
    whole book for you because this is at
  • 00:19:37
    the end. Strobe Talbot, who was Bill
  • 00:19:40
    Clinton's guy, his main Russia guy,
  • 00:19:43
    originally a skeptic and then main
  • 00:19:45
    advocate for NATO expansion. He was
  • 00:19:48
    interviewed by Keith Gesson of the New
  • 00:19:50
    York Times in I'm going to say 2018. So
  • 00:19:53
    it's after the war in the Donbass is
  • 00:19:55
    really going on but before the worst war
  • 00:19:57
    here and you know it's Trump years
  • 00:20:02
    and Guess asks him like man wasn't this
  • 00:20:06
    a big mistake all of this NATO expansion
  • 00:20:08
    and everything that we did to kind of
  • 00:20:10
    create this provocative kind of
  • 00:20:12
    atmosphere here and Tala he gives the
  • 00:20:15
    most revealing kind of statement from a
  • 00:20:18
    government bureaucrat right he says well
  • 00:20:21
    listen there's a rule to state craft or
  • 00:20:24
    running a government or something like
  • 00:20:26
    that. And that rule is you do what you
  • 00:20:28
    can in your country's national interest.
  • 00:20:31
    And if you don't do that, well then
  • 00:20:33
    you're not going to be in charge very
  • 00:20:34
    long.
  • 00:20:36
    But then he starts scratching his chin
  • 00:20:38
    and he says, "Hm."
  • 00:20:41
    However, though,
  • 00:20:43
    maybe should we have had a higher,
  • 00:20:47
    wiser conception of our national
  • 00:20:50
    interest
  • 00:20:52
    and thought of it that way, maybe we
  • 00:20:55
    should have. In other words, ooh, we can
  • 00:20:58
    expand our power and influence. We could
  • 00:21:00
    bring Hungary and Poland and the Czech
  • 00:21:03
    Republic into NATO. Wow, we could maybe
  • 00:21:05
    even do the Baltics and that would
  • 00:21:06
    expand our power and influence in the
  • 00:21:08
    region and all these things. One way
  • 00:21:11
    street makes perfect sense. But wait a
  • 00:21:14
    minute, does this mean we're going to
  • 00:21:17
    cause a year a war in the year 2022 when
  • 00:21:21
    a major contest breaks out over
  • 00:21:23
    dominance in Ukraine? Are we just
  • 00:21:26
    setting the stage for a total divorce
  • 00:21:28
    between Washington and Moscow and the
  • 00:21:31
    beginning of a whole new era, even a
  • 00:21:33
    century of enmity that we just finally
  • 00:21:37
    got over? That's what George Kennan
  • 00:21:38
    said. You brought up George Kennan. He
  • 00:21:40
    coined a containment policy. He told
  • 00:21:42
    Freriedman, Thomas L. Friedman of the
  • 00:21:44
    New York Times in 1998, this is going to
  • 00:21:46
    cause a whole new cold war and it'll
  • 00:21:48
    probably end in a hot one.
  • 00:21:51
    Why are we doing this? is just self-
  • 00:21:54
    sabotage. And so what's funny about
  • 00:21:57
    that, what I say about, you know, making
  • 00:21:59
    fun of u Talbot just for being a
  • 00:22:01
    bureaucrat, right? Is because that's his
  • 00:22:04
    thinking, right? We got to stay in
  • 00:22:06
    power. He said it himself. If we don't
  • 00:22:08
    do what we can, if we don't take
  • 00:22:09
    advantage of what we can on this short
  • 00:22:11
    time horizon, we could get unelected in
  • 00:22:14
    the next thing. This is a huge part of,
  • 00:22:17
    you know, Bill Clinton going after
  • 00:22:19
    Polish and Ukrainian votes in Illinois
  • 00:22:21
    and Pennsylvania. Those are important
  • 00:22:23
    swing states. He's got an election in
  • 00:22:25
    1996 coming up and the Republicans are
  • 00:22:28
    touring around criticizing him for not
  • 00:22:31
    helping our Eastern European friends and
  • 00:22:33
    bringing them into our alliance. So, we
  • 00:22:35
    need Lockheed dollars and we need Polish
  • 00:22:37
    votes. We have to do this now. So, they
  • 00:22:41
    do it. They're thinking about
  • 00:22:42
    themselves. They're not thinking about
  • 00:22:44
    the future of the United States and
  • 00:22:46
    Russia in the 21st century. They're
  • 00:22:49
    thinking about Bill Clinton's ass and
  • 00:22:51
    how he's going to get to keep it in that
  • 00:22:53
    chair at the expense of the rest of
  • 00:22:57
    humanity quite frankly. Right? When you
  • 00:22:59
    zoom out here, where America's
  • 00:23:01
    relationship with Russia is the single
  • 00:23:03
    most important thing in the entire world
  • 00:23:05
    and nothing else compares at all. We
  • 00:23:08
    could destroy humanity. We could set
  • 00:23:10
    humanity back a thousand years if we
  • 00:23:13
    have more worse if we had a real war
  • 00:23:17
    break out between the United States and
  • 00:23:19
    the Russian Federation. It's insane that
  • 00:23:20
    we would let
  • 00:23:22
    tiny insignificant little parochial
  • 00:23:25
    interests determine the path we're on
  • 00:23:28
    here instead of zooming out and and
  • 00:23:31
    forcing Strobe Talbot to have a higher
  • 00:23:34
    wiser conception of America's national
  • 00:23:37
    interest. not this idiotic short-term
  • 00:23:41
    you know political gain at the expense
  • 00:23:43
    of the rest of us.
  • 00:23:46
    This is the problem of Nova this uh yeah
  • 00:23:49
    bureaucrats uh that is that whenever
  • 00:23:51
    they look at policy they either you know
  • 00:23:55
    limit their thinking to what should we
  • 00:23:57
    do more of or what should we do less of.
  • 00:23:59
    So they're just you know tweaking
  • 00:24:02
    existing policies. Now when you just
  • 00:24:04
    exit a cold war uh with two ideological
  • 00:24:08
    blocks, two centers of power going at it
  • 00:24:10
    and you have the chance to actually
  • 00:24:12
    reshape the international system, create
  • 00:24:14
    inclusive security institution where you
  • 00:24:16
    seek security with your opponents
  • 00:24:17
    instead of against them. All of these
  • 00:24:20
    availabilities are there. Uh this is a
  • 00:24:22
    bad time to have this uh yeah political
  • 00:24:26
    midgets if you will leading. And this
  • 00:24:28
    was kind of the argument of as you refer
  • 00:24:30
    to Kenan because he said uh you know he
  • 00:24:33
    he blamed to a large extent also the the
  • 00:24:35
    lack of political imagination there's a
  • 00:24:38
    great quote I think from 97 or maybe
  • 00:24:41
    yeah 97 where he argues you know we have
  • 00:24:43
    all this opportunity so we can you know
  • 00:24:46
    reshape the world and the only thing we
  • 00:24:49
    can come up with is who should be inside
  • 00:24:51
    our military block and who should be
  • 00:24:53
    left outside. This is the extent of
  • 00:24:56
    strategic thinking. I mean it's it's
  • 00:24:58
    quite um yeah it's it's quite shocking
  • 00:25:01
    that there was uh not any other efforts
  • 00:25:04
    and you know even Clinton already in
  • 00:25:06
    January of 94 he he warned uh it's on
  • 00:25:10
    the US one of the embassy websites where
  • 00:25:13
    he made a speech and he warned you if we
  • 00:25:15
    do decide to expand NATO we'll probably
  • 00:25:18
    redivide Europe and recreate the logic
  • 00:25:20
    of the cold war. So, right, you know,
  • 00:25:22
    it's not even canon. It's But but this
  • 00:25:24
    today is Russian talking points. You're
  • 00:25:27
    not allowed to say it if you want to be
  • 00:25:29
    allowed to keep your credibility. And
  • 00:25:31
    yeah, I'll tell you too, Glenn. I mean,
  • 00:25:33
    look, man, you just have to believe me,
  • 00:25:35
    I guess. I promise you it's true that I
  • 00:25:38
    didn't go around like searching for the
  • 00:25:39
    word provoked in quotes regarding Russia
  • 00:25:42
    policy in the 90s and 2000s. I did not
  • 00:25:45
    do that. But I did come across quote
  • 00:25:48
    after quote after quote of these men
  • 00:25:51
    saying we're going to provoke the
  • 00:25:52
    Russians and this kind of thing because
  • 00:25:55
    they all knew it. They all said so over
  • 00:25:57
    and over again. And just as you say with
  • 00:25:58
    Bill Clinton there, they all said,
  • 00:25:59
    "Geez, are we erasing dividing lines or
  • 00:26:01
    just moving them east?" Because if we're
  • 00:26:03
    just moving them east, we're just
  • 00:26:04
    scheduling a conflict. As Pepuchan said,
  • 00:26:06
    we're just scheduling a conflict for the
  • 00:26:08
    21st century um by doing this. And so it
  • 00:26:12
    was also plain to see. In fact, there's
  • 00:26:15
    a guy, I'm not sure if you're familiar
  • 00:26:16
    with a guy named Michael O'Hanlin.
  • 00:26:19
    No, no, no. Was it Pollock? I'm sorry. I
  • 00:26:21
    always confuse these two. In the W. Bush
  • 00:26:23
    years, there were two very prominent
  • 00:26:25
    Democrat Warhawks like Brookings
  • 00:26:27
    Institution, Council on Foreign
  • 00:26:29
    Relations, but just left the center,
  • 00:26:30
    Bill Clintonite Democrats, and they were
  • 00:26:33
    like Burton Ernie, you know, partners.
  • 00:26:35
    They're Michael O'Hanland and Kenneth
  • 00:26:37
    Pollock. And they uh one of them had
  • 00:26:40
    written a book called The Threatening
  • 00:26:41
    Storm. And they all went around saying,
  • 00:26:43
    "Yes, good liberal Democrats support
  • 00:26:45
    George Bush's aggressive war against
  • 00:26:47
    Iraq." That was their role. So that's,
  • 00:26:49
    you know who I'm talking about, right?
  • 00:26:50
    Like Brookings institution personified
  • 00:26:52
    these two. And I'm sorry now I forget
  • 00:26:55
    which one it was. I believe it was
  • 00:26:56
    Pollock who wrote in 2018, he wrote a
  • 00:27:01
    little monograph that said, "Hey," and
  • 00:27:04
    this is, of course, as your your viewers
  • 00:27:07
    and listeners are well aware, this is in
  • 00:27:09
    the middle of the ongoing Civil War
  • 00:27:10
    post. uh uh made on uh so-called
  • 00:27:13
    revolution of 14 and all of that in the
  • 00:27:16
    midst of that but before everything got
  • 00:27:18
    much worse in 22
  • 00:27:20
    Pollock puts this thing out and he says
  • 00:27:22
    we need as they many experts had said
  • 00:27:25
    through the years including Kissinger
  • 00:27:27
    and Brazinski even had said this and
  • 00:27:28
    they were expansionist hawks the whole
  • 00:27:30
    time they said we need to do the Austria
  • 00:27:33
    model for Ukraine and that's a reference
  • 00:27:36
    to the old cold war with the commies
  • 00:27:39
    where Austria was allowed to be neutral
  • 00:27:41
    Finland the same where they have no
  • 00:27:43
    Warsaw pack alliance or NATO alliance
  • 00:27:46
    and no troops from either side occupying
  • 00:27:49
    their country, but they promise to play
  • 00:27:51
    nice with both and not side against
  • 00:27:53
    either one and this kind of thing and
  • 00:27:55
    play it neutral and keep themselves uh
  • 00:27:58
    safe basically. So um in other words and
  • 00:28:03
    and a huge part of that was America and
  • 00:28:05
    the Soviet Union had agreed to not fight
  • 00:28:07
    over them, right? we're gonna let them,
  • 00:28:09
    both sides agreed, we're going to let
  • 00:28:11
    them stay in the middle. And so he wrote
  • 00:28:14
    this monograph saying we have to do this
  • 00:28:17
    for Ukraine. And I think he may have
  • 00:28:19
    even said for Finland, let's go back to
  • 00:28:21
    the Finland model for Finland, too. And
  • 00:28:23
    then he says there should be some war
  • 00:28:24
    guarantees and all kinds of whatever
  • 00:28:26
    clap trap in there as well and the
  • 00:28:28
    structure of the thing. But he was
  • 00:28:30
    saying we cannot have a major power
  • 00:28:34
    contest over Ukraine. Look at the path
  • 00:28:36
    we're on now. We have to stop this right
  • 00:28:38
    now before it gets worse. We need a
  • 00:28:40
    settlement in the war and we need a
  • 00:28:43
    reliable and stable structure for moving
  • 00:28:45
    forward in Eastern Europe from now on.
  • 00:28:48
    But of course, you heard the magic word
  • 00:28:50
    there. 2018, the height of all the
  • 00:28:53
    Russia gate hype and the absolute
  • 00:28:55
    ridiculous hoax, which the volume was
  • 00:28:57
    turned up to 11 at that time of this
  • 00:29:00
    hoax that Donald Trump had been
  • 00:29:01
    installed in power by Vladimir Putin in
  • 00:29:04
    a Russian coup d'eta and you served
  • 00:29:06
    Hillary Clinton's rightful throne and
  • 00:29:08
    all this stuff. So there was no one in
  • 00:29:10
    responsible circles of power anywhere
  • 00:29:13
    who wanted to hear what Pollock was
  • 00:29:15
    selling here. his his monograph. I don't
  • 00:29:17
    know if anybody even noticed it but me,
  • 00:29:19
    right? It was just just this was so
  • 00:29:22
    desperately needed at that time and
  • 00:29:25
    because of the lies of the American
  • 00:29:27
    government and framing their own
  • 00:29:28
    president for treason is the most
  • 00:29:30
    ridiculous and unheard of thing in the
  • 00:29:31
    world. I have 75 pages on it mostly due
  • 00:29:34
    to my rage over it uh in the book. Um
  • 00:29:38
    but because of that he was just
  • 00:29:39
    completely hampered. And you know Glenn
  • 00:29:41
    it's in that same article um by Keith
  • 00:29:44
    Gesson where he talks with Strobe
  • 00:29:46
    Talbot. It's called the quiet Americans.
  • 00:29:49
    It's about the the Russia hands the
  • 00:29:51
    quiet Americans. And in there one of
  • 00:29:52
    these guys I can't remember who it is
  • 00:29:54
    anymore. I always need I always forget
  • 00:29:55
    to look this back up again. I forget
  • 00:29:57
    where the quote comes from. I think it
  • 00:29:58
    was one of Trump's own guys says well
  • 00:30:01
    when it comes to Russia policy you know
  • 00:30:03
    Trump is like the captain of a ship.
  • 00:30:05
    He's holding the wheel, but it's not
  • 00:30:07
    attached to anything. And the rest of
  • 00:30:10
    the government is the ship. And they
  • 00:30:12
    have their Russia policy. And we really
  • 00:30:14
    saw this with the Ukraine gate. If you
  • 00:30:16
    go back and look at the testimony of
  • 00:30:17
    Alexander Vinman, um, who had been the
  • 00:30:20
    lieutenant colonel on the National
  • 00:30:22
    Security Council who had turned in
  • 00:30:24
    Trump, he was the real original
  • 00:30:26
    whistleblower before Charmela. and uh
  • 00:30:29
    and in his testimony and in his article
  • 00:30:31
    that he wrote, I think for the Atlantic,
  • 00:30:33
    it may have been the New Republic, it's
  • 00:30:35
    one of the two. He wrote this really
  • 00:30:37
    long thing explaining and it's just
  • 00:30:39
    absolutely clear that he and the rest of
  • 00:30:42
    the government were absolutely outraged
  • 00:30:44
    that the president of the United States
  • 00:30:45
    thought he had the right to change
  • 00:30:46
    America's Russia policy. And he says
  • 00:30:49
    quite clearly, no, we have a Russia
  • 00:30:51
    policy and that's it. Like, we're not
  • 00:30:53
    going to let this guy change it. It was
  • 00:30:55
    an emergency in the NSE. What are we
  • 00:30:57
    going to do to stop the president from
  • 00:30:58
    changing the policy? And the the fact
  • 00:31:01
    that this man had won the election and
  • 00:31:03
    he's the only one with the right to sit
  • 00:31:05
    in that chair behind that desk and call
  • 00:31:07
    these shots.
  • 00:31:09
    This lieutenant colonel never heard of
  • 00:31:11
    that. He has no idea that he works for
  • 00:31:13
    Trump at all. How dare Donald Trump
  • 00:31:16
    changed the government's policy on
  • 00:31:19
    Russia? And it's just as clear as could
  • 00:31:20
    be. We had a meeting, Glenn, of the
  • 00:31:23
    inter agency and we decided what we're
  • 00:31:26
    doing here is what we want to do, not
  • 00:31:29
    you. And of course, Trump has been
  • 00:31:31
    curial enough that he can make a big
  • 00:31:32
    bold decision and then forget about it
  • 00:31:34
    and never say it again and never follow
  • 00:31:35
    up again. And so they essentially said,
  • 00:31:37
    "Well, we're just wait. We just decided,
  • 00:31:40
    well, we're just going to buy our time
  • 00:31:41
    and and hopefully he'll forget about
  • 00:31:43
    whatever it was he told us to do and
  • 00:31:45
    this kind of thing." And then when it
  • 00:31:46
    came down to it, they tried to overthrow
  • 00:31:48
    him. They tried to have him impeached
  • 00:31:50
    and removed from office. Uh even after
  • 00:31:53
    the hoax that he'd been installed by
  • 00:31:55
    Russia had been debunked and had fallen
  • 00:31:57
    apart. This is six months later and
  • 00:32:00
    they're trying again. It's really
  • 00:32:02
    unbelievable story, you know, and I'm
  • 00:32:04
    not a Trump partisan. I have not voted
  • 00:32:06
    for him. I admit rooting for him three
  • 00:32:08
    different times against his enemies who
  • 00:32:10
    I hate more, but I can never vote for
  • 00:32:11
    the guy for various reasons, including
  • 00:32:13
    especially Zionism and other things. But
  • 00:32:16
    um so this is not like a personal grudge
  • 00:32:19
    on his behalf. It's only a personal
  • 00:32:22
    grudge in that I hate being lied to. And
  • 00:32:24
    oh my god, did they lie to all of us
  • 00:32:26
    about that stuff. And and and just the
  • 00:32:29
    courage of some lowly lieutenant
  • 00:32:32
    colonel. I'm being polite calling it
  • 00:32:34
    courage. some low lieutenant colonel on
  • 00:32:37
    the NSC leading a coup against the
  • 00:32:40
    president just cuz he's born in Ukraine
  • 00:32:41
    and wants it his way is just Hbomb going
  • 00:32:45
    off over my head like just unbelievable
  • 00:32:48
    and intolerable, right? I can't I I just
  • 00:32:50
    can't stand it that anybody allowed that
  • 00:32:52
    to happen at any time. And and I
  • 00:32:54
    wouldn't be upset if Trump spent the
  • 00:32:56
    rest of his term here just exacting
  • 00:32:58
    vengeance against the people who did
  • 00:33:00
    that to him before. I mean, they deserve
  • 00:33:02
    it. It was unbelievable. the hutzbah
  • 00:33:05
    that they, you know, uh that they
  • 00:33:09
    displayed their their their willingness
  • 00:33:11
    to to cross those lines to try to
  • 00:33:13
    prevent him from from what I mean, just
  • 00:33:15
    think about the alternative history
  • 00:33:16
    without Russia gate. We would have had
  • 00:33:18
    Minsk 2 implemented and there would have
  • 00:33:20
    never been a war of 22. The war would
  • 00:33:23
    have been settled in the first Trump
  • 00:33:25
    term if they had not framed him for
  • 00:33:27
    treason with the Kremlin, which again I
  • 00:33:30
    know how hyperbolic and insane that
  • 00:33:31
    sounds when I say it, but that's cuz
  • 00:33:33
    that's how hyperbolic and insane their
  • 00:33:35
    claims were.
  • 00:33:37
    All right, I agree. And it is
  • 00:33:39
    interesting though that the whole
  • 00:33:40
    concept of the deep state is treated as
  • 00:33:42
    something of a conspiracy theory. when
  • 00:33:45
    you have a more or less a pure permanent
  • 00:33:46
    bureaucracy wedded to permanent policies
  • 00:33:50
    and they yeah pursue their independent
  • 00:33:54
    agendas irrespective of who you know
  • 00:33:56
    sits on the throne uh it is uh it's yeah
  • 00:34:01
    it's very difficult to explain this away
  • 00:34:02
    but it's just a nomenclature you got to
  • 00:34:05
    get it right in Turkey it's the deep
  • 00:34:07
    state in America it's called the inter
  • 00:34:09
    agency there you go now we're all on the
  • 00:34:12
    same page no conspiracy theory required
  • 00:34:15
    Fair enough. Well, well, the thing is
  • 00:34:19
    when when this decision made was made in
  • 00:34:21
    2014 to yeah topple the government in
  • 00:34:24
    Ukraine, something that leading uh polit
  • 00:34:27
    politicians, ambassadors, intelligence
  • 00:34:30
    chiefs had all warned, you know, this
  • 00:34:32
    would probably lead to civil war within
  • 00:34:34
    Ukraine given the divide and Russia's
  • 00:34:37
    military intervention given that this
  • 00:34:40
    is, you know, they would lean towards
  • 00:34:41
    the eastern Ukrainians and also make
  • 00:34:44
    sure that Ukraine doesn't end in NATO's
  • 00:34:47
    orbit. But again, such a disaster
  • 00:34:50
    unleashed the war in 2014. Uh, you know,
  • 00:34:53
    this is when you rely on, you know, cool
  • 00:34:55
    heads to calm the situation down and
  • 00:34:58
    walk this back. Instead, we have Russia
  • 00:35:01
    gate in 2016. You know, the American
  • 00:35:04
    president is now an agent of the
  • 00:35:05
    Kremlin. It's impossible for anyone to
  • 00:35:08
    look for any
  • 00:35:11
    common interest with Russia. Everything
  • 00:35:12
    is zero sum. uh if it's bad for Russia,
  • 00:35:15
    it's good for us. So let's just uh you
  • 00:35:18
    know bring as much pain as we can and
  • 00:35:21
    negotiation, diplomacy becomes
  • 00:35:22
    criminalized. Escalation is just a you
  • 00:35:25
    know sign of virtue. Uh how did how do
  • 00:35:28
    we end up with the further provocation?
  • 00:35:30
    So up until the Russian invasion.
  • 00:35:34
    Well, that's first of all very well
  • 00:35:35
    said. I mean what a great quote. I wish
  • 00:35:37
    I had that in the book. Yeah. Just the
  • 00:35:40
    way that you described all that I I
  • 00:35:42
    think was just fantastic. Like, yeah,
  • 00:35:44
    that's exactly right. Um I look at it
  • 00:35:46
    like what if Joe Biden had not been
  • 00:35:48
    forced out for being a lying plagiarist
  • 00:35:50
    in 1987 and he had just won the election
  • 00:35:52
    of 88 and we just had Joe Biden in
  • 00:35:54
    office this whole time. Like that's
  • 00:35:56
    basically the story to me. We have our
  • 00:35:59
    American policy is what John McCain, Joe
  • 00:36:02
    Biden, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush
  • 00:36:04
    all thought was smart. Like there you
  • 00:36:06
    go. That kind of explains it right
  • 00:36:08
    there. that like, yeah, of course, why
  • 00:36:09
    would you give these men the benefit of
  • 00:36:11
    the doubt? They have not done a single
  • 00:36:13
    thing to deserve it. Not one of them.
  • 00:36:15
    And this is all essentially Biden
  • 00:36:17
    policy. And if you go back to Biden when
  • 00:36:19
    he was coherent just, you know, whatever
  • 00:36:22
    10, 15 years ago or whatever, the guy
  • 00:36:24
    was an absolute idiot, right? He and
  • 00:36:26
    John McCain are the perfect avatars of
  • 00:36:28
    the American empire. These completely
  • 00:36:30
    over the hill, no nothing, blowhard,
  • 00:36:32
    know it alls, right? They do nothing but
  • 00:36:34
    talk, nothing about monger war. None of
  • 00:36:36
    them ever read a book about anything.
  • 00:36:38
    none of them know anything about
  • 00:36:39
    anything. If you asked them a some kind
  • 00:36:41
    of pop quiz, they both would absolutely
  • 00:36:43
    crash and be done and um and and go on.
  • 00:36:48
    So, you know, it's essentially that same
  • 00:36:50
    idiocy and then and then right at the
  • 00:36:53
    crisis point, Joe Biden himself is the
  • 00:36:56
    one sworn in like the worst co-pilot
  • 00:36:59
    Obama could have possibly had, as bad as
  • 00:37:02
    Obama already was. Uh but letting Joe
  • 00:37:05
    Biden drive, hell, that was what caused
  • 00:37:08
    all the problems in 2014 in the first
  • 00:37:10
    place. Um you know, with the Maidon and
  • 00:37:12
    all of that and and then he gets to take
  • 00:37:16
    control right after Donald Trump's
  • 00:37:19
    wheels not attached to anything. Joe
  • 00:37:20
    Biden comes in and his wheels attached.
  • 00:37:23
    He gets to drive only now. He's he's
  • 00:37:26
    kind of he has the same like overall
  • 00:37:28
    opinions of just disdain and and maybe
  • 00:37:31
    even hatred for Vladimir Putin and for
  • 00:37:33
    Putin's Russia and for as you put it
  • 00:37:36
    like the zero sum thinking about their
  • 00:37:39
    loss and our gain. And at the same time
  • 00:37:41
    like he's so dang he doesn't know much
  • 00:37:43
    more than that. He can't like really
  • 00:37:46
    think hard. He can't swim. I mean maybe
  • 00:37:48
    never could. He but he certainly like
  • 00:37:50
    can't swim in any kind of details or or
  • 00:37:52
    or make any kind of choices that would
  • 00:37:55
    require
  • 00:37:57
    even the the most basic amount of
  • 00:38:00
    insight or wisdom or like con deep
  • 00:38:03
    context thinking that you would need in
  • 00:38:05
    a president in a crisis with Russia. And
  • 00:38:08
    so you know I had thought that the war
  • 00:38:12
    would be averted not because I said
  • 00:38:13
    Putin would never do such a thing. I'd
  • 00:38:15
    been warning for years that yeah he
  • 00:38:17
    would too. He threatened George Bush to
  • 00:38:19
    his face that he would. He told an
  • 00:38:20
    Italian minister in 2014, I could be in
  • 00:38:23
    in Kiev in two weeks. Boy, don't you try
  • 00:38:25
    me. And I've been warned about that for
  • 00:38:26
    a long time. What I thought was that
  • 00:38:29
    that um Burns, I'm sorry, I keep wanting
  • 00:38:33
    to call him George Burns or Nicholas
  • 00:38:34
    Burns, and neither of those is right.
  • 00:38:35
    George Burns is the hilarious actor, and
  • 00:38:37
    Nicholas Burns was George uh W. Bush's
  • 00:38:39
    guy. Uh William Burns, William Burns,
  • 00:38:41
    William Burns, who had been, you know, I
  • 00:38:44
    don't know if he was ever CIA or what,
  • 00:38:45
    but was a long time uh Russia hand, you
  • 00:38:48
    know, had had worked in the embassy in
  • 00:38:51
    Moscow since the Bill Clinton years and
  • 00:38:53
    had been ambassador under W. Bush and
  • 00:38:57
    who Biden made head of the CIA. And a
  • 00:38:59
    lot of times, even on Middle East stuff,
  • 00:39:00
    he would act as the Secretary of State
  • 00:39:03
    as well while Blinken was at home
  • 00:39:04
    sucking his thumb or whatever. Um Burns
  • 00:39:07
    was the guy, if there was one competent
  • 00:39:10
    man in that government. And I thought
  • 00:39:12
    Burns is gonna see Biden through this.
  • 00:39:14
    He's gonna find a way to negotiate an
  • 00:39:16
    understanding here. But then clearly
  • 00:39:18
    that was wrong because those were not
  • 00:39:20
    his orders. His orders, you know, the
  • 00:39:22
    whole government's orders in 21 and late
  • 00:39:25
    21 was to tell Russia, you better not,
  • 00:39:27
    and if you do, we'll arm up Ukraine and
  • 00:39:30
    even the Ukrainian insurgency to fight
  • 00:39:33
    against you.
  • 00:39:34
    But they were not willing to negotiate
  • 00:39:36
    in good faith. And as I show in the
  • 00:39:38
    book, and I'm I'm kind of skipping the
  • 00:39:40
    whole history of 21 there because there
  • 00:39:42
    are, you know, some some crises in the
  • 00:39:45
    leadup there, but uh in by the end of of
  • 00:39:49
    21 on the 30th, Putin and Biden have a
  • 00:39:53
    phone call and I think there's only a
  • 00:39:57
    Russian
  • 00:39:59
    uh readout of what was discussed there,
  • 00:40:00
    but the White House never contradicted
  • 00:40:02
    anything in it. And apparently Biden had
  • 00:40:04
    told Putin, "Look, man, I'm not bringing
  • 00:40:07
    Ukraine into NATO." Nobody is. Not
  • 00:40:10
    anytime in the next 10 years at least.
  • 00:40:12
    And I mean, that's crazy. Everybody
  • 00:40:14
    knows they're too corrupt. Whatever. I
  • 00:40:16
    don't know if you said that part, but
  • 00:40:17
    everybody knows they're not a good fit.
  • 00:40:18
    And we we can't give them a word
  • 00:40:20
    guarantee. And we have this ongoing
  • 00:40:22
    crisis in the east, all these things.
  • 00:40:24
    And missiles, man. You think I'm going
  • 00:40:25
    to deploy, you know, anti-missile
  • 00:40:28
    launchers infection
  • 00:40:31
    doing that. I have to tell you, Glenn, I
  • 00:40:32
    think that that was sincere. I don't
  • 00:40:34
    think that I've never seen anything that
  • 00:40:36
    said the Pentagon wanted to put sparrows
  • 00:40:38
    and Mark 41 missile launchers in her. If
  • 00:40:41
    there's something like that that I
  • 00:40:42
    missed, I apologize, but I've never seen
  • 00:40:44
    anything like that. Putin said, "Well,
  • 00:40:46
    that's what I'm worried about. You went
  • 00:40:47
    ahead and did this in Poland and Romania
  • 00:40:50
    and and these are dualuse launchers that
  • 00:40:52
    can hold Tomak cruise missiles that can
  • 00:40:54
    be tipped with H bombs. Thank you very
  • 00:40:56
    much." And so, no, dude, I'm drawing a
  • 00:40:58
    line here. and Biden told them, "Man,
  • 00:40:59
    I'm not going to put those missiles in."
  • 00:41:01
    And Putin said, "Okay, well, let's have
  • 00:41:03
    our guys sit down and put this in
  • 00:41:04
    writing then." And then they did not do
  • 00:41:07
    that. Those are, you know, two of the
  • 00:41:09
    major, of course, resolving the conflict
  • 00:41:12
    in the east was the other major um thing
  • 00:41:15
    there. But this was all, you know,
  • 00:41:17
    basically in the treaty. Go ahead and
  • 00:41:19
    assure us in the proposed treaty by the
  • 00:41:21
    Russians. Go ahead and assure us you're
  • 00:41:23
    not going to bring Ukraine into NATO.
  • 00:41:24
    You're not going to put missiles in
  • 00:41:26
    there. and you're not going to, you
  • 00:41:28
    know, expand the NATO alliance any
  • 00:41:30
    further east. You're going to respect
  • 00:41:31
    Bill Clinton's promises in the founding
  • 00:41:32
    act of 1997 and stop moving military
  • 00:41:36
    equipment into the new NATO states. And
  • 00:41:38
    all this was reasonable, you know, and
  • 00:41:40
    by the way, you know, I had talked to
  • 00:41:42
    Freeman, who was a lifelong diplomat and
  • 00:41:44
    other experts at the time who said the
  • 00:41:46
    Russian treaty, it's not perfect, and no
  • 00:41:48
    American president should just sign at
  • 00:41:50
    the dotted line of a Russian proposed
  • 00:41:52
    treaty on probably anything, right? Um,
  • 00:41:54
    but was this a reasonable basis for
  • 00:41:56
    negotiation? Absolutely. Was this meant
  • 00:41:59
    to be like Mattaline Albbright's Ramble
  • 00:42:01
    Accord, which is just all full of poison
  • 00:42:02
    pills and meant to fail? No. Absolutely
  • 00:42:05
    not. This chosen said, "You could have
  • 00:42:07
    sat down and negotiated this." And as I
  • 00:42:09
    show in the book, New York Times and
  • 00:42:11
    Washington Post have unnamed Biden
  • 00:42:15
    administration officials agreeing with
  • 00:42:17
    that and saying this is not some wild
  • 00:42:20
    set of ridiculous promises that they're
  • 00:42:23
    demanding that we make. This is
  • 00:42:25
    absolutely the basis for a reasonable
  • 00:42:27
    negotiation if we wanted to sit down at
  • 00:42:29
    the table. We're trying to figure out
  • 00:42:30
    whether they really mean it or not, but
  • 00:42:33
    on paper, this is reasonable. We could
  • 00:42:35
    discuss this. But then they just did not
  • 00:42:37
    do that. They did not do that. They
  • 00:42:39
    said, "You know what we'll do? We'll
  • 00:42:40
    have this lower level meeting about the
  • 00:42:41
    missiles." And then they didn't do that.
  • 00:42:43
    They never arranged it. They never
  • 00:42:44
    showed up. And so all of it was
  • 00:42:46
    essentially, you know, just um
  • 00:42:51
    look, I I don't think that plan A was
  • 00:42:54
    lure them into war. I think plan A, just
  • 00:42:58
    on the face of it, seems honest enough,
  • 00:43:00
    was to threaten the Russians. Don't do
  • 00:43:03
    it. This a big mistake. Don't make it.
  • 00:43:05
    cuz they clearly said that a lot of
  • 00:43:07
    times and they clearly meant that I
  • 00:43:09
    believe um on the face of it they meant
  • 00:43:13
    it but they were not willing to say okay
  • 00:43:16
    buddy you know what let's sit down and
  • 00:43:17
    talk about this and hash this out and
  • 00:43:19
    have a real basis for a real agreement
  • 00:43:21
    and what can we do to prevent this thing
  • 00:43:23
    from really going this wild now and they
  • 00:43:26
    were not willing to do that and I
  • 00:43:27
    believe they could have prevented the
  • 00:43:28
    war if they had done that I think you
  • 00:43:31
    know it's not again the book is not
  • 00:43:33
    justified and it's not oh I Putin was so
  • 00:43:36
    sincere in whatever beliefs or
  • 00:43:39
    statements or anything, but the fact of
  • 00:43:40
    the matter is they're very concrete
  • 00:43:42
    proposals on the table. The B
  • 00:43:45
    administration said that they were
  • 00:43:46
    essentially agreeable. So, okay, maybe
  • 00:43:49
    he's just, you know, Zar Vlad and wants
  • 00:43:52
    to recreate the entire Russian Empire.
  • 00:43:54
    Let's test that premise. Let's go ahead
  • 00:43:56
    and sign his reasonable treaty and then
  • 00:43:58
    see what happens after that. If he
  • 00:44:01
    proves that he was just kidding and the
  • 00:44:03
    treaty meant nothing and he wants to
  • 00:44:04
    steal it all anyway, well then we'll be
  • 00:44:06
    living in a different world. But at the
  • 00:44:08
    very least, let's call his bluff. He
  • 00:44:10
    says that his terms are reasonable and
  • 00:44:13
    they actually are like within reason
  • 00:44:15
    anyway, like somewhere around
  • 00:44:17
    approaching reasonable. Okay, well let's
  • 00:44:19
    see. But they weren't willing to see.
  • 00:44:22
    And um and and that's a real tragedy of
  • 00:44:25
    thing because you look at how
  • 00:44:26
    destructive it's been. In fact,
  • 00:44:29
    you know, they thought again that the
  • 00:44:30
    Ukraine military would just be smashed,
  • 00:44:32
    that they'd be backing an insurgency
  • 00:44:33
    against the Russian occupation rather
  • 00:44:36
    than a military. But in fact, their
  • 00:44:38
    military, the Ukrainian military stood
  • 00:44:40
    and so America has had a real organized
  • 00:44:42
    state army to back this whole time
  • 00:44:44
    instead of just rag tag militias run by
  • 00:44:47
    Nazis and whoever. Although Andrew Bitki
  • 00:44:50
    is still out there, but he's a military
  • 00:44:52
    commander, right? He's not just a
  • 00:44:53
    militia coupe now. And um and so but
  • 00:44:58
    what that's meant is it's worse for
  • 00:45:00
    Ukraine, right? Because it means that
  • 00:45:03
    they're probably eventually going to end
  • 00:45:05
    up losing more territory along with
  • 00:45:08
    having their economy completely
  • 00:45:09
    destroyed and having, you know, hundreds
  • 00:45:12
    of thousands of men probably, I don't
  • 00:45:14
    know, in the high hundreds of thousands.
  • 00:45:15
    I'm not sure which estimates uh which
  • 00:45:17
    estimates to believe in or what but like
  • 00:45:20
    certainly high hundreds of thousands of
  • 00:45:21
    them have been killed and maybe more
  • 00:45:23
    than a million uh if you include all the
  • 00:45:25
    wounded as well. Um it's been a
  • 00:45:29
    catastrophe
  • 00:45:30
    uh for the country when this really
  • 00:45:32
    could have been averted and negotiated.
  • 00:45:34
    I firmly believe that and I think that
  • 00:45:36
    you know the Americans they gave away
  • 00:45:38
    the game. while we're trying to inflict
  • 00:45:39
    a strategic defeat on Russia. And by
  • 00:45:42
    pouring in these arms and waging our
  • 00:45:44
    massive economic war against them, it's
  • 00:45:46
    just going to them. I mean, they
  • 00:45:47
    really believed it. They said this over
  • 00:45:48
    and over again. Maline Albbright said
  • 00:45:50
    before she died, oh, the Russian
  • 00:45:51
    government's going to fall and Putin's
  • 00:45:53
    going to be overthrown and freedom will
  • 00:45:55
    reign in North Asia. Like, yeah, right.
  • 00:45:58
    And but they believe that. They weren't
  • 00:45:59
    lying about that. They thought we got
  • 00:46:01
    them on the ropes. We got them in our
  • 00:46:02
    trap. It's the same thing we did to the
  • 00:46:04
    Soviets. We're going to do in
  • 00:46:05
    Afghanistan in the 80s and Rambo 3. now
  • 00:46:07
    we're gonna do it to him again here. And
  • 00:46:10
    they talk themselves into believing
  • 00:46:11
    that. And yet, who's spent more money on
  • 00:46:13
    the war now? America or Russia? And you
  • 00:46:17
    know what I mean? Uh and and who's going
  • 00:46:19
    to end up with the South and the East?
  • 00:46:21
    Not Ukraine. All those promises that
  • 00:46:23
    we're going to kick the Russian again,
  • 00:46:25
    as we talked about at the beginning, as
  • 00:46:26
    you as you stated, based on the lie that
  • 00:46:28
    it was totally unprovoked, that means
  • 00:46:30
    well, we're just going to push them back
  • 00:46:31
    and get regain every square inch of
  • 00:46:33
    Ukraine, including Crimea. And in fact,
  • 00:46:35
    they're not right. right? They're going
  • 00:46:37
    to end up losing at least four major
  • 00:46:39
    provinces and maybe six or eight before
  • 00:46:41
    the thing is over. And it's just the
  • 00:46:44
    whole thing is an absolute tragedy for
  • 00:46:46
    Ukraine. And it's I hate to say the
  • 00:46:49
    degree to which it is Washington DC's
  • 00:46:51
    fault, but it is.
  • 00:46:54
    I often heard argument that well uh
  • 00:46:57
    there was no intentions of bringing
  • 00:47:00
    Ukraine into NATO, so the Russians
  • 00:47:02
    didn't really have anything to worry
  • 00:47:03
    about. But uh a key concern in Russia I
  • 00:47:07
    is the incrementalism or salami tactics.
  • 00:47:09
    I actually wrote about this in November
  • 00:47:11
    of 21 because I was saying a war would
  • 00:47:14
    come. Uh yeah that was actually accused
  • 00:47:17
    of trying to legitimize a war. So we
  • 00:47:19
    have the same uh dynamic but but but
  • 00:47:22
    this was the whole point in you they
  • 00:47:24
    could have said back in ' 89 to
  • 00:47:26
    Gorbachov well you know you don't need
  • 00:47:27
    in writing because we have no intention
  • 00:47:29
    of expanding NATO. Indeed, when they
  • 00:47:31
    expanded NATO in 99 to Poland, Hungary
  • 00:47:34
    and Czech Republic, the argument was,
  • 00:47:36
    you know, it's just three countries.
  • 00:47:37
    It's not going to affect Russia. And uh
  • 00:47:40
    and the comments even then they did
  • 00:47:42
    interview then with Gorbachov and he was
  • 00:47:43
    making it very clear, well, it's not
  • 00:47:45
    just about these three countries. What's
  • 00:47:46
    going to happen down the future? And
  • 00:47:47
    that's what the Russian leadership said
  • 00:47:49
    as well. What's going to happen when you
  • 00:47:50
    reach Ukraine? Where's the natural stop?
  • 00:47:52
    You know, like we need to have some
  • 00:47:53
    agreements in place that cements a new
  • 00:47:56
    status quo. And uh we saw the same with
  • 00:47:58
    missile defense. It was back in 2007. Uh
  • 00:48:01
    yeah, Condisa Risen said, "Oh, the
  • 00:48:03
    Russians are just they're not serious.
  • 00:48:05
    You know, we're just going to put 10
  • 00:48:06
    interceptive missiles in Poland. They
  • 00:48:08
    can't seriously be worried about this."
  • 00:48:09
    But the Russians said, "Well, that you
  • 00:48:11
    won't if you would stop there would be
  • 00:48:13
    one thing, but put it in a treaty, but
  • 00:48:14
    soon we'll hear about hundreds. We'll
  • 00:48:16
    hear about thousands." And indeed,
  • 00:48:18
    that's the way we went. And uh and
  • 00:48:19
    they're dual use launchers. So, you
  • 00:48:21
    really can fire any type of cruise
  • 00:48:23
    missile from there. And they know that.
  • 00:48:25
    Um it is a big deal. And um uh I'm sorry
  • 00:48:30
    I lost my train of thought. I was going
  • 00:48:31
    to say um the incrementalism.
  • 00:48:34
    Uh oh yes, the the key word here is
  • 00:48:36
    interoperability, right? And this is
  • 00:48:38
    something that I I show in the book and
  • 00:48:40
    lately Larry Johnson at Sonar 21, he
  • 00:48:42
    went and unearthed way more documents
  • 00:48:44
    that I wish I had had my hands on where
  • 00:48:46
    he shows the entire history of
  • 00:48:48
    integration of Ukraine into NATO
  • 00:48:50
    incrementally from 1992 on and starting
  • 00:48:54
    with training in Poland and lots of
  • 00:48:56
    different joint training exercises. I
  • 00:48:58
    have a bit in my book about a big
  • 00:48:59
    operation that they did in 1997 where
  • 00:49:02
    they were going to mimic invading Crimea
  • 00:49:04
    in the name of uh ethnic conflict which
  • 00:49:07
    was taken to mean to kick the Russians
  • 00:49:09
    out and and and make sure that Ukraine
  • 00:49:11
    owns the whole peninsula and cause a
  • 00:49:13
    major reaction back then. And this is
  • 00:49:16
    what uh I believe certainly Mir Shimemer
  • 00:49:19
    and I believe Walt both or the other way
  • 00:49:21
    around. pretty sure both of them had
  • 00:49:22
    said on my show years ago uh you know
  • 00:49:26
    like probably after the Maidon but
  • 00:49:27
    before 22 that what they're doing here
  • 00:49:30
    this is de facto NATO membership and
  • 00:49:33
    from the Russian point of view doesn't
  • 00:49:35
    exactly matter what it says on the piece
  • 00:49:37
    of paper the point here is America's not
  • 00:49:39
    giving them a real war guarantee as
  • 00:49:41
    we've seen we're not sending in the 82nd
  • 00:49:43
    airborne to protect the donass forget it
  • 00:49:46
    but what we were doing we the US
  • 00:49:48
    government what they were doing was norm
  • 00:49:51
    normalizing
  • 00:49:52
    Ukraine's military with the rest of NATO
  • 00:49:56
    so that their command structures, their
  • 00:49:59
    just their order of battle and their
  • 00:50:01
    order of command, their uh
  • 00:50:03
    communications equipment and as much of
  • 00:50:05
    their military equipment as possible was
  • 00:50:07
    being standardized with NATO forces so
  • 00:50:10
    that in the event of a war with the
  • 00:50:12
    Russian Federation, even if we're not
  • 00:50:14
    giving an explicit war guarantee to
  • 00:50:16
    Ukraine, they know that if we have a war
  • 00:50:19
    between NATO and Russia, that Ukraine's
  • 00:50:21
    military would be then suborn into NATO
  • 00:50:25
    and would be just another auxiliary army
  • 00:50:27
    along with the Hungarians and the
  • 00:50:28
    Lithuanians and the Germans and the
  • 00:50:30
    Poles and the rest all fighting
  • 00:50:32
    together. So even though it was an
  • 00:50:34
    official NATO membership with the trick
  • 00:50:36
    there being article 5, we promise to
  • 00:50:38
    come and save you if somebody attacks
  • 00:50:41
    you with still short of that by all this
  • 00:50:45
    interoperability and standardization and
  • 00:50:48
    subsidization of uh the Ukrainian
  • 00:50:51
    military especially after 2014.
  • 00:50:54
    They were in fact making it an auxiliary
  • 00:50:56
    force of NATO and were being taken
  • 00:50:59
    seriously by the Russians on that basis.
  • 00:51:01
    Another major provocation that I barely
  • 00:51:04
    even mention anymore, but it is in the
  • 00:51:06
    book, but it is huge on the list, was
  • 00:51:08
    all of the bomber flights. And this was
  • 00:51:10
    going on all through, I forget exactly
  • 00:51:12
    when it started. I believe it was during
  • 00:51:13
    Obama, but all through Trump, too. They
  • 00:51:17
    flew routinely they would fly um
  • 00:51:21
    American heavy bombers of different
  • 00:51:23
    types I guess B-52s and B2s and would
  • 00:51:26
    fly them at the Baltic coast at the
  • 00:51:29
    Black Sea coast and always mispronounce
  • 00:51:32
    it. It's Ashtto over there in the in the
  • 00:51:35
    far east. Um and essentially they're
  • 00:51:38
    testing as they put they're testing
  • 00:51:40
    Russian radars but they're turning back
  • 00:51:42
    at 12 and a half miles off the coast.
  • 00:51:44
    They're they're they're flying right up
  • 00:51:46
    to Russia's international airspace, you
  • 00:51:48
    know, border and then turn around again,
  • 00:51:52
    essentially forcing them to light up all
  • 00:51:54
    their radars.
  • 00:51:55
    They're rehearsing a nuclear first
  • 00:51:57
    strike.
  • 00:51:59
    And they're doing it constantly and and
  • 00:52:02
    having heavy naval exercises in the
  • 00:52:04
    Black Sea, which included confrontations
  • 00:52:06
    between British destroyers and the
  • 00:52:08
    Russians on two different occasions.
  • 00:52:10
    um this was all heavily provocative in
  • 00:52:14
    the leadup to the war and Biden
  • 00:52:16
    continued that same policy you know
  • 00:52:18
    through the year 2021 and I mean this
  • 00:52:22
    thing I'm sure anyone watching this can
  • 00:52:25
    imagine the hysteria in the United
  • 00:52:27
    States you know when the Russians fight
  • 00:52:29
    anywhere near Alaska it makes national
  • 00:52:31
    news you know even when they're they're
  • 00:52:34
    far from crossing any borders or
  • 00:52:36
    whatever they'll take the air defense
  • 00:52:38
    identification zone and pretend that
  • 00:52:40
    that's airspace and go, "Oh my god, they
  • 00:52:41
    crossed our air defense identification
  • 00:52:44
    zone," which is like fine, right? It's
  • 00:52:47
    okay. They imagine if they were really
  • 00:52:50
    flying within 12 miles of our coast all
  • 00:52:53
    the time, creeping up on California,
  • 00:52:55
    creeping up on New Jersey, creeping up
  • 00:52:58
    on our naval bases, you know, creeping
  • 00:53:01
    up on Corpus Christi. We would be on
  • 00:53:03
    Defcon, too, and telling them that you
  • 00:53:06
    better stop it or there's going to be
  • 00:53:07
    consequences immediately. And that's
  • 00:53:10
    under any president. You know, it hadn't
  • 00:53:12
    been like this since the old Cold War.
  • 00:53:14
    There's no way in the there's no reason
  • 00:53:15
    in the world why America needed to be
  • 00:53:18
    treating Putin's Russia in that way. And
  • 00:53:20
    as you said, soon as he came into power,
  • 00:53:22
    he tried to move west. I quote Joe Biden
  • 00:53:24
    himself in the book saying, "No Russian
  • 00:53:26
    leader in history has ever thrown in
  • 00:53:28
    with the West the way Vladimir Putin
  • 00:53:30
    has. This is our guy. We got to be good
  • 00:53:32
    friends with him." And this is
  • 00:53:35
    absolutely his take. He told um his
  • 00:53:37
    biographer, "Hey, look, I like uh eating
  • 00:53:40
    with chopsticks. That's fun, but like
  • 00:53:43
    come on. Are we an Asian society?" We're
  • 00:53:45
    not. We're part of Europe. We're
  • 00:53:49
    pale skinned and Christian. And so,
  • 00:53:53
    China's great and all that, but like our
  • 00:53:55
    civilization is this other civilization.
  • 00:53:57
    Like, obviously they're the bridge.
  • 00:53:59
    Obviously, they are the eastern most
  • 00:54:01
    part of Christrysendom. And yet, like,
  • 00:54:05
    are they part of Confucian civilization?
  • 00:54:07
    Does anyone think that? Okay. Right. So,
  • 00:54:09
    they're not. So, what's he going to do?
  • 00:54:11
    Communism's over. What are you going to
  • 00:54:13
    do now? Well, we're going to try to
  • 00:54:15
    integrate with the rest of Christian
  • 00:54:17
    Europe is what? Obviously, what else is
  • 00:54:19
    he supposed to do? It took America
  • 00:54:22
    kicking him out of Russia to get him to
  • 00:54:24
    turn toward the rest of Asia the way
  • 00:54:26
    that he has now. And hopefully that
  • 00:54:28
    could be repaired. But, put yourself in
  • 00:54:30
    Russia's position. Donald Trump right
  • 00:54:32
    now is willing to say, "Look, man, if
  • 00:54:34
    you guys will end the war, I will
  • 00:54:35
    completely normalize relations with you.
  • 00:54:38
    But if you're Sergey Lavough, what are
  • 00:54:40
    you going to tell Vladimir Putin about
  • 00:54:41
    that?" Well, Chelsea Clinton could be
  • 00:54:45
    the president three years from now, you
  • 00:54:48
    know? So, we could be in deep trouble,
  • 00:54:51
    right? Like I don't know if we can take
  • 00:54:54
    even if Donald Trump is absolutely
  • 00:54:56
    sincere and I believe he is sincere on
  • 00:54:57
    these Russia issues that he is probably
  • 00:54:59
    the least worst guy in DC when it comes
  • 00:55:01
    to Russia uh or one of them he he very
  • 00:55:05
    much would like to have a new friendship
  • 00:55:07
    with the Russian Federation again. Um,
  • 00:55:10
    but can he promise that that's how it
  • 00:55:13
    would stay even if the Russians live up
  • 00:55:15
    to their end of everything? Be pretty
  • 00:55:18
    difficult, you know? So, I I certainly
  • 00:55:21
    wish him the best with that. And as I
  • 00:55:23
    said before, I don't think there's any
  • 00:55:24
    issue that faces humanity more important
  • 00:55:26
    than America's relationship with Russia,
  • 00:55:29
    Washington, and Moscow, best friends
  • 00:55:31
    forever, or or deadly adversaries. If
  • 00:55:34
    we're going to have, you know, 7,000
  • 00:55:36
    Hbombs pointed at each other's head and
  • 00:55:38
    sweating and angry, that can't last. It
  • 00:55:42
    can't. We have to. Nobody's giving up
  • 00:55:44
    their Hbombs. So, at the very least, we
  • 00:55:46
    can do everything we can to try to
  • 00:55:49
    strike an attitude of friendship and
  • 00:55:51
    cooperation going forward.
  • 00:55:54
    Oh, well, that's wise words to finish
  • 00:55:56
    on. Uh yeah, I wish we had more time as
  • 00:55:58
    well because I I watched an excellent
  • 00:56:00
    debate of yours with Neil Ferguson and
  • 00:56:02
    he had a you know he had this um article
  • 00:56:06
    back in March of 2022 where he
  • 00:56:09
    interviewed some American and British
  • 00:56:12
    political and military leaders who had
  • 00:56:13
    all concluded in his article that the
  • 00:56:16
    only acceptable path to this war is
  • 00:56:20
    regime change in Moscow. we now have an
  • 00:56:22
    opportunity to believe the Russians and
  • 00:56:24
    you know essentially outlining what is
  • 00:56:26
    now condemned as as you know Russian
  • 00:56:29
    talking points but uh this was the
  • 00:56:32
    objective so it was a yeah a great
  • 00:56:34
    pleasure to see you arguing using his
  • 00:56:37
    words against him because of course now
  • 00:56:39
    that we're deep into this war we're not
  • 00:56:41
    allowed to say say this anymore so it
  • 00:56:44
    was it was amazing to watch him argue to
  • 00:56:47
    some extent against himself from yeah
  • 00:56:49
    three years ago so well it Not my best
  • 00:56:52
    debate performance, but I did get him on
  • 00:56:54
    that one.
  • 00:56:56
    I agree. So, anyways, uh thank you so
  • 00:56:58
    much for your time and for the
  • 00:57:00
    listeners, uh please check the
  • 00:57:01
    description for a link to Unprovoked by
  • 00:57:05
    Scott Horton. And uh yeah, so thanks
  • 00:57:07
    again for your time and uh uh yes, I
  • 00:57:10
    hope you'll come back on the program one
  • 00:57:12
    day. Absolutely. Thank you so much for
  • 00:57:14
    having me. I'd be happy to.
Tags
  • Scott Horton
  • Provoked
  • Ukraine
  • Russia
  • NATO
  • U.S. foreign policy
  • war narrative
  • peace negotiations
  • historical context
  • military actions