00:00:00
this Air India Express plane is
00:00:02
approaching Runway 10 at coric COD
00:00:04
International Airport in it are people
00:00:08
returning to India after being stuck in
00:00:10
Dubai due to the covid
00:00:12
lockdowns but this isn't going to be a
00:00:15
happy ending because in 5 minutes this
00:00:19
plane is going to
00:00:23
crash at the end of the runway is a 110
00:00:26
ft
00:00:27
Cliff the plane is going to touch down
00:00:29
on the the runway the pilot will apply
00:00:32
the brakes but he won't be able to stop
00:00:34
the
00:00:36
plane it'll overrun the
00:00:39
runway fall down the
00:00:41
cliff and break into three
00:00:53
sections this crash needn't have
00:00:58
happened many unfortunate events mostly
00:01:01
man-made combined to cause this
00:01:04
tragedy so the question now is what just
00:01:09
happened let's find
00:01:11
out this is the story of Air India
00:01:14
Express
00:01:16
[Music]
00:01:20
1344 many people across the globe were
00:01:23
stuck in other countries unable to
00:01:25
return home due to the sudden covid
00:01:28
lockdowns and for people people of the
00:01:30
Southern Indian state of Kerala where
00:01:32
coric Cod is
00:01:33
situated the Middle East is a popular
00:01:36
tourist and expat
00:01:38
destination so to bring Indian citizens
00:01:40
stranded outside the country back home
00:01:43
the Indian government organized
00:01:44
repatriation flights and one such flight
00:01:48
was Air India Express
00:01:50
1344 the aircraft used for this flight
00:01:53
was a 14-year-old Boeing
00:01:56
737800 which first flew for Air India
00:01:58
Express in 20 06 other than requiring
00:02:02
minor maintenance work over the years
00:02:04
the plane was in a good condition with
00:02:07
no major issues
00:02:10
recorded it's the morning of August 7th
00:02:12
at coric COD an empty flight with just
00:02:16
the crew takes off at 449 UTC headed for
00:02:20
Dubai the flight was flown by a
00:02:22
59-year-old captain and a 32-year-old
00:02:25
first officer after a short flight it
00:02:28
lands uneven at Dubai International
00:02:31
Airport at 811 UTC the return flight was
00:02:35
scheduled to depart 1 and a half hours
00:02:37
later at around 9:30
00:02:40
UTC due to co protocols the boarding was
00:02:44
slower than expected this made the
00:02:46
captain concerned and he was visibly
00:02:49
anxious the captain is going to play a
00:02:52
major role in this incident so let's
00:02:55
talk about him he was an ex Indian
00:02:57
military pilot and he had been working
00:02:59
working for Air India and then Air India
00:03:02
Express from around the year 2000 he had
00:03:05
around 11,000 hours of Total flying
00:03:07
experience of which 4,500 hours were on
00:03:10
the type he had a medical history of
00:03:13
diabetes for which he was prescribed
00:03:16
company approved allopathic
00:03:18
medications but unknown to anyone at
00:03:21
that time he was also taking ayurvedic
00:03:23
medications for his diabetes the
00:03:26
combination of the two could lead to
00:03:27
spikes in sugar levels and decreased
00:03:30
situational awareness the captain's
00:03:32
training records had some Curious
00:03:34
remarks in
00:03:35
them between the years 2009 and 2014
00:03:40
there were at least nine comments by
00:03:42
trainers and supervisors that said
00:03:46
unsatisfactory loses concentration when
00:03:48
under stress and tends to float during
00:03:53
Landings the captain's home base was
00:03:55
Mumbai and he was repositioned to Cory
00:03:58
code on the sixth
00:04:00
he was scheduled to fly flight 1344 to
00:04:03
Dubai on the 7th to be on standby Duty
00:04:06
on the 8th and then had another Dubai
00:04:08
flight on the 9th before returning to
00:04:11
Mumbai player number two in this
00:04:12
incident is the airline Air India
00:04:16
Express the way Air India Express bases
00:04:18
its Pilots is that the first officers
00:04:21
are posted based on where they are
00:04:23
required but the captains can choose
00:04:25
their home base as per their preference
00:04:28
this meant that at Cory Cod there were
00:04:30
26 first officers but only one Captain
00:04:33
stationed due to the sudden increase in
00:04:36
the number of repatriation flights there
00:04:38
weren't enough captains in goic COD and
00:04:41
hence the captain of this flight was
00:04:43
repositioned from
00:04:46
Mumbai the crew were undertaking their
00:04:48
pre-flight checks when the captain got
00:04:50
an update from Air India
00:04:52
Express the company had added an
00:04:55
additional flight to the schedule and
00:04:57
hence had to change the captain's roster
00:05:00
he was originally supposed to be on
00:05:01
standby Duty the next day but as for the
00:05:04
new schedule he was now asked to fly a
00:05:07
flight to Doha at 8:30 in the morning
00:05:11
company policy required a minimum rest
00:05:13
period of 12 hours between flights and
00:05:16
after adding on additional time for prep
00:05:18
and for travel the minimum Gap required
00:05:21
between the captain's two flights was 15
00:05:23
hours since his Dubai flight today was
00:05:26
scheduled to return at 7:00 p.m. ist the
00:05:29
Doha flight the next day was rescheduled
00:05:32
from 8:30 in the morning to 10: in the
00:05:34
morning to get a 15-hour
00:05:37
gap but what this meant was that any
00:05:40
delay to The Landing time of this flight
00:05:42
at coric code would delay the departure
00:05:44
of his flight to Doha the next
00:05:47
day this last minute assignment put
00:05:50
additional pressure on the captain to
00:05:52
land back at Cory code on
00:05:55
time this was a reason for the captain's
00:05:58
anxiety when when the boarding of
00:06:00
passengers in Dubai was
00:06:02
delayed now back to
00:06:04
Dubai 184 passengers and 10 infants
00:06:08
boarded the flight and were eager to
00:06:10
return to India after having spent an
00:06:12
uncertain 6 months in Dubai the pilots
00:06:15
pushed back as soon as the doors closed
00:06:17
and they departed Dubai at 1000
00:06:24
[Music]
00:06:26
UTC destination Cor
00:06:34
coric Cod is situated in the Indian
00:06:36
Peninsula it experiences significant
00:06:39
amount of rainfall due to its proximity
00:06:41
to the Western guts to the East and to
00:06:43
the Arabian Sea to its
00:06:45
West it's one of the wetest cities in
00:06:48
India and August is peak season for the
00:06:51
Southwest Monsoon which brings the city
00:06:54
most of its rainfall and on the day of
00:06:56
the incident the city was being battered
00:06:59
by rain rain the potential alternate
00:07:01
airports for kic COD were trali katur
00:07:05
and Ki they chose Kochi as the alternate
00:07:09
since both cities are on the same side
00:07:11
of the western GS the weather in koochi
00:07:14
was very similar to that of coric cod it
00:07:17
was raining and had a visibility of 2500
00:07:20
m 3 and 1 half hours after leaving Dubai
00:07:24
and whiles 52 nautical miles from coric
00:07:26
Cod airport the pilots got in touch with
00:07:29
at C who relayed that the visibility at
00:07:31
Cory Cod was 1500 M with a moderate
00:07:35
thunderstorm surface winds at 270° at 14
00:07:39
knots corico airport is also going to
00:07:42
play a crucial role in the
00:07:44
story this airport has what's called a
00:07:47
tabletop Runway it was constructed by
00:07:50
shaving off the top of a hill to create
00:07:52
a flat
00:07:55
tabletop these runways have steep drops
00:07:58
at both ends and on the sides at the end
00:08:01
of Runway 10 the ground drops 110 ft
00:08:05
here's a video of an air bus landing on
00:08:07
the runway and you can clearly see how
00:08:09
steep the edges are on this Runway
00:08:12
cicode airport is non-standard in many
00:08:15
ways every Runway has a Runway end
00:08:18
safety area a racer the racer is
00:08:21
designed using special material to
00:08:23
prevent airplanes from overshooting the
00:08:25
runway Racers are supposed to be 90 M by
00:08:28
90 m
00:08:29
but due to the unavailability of land
00:08:32
the width of the racer here varied
00:08:34
between 71 M and 85
00:08:37
M the airport also has a non-standard
00:08:41
Runway width due to land availability
00:08:43
restrictions the airport was approved to
00:08:46
have a Runway width of 75 M the standard
00:08:49
minimum width for a Runway is 140 M the
00:08:53
runway lighting at the airport was also
00:08:56
non-standard again due to the
00:08:58
unavailable ability of land the approach
00:09:01
Lights of the runway which the pilots
00:09:03
used to see and locate the runway was
00:09:05
permitted to be 150
00:09:07
M standard length of approach lights is
00:09:10
900 M due to how non-standard this
00:09:13
Runway is corod airport is classified as
00:09:16
a critical airport which means that only
00:09:19
the captain is allowed to operate the
00:09:21
flight from this airport the co-pilot
00:09:24
can only be pilot
00:09:26
monitoring cicor airport was under two
00:09:29
concurrent Aerodrome
00:09:31
warnings one for the rain and two
00:09:34
because the wind was exceeding 17
00:09:37
knots the conditions were so dangerous
00:09:40
that the airport had proactively
00:09:41
stationed airport fire engines at
00:09:44
predetermined points along the runway
00:09:47
during the approach the plane was flying
00:09:48
in light rain and moderate turbulence
00:09:51
conditions now we already know that the
00:09:54
plane failed to stop on the runway once
00:09:56
it landed at coric
00:09:58
cot to understand the reasons better you
00:10:01
need to understand the various
00:10:02
mechanisms available to a pilot to stop
00:10:05
a plane here's a quick guide the first
00:10:09
are the speed brakes remember when as a
00:10:11
kid you used to put your hand out of the
00:10:13
window of the car and you'd feel the
00:10:15
force of the wind on your hand and
00:10:17
there's resistance that is exactly what
00:10:20
a speed break
00:10:21
is if your hands were large enough that
00:10:24
wind resistance could have stopped the
00:10:26
car and we can use that same principle
00:10:29
to stop a
00:10:30
plane once the airplane touches down the
00:10:33
computer senses an increase in the force
00:10:35
of the wheels and immediately pops up
00:10:37
huge panels above the wing which
00:10:39
increases the drag and decreases the
00:10:42
speed the second are the
00:10:45
reversal during normal flight the
00:10:48
engines create thrust in this direction
00:10:51
which causes the plane to move in the
00:10:53
opposite direction but when the
00:10:55
reversers are enabled there's a panel in
00:10:57
the engine that opens up up and directs
00:11:00
the engine output in the opposite
00:11:02
direction this will cause the plane to
00:11:04
want to go in reverse thus slowing the
00:11:07
plane down the reverses are not
00:11:09
automatically deployed and will need to
00:11:11
be manually enabled by the pilot flying
00:11:14
the third is manual
00:11:16
braking this is similar to how you stop
00:11:19
your car the pilot can step on the brake
00:11:21
pedals to invoke manual braking and
00:11:24
bring the plane to a
00:11:26
stop and the last is Auto
00:11:29
braking due to the heavy workload that
00:11:31
the pilots have during Landing the
00:11:34
airplanes are designed to break
00:11:36
itself for this the Pilates need to set
00:11:39
the auto functionality to one of four
00:11:41
values these four values Define how
00:11:44
quickly the plane will come to a stop
00:11:47
when Max is selected the plane will stop
00:11:50
at the shortest distance possible and
00:11:52
when one is selected the plane will come
00:11:54
to a more gradual stop but when the
00:11:57
pilot manually breaks the Auto Brak is
00:11:59
automatically disabled and the computer
00:12:02
gives full control of braking to the
00:12:10
pilots now in order to know what flap
00:12:13
settings and auto Brak values to use the
00:12:15
pilots are required to calculate a
00:12:17
landing distance required value at every
00:12:20
approach
00:12:21
briefing this needs to be done every
00:12:23
time because no two approaches are ever
00:12:26
the same there could be differences in
00:12:28
weather aircraft weight and flying style
00:12:30
to account
00:12:32
for but these pilots on this approach
00:12:35
didn't calculate it the captain had
00:12:38
operated 36 flights in and out of corico
00:12:41
airport in the past 1 year and he chose
00:12:44
the auto Brak and flap settings from
00:12:46
memory the plane was cleared for ILS
00:12:49
approach for Runway 28 at 1344
00:12:52
UTC the approach for Runway 28 required
00:12:55
the plane to fly to the VR overfly F the
00:12:59
runway and then fly outward for a
00:13:01
specific distance do a U-turn and then
00:13:04
attempt the approach on Runway 28 the
00:13:07
ATC informed the crew that the runway
00:13:10
visibility was 2,000 M and it was
00:13:12
decreasing to 1500 M the wind was
00:13:15
blowing from 280° there was light rain
00:13:18
and the runway surface was
00:13:20
wet the captain was concerned about
00:13:23
visibility and instructed the first
00:13:25
officer to ensure that the windshield
00:13:27
wipers were working you just see that
00:13:30
this works remember put it to high and a
00:13:32
minute later he
00:13:34
said the first officer turned the wipers
00:13:37
on both the captain and the co-pilot saw
00:13:40
the runway leading lights and at exactly
00:13:43
the same time that they saw the lights
00:13:45
the captain's windshield wiper stopped
00:13:47
working Viper is gone what a day for the
00:13:50
wiper to
00:13:51
go due to the sudden decrease in
00:13:54
visibility because of the wiper stopping
00:13:56
the captain could no longer sight the
00:13:58
Runway and hence he decided to go
00:14:01
around they pressed the toga switch and
00:14:04
applied max power and executed the go on
00:14:07
procedure the aircraft was then cleared
00:14:09
by ATC to climb to 10,000
00:14:13
ft now there was an opportunity here for
00:14:16
the accident to be
00:14:18
averted but it was not
00:14:20
taken Air India expresses operating
00:14:23
procedures requires that if the
00:14:25
windshield wipers are not functioning
00:14:27
during rain then the plane has to diver
00:14:29
to an airport where it isn't
00:14:32
raining remember coric Cod is a critical
00:14:35
airport and hence the pilot monitoring
00:14:37
wasn't allowed to land the plane even if
00:14:40
he had a perfectly functioning wiper Ki
00:14:43
their chosen alternate was also in rainy
00:14:47
conditions the nearest airport that had
00:14:50
clear weather was katur they had
00:14:52
sufficient fuel to diver to their
00:14:54
alternates fuel was not an
00:14:57
issue but at no no point did the captain
00:15:00
nor the first officer discuss the
00:15:02
possibility of a diversion at the same
00:15:04
time that all of this was happening an
00:15:07
Air India Airbus A320 with call sign Air
00:15:10
India 425 is preparing to take off from
00:15:14
Cory code headed for Delhi the current
00:15:17
active Runway is Runway 28 but the pilot
00:15:20
of Air India 425 request the ATC for
00:15:24
permission to take off from Runway 10
00:15:26
instead this is because there are active
00:15:29
rain clouds over the direction of Runway
00:15:32
28 and the Air India plane wanted to
00:15:34
avoid it the ATC accepted this request
00:15:38
and immediately switched the active
00:15:40
Runway from Runway 28 to 10 and gave Air
00:15:44
India 425 taxi clearance to the
00:15:49
runway the ATC then asked the crew of
00:15:52
Air India Express 1344 whether they
00:15:54
would like to use Runway 10 as
00:15:56
well and reported that the current wind
00:15:59
was at 270° and at 8
00:16:02
knots so I've been mentioning the wind
00:16:04
speed and wind direction quite a few
00:16:06
times in this video why is the wind
00:16:09
speed and wind direction important let's
00:16:12
take a look airplanes usually land and
00:16:15
take off Against the Wind this is also
00:16:18
called
00:16:19
headwind this is because the aircraft's
00:16:22
wings relies on the speed of the air
00:16:24
moving over it to lift it off the ground
00:16:28
here's an example this is a small cesna
00:16:32
172 the takeoff speed is approximately
00:16:35
55 to 60
00:16:36
knots keep an eye on the wind sock at
00:16:39
the back it'll show you how fast the
00:16:41
wind is blowing I'm going to park the
00:16:44
plane and then increase the wind speed
00:16:46
to 55
00:16:47
knots and as I keep increasing the wind
00:16:50
at one point the plane just starts to
00:16:54
fly I admited it's not stable because
00:16:57
I'm not controlling it but this is a
00:17:00
good illustration to show that it's not
00:17:03
the ground speed of the plane on the
00:17:04
runway but rather the speed of the wind
00:17:07
over the wings that matters the higher
00:17:10
the wind speed over the plane the
00:17:11
shorter the takeoff or Landing distance
00:17:14
for example here the takeoff distance
00:17:17
was 0
00:17:18
m now let's flip the wind direction the
00:17:22
little plane now has a
00:17:24
Tailwind the wind is blowing from the
00:17:26
right to the left and as you can see as
00:17:30
I start increasing the wind speed the
00:17:32
wind is pushing the plane forward it
00:17:34
doesn't fly so to stop this plane I need
00:17:37
to press the brakes harder to counteract
00:17:40
the wind which means if I land with a
00:17:43
Tailwind I'm going to need a much longer
00:17:46
Landing distance to bring the plane to a
00:17:49
stop so at this point the ATC has asked
00:17:52
the pilots whether they'd like to land
00:17:54
on Runway 10 instead of Runway
00:17:57
28 Runway way 10 was the inferior of the
00:18:00
two runways it doesn't have leaden
00:18:02
lights and they would also be flying
00:18:05
with a Tailwind which would increase a
00:18:07
landing distance but on the other hand
00:18:09
remember the captain is under pressure
00:18:12
to make sure his flight the next day
00:18:14
isn't delayed he needs to land this
00:18:16
plane on time he was already half an
00:18:20
hour late when he took off from Dubai
00:18:22
and he's now had to spend additional
00:18:24
time due to the go around if he were to
00:18:27
land on Runway 20 eight he'd have to
00:18:29
once again intercept the V fly back over
00:18:33
the runway make a U turn and then
00:18:35
attempt The Landing at Runway
00:18:38
28 there's also this concern that the
00:18:40
weather system that they are in right
00:18:42
now would move over the runway whilst
00:18:45
they are setting themselves up for
00:18:47
Runway 28 visibility is 2,000 M wind is
00:18:51
at 260° at 5
00:18:53
knots considering all this they decide
00:18:56
to land on Runway 10 and for the second
00:18:59
time today no calculation of the landing
00:19:02
distance was
00:19:03
done the pilots didn't brief each other
00:19:06
either the flaps and auto Brak settings
00:19:09
were set from memory the crew chose
00:19:13
flaps 30 the correct setting for this
00:19:15
approach was 40 the crew chose Auto
00:19:19
break 3 the recommended value was
00:19:22
Max at 1400 UTC Air India Express 1344
00:19:27
was then cleared to approach Runway 10 1
00:19:30
minute later the Air India flight to
00:19:33
Delhi departed from Runway 10 and by
00:19:35
this time the wind speed had doubled to
00:19:38
10 knots and was gusting from
00:19:41
270° at 1406 the aircraft was
00:19:44
established on the
00:19:46
localizer the captain then instructed
00:19:49
the first officer I'll tell you when to
00:19:51
put it
00:19:52
on I hope it works he was referring to
00:19:55
the windshield
00:19:56
wiper a minute later the wiper was
00:19:58
turned on but it was working at a much
00:20:01
slower
00:20:04
speed ATC cleared them to land on Runway
00:20:06
10 with a visibility of 2,000 M and a
00:20:10
wet Runway surface during Landing the
00:20:13
plane needs to follow the Glide
00:20:15
slope the Glide slope is an imaginary 3°
00:20:18
line from the end of the runway that
00:20:20
planes follow for a normal Landing when
00:20:23
the plane is on the Glide slope the pink
00:20:25
diamond will be
00:20:26
centered the first F the diamond is off
00:20:29
center the further away from the Glide
00:20:31
slope they
00:20:33
are things are going to start happening
00:20:35
very fast now the already heavy workload
00:20:39
on the crew is increasing
00:20:41
significantly the first officer
00:20:43
disengaged the autopilot at 500 ft above
00:20:45
the ground the pitch of the plane
00:20:48
reduced and The Descent rate started to
00:20:49
increase touching 1500 ft a
00:20:53
minute the ideal descent rate is 750 ft
00:20:56
per
00:20:57
minute
00:20:58
the first officer cautioned the pilot
00:21:00
about the high rate of descent rate of
00:21:02
descent
00:21:05
check they were now5 nautical miles from
00:21:08
the runway the airplane was well below
00:21:11
the Glide slope and was too close to the
00:21:13
ground the ground proximity warning
00:21:15
system warned them with a Glide slope
00:21:18
Glide slope
00:21:19
warning the plane was around two dots
00:21:22
away from the Glide slope this has now
00:21:25
become a very unstabilized approach
00:21:28
noticing that the captain hadn't reduced
00:21:30
the rate of descent sufficiently the
00:21:32
first officer cautioned him again rate
00:21:35
of descent Captain yeah yeah correcting
00:21:37
correcting correcting it's time we
00:21:39
talked about the final player in this
00:21:41
incident the first officer the first
00:21:44
officer was a 32-year-old male he had a
00:21:47
total flying experience of around 2,000
00:21:49
hours having joined Air India Express
00:21:52
just 2 years prior to the incident the
00:21:54
first officer was flying with a captain
00:21:56
whom he had never flown with before
00:21:58
before with a captain who was almost
00:22:00
twice age who was ex Indian military and
00:22:04
was also a training Captain within the
00:22:06
company whereas the co-pilot himself had
00:22:09
just 2 years of experience in the
00:22:11
cockpit the power gradient here was
00:22:15
significant rate of descent Captain yeah
00:22:17
yeah correcting correcting correcting
00:22:19
the captain corrected The Descent and
00:22:21
the plane momentarily went slightly
00:22:23
above the Glide slope the plane crossed
00:22:26
the threshold of Runway 10 at a height
00:22:28
of 92 ft the engine thrust was at
00:22:32
61% the auto throttle was commanding to
00:22:35
reduce thrust to land the plane but the
00:22:38
captain increased the engine thrust to
00:22:40
83% this caused the plane to not touch
00:22:43
down and instead it just floated above
00:22:45
the runway for the next 5 Seconds the
00:22:48
first officer tried to get the captain's
00:22:49
attention by saying just check
00:22:52
it at this point the aircraft was 2,500
00:22:56
ft from the start of the runway and the
00:22:58
touchdown Zone would end in 500 ft the
00:23:01
touchdown zone is a marked area on the
00:23:04
runway where the plane needs to land
00:23:06
inside off in order to provide the
00:23:08
pilots with sufficient distance to come
00:23:10
to a stop by not touching down in time
00:23:13
the plane was eating into valuable
00:23:15
stopping distance remember this plane is
00:23:18
landing on a wet Runway and with a
00:23:20
Tailwind both of which would increase
00:23:22
your Landing distance so it's important
00:23:25
that they got this right also remember
00:23:27
these pil hadn't calculated their actual
00:23:30
Landing distance during the approach so
00:23:32
they're basically just winging It 2
00:23:35
seconds later the captain reduced the
00:23:37
thrust to try to get the wheels to touch
00:23:39
the ground but the plane had already
00:23:42
crossed the end of the touchdown Zone
00:23:44
the first officer said a feeble Captain
00:23:47
go around when a go around call is given
00:23:50
by either pilot a go around has to be
00:23:53
carried out also after two go rounds the
00:23:57
pilots have to divert to an alternate
00:23:59
airport and cannot attempt a third
00:24:01
Landing but the captain here is under
00:24:04
pressure to not delay The Landing so
00:24:06
that his flight the next day can take
00:24:08
off on
00:24:09
time if he goes around now he'll have to
00:24:12
divert to
00:24:13
katur so he ignores the Goon
00:24:17
call due to the Steep power gradient in
00:24:19
the cockpit the co-pilot doesn't
00:24:21
override the captain and conduct the go
00:24:23
around
00:24:24
himself the plane touched down on the
00:24:26
runway one second after the Goon call
00:24:29
was made at 1410 UTC the plane was
00:24:32
traveling at around 165 knots at this
00:24:34
point and it had already consumed 4438
00:24:37
ft of the available 8858 ft the captain
00:24:42
then applied Max manual
00:24:44
braking the speed brakes were
00:24:46
automatically deployed the first officer
00:24:49
made mandatory call outs speed brake up
00:24:52
Auto break disarm but the captain didn't
00:24:54
respond to these call outs after 3
00:24:57
seconds the captain deployed the thrust
00:24:59
reverses but then shut it off within 2
00:25:02
seconds before it had any impact and at
00:25:05
the same time that he shut off the
00:25:07
reverses he lifted his legs from the
00:25:09
brake pedal which reduced the braking
00:25:11
effect it is likely that he was in two
00:25:14
minds about going around but it was too
00:25:16
late to spool the engines back up but
00:25:19
also the plane wasn't stopping in
00:25:22
time he then applied the thrust
00:25:25
reverses again when the reverses maximum
00:25:29
the plane was already beyond the end of
00:25:30
the runway and in the racer both Pilots
00:25:34
said it exited the runway at a
00:25:37
speed of 85 knots way higher than what
00:25:40
the racer was designed for it broke the
00:25:42
ILS antennas and a fence before
00:25:45
plummeting down the cliff of the
00:25:46
tabletop
00:25:49
Runway the plane fell 110 ft down the
00:25:53
cliff unfortunately this impact resulted
00:25:57
in the death of 21 people including the
00:25:59
two pilots the primary cause of the
00:26:02
accident was attributed to the pilot
00:26:05
flying not following established
00:26:07
procedures and not going around when the
00:26:10
approach was
00:26:12
unstabilized the investigation team also
00:26:14
found systemic failures within the
00:26:17
airlines training and rostering
00:26:19
procedures and the airport's design and
00:26:21
certification as contributing factors to
00:26:24
the incident the investigators found
00:26:26
that Air India Express didn't have its
00:26:29
own simulators and was instead using
00:26:31
those of Air
00:26:33
India and those simulators were in
00:26:35
properly maintained and had multiple
00:26:37
flaws in how it performed due to this
00:26:40
the pilots were learning incorrect
00:26:42
techniques in the simulator what the
00:26:44
industry refers to as negative training
00:26:47
recommendations were also made to
00:26:49
improve the runway lighting at kico
00:26:50
airport and to also increase eraser at
00:26:53
both ends of the
00:26:55
runway the runway lighting was upgraded
00:26:57
in October 2023 3 years after the
00:27:01
incident there were 37 other
00:27:03
recommendations that were made which are
00:27:06
all available in the final report that
00:27:08
I've Linked In the video
00:27:09
description if you like this video
00:27:12
here's another story of an Air India
00:27:14
Boeing 7 that lost all navigation
00:27:16
instruments and was stuck in the clouds
00:27:19
unable to land in New York City I'll see
00:27:22
you
00:27:24
there
