The U.S.-Russia Summit: What Happened, Divisions in the West, Ukrainian Frustrations and What's Next

00:38:25
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X-rQx9WTHxc

Summary

TLDRThe video discusses a recent U.S.-Russia summit, focusing on the geopolitical ramifications of excluding Europe and Ukraine from talks. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's meeting highlights tensions and complex dynamics in international relations. The video elaborates on Trump's role in pushing for greater European defense contributions, the shifting sentiments among the American public towards military aid for Ukraine, and challenges regarding NATO membership for Ukraine. Furthermore, it reflects on historical precedents of conflict resolution and considers the possibility of an enduring guerrilla conflict in Ukraine, amidst a fluctuating political landscape.

Takeaways

  • 📸 Recent summit between the U.S. and Russia held in Saudi Arabia.
  • 🗣️ Marco Rubio represented the U.S., while Sergei Lavrov represented Russia.
  • ⚖️ The U.S. is encouraging Europe to take more responsibility in defense matters.
  • 🇺🇦 Public opinion in the U.S. is mixed regarding military aid to Ukraine.
  • 📉 U.S. withdrawal of aid could weaken Ukraine's military efforts.
  • ❌ NATO membership for Ukraine is currently unlikely due to opposition from some member states.

Timeline

  • 00:00:00 - 00:05:00

    The video discusses a recent summit between the United States and Russia held in Saudi Arabia, featuring Marco Rubio and Sergey Lavrov, and outlines the current geopolitical tensions involving Ukraine.

  • 00:05:00 - 00:10:00

    The presenter emphasizes the uncertainty surrounding the U.S. foreign policy approach towards Europe and Ukraine, particularly in light of Trump's stance on European defense contributions, suggesting a strategic shift in U.S. relations with Europe.

  • 00:10:00 - 00:15:00

    A discussion is presented on U.S. public opinion regarding military support for Ukraine, noting that while there is no majority pushing to decrease support, skepticism remains about increasing aid, indicating a divided stance in America.

  • 00:15:00 - 00:20:00

    The presenter highlights the evolving nature of U.S. foreign policy under Trump, with contrasting historical perspectives between parties, leading to uncertainty about future positions and decisions on Ukraine and Russia.

  • 00:20:00 - 00:25:00

    Though many allies may see neglect in U.S. foreign policy, they also recognize the urgency Trump's policies inspire in Europe, as leaders seek to take more responsibility for their defense against Russian aggression.

  • 00:25:00 - 00:30:00

    The discussion includes skepticism about Russia's position in relation to China and Taiwan, asserting that Beijing does not view a U.S.-Russia deal as a beneficial precedent for its own geopolitical interests, particularly regarding Taiwan.

  • 00:30:00 - 00:38:25

    The host concludes that peace negotiations in conflicts like Ukraine will be complex and prolonged, drawing parallels with historical conflicts, while expressing cautious optimism about the potential for establishing lines of communication.

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Mind Map

Video Q&A

  • What happened at the recent U.S.-Russia summit?

    A summit took place in Saudi Arabia with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov discussing peace talks concerning Ukraine.

  • Why did the U.S. exclude Europe and Ukraine from peace talks?

    The video suggests the U.S. aims to encourage Europe to take more responsibility for its own defense.

  • How does Trump view Europe’s contributions to defense?

    Trump believes Europe has free-ridden on U.S. defense expenditures and wants Europe to contribute more.

  • What is the current American public sentiment toward aid for Ukraine?

    Polls show mixed support, with many favoring maintaining current aid levels instead of increasing support.

  • What might happen if the U.S. withdraws aid from Ukraine?

    Ukraine could face challenges in maintaining its current military efforts, potentially weakening its position.

  • Why is NATO membership for Ukraine currently unlikely?

    Current NATO dynamics, particularly resistance from Hungary and Turkey, make membership unlikely.

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Subtitles
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  • 00:00:00
    well in case you were asleep for the
  • 00:00:02
    last 24 hours this is a real photo we
  • 00:00:06
    have had a summit between the United
  • 00:00:08
    States and Russia in Saudi Arabia as you
  • 00:00:11
    can see there Marco Rubio the Secretary
  • 00:00:14
    of State for the United States the main
  • 00:00:16
    representative for the United States at
  • 00:00:18
    the summit and on the right here we have
  • 00:00:20
    sge lavro the main representative from
  • 00:00:22
    Russia he's there foreign minister what
  • 00:00:25
    the heck actually happened well let's
  • 00:00:27
    have a Q&A and talk about it oh and
  • 00:00:30
    don't forget that you can use the
  • 00:00:31
    chapter buttons on the timeline to skip
  • 00:00:33
    two particular questions if you're
  • 00:00:35
    uninterested in the one that I'm
  • 00:00:37
    currently talking about I think we can
  • 00:00:39
    start with the question what the fair
  • 00:00:42
    enough that is a good point I also think
  • 00:00:45
    that a recurring segment in today's
  • 00:00:47
    video is going to be me saying I don't
  • 00:00:50
    know or we can't be sure yet or we need
  • 00:00:53
    to have some more time to see what's
  • 00:00:54
    actually going on you want to keep score
  • 00:00:57
    at home feel free to do so maybe make a
  • 00:00:59
    drinking game out of
  • 00:01:01
    it what does the USA gain by excluding
  • 00:01:04
    Europe and Ukraine from these initial
  • 00:01:06
    peace talks all right strap in because
  • 00:01:09
    this is a rant that I have wanted to go
  • 00:01:11
    on for the last couple of weeks Trump
  • 00:01:14
    complains that Europe does not
  • 00:01:16
    contribute enough to defense whether
  • 00:01:18
    that's the last 25 or 35 years or maybe
  • 00:01:21
    going back further into the cold war
  • 00:01:24
    that Europe has essentially chosen to
  • 00:01:26
    free ride off us expenditures and Trump
  • 00:01:29
    wants Europe to contribute its fair
  • 00:01:31
    share whether that fair share is the 2%
  • 00:01:34
    goal that was agreed upon prior to
  • 00:01:36
    Russia's invasion of Ukraine or maybe a
  • 00:01:39
    higher percentage of GDP whatever that
  • 00:01:42
    is Trump wants Europe to start
  • 00:01:44
    contributing more okay how has Europe
  • 00:01:47
    responded to that well they convened a
  • 00:01:50
    major meeting involving a lot of top
  • 00:01:52
    leaders from around Europe to discuss
  • 00:01:55
    what Europe can do by themselves in the
  • 00:01:58
    absence of the United States to protect
  • 00:02:00
    Europe from Russia essentially believing
  • 00:02:03
    that the United States May soon be
  • 00:02:05
    abandoning the continent or something to
  • 00:02:07
    that effect abandonment is a little bit
  • 00:02:09
    of a strong word and we might go back to
  • 00:02:11
    that point later on in this video
  • 00:02:14
    actually because I pulled on that
  • 00:02:16
    recently let's just get this topic out
  • 00:02:18
    of the way now European leaders are not
  • 00:02:20
    actually worried about the United States
  • 00:02:22
    abandoning the continent of Europe it's
  • 00:02:25
    more of a concern that the United States
  • 00:02:27
    is not going to be contributing as much
  • 00:02:29
    to Europe defense and Europe trying to
  • 00:02:31
    figure out solutions to that problem so
  • 00:02:34
    it's not zero dollars and zero effort
  • 00:02:36
    and zero troops involved in Europe from
  • 00:02:38
    the United States's perspective it is
  • 00:02:41
    just a lower amount than the Baseline
  • 00:02:43
    that Europe has come to expect over the
  • 00:02:45
    last few decades and I know that because
  • 00:02:48
    I have had conversations with European
  • 00:02:50
    officials to that effect but I don't
  • 00:02:53
    want to spoil what is going to be a
  • 00:02:55
    fantastic video next week on the main
  • 00:02:57
    channel so hold off further thoughts on
  • 00:03:00
    that until next week the point is and
  • 00:03:03
    recapping a little bit here Trump wanted
  • 00:03:05
    Europe to contribute more to European
  • 00:03:08
    Defense Trump does things that Europe
  • 00:03:11
    doesn't like Europe responds by
  • 00:03:13
    panicking and then figuring out ways to
  • 00:03:16
    contribute more to European Defense
  • 00:03:19
    Trump is getting exactly what he wants
  • 00:03:21
    from this
  • 00:03:22
    situation now I do not mean to suggest
  • 00:03:25
    that Trump is playing some sort of 4D
  • 00:03:27
    chess here I do not know it is I said it
  • 00:03:30
    I don't know I do not know what is going
  • 00:03:33
    on in Trump's mind here but the effect
  • 00:03:36
    that Trump wants is a consequence of
  • 00:03:39
    Trump's actions and I can tell you
  • 00:03:41
    further that there are lots of people
  • 00:03:43
    inside of the Trump Administration who
  • 00:03:45
    are mostly coming from careers as career
  • 00:03:48
    diplomats and career defense officials
  • 00:03:51
    so not these straightforward sorts of
  • 00:03:53
    political appointees that are coming
  • 00:03:55
    through the Trump campaign or lifelong
  • 00:03:57
    Republicans who have sworn some sort of
  • 00:03:59
    loyalty to the political party and are
  • 00:04:01
    being appointed two positions as a
  • 00:04:03
    consequence of that I'm talking about
  • 00:04:05
    people that are living inside of the
  • 00:04:07
    United States's bureaucracy and would be
  • 00:04:09
    working in other administrations too if
  • 00:04:11
    someone else had won the presidency
  • 00:04:13
    whether it is a Democrat or whether it
  • 00:04:15
    is a republican who is not Trump so
  • 00:04:18
    these individuals inside of the Trump
  • 00:04:19
    Administration they want Europe to
  • 00:04:22
    contribute more to European Defense and
  • 00:04:24
    they recognize that the consequences of
  • 00:04:27
    Trump's actions are producing this sort
  • 00:04:29
    of of outcome so I can guarantee you
  • 00:04:32
    that they are not particularly inclined
  • 00:04:34
    to try to convince Trump to start acting
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    differently given that they are getting
  • 00:04:39
    what they want out of the outcome even
  • 00:04:41
    if it is not necessarily a normal way to
  • 00:04:44
    reach such an outcome in some the United
  • 00:04:47
    States does gain something by excluding
  • 00:04:49
    Europe here is it worth it I don't know
  • 00:04:52
    about that but at least there is some
  • 00:04:55
    gain it's not just a straightforward
  • 00:04:57
    loss why is the American americ public
  • 00:05:00
    so against disarming and destroying the
  • 00:05:02
    military of a geopolitical enemy while
  • 00:05:05
    expending zero American lives and some
  • 00:05:07
    1980s equipment I get what the question
  • 00:05:10
    is saying overall although I think it is
  • 00:05:12
    worth pointing out that there's a little
  • 00:05:13
    bit of hyperbole at the end there it is
  • 00:05:16
    not just that the United States is
  • 00:05:17
    drawing down supplies of 1980s equipment
  • 00:05:20
    from its warehouses as a consequence of
  • 00:05:23
    the war the United States has also had
  • 00:05:25
    to make Capital expenditures and is also
  • 00:05:27
    having to produce more stuff on a
  • 00:05:29
    marginal cost basis that it would not
  • 00:05:31
    have to do if this war was not being
  • 00:05:34
    fought or alternatively the United
  • 00:05:36
    States bowed out of its fight entirely
  • 00:05:38
    by not supplying Ukraine that caveat
  • 00:05:41
    aside I think this question is
  • 00:05:43
    referencing a series of polls that tend
  • 00:05:45
    to show that a majority of US citizens
  • 00:05:48
    are against increasing Aid to Ukraine
  • 00:05:52
    now to be clear it is not the case that
  • 00:05:55
    a majority of US citizens want to
  • 00:05:57
    decrease Aid to Ukraine usually when
  • 00:06:00
    these surveys are conducted there is a
  • 00:06:02
    third option which is to maintain
  • 00:06:04
    current levels and that tends to be a
  • 00:06:06
    popular one such that you get maybe
  • 00:06:09
    close to a third saying that they want
  • 00:06:10
    to increase close to a third saying that
  • 00:06:13
    they want to decrease and close to a
  • 00:06:15
    third saying that they want things to
  • 00:06:16
    stay the same nonetheless the question
  • 00:06:19
    Still Remains why isn't there more
  • 00:06:21
    support and at the risk of giving half
  • 00:06:24
    an answer to that question there is a
  • 00:06:26
    long running debate in US politics
  • 00:06:29
    research
  • 00:06:30
    about whether political preferences come
  • 00:06:32
    from the bottom up or come from the top
  • 00:06:35
    down what I mean by that is a bottom up
  • 00:06:38
    situation is where you have individual
  • 00:06:40
    citizens inside of the United States
  • 00:06:42
    forming their own political beliefs and
  • 00:06:44
    political preferences and then
  • 00:06:46
    communicating that information either
  • 00:06:48
    directly by talking to candidates or by
  • 00:06:51
    voting the candidates they like into
  • 00:06:53
    office such that the policy preferences
  • 00:06:55
    that they have are reflected by those
  • 00:06:58
    individuals who are getting into office
  • 00:07:01
    the opposite of that is the top- down
  • 00:07:03
    approach where you have leaders in
  • 00:07:05
    office especially the president using
  • 00:07:07
    the power of that office and the bully
  • 00:07:09
    pulpit and all of the media attention
  • 00:07:11
    that they Garner to change the minds of
  • 00:07:13
    Voters down below and I think what we
  • 00:07:16
    have seen for the last eight years or so
  • 00:07:19
    is that we now live in an era where
  • 00:07:21
    things are topped down especially as it
  • 00:07:23
    relates to Trump and especially as it
  • 00:07:26
    relates to foreign policy concerns for
  • 00:07:29
    most most of us history there has been
  • 00:07:31
    little difference in foreign policy
  • 00:07:33
    platforms between the two major dominant
  • 00:07:36
    parties in US politics in other words if
  • 00:07:39
    you elected a Republican or elected a
  • 00:07:41
    Democrat for the current ERA of the two-
  • 00:07:43
    party system you would have a relatively
  • 00:07:45
    same foreign policy platform now
  • 00:07:48
    obviously there are a lot of exceptions
  • 00:07:50
    to that you can think about John krey
  • 00:07:52
    versus George W bush and go back to
  • 00:07:54
    Nixon's Administration and how Nixon got
  • 00:07:56
    into office as running against the
  • 00:07:58
    Vietnam War so there are exceptions out
  • 00:08:00
    there but by and large the big
  • 00:08:03
    overarching picture of us politics and
  • 00:08:05
    US foreign policy is relative
  • 00:08:08
    convergence between the two parties on
  • 00:08:10
    the particular platforms well to be
  • 00:08:13
    blunt we don't have that anymore and it
  • 00:08:16
    is unclear whether that is a trump
  • 00:08:18
    specific effect or if that is just the
  • 00:08:20
    new era that we live in in other words I
  • 00:08:23
    do not know if we jump three years from
  • 00:08:26
    now and we go to the Republican
  • 00:08:28
    primaries we have Donald Trump Fading
  • 00:08:30
    Into the background as a lame duck and
  • 00:08:32
    instead we're going to have new blood
  • 00:08:34
    from the Republican party vying for the
  • 00:08:35
    presidency through that primary election
  • 00:08:38
    I don't know whether it's still going to
  • 00:08:40
    be top down where those candidates are
  • 00:08:42
    going to be persuading voters and having
  • 00:08:44
    voters be convinced by them having a
  • 00:08:46
    particular position for the voters to
  • 00:08:49
    adopt that position or if it's going to
  • 00:08:51
    switch to being back to bottom up where
  • 00:08:53
    the candidates are listening to what
  • 00:08:55
    voters actually want with Donald Trump
  • 00:08:57
    again perhaps faded into the background
  • 00:08:59
    and then the candidates adopting those
  • 00:09:01
    positions and another reason why this
  • 00:09:04
    matters now and this is something that
  • 00:09:05
    I've said many times in the past is that
  • 00:09:08
    if Donald Trump wants to he can snap his
  • 00:09:11
    fingers adjust the way that he thinks
  • 00:09:13
    about foreign policy and do this in a
  • 00:09:15
    public way that's going to change the
  • 00:09:17
    political positions of the people down
  • 00:09:19
    below as well again because this is top
  • 00:09:21
    down if Trump changes his mind we are
  • 00:09:24
    going to see that reflected with what
  • 00:09:25
    the masses are looking at politically
  • 00:09:28
    especially when it comes to the Republic
  • 00:09:29
    party or voters who identify as
  • 00:09:32
    Republicans now that's interesting from
  • 00:09:34
    a foreign policy platform perspective
  • 00:09:37
    because it means that we do not have
  • 00:09:39
    necessarily the most stable foreign
  • 00:09:41
    policies anymore it could be the case
  • 00:09:43
    that Donald Trump switches his opinion
  • 00:09:45
    and then there is a massive switch with
  • 00:09:47
    the voters behind them and as a
  • 00:09:48
    consequence of that we have completely
  • 00:09:50
    changed our foreign policy overnight
  • 00:09:52
    we're kind of seeing that right now with
  • 00:09:54
    the way the negotiations are going
  • 00:09:55
    between the United States and Russia but
  • 00:09:57
    I don't think that we should be holding
  • 00:09:59
    to the idea that this is going to be
  • 00:10:01
    consistent it could be very well the
  • 00:10:03
    case that I don't know 5 days from now
  • 00:10:06
    we start seeing a lot of anti-russia
  • 00:10:08
    rhetoric coming from Trump and suddenly
  • 00:10:10
    this seems like it's politically three
  • 00:10:13
    years ago at this point just think about
  • 00:10:15
    the roller coaster ride we've been on
  • 00:10:17
    over the last four months when Trump was
  • 00:10:19
    candidate trump it seemed that he was a
  • 00:10:21
    relative Ukraine skeptic then after
  • 00:10:24
    Trump won the election seemed like Trump
  • 00:10:27
    buckled down and started getting a
  • 00:10:28
    little bit harsh with his rhetoric
  • 00:10:30
    against Russia then we fast forward to
  • 00:10:32
    just a few weeks ago and it seems like
  • 00:10:34
    that is flipped again well if we fast
  • 00:10:36
    forward three weeks into the future from
  • 00:10:38
    now is it going to flip another time and
  • 00:10:40
    then what about three months from now
  • 00:10:42
    all of this again I don't know how is
  • 00:10:46
    alienating most of its historical
  • 00:10:48
    partners and allies a viable long-term
  • 00:10:51
    strategy for US foreign policy again
  • 00:10:54
    this is going to be a topic for next
  • 00:10:56
    week on the main Channel I think there
  • 00:10:58
    is something interesting worth working
  • 00:11:00
    through right now though among hawkish
  • 00:11:03
    allies thinking here about individuals
  • 00:11:05
    within Europe not countries but
  • 00:11:07
    individuals who have hawkish beliefs who
  • 00:11:10
    think that the United States and Europe
  • 00:11:12
    should be taking a harsher stance
  • 00:11:14
    against Russia there is a belief that
  • 00:11:17
    Trump is right about Europe slacking off
  • 00:11:20
    in other words that Europe has chosen to
  • 00:11:22
    free ride off of the United States and
  • 00:11:24
    it's been to the overall detriment of
  • 00:11:27
    Europe and Western priorities
  • 00:11:30
    the only quibble of course that they
  • 00:11:31
    have is that perhaps Trump's delivery of
  • 00:11:34
    the message is not so great and that
  • 00:11:36
    maybe Biden was also trying to express
  • 00:11:39
    similar sorts of concerns but was much
  • 00:11:42
    better at being diplomatic about it the
  • 00:11:44
    flip side of course though is that
  • 00:11:46
    perhaps Biden wasn't getting as much
  • 00:11:48
    urgency from European leaders As Trump
  • 00:11:50
    has induced out of them over the last
  • 00:11:52
    few weeks that aside there is an
  • 00:11:55
    interesting evolution in how allies have
  • 00:11:57
    been looking at the situation over the
  • 00:11:59
    last decade or so when Trump first won
  • 00:12:02
    office in 2016 the Ally opinion was that
  • 00:12:06
    this is just a phase perhaps for the
  • 00:12:08
    United States and that it will pass and
  • 00:12:12
    four years later when Biden wins in 2020
  • 00:12:15
    there's some confirmation of that from
  • 00:12:17
    the Allies perspective that the United
  • 00:12:19
    States or the citizens of the United
  • 00:12:21
    States saw what happened under the first
  • 00:12:23
    Trump Administration and realized that
  • 00:12:25
    this was not going to be an effective
  • 00:12:27
    strategy for how the world needs to be
  • 00:12:29
    organized from the Western perspective
  • 00:12:32
    and then bringing Biden in is a return
  • 00:12:34
    to normaly to some degree well at this
  • 00:12:37
    point those same allies are no longer
  • 00:12:39
    thinking that this is just a phase that
  • 00:12:40
    is going to pass from the United States
  • 00:12:43
    that this is something that Europe needs
  • 00:12:44
    to confront as a possible reality from
  • 00:12:47
    every four-year election Cycles
  • 00:12:49
    perspective it might not be the case
  • 00:12:51
    that there'll be a repeat of this in
  • 00:12:52
    2028 but it could be and even if there
  • 00:12:55
    isn't in 2028 there's no guarantees for
  • 00:12:58
    2032 either
  • 00:13:00
    and again I know that we are so many
  • 00:13:01
    years away from this and it's always the
  • 00:13:03
    worst thing to think about how quickly
  • 00:13:05
    the United States goes through its
  • 00:13:06
    election cycles and we're always already
  • 00:13:09
    thinking about the next election but one
  • 00:13:11
    of the Intriguing things to see about
  • 00:13:13
    what's going to happen in the 2028
  • 00:13:15
    primaries is do we have a more Rubio
  • 00:13:18
    style approach which has some of the
  • 00:13:21
    elements of what the Trump
  • 00:13:22
    Administration wants to do from a
  • 00:13:24
    foreign policy perspective but is better
  • 00:13:27
    able to wrap it up and is a little bit
  • 00:13:29
    more diplomatic with its execution or is
  • 00:13:32
    what comes out of the Republican Party
  • 00:13:34
    something more like JD Vance who of
  • 00:13:36
    course is the betting market leader
  • 00:13:38
    right now to win the Republican
  • 00:13:39
    primaries which is more similar to how
  • 00:13:41
    Trump has approached the situation well
  • 00:13:44
    I don't know we're going to have to find
  • 00:13:45
    out later how do you think the Trump
  • 00:13:48
    Administration will be perceived
  • 00:13:49
    domestically and internationally if they
  • 00:13:52
    capitulated to Russian demands in the
  • 00:13:54
    negotiations will this encourage China
  • 00:13:56
    to make advances on Taiwan this is
  • 00:13:59
    actually something that I don't lose
  • 00:14:01
    very much sleep over now there are
  • 00:14:04
    plenty of good reasons why European
  • 00:14:06
    allies won't like a deal or at least the
  • 00:14:08
    way that a lot of this is Being Framed
  • 00:14:10
    right now and that extends to other
  • 00:14:12
    Western allies thinking specifically
  • 00:14:13
    here about Japan and South Korea and as
  • 00:14:16
    the question is mentioning Taiwan as
  • 00:14:18
    well but that said this conversation is
  • 00:14:21
    all over the place in the media and I
  • 00:14:23
    think we are spending way too much time
  • 00:14:25
    talking about it again no one in Beijing
  • 00:14:28
    is looking at this and thinking that
  • 00:14:29
    Moscow is having a success here even if
  • 00:14:32
    tomorrow there is some sort of deal
  • 00:14:34
    reached between the United States and
  • 00:14:36
    Russia and the United States figures out
  • 00:14:38
    a way to force Europe to be okay with it
  • 00:14:41
    and force Ukraine to be okay with it you
  • 00:14:43
    have some sort of solidification of
  • 00:14:45
    where the line of control is right now
  • 00:14:47
    and then over the course of the short to
  • 00:14:49
    medium to perhaps even the long term you
  • 00:14:52
    have Russia having control over a large
  • 00:14:55
    segment of eastern Ukraine once again no
  • 00:14:58
    one in Beijing is going to look at that
  • 00:15:00
    and be like oh yes that is something
  • 00:15:02
    that we need to replicate right now this
  • 00:15:04
    has been an enormously costly process
  • 00:15:07
    for Russia and the phrase purick Victory
  • 00:15:09
    comes to mind when we're thinking about
  • 00:15:11
    this and you can see this in how Beijing
  • 00:15:14
    has handled the war from its perspective
  • 00:15:16
    Beijing has kept Moscow at arms length
  • 00:15:19
    from the conflict for a good reason you
  • 00:15:21
    have Iran supplying all sorts of drone
  • 00:15:23
    technology to Russia you even have North
  • 00:15:26
    Korea supplying troops to Russia to
  • 00:15:28
    fight and K what you don't really have
  • 00:15:31
    so much is China intervening in those
  • 00:15:33
    similar sorts of ways China has been
  • 00:15:36
    happy to profit from this war we'll talk
  • 00:15:38
    more about this in later questions as it
  • 00:15:40
    relates to oil but China has also acted
  • 00:15:43
    as an intermediary to import products
  • 00:15:46
    that are banned currently from export to
  • 00:15:49
    Russia but instead you have China
  • 00:15:51
    importing them and then China taking
  • 00:15:53
    them from China and then giving them to
  • 00:15:55
    Russia or selling them to Russia with
  • 00:15:57
    China pocketing the differ
  • 00:15:59
    China has been perfectly happy to make a
  • 00:16:01
    lot of money in this transaction but at
  • 00:16:04
    no point is China thinking to themselves
  • 00:16:06
    hey we need to encourage Russia to do
  • 00:16:08
    more of this because this is going to be
  • 00:16:10
    good for Russia China views this as a
  • 00:16:13
    strategic disaster for Russia which is
  • 00:16:16
    going to make Russia less capable of
  • 00:16:18
    coercing the West over the long run
  • 00:16:20
    which is bad for China because in the
  • 00:16:23
    event that there is some sort of
  • 00:16:24
    invasion of Taiwan or other conflict
  • 00:16:27
    involving China China needs Russia to
  • 00:16:30
    act as a second source of coercion
  • 00:16:32
    against the west and if Russia has
  • 00:16:35
    hamstrung itself via this war in Ukraine
  • 00:16:37
    which again Beijing views as having been
  • 00:16:40
    the case that is something that is not
  • 00:16:42
    making China particularly happy and that
  • 00:16:45
    doesn't even touch on the point that
  • 00:16:46
    we're seeing a pivot from the US
  • 00:16:48
    military to the Pacific which
  • 00:16:50
    specifically would make it more
  • 00:16:52
    difficult for China to invade Taiwan or
  • 00:16:55
    just generally speaking coer Taiwan so
  • 00:16:58
    again there are plenty of reasons why
  • 00:17:00
    Western countries might not be happy
  • 00:17:02
    with whatever the Trump Administration
  • 00:17:04
    may be negotiating but I don't think
  • 00:17:06
    that they should be staying up late at
  • 00:17:08
    night worrying about some sort of
  • 00:17:10
    precedent this sets as it relates Visa V
  • 00:17:12
    China and Taiwan how exactly would
  • 00:17:15
    Ukraine fa in the event of a US
  • 00:17:17
    withdrawal can Europe potentially pick
  • 00:17:19
    up America's slack and if they can will
  • 00:17:22
    they well that was a topic of a previous
  • 00:17:25
    video on the main channel so I'll keep
  • 00:17:26
    the answer here short you're can
  • 00:17:30
    obviously it would not be as good as
  • 00:17:32
    compared to if both Europe and the
  • 00:17:34
    United States were contributing at high
  • 00:17:35
    levels but Europe can do a large portion
  • 00:17:38
    of this itself with itself having a big
  • 00:17:41
    asterisk there the irony of the
  • 00:17:43
    situation is that Europe would still
  • 00:17:45
    need the United States to produce a lot
  • 00:17:47
    of material but if Europe is the one
  • 00:17:50
    paying for that then it's hard to
  • 00:17:52
    believe the Trump Administration is
  • 00:17:53
    going to say no to purchases coming from
  • 00:17:56
    the United States Trump would view that
  • 00:17:58
    as a way for the United States to get
  • 00:17:59
    rich and would therefore actively
  • 00:18:01
    encourage it which again is seeming to
  • 00:18:04
    suggest that all of this 4D chess
  • 00:18:06
    possibility is a thing because if all of
  • 00:18:09
    the things that Trump has done up to
  • 00:18:10
    this point has inspired Europe to try to
  • 00:18:13
    figure out solutions to this problem
  • 00:18:15
    it's ultimately resulting in money being
  • 00:18:17
    spent in the United States man Trump is
  • 00:18:19
    going to be very pleased with that
  • 00:18:21
    possibility why weren't European and
  • 00:18:23
    Ukrainian Representatives at the summit
  • 00:18:26
    throwing aside the 4D chess argument
  • 00:18:28
    again
  • 00:18:29
    I do not know and if I were one of those
  • 00:18:32
    European leaders or if I were in Ukraine
  • 00:18:35
    I too would be frustrated with the
  • 00:18:37
    situation however I think a lot of the
  • 00:18:40
    media reaction here has been overblown
  • 00:18:43
    and this is yet another one of those
  • 00:18:45
    things that we need to take a step back
  • 00:18:47
    have a deep breath and see how this
  • 00:18:49
    plays out over time this was not a peace
  • 00:18:52
    Summit it was a conversation between the
  • 00:18:54
    United States and Russia certainly a lot
  • 00:18:57
    of that conversation involved Ukraine
  • 00:18:59
    but it was not a peace Summit as you
  • 00:19:01
    would think a peace Summit would be and
  • 00:19:03
    there wasn't at least as far as we can
  • 00:19:05
    tell anything serious agreed to coming
  • 00:19:07
    out of the summit I also think that
  • 00:19:09
    there's a perspective here that there's
  • 00:19:11
    going to be a quick conversation and
  • 00:19:13
    that the war is going to be over
  • 00:19:15
    instantaneously which to be fair is
  • 00:19:17
    something that the Trump Administration
  • 00:19:19
    was trying to convince us of that the
  • 00:19:21
    war would be over in 24 hours it is
  • 00:19:24
    possible that something like that could
  • 00:19:25
    happen but let's talk a little bit
  • 00:19:28
    historically about what peace talks can
  • 00:19:30
    actually look like the Korean War may be
  • 00:19:33
    the closest historical analog to the
  • 00:19:35
    battle between Ukraine and Russia in
  • 00:19:38
    that it was a proxy battle between the
  • 00:19:40
    East and the west and in addition to
  • 00:19:42
    that conceivably the way that this war
  • 00:19:45
    is most likely to end is in some form of
  • 00:19:48
    demilitarized zone between Ukraine and
  • 00:19:50
    Russia just like the demilitarize zone
  • 00:19:53
    that exists on the Korean Peninsula so
  • 00:19:56
    with that as a preface how long into the
  • 00:19:59
    peace negotiations for the Korean War
  • 00:20:01
    last 2 years two years not an overnight
  • 00:20:05
    thing it took two years for them to sit
  • 00:20:07
    down and then work through everything
  • 00:20:09
    and then agree to something now part of
  • 00:20:11
    that is just waiting to see when the
  • 00:20:13
    demands between the two sides become
  • 00:20:15
    compatible and it's not clear that is
  • 00:20:17
    the case right now maybe it is though
  • 00:20:19
    and if it is that would accelerate the
  • 00:20:21
    process but even once there is a set of
  • 00:20:24
    Demands that are compatible between the
  • 00:20:25
    two sides actually choosing which of the
  • 00:20:28
    many different possible peace agreements
  • 00:20:30
    that one could write down is the one
  • 00:20:32
    that they actually write down that takes
  • 00:20:34
    a long time as well so in that light
  • 00:20:37
    this is just one talk of the many talks
  • 00:20:40
    that there will be and the question
  • 00:20:42
    remains whether all of those in the
  • 00:20:43
    future are going to continue to be
  • 00:20:45
    bilateral with just the United States
  • 00:20:48
    and Russia or whether other European
  • 00:20:50
    countries and partners will be invited
  • 00:20:52
    and whether Ukraine will also be invited
  • 00:20:54
    to the table and I think in that light
  • 00:20:56
    we should spend a moment reading what
  • 00:20:58
    Rubio comments were at the presser
  • 00:21:00
    following the talks the second thing I
  • 00:21:02
    would say is that in order for a
  • 00:21:04
    conflict to end everyone involved in
  • 00:21:07
    that conflict has to be okay with it has
  • 00:21:09
    to be acceptable to them so there you go
  • 00:21:12
    you have Marco Rubio saying that Ukraine
  • 00:21:14
    has a veto in this and then we have a
  • 00:21:16
    bit of a conversation about what this
  • 00:21:18
    was actually supposed to be we have to
  • 00:21:20
    understand that it's been 3 and a half
  • 00:21:22
    years since there's been any sort of
  • 00:21:23
    regularized contact between the United
  • 00:21:26
    States and Russia and in some cases
  • 00:21:28
    between any of the participants in this
  • 00:21:30
    conflict and Russia so the goal of
  • 00:21:32
    today's meeting was to follow up on the
  • 00:21:34
    phone call that the president had a week
  • 00:21:35
    ago and begin to establish those lines
  • 00:21:38
    of communication once more this is a
  • 00:21:40
    wait and see sort of thing but at least
  • 00:21:43
    from that statement it does not seem
  • 00:21:45
    like it's always going to be a bilateral
  • 00:21:47
    conversation between just the United
  • 00:21:49
    States and Russia how many scripts have
  • 00:21:52
    you had to trash the past two weeks
  • 00:21:54
    because of the ridiculously
  • 00:21:56
    unpredictable political landscape
  • 00:21:58
    fortunately none so far but the number
  • 00:22:01
    of videos that I need to do is piling up
  • 00:22:04
    I got a couple coming out on the main
  • 00:22:05
    Channel this week I have a couple coming
  • 00:22:07
    out next week and I'm really excited for
  • 00:22:09
    the ones that are going to be out next
  • 00:22:10
    week so I hope you enjoy them too
  • 00:22:12
    couldn't Ukraine just continue strikes
  • 00:22:14
    on oil refineries until Russia gives up
  • 00:22:17
    how would the United States pulling Aid
  • 00:22:19
    have any effect on their real strategy
  • 00:22:21
    of beating the Russian economy to
  • 00:22:23
    submission unless the United States
  • 00:22:25
    lifts all sanctions which I do not see
  • 00:22:28
    happening
  • 00:22:29
    well it could and again that matters
  • 00:22:31
    because Ukraine has agency in this but
  • 00:22:35
    there are some issues here for one thing
  • 00:22:37
    while it is true that the United States
  • 00:22:39
    pulling military aid should not have an
  • 00:22:42
    effect on the Russian economy strategy
  • 00:22:44
    essentially trying to destroy oil
  • 00:22:46
    refineries and those sorts of facilities
  • 00:22:49
    which Ukraine has not been using
  • 00:22:50
    American supplies for it seems that what
  • 00:22:52
    the strategy has been for Ukraine is to
  • 00:22:54
    use Ukrainian made drones to go into
  • 00:22:57
    Russia to destroy those things
  • 00:22:59
    and conceivably that means that Ukraine
  • 00:23:01
    would be able to continue that process
  • 00:23:03
    even if the United States is no longer
  • 00:23:05
    directly assisting Ukraine however there
  • 00:23:07
    are two big caveats there first I do
  • 00:23:10
    think it is a realistic possibility that
  • 00:23:13
    some level of sanctions relief may be
  • 00:23:15
    made especially as it relates to oil
  • 00:23:18
    again the Trump Administration is very
  • 00:23:20
    concerned about China and the effect of
  • 00:23:23
    Western sanctions on Russian oil and gas
  • 00:23:26
    has been to give China a very cheap
  • 00:23:29
    source of oil and gas to purchase from
  • 00:23:31
    because other countries are unwilling to
  • 00:23:33
    challenge the Western economic sanctions
  • 00:23:35
    and enforcement mechanisms as it relates
  • 00:23:37
    to those purchases well the Trump
  • 00:23:40
    Administration doesn't like that so you
  • 00:23:42
    remove economic sanctions and suddenly
  • 00:23:45
    all of that cheap oil and gas that China
  • 00:23:47
    was getting disappears and all of the
  • 00:23:49
    windfall profits that China has been
  • 00:23:51
    acre also go away and all of that makes
  • 00:23:54
    Trump very happy the second caveat is
  • 00:23:57
    that military Aid does affect Ukraine's
  • 00:24:00
    ability to inflict casualties on Russia
  • 00:24:03
    and that does have an economic cost on
  • 00:24:06
    Russia every casualty inside of Ukraine
  • 00:24:09
    is something that the Kremlin has to
  • 00:24:10
    replace and it's getting progressively
  • 00:24:12
    more and more difficult for Russia to be
  • 00:24:15
    able to recruit Soldiers the way that
  • 00:24:17
    they've been combating that is to
  • 00:24:19
    increase the offers made to those
  • 00:24:20
    soldiers which means the more casualties
  • 00:24:23
    there are in Ukraine the more that
  • 00:24:25
    Russia has to spend to get soldiers to
  • 00:24:27
    go over there which is of course going
  • 00:24:29
    to be a problem if Ukraine is getting
  • 00:24:31
    less military aid that means there's
  • 00:24:33
    going to be fewer casualties and
  • 00:24:34
    recruitment is going to be easier for
  • 00:24:36
    Russia so yes Ukraine can continue this
  • 00:24:40
    no it will not be
  • 00:24:42
    unaffected question then remains how bad
  • 00:24:44
    will it be that's something that we're
  • 00:24:46
    going to have to find out later why
  • 00:24:48
    would Heth say flat out that Ukraine
  • 00:24:50
    will not be joining NATO it seems like
  • 00:24:53
    that wouldn't happen regardless but I
  • 00:24:55
    would have thought he would have at
  • 00:24:56
    least kept that card in his pocket as a
  • 00:24:58
    bargaining chip this is another one of
  • 00:25:01
    those things that I thought was really
  • 00:25:02
    overblown two points here one all heg
  • 00:25:05
    Seth was making was a concise statement
  • 00:25:08
    of what was already not only publicly
  • 00:25:10
    known but publicly discussed if you
  • 00:25:13
    followed any sort of NATO meeting from
  • 00:25:15
    the last few years there were multiple
  • 00:25:17
    countries that had that sort of attitude
  • 00:25:19
    not the least of which were Hungary and
  • 00:25:21
    turkey and remember the way that NATO
  • 00:25:23
    membership works you have to have every
  • 00:25:26
    single country sign on to another
  • 00:25:28
    country joining so if you have Hungary
  • 00:25:30
    and turkey who are adamantly against it
  • 00:25:32
    and you have other countries that are
  • 00:25:34
    like well that doesn't seem like a good
  • 00:25:36
    idea right now maybe in the future but
  • 00:25:39
    not anytime soon that was the sentiment
  • 00:25:41
    that was around NATO for years now and
  • 00:25:44
    all higth did was just say a sentence
  • 00:25:47
    that was concise and summarize what the
  • 00:25:49
    meetings at NATO were already saying if
  • 00:25:52
    you went through the notes I cannot say
  • 00:25:54
    this enough literally out of that
  • 00:25:57
    statement from hgat there was no change
  • 00:25:59
    in beliefs among people within the
  • 00:26:02
    foreign policy sphere it got a lot of
  • 00:26:04
    media attention and maybe individuals
  • 00:26:06
    that were not paying as much attention
  • 00:26:08
    to the situation and to the depths of
  • 00:26:10
    NATO meetings were surprised to hear
  • 00:26:12
    this but anyone paying attention already
  • 00:26:15
    knew that this was something that was
  • 00:26:17
    going on zero influence on anyone inside
  • 00:26:20
    of NATO and more importantly perhaps
  • 00:26:22
    zero influence on anyone inside of
  • 00:26:24
    Russia but here's the other half that
  • 00:26:26
    really gets me imagine that you had a
  • 00:26:28
    nuclear weapon program would you tell
  • 00:26:31
    people that you were very close to
  • 00:26:32
    having a nuclear weapon no you would
  • 00:26:35
    keep that secret you would quietly
  • 00:26:37
    develop it underground deep where no one
  • 00:26:40
    can see what's going on and then
  • 00:26:41
    suddenly one day when you've put
  • 00:26:43
    everything together you've got your fuel
  • 00:26:44
    and you put it into a bomb that actually
  • 00:26:46
    works and functions properly to go
  • 00:26:48
    critical and get that big boom that's
  • 00:26:50
    the point where you would tell everyone
  • 00:26:52
    you wouldn't be broadcasting we are two
  • 00:26:54
    days away from developing a bomb cuz if
  • 00:26:56
    you do that you put a giant Target on
  • 00:26:58
    your back now that matters because
  • 00:27:01
    Ukraine joining NATO has the same sort
  • 00:27:03
    of effect as the development of a
  • 00:27:05
    nuclear weapon and actually that's not
  • 00:27:07
    me that's saying that that is also
  • 00:27:09
    something that has come from zalinsky
  • 00:27:10
    and come from keev directly that keev
  • 00:27:13
    wants either NATO membership and in the
  • 00:27:15
    absence of NATO membership the way that
  • 00:27:16
    keev is going to resolve the problems
  • 00:27:18
    associated with not having NATO
  • 00:27:20
    membership is to develop a nuclear
  • 00:27:22
    weapon to be clear that was just sort of
  • 00:27:24
    a hypothetical conversation of a
  • 00:27:25
    discussion that Ukraine was having that
  • 00:27:27
    nuclear weapons were a replacement not
  • 00:27:29
    that Ukraine is actually pursuing
  • 00:27:31
    nuclear weapons as a consequence of NATO
  • 00:27:33
    membership not being something that's
  • 00:27:35
    going to happen anytime soon if it were
  • 00:27:37
    the case that Ukraine were in fact right
  • 00:27:40
    on the verge of being able to join NATO
  • 00:27:42
    the last thing that you would want to
  • 00:27:44
    communicate to Russia is that that is
  • 00:27:46
    true because if that were the case
  • 00:27:49
    Russia would do everything in its power
  • 00:27:51
    to try to figure out ways of sabotaging
  • 00:27:53
    Ukraine's entry into NATO now I am very
  • 00:27:57
    confident that this one is not 4D chess
  • 00:27:59
    because again Heth was just having a
  • 00:28:01
    conversation that reflects the
  • 00:28:03
    well-known reality of the
  • 00:28:05
    situation however if you're someone who
  • 00:28:08
    really wants Ukraine to join NATO then
  • 00:28:11
    what you should be trying to promote
  • 00:28:12
    from a public perspective is the
  • 00:28:14
    perception that Ukraine will never be
  • 00:28:16
    able to join NATO and then one day
  • 00:28:19
    Ukraine just suddenly joins NATO and has
  • 00:28:21
    that article 5 protection that is the
  • 00:28:24
    best way of ordering things of course
  • 00:28:27
    that assumes that Russia's belief would
  • 00:28:29
    be influenced by those public
  • 00:28:31
    declarations which as you know should
  • 00:28:33
    not be the case I suppose what I am
  • 00:28:36
    really trying to say here is don't
  • 00:28:38
    listen to what leaders say watch what
  • 00:28:41
    they do and as a corollary to that don't
  • 00:28:44
    care about what leaders say care about
  • 00:28:47
    what they do is there any game theory
  • 00:28:50
    based on non-rational actors such as
  • 00:28:53
    narcissists if so can you go over it yes
  • 00:28:56
    I can next week on the main Channel
  • 00:28:58
    Chanel another one of those topics that
  • 00:28:59
    I've really been itching to get to but
  • 00:29:01
    couldn't because of everything else
  • 00:29:02
    that's going on in the world right
  • 00:29:04
    now would you agree that nothing really
  • 00:29:07
    concrete came out of this discussion
  • 00:29:09
    just as one would expect apart from a
  • 00:29:11
    historical photo opportunity confirming
  • 00:29:13
    America's apparent desire to offer the
  • 00:29:16
    alien Russian Federation a life raft yes
  • 00:29:19
    that is my reading of it currently but
  • 00:29:21
    again I'm going to hold final thoughts
  • 00:29:23
    on that until we perhaps have a better
  • 00:29:25
    understanding of exactly what was
  • 00:29:28
    discussed there which perhaps maybe will
  • 00:29:30
    leak in the next couple of days who
  • 00:29:32
    knows I think one thing that's
  • 00:29:34
    interesting to point out though is that
  • 00:29:35
    as I was going through these questions
  • 00:29:37
    to read them on the screen the question
  • 00:29:40
    directly below this one on the YouTube
  • 00:29:42
    discussion comment section was a
  • 00:29:44
    question that compared the meeting to
  • 00:29:46
    Munich 1938 which gives you an
  • 00:29:48
    interesting perspective on how far apart
  • 00:29:51
    some people are in what went on over the
  • 00:29:53
    last 24
  • 00:29:55
    hours ah yes Rubio looking like the
  • 00:29:57
    teacher teacher pet who got moved up to
  • 00:29:59
    college level and is completely over his
  • 00:30:01
    head I think there is something worth
  • 00:30:03
    pointing out here there is a perspective
  • 00:30:06
    that this is going to be a summit and
  • 00:30:07
    the United States is going to bow down
  • 00:30:09
    to Russia and nothing positive could
  • 00:30:11
    come from this from the Ukrainian
  • 00:30:13
    perspective fair enough but I think it
  • 00:30:16
    is worth noting exactly who was there
  • 00:30:19
    and compare that to the perceptions
  • 00:30:21
    going into the possibility that there
  • 00:30:22
    would be a summit Rubio historically has
  • 00:30:26
    been on more of a hawkish side of things
  • 00:30:28
    when it comes to Russia and Ukraine you
  • 00:30:30
    can see this going back to the beginning
  • 00:30:31
    of the war when he was a co-sponsor of a
  • 00:30:34
    bill to sanction all of Russian
  • 00:30:35
    state-owned
  • 00:30:37
    Enterprises now his voting record has
  • 00:30:39
    not been 100% consistent with that to be
  • 00:30:42
    clear but the point is that there are
  • 00:30:45
    lots of people inside of the Trump
  • 00:30:47
    Administration that Trump could have
  • 00:30:49
    sent on this particular meeting Marco
  • 00:30:52
    Rubio is a sensible person to do that as
  • 00:30:54
    the Secretary of State but he's not the
  • 00:30:56
    only person that could have done this so
  • 00:30:59
    as we are grasping at straws trying to
  • 00:31:02
    understand what is going on here for
  • 00:31:04
    those that are sympathetic to Ukraine
  • 00:31:06
    one consolation that you can take from
  • 00:31:08
    this is that it was Rubio who was sent
  • 00:31:10
    here and if Trump really wanted to have
  • 00:31:13
    someone go to Russia and bow down to
  • 00:31:16
    Russia and concede everything to Russia
  • 00:31:18
    Rubio is probably not the person that
  • 00:31:20
    you would send there to do that if you
  • 00:31:23
    were president since 2020 what would you
  • 00:31:25
    undertake let's forget who did what and
  • 00:31:28
    concentrate on the actions done okay
  • 00:31:31
    let's imagine that I'm a hawkish United
  • 00:31:33
    States citizen and I am now president of
  • 00:31:35
    the United States what would I have done
  • 00:31:38
    well as a starting point I think the
  • 00:31:40
    Biden Administration mostly made the
  • 00:31:42
    right call given the intelligence that
  • 00:31:44
    it had at the time during the early
  • 00:31:47
    phase of the war so specifically and
  • 00:31:50
    again given the intelligence consensus
  • 00:31:52
    at the time which is that Russia was
  • 00:31:55
    going to be able to very quickly conquer
  • 00:31:56
    Ukraine I would have been very hesitant
  • 00:31:59
    to make large Aid transfers to Ukraine
  • 00:32:02
    given that I would not want to have all
  • 00:32:04
    of that military aid go to waste where I
  • 00:32:07
    think you can start making a good
  • 00:32:09
    argument that the Biden Administration
  • 00:32:11
    went wrong and not because of inaccurate
  • 00:32:13
    intelligence assessments that the Biden
  • 00:32:15
    Administration is not directly in
  • 00:32:17
    control of but rather mistakes that the
  • 00:32:19
    Biden Administration made because
  • 00:32:21
    perhaps their own risk aversion was
  • 00:32:23
    relatively High I think that's starting
  • 00:32:25
    to get into the second phase of the war
  • 00:32:27
    after after it became clear that this
  • 00:32:29
    was going to be a more traditional land
  • 00:32:31
    war in Europe it seems like the Biden
  • 00:32:34
    Administration was consistently perhaps
  • 00:32:36
    one or two steps behind in getting Aid
  • 00:32:39
    to Ukraine and escalating the amount of
  • 00:32:41
    Aid and the quality of Aid and the
  • 00:32:43
    military effectiveness of that Aid and I
  • 00:32:46
    get at some level why the Biden
  • 00:32:48
    Administration chose to do that they
  • 00:32:50
    were concerned about escalations with
  • 00:32:52
    Russia and nuclear escalations perhaps
  • 00:32:55
    most specifically but nevertheless the
  • 00:32:58
    United States has the ability to
  • 00:32:59
    escalate back in ways that are going to
  • 00:33:01
    be devastating to Russia as well so
  • 00:33:04
    Russia has a disincentive to try to
  • 00:33:06
    escalate because they don't want to be
  • 00:33:07
    involved in the disaster either what won
  • 00:33:10
    out within the Biden Administration
  • 00:33:12
    though was risk aversion and concerns
  • 00:33:14
    that perhaps Russia would take those
  • 00:33:16
    steps or at least there's a higher risk
  • 00:33:18
    of accident that could happen as a
  • 00:33:19
    consequence of those steps But
  • 00:33:22
    ultimately that left us in a situation
  • 00:33:24
    where Ukraine has been two steps behind
  • 00:33:27
    and and not in a position to be able to
  • 00:33:29
    militarily defeat Russia the irony of
  • 00:33:32
    that is that it has perhaps created more
  • 00:33:34
    risks over the long run as a result
  • 00:33:37
    which means it is a mistake not only in
  • 00:33:40
    retrospect but perhaps the type of
  • 00:33:41
    mistake that could have been understood
  • 00:33:43
    previously and rectified before we
  • 00:33:46
    reached a situation where we're
  • 00:33:47
    currently in it if Ukraine is forced
  • 00:33:50
    into a peace deal How likely do you
  • 00:33:52
    think a second Afghanistan as zalinsky
  • 00:33:54
    put it would be that is long-term
  • 00:33:57
    official gorilla conflict in the
  • 00:33:59
    occupied territories with cheap gear
  • 00:34:02
    Ukrainian material and or Undeclared
  • 00:34:05
    Western
  • 00:34:06
    supplies very likely and I think the
  • 00:34:09
    interesting thing here perhaps going
  • 00:34:10
    back to the previous question that is
  • 00:34:12
    what we all anticipated was going to be
  • 00:34:15
    the case in February of 2022 that Russia
  • 00:34:19
    would be able to roll in perhaps very
  • 00:34:21
    quickly take over the country but then
  • 00:34:23
    over the course of the next decade or so
  • 00:34:25
    essentially get bogged down in a
  • 00:34:27
    situation where it's fighting an
  • 00:34:28
    Insurgency and ultimately live to regret
  • 00:34:31
    the decision it will be interesting if 3
  • 00:34:33
    or four years after the fact Russia
  • 00:34:36
    ultimately finds itself in that position
  • 00:34:39
    except it has spent a ton of time in the
  • 00:34:41
    meantime accumulating a whole bunch of
  • 00:34:43
    casualties and spending a whole bunch of
  • 00:34:46
    money just to get a set of territories
  • 00:34:49
    that are going to be fought over again
  • 00:34:51
    this time in the form of an Insurgency
  • 00:34:54
    and that is not hypothetical there is an
  • 00:34:56
    Insurgency going on inside of eastern
  • 00:34:58
    Ukraine we tend not to hear too much
  • 00:35:01
    about it in the western media sphere one
  • 00:35:04
    because it's really difficult as it
  • 00:35:06
    turns out to be able to do reporting
  • 00:35:07
    inside of eastern Ukraine but aside from
  • 00:35:10
    that the West has a vested interest in
  • 00:35:12
    protecting operational security of the
  • 00:35:14
    partisans that are fighting in those
  • 00:35:16
    areas but it is happening we've heard a
  • 00:35:19
    lot more about it in hsan during the
  • 00:35:21
    occupation of heran and then the
  • 00:35:23
    subsequent Ukrainian recapture of heran
  • 00:35:25
    a lot more stories coming out of that
  • 00:35:28
    and we would expect to hear a lot more
  • 00:35:30
    perhaps if there is a solidified line
  • 00:35:32
    and that becomes the primary Vector of
  • 00:35:34
    violence against the Russian state two
  • 00:35:37
    more points one I do find it pretty
  • 00:35:39
    funny that zilinsky put it as a second
  • 00:35:41
    Afghanistan really it could be like the
  • 00:35:43
    18th or the 20th or the 97th version of
  • 00:35:45
    Afghanistan Afghanistan keeps getting
  • 00:35:47
    invaded and it never goes well for the
  • 00:35:49
    Invader the second thing is that
  • 00:35:51
    autocratic governments tend to do better
  • 00:35:53
    fighting insurgencies because they can
  • 00:35:55
    use counterinsurgency techniques that
  • 00:35:58
    shall we say Democratic public might not
  • 00:36:00
    be too keen on however that does not
  • 00:36:03
    mean that Russia is guaranteed success
  • 00:36:05
    in that regard look no further than well
  • 00:36:08
    again Afghanistan and Moscow trying to
  • 00:36:11
    do that in the
  • 00:36:12
    1980s is it reasonable to assume that
  • 00:36:15
    this is the United States seeing what is
  • 00:36:17
    even possible from the Russian side so
  • 00:36:19
    they can go back to Ukraine and talk
  • 00:36:22
    about it rather than dictating terms I
  • 00:36:24
    would just change the language here to
  • 00:36:26
    not saying that it is reable to assume
  • 00:36:28
    that that is the case but rather that is
  • 00:36:30
    a plausible interpretation of what might
  • 00:36:32
    be happening here but again is the type
  • 00:36:35
    of thing that we're going to have to
  • 00:36:35
    wait and see on there has been an
  • 00:36:38
    argument that Ukraine has been holding
  • 00:36:40
    back some strikes based on us requests
  • 00:36:43
    without the aid Ukraine has no reason to
  • 00:36:45
    honor those requests do you think that
  • 00:36:48
    this is true and that we will see more
  • 00:36:50
    strikes on Russia's infrastructure
  • 00:36:52
    including oil pumping and shipping
  • 00:36:54
    infrastructure not just
  • 00:36:56
    refineries yes this is an interesting
  • 00:36:58
    point and we certainly know from the
  • 00:37:00
    Biden Administration that the Biden
  • 00:37:02
    Administration was trying to convince
  • 00:37:04
    Ukraine to scale back the attacks deep
  • 00:37:07
    inside of Russian
  • 00:37:08
    territory now what I do not know is
  • 00:37:11
    whether Ukraine was processing those
  • 00:37:13
    requests and then changing its Behavior
  • 00:37:16
    accordingly in so far as that is the
  • 00:37:18
    case then there is a consolation prize
  • 00:37:21
    here to the United States cancelling Aid
  • 00:37:23
    it unlocks handcuffs and Ukraine can go
  • 00:37:25
    after things that it wasn't going after
  • 00:37:27
    after before but again it's a
  • 00:37:29
    consolation prize the fact that Ukraine
  • 00:37:32
    may be adjusting Its Behavior is
  • 00:37:34
    indicative that Ukraine believes that
  • 00:37:36
    having us Aid is better than conducting
  • 00:37:39
    those attacks and getting no us Aid so
  • 00:37:42
    it's a consolation prize it is not a
  • 00:37:44
    good thing in the
  • 00:37:45
    aggregate to make a lines on map's
  • 00:37:48
    metaphor would you rather use a a sumo
  • 00:37:51
    wrestling match or B there is no other
  • 00:37:54
    option sumo wrestling is a great lines
  • 00:37:57
    on Maps metaphor well some would say
  • 00:38:00
    that all of these lines are completely
  • 00:38:02
    made up and as a result professional
  • 00:38:04
    wrestling may be the better wrestling
  • 00:38:07
    metaphor this world is absolutely
  • 00:38:10
    disgusting always was my friend we just
  • 00:38:13
    now realized it well that happy note
  • 00:38:15
    seems like a great place to end this
  • 00:38:17
    video hope you enjoyed it and if you did
  • 00:38:19
    please like share and subscribe and I
  • 00:38:21
    will see you next time take care
Tags
  • U.S.-Russia relations
  • Ukraine conflict
  • European defense
  • NATO
  • Trump administration
  • peace talks
  • military aid
  • geopolitical dynamics
  • foreign policy