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hi last week I posted a video about the
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British Army and the well the video was
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fairly successful and in the comments
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both on YouTube and also on Twitter
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people said hey this video was really
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great but could you do a comparison of
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the British army with the French army
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well that's what this video is now the
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easiest way of putting it is that the
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British and the French armies are
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different in some ways and similar in
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others and honestly I think that the
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ways in which they are similar is more
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interesting and more important than the
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ways in which they are different why
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more important because the ways in which
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they are similar is bad news for both
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armies with respect to their ability to
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do the one thing that's on everybody's
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mind these days which is their ability
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to fight a major land war and
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conventional highend conventional
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Warfare against a peer or near peer
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competitor such as Russia so I'm going
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to divide this video into four parts
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first part I'm going to talk very
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briefly about my credentials basically
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why should you be listening to me second
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part I'm going to talk about why or how
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these two armies are different the third
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part I'm going to talk about how these
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armies are similar and the fourth part
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I'm going to try to wrap it up with some
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conclusions about where we are and
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whether or not the different differences
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in similarties actually even matter and
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the how best both armies should should
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really move forward my name is Michael
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shuren and welcome to my YouTube channel
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Pax Americana a conversation about world
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affairs global conflict military
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strategy and anything else that happens
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be on my mind so let's get into it so
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first part credentials with regard to
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the British military I've been following
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the British military now for many many
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years I worked on them both at the Rand
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Corporation and I also wrote some stuff
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on my own so I've got some Publications
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at Rand and also written for things like
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the wavel room about British military
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the British military policy Etc I also
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happen to be an associate fellow of the
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world United Services Institute which is
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the preeminent UK defense Think Tank and
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I parti participated this summer at
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their annual land Warfare conference in
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in London uh which means to say that I I
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am participating in albeit from a
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distance in the current discussions
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about the state of the British Army and
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the future of the British army Etc as
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for the French army I I confess I know a
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great deal more about the French
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military and army than I do about the
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British simply because I focused much
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more intensively on the French uh at
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this point I think it's fair to say that
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I'm one of the if not the leading
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American expert in the French military
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and I've written several studies for
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Rand Corporation as well as for uh
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Publications such as waren the rocks and
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the Texas National Security view all
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about the the British milit uh the
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French military uh these include for
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Rand I led a study of French networked
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or French approaches to networked
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Warfare I wrote a history of French coin
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Doctrine the most important of these by
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far is a study that I co-authored at
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Rand with the Magnificent Stephanie
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pizard under the title strong Ally
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stretch thin which is a study of the
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strengths and weaknesses of the French
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military that was commissioned by the
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United States Department of Defense this
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study uh which by the way you can find
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on the ran website and I put links in
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the description to to that study as well
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as everything else including the the uh
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study on French approaches to network
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Warfare but the the sh alyar them was
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very well received by the highest
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echelons of the French military General
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Burkhart uh who is the chair of the
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joint staff told me in person that he
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thought very highly of the study and he
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AG agreed with the conclusions the
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French think so hardly of my work on
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them and my work on the French military
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and my efforts to basically be the the
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explainer of the French military to an
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American audience they actually made be
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a uh a knight of the order of Merit
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National order of Merit um which means
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that from hence forth you should refer
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to me as Sir Michael or if you are a
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Monty Python fan uh Brave Sir Michael
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I'm joking of course
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so let's talk now let's talk now about
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the differences between the two
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militaries the first obvious difference
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is size at this point the French army is
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roughly almost twice as large as the
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British army the British army has about
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73,000 regular soldiers plus about
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24,000 reservas the French army has
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about 130 or 120 depending on what you
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read thousand regular soldiers plus
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about 25,000 reservists of those regular
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Soldiers the French can consider the
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size of its Deployable force to be about
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77,000 I've read no comparative number
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comparable number and any British Army
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documents I've read in terms of what
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they consider their Deployable Force I'm
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not entirely sure what the french even
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mean by that the point simply being that
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the French army is significantly larger
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than the British army it's also fair to
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say that the French army is in better
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shape than the British army I I I insist
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it's not better that's not my argument
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but rather it's just in better shape and
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I think a a classic example of that is
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the the relative success of French army
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modernization programs compared to
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British Army modernization programs in
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the previous video about the British
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army I talked about the future rapid
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effects system or fres which was this
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major program in the 2000s which was
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designed to to replace obsolete British
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armored vehicles with upto-date modern
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armored vehicles all of which were
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supposed to be stuffed to the guilds
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with all the highest technology fres
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failed and the only bit of fres as far
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as I know that survives is the Ajax
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infantry Fighting Vehicle which is
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expected to enter service soon I'm sure
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the Ajax is going to be a phenomenal
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vehicle but the the whole story The Saga
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of its development and production was
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just Frau with all of problems and
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delays Etc it's very problematic now
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some people have also said for instance
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some of the comments on to my video said
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that the boxer which is a German design
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vehicle that the British are also
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building and and and now is coming into
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service with the British army that boxer
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also is is a legacy of fres uh I don't
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know if that's true I your s of boxer as
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being basically something that they
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resorted to to replace a capability Gap
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that's left by the failure FES but
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either way I just want to know that
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boxer exists and and and there is
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apparently some British DNA and the the
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whole program which arguably dates to to
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to fit I don't know you should ask uh
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Nicholas Drummond who is the boxer
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expert in the UK now the French in
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general have done much much better with
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their modernization efforts so for
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instance France leads the way when it
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comes to digi
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digitization and the implementation of
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information networks and uh Network
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Warfare Technologies and the development
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of a whole family of armored vehicles
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I'm thinking of the vbci which uh
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entered into service I believe in 2006
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the Jaguar the Griffin
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next is going to come something called
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surval and then in the meantime they're
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working on modernizing the liaran battle
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tank they're going to modernize uh
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they're intending to modernize 200 of
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the deair I I mention that just in
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contrast because I believe that the
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British plans to modernize the
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Challenger to they're only going to
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modernize something like 140 149 of them
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so they're going to end up with a uh
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hopefully they're going to keep the rest
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but we're talking roughly the same
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numbers the uh I also if if I'm going to
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talk about modernization I also have to
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to talk about something called the
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Scorpion program uh which dates to 2014
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uh I mean French army networked or their
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implementation of network Warfare te
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technologies predates that by a lot I
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wrote about it in my studies if you want
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to learn more about the history of this
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please go go read that I think it's very
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interesting um but uh scorpion
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represents sort of like a scaling up of
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of these efforts and and sort of
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development of a much more comprehensive
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all of force kind of effort scorpion
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technically is an acronym it refers to
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the Synergy the Synergy the
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contact
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whatever is completely untranslatable
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into English um but I'm willing to bet
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that there not a single French officer
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actually knows that that's what scorpion
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stands for because they kind of invent
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pick the word and then invented a way to
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say that s going them either way it
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doesn't really matter um just think of
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it a scorpion they've got a cool logo
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complete with a scorpion on it's pretty
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cool anyways scorpion is a very large
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program at the heart of scorpion is a
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digital information architecture uh
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complete with new radios and new battle
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Battlefield management software as well
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as newly designed vehicles that are
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basically built around scorpion
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vbci predates scorpion and and
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implements the pre- Scorpion technology
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but of course they're they've adapted
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everything and brought it online so you
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should think of vbci as being part of
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the Scorpion program even though
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technically it predates that same is
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true with theair which has been they've
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modified it already so that it's got all
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the the latest tech on it so theair is
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also very much it's not excluded from
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scorpion even though it's technically
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not not part of it lastly scorpion is an
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effort to rethink for structure and
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tactics in order to optimize the use of
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the new technology so they're really
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thinking about like how do you redesign
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and how do you uh a tank company
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how do you fight the T company Etc
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scorpion by all measures is successful
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and I think it's fair to say that the
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French army is really ahead of all of
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the other NATO armies including possibly
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the United States when it comes to the
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development and implementation at a
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comprehensive level of a comprehensive
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modernization program in terms of
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Information Technology networked Warfare
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Etc I I think it's true based on what I
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read that they are really second only to
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the Israelis in terms of the
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implementation of the stuff now scorpion
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I want to address this scorpion uh in
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the associate technology can do several
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neat things it's got some cool tricks to
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it one is something called vetronics and
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the idea is that the the network
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monitors the systems on French army
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vehicles so that it it it's it's these
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vehicles send data to the network
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regarding the systems on the vehicle uh
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things that it's going to run out of
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things that are going to break Etc this
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is supposed to help the logistical
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effort because this enable ables the
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Army to have a precise understanding of
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what vehicle is going to need what kind
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of parts and when so that they could get
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precisely those parts to the right place
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at the right time so this means that
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they can send fewer parts right because
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it can be much more precise so this is
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supposed to help the whole logistical
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effort I think that the real star of the
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show though is the network and the
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battlefield management software which of
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course features Blue Force tracker and
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slw toq Technology slw to Q is the
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ability of the the ideas that
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your tanker vehicle or whatever your
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maybe your Caesar how it's are you get
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the firing data from the network right
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the network tells you the target is
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there and the cannon on your on your
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vehicle will automatically slew and
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position itself to aim precisely at that
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Target uh uh it will not fire
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automatically the French is a matter of
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policy do insist that they they have
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what's called a man in the loop the idea
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that somewhere in this chain there's
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going to be somebody who has to press a
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button or pull the trigger such that uh
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you know it's not firing automatically
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although I did ask a French General who
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was in charge of Scorpion for a while
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whether or not there was maybe like
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maybe on the back of the box in the tank
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you can flip a switch and the whole
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thing will go fully automatic he
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actually did not answer that question
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but he did say that he thought that
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fully automated Warfare was completely
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inevitable simply because fully
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automatic Warfare fully automating the
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system would save a lot of time and in
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some context like kind of Time Savings
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like squeezing out seconds out of your
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reaction time could be critical anyways
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be that as it may all of this is
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supposed to enable something called
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collaborative Warfare which is I think
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you can describe it as the holy Grill of
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all the Western militaries the idea
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behind collaborative Warfare is that uh
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you know you're out in the battlefield
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and you've got all these different
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elements because of course everything is
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combined arms these days so you've got
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the howitzers and infantry fighting
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vehicles and you got the tanks you got
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drones and fighter jets and all this
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kind of stuff and infantry got eyes and
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and the idea is that all of them are
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networked right all of them are sharing
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information and so if there's
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information about let's say a threat
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pops up maybe send me tank or maybe just
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some guy on a roof the with a anti-tank
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guided missile who's prepared to take a
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shot at something uh he's he's seen he's
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located the information is shared on the
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network the in the network basically
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delivers to uh helps decide very quickly
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what is the best weapons platform or
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weapons system that can take a shot at
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that threat and neutralize the threat
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and then you know again with sud then
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you know somebody's turret is going to
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automatically move over to take a
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precise shot collaborative Warfare is
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something that all militaries are
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working on uh I I believe that with the
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implementation of Scorpion the French is
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now simply ahead of the game with
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everybody else the British are also
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implementing Etc but the French is
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simply ahead at a at a comprehensive
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level now why has France been more
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successful I I think that there are two
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major reasons the first reason seon has
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to do with the the the predictability
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and stability of French military budgets
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and it has to do with also how the
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French manage their their their their
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budgets and their spending so that even
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when the French military was going
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through severe budget cuts which was the
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case up until about I think 2014 2015
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when around then when the French stopped
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cutting and it started to turn reverse
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the curves and started to spend more
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money on defense uh because of the
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5-year military programming laws Etc I
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think that all the people involved in we
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weapons development and weapons
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procurement had just better visibility
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with regard to how much money they had
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and how much money they were going to
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have I believe that this is a key
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ingredient to successful modernization
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program the other major reason why the
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French have been successful where the
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British have failed at least with fres
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is that the French have done a much
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better job of making decisions about
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their requirements and then sticking to
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those decisions right whereas the
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British have had a hard time making
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decisions and then often after they make
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a decision they've changed the mind and
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and changed the requirements midc course
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which is very problematic now this does
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not mean and I want to stress this this
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does not mean that the French made the
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right decisions these decisions are
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based on your understanding of not just
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your current requirements but your
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future requirements they are calculated
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bets that you're making as far as I'm
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aware the decisions that the French army
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made that I'm I'm speaking about here
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decisions that they made if not prior to
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2014 then at least prior to to uh 2022
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in other words before the French army
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shifted its focus to to focus
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single-mindedly on high-end conventional
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Warfare and potentially fighting the
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Russians the
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requirements of the day what they were
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thinking when they made the decisions
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which you can now see reflected in their
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new vehicle Fleet had to do with the
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French calculus of uh where a happy
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medium was in terms of risk and
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requirements they wanted to they didn't
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want to tell her their force to be able
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to be to fight to they didn't want to
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optimize it for the lower end of the
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conflict Spectrum or the higher end of
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the conflict spectrum they aimed instead
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for what they call the middle segment or
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the
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Sego so the result is a fleet of
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vehicles that they intended to be light
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enough to be deployed to let's say
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Africa not just deployed to Africa but
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also sustained in Africa particularly
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thech military's relatively poor
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logistical
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capabilities but heavy enough to survive
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on a on a battlefield and conventional
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Warfare now the word enough I think is
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very very important the US military does
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not like to buy things that are good
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enough they want Optimal Solutions and
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they can often afford to have Optimal
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Solutions so they can afford to look for
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optimal solutions for things the French
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uh have I think much more modest
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Ambitions because they have much more
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limited means and so as a result they're
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satisfied with enough of course whether
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or not something is good enough for a
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certain context is a risk it's it's it's
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a risk they're betting but that's what
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they're thinking of uh as a result I
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mean the most obvious way you can see
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this in the new vehicle Fleet is the
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fact that uh there all wheel the vbci is
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Wheels the Jaguar the Griffin the sural
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they all have wheels the only things now
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in the French army inventory that still
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have caterpillar tracks so they the
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Clare main battle tank and I believe
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that they still have some of their old
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au1 self-re howitzers from the 1980s I
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think they still have some of them in
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their inventory some of them in their
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atolia units but those I believe are
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slated to be phased out by the Caesar
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Howitzer a s self-propelled Howitzer
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which is on a truck chassis with with
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wheels wheels are optimal for deploying
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to places like Africa they are not
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optimal for slugging out for the
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Russians in Ukraine and we've seen this
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in the Ukraine war that the wheel
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vehicles have suffered have not done as
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well
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as the track vehicles given the snow
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given the mud the very difficult
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conditions but that's what you see and
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and so when the French now they're
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thinking about restoring their cap cap
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capability to do high in conventional
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Warfare they're trying to do it with a
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force that ultimately is designed for
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something else it's designed for the
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middle segment rather than the force
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that perhaps they would have designed if
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they had been focus on conventional
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Warfare 20 30 years ago when they're
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making decisions that uh are now
00:17:59
reflected in their their vehicle
00:18:01
Fleet okay so let's talk now about how
00:18:03
the British and the French armies are
00:18:05
similar in the previous video about the
00:18:08
French army I talked about the British
00:18:09
army I talked about how the Ukraine war
00:18:12
has revealed certain capabilities to be
00:18:16
essential on the modern Battlefield and
00:18:18
these are capabilities that Western
00:18:20
armies including the British including
00:18:22
the French either do not really have
00:18:25
because they're new or have
00:18:29
but are really more legacies from the
00:18:31
cold war and are capabilities that
00:18:33
they've disinvested from meaning they
00:18:35
don't have a lot of it or what they have
00:18:37
just as simply inadequate or too few Etc
00:18:40
and so the idea is that all Western
00:18:41
militaries are in the same kind of boat
00:18:44
and they need to boost these
00:18:45
capabilities and they do do it either
00:18:47
fill the capability gaps or enhance the
00:18:49
capabilities that they have and they
00:18:51
need do do it really quickly so what am
00:18:53
I talking about I'm talking about air
00:18:54
defense capabilities I'm talking about
00:18:56
drones counter drone capabilities I'm
00:18:58
talking about ISR counter ISR long range
00:19:02
fires I'm thinking tube and and Rocket
00:19:04
artillery electronic warfare and I think
00:19:07
also certain engineering capabilities
00:19:08
like breaching capabilities and bridging
00:19:11
capabilities these things are equally
00:19:14
true of both the British and the French
00:19:16
army so both of them really are
00:19:18
inadequate in this regard both for
00:19:20
example have uh Howers and self Howers
00:19:24
but really very few both of them have
00:19:26
multiple launch rocket systems but very
00:19:28
few I think actually the British have
00:19:29
more than the French both of them only
00:19:31
have a few main battle tanks roughly
00:19:33
about 200 both of them by the way
00:19:35
neither is capable of building new main
00:19:37
battle tanks because the assembly lines
00:19:38
closed a long time ago both armies also
00:19:42
have too little uh they don't have
00:19:46
enough ammunition they don't have enough
00:19:47
missiles the result being that neither
00:19:49
would last very long in any kind of war
00:19:51
and both now I think are struggling both
00:19:53
to restore their own stocks while also
00:19:55
trying to keep ammunition in the
00:19:57
pipeline for the ukrainians to use I
00:19:59
believe that the French defense industry
00:20:01
is healthier than the British defense
00:20:02
industry simply as a result of
00:20:04
long-standing French industrial policy
00:20:07
that being said neither defense industry
00:20:09
has much in the way of industrial
00:20:11
capacity they they're making things but
00:20:13
they can't really crank them out in very
00:20:15
large numbers which would be necessary
00:20:16
in the invent of a major war to give you
00:20:19
an example uh the Caesar howitz or sthal
00:20:22
Howitzer right now after a lot of effort
00:20:25
trying to ramp up the capacity the
00:20:28
manufacturer of the Caesar which is
00:20:30
nexter can make 70 of them a year but
00:20:33
that's only now right just a few years
00:20:35
ago they could make much fewer than that
00:20:37
I don't remember the numbers but 70 is
00:20:39
not really a lot now what about 155 mm
00:20:43
Howitzer shells which we have all
00:20:46
learned in because the Ukraine war are
00:20:48
absolutely essential This Is Like Oxygen
00:20:51
for for an army engaged in a
00:20:53
conventional fight uh my source on the
00:20:56
the the French uh and their ability to
00:20:59
manufacture these shells is Jean Dominic
00:21:02
M uh this man here uh for those of you
00:21:06
who are not French and probably are not
00:21:07
familiar with him Jean Dominique m is
00:21:10
one of France's leading uh journalists
00:21:13
analysts and commentators on
00:21:15
international relations National
00:21:16
Security and and the defense defense
00:21:19
establishment French military he's
00:21:21
really really very good this is a
00:21:24
book are we ready for war which came out
00:21:27
in January of 2024 M says that he does
00:21:31
not know how many howzer shells the
00:21:33
French can manufacture a year because
00:21:35
the number is classified he does say
00:21:37
that nexter which makes these shells for
00:21:39
the French army recently has stated that
00:21:43
they intend to double the rate of shell
00:21:46
production to 100,000 per year by
00:21:49
2025 which suggests that right now that
00:21:53
100,000 is the doubled amount that means
00:21:55
that they are now making 50,000 per year
00:21:58
he also reports that the French army
00:22:00
itself says that they can sustain a rate
00:22:03
of Howard
00:22:05
fire uh of at most 9,000 Howards or
00:22:09
shells per year given the current rate
00:22:12
of production which he notes is roughly
00:22:15
the same number of poer shells that the
00:22:17
Ukrainian Army fires each and every day
00:22:21
meaning that France isn't producing
00:22:22
nearly enough hoarder shells what about
00:22:25
the British again I I don't know how
00:22:27
many hoarder shells the British are are
00:22:29
capable of producing uh that number
00:22:31
probably is classified I do know that
00:22:33
the ministry of Defense has thrown a lot
00:22:35
of money recently at the Bae which is
00:22:37
the company that makes them for the
00:22:38
British Army in order to uh scale up the
00:22:41
production of shells what are the
00:22:42
numbers I don't know I suspect they're
00:22:44
not really high enough another big
00:22:47
similarity with the two armies is that
00:22:49
neither really has the means to fight a
00:22:51
large War because they just simply lack
00:22:53
in Mass they just don't have numbers
00:22:55
they have too few stuff right too few
00:22:58
things
00:22:59
uh in the last video I described the
00:23:00
British army as a bonsai tree the French
00:23:02
army is itself a bonsai tree it's a
00:23:05
better tended bonsai tree I would argue
00:23:07
it's a little bit larger but it's still
00:23:08
a bonsai tree so could Britain fight a
00:23:11
major ground war I don't really think so
00:23:13
could France fight a major ground
00:23:15
war yeah um uh M says that the French
00:23:19
army could manage a front of 80
00:23:21
kilometers which sounds a lot but really
00:23:23
isn't uh and it's certainly a far cry
00:23:26
from what the French army was capable of
00:23:28
during the cold war or you know during
00:23:30
or prior to World War II would these
00:23:33
armies be of any use I think that they
00:23:35
would be but but not necessarily for
00:23:37
long I mean both armies are really
00:23:38
counting on quality over quantity
00:23:40
they're they're betting over that
00:23:42
throwing money at technology or uh a
00:23:46
training right which is going to give
00:23:48
them like they've got all these really
00:23:49
great things and these very wellt
00:23:50
trained soldiers that that's going to
00:23:53
get them somewhere and that's really
00:23:54
going to to help them uh and and I
00:23:57
there's some truth truth to that right
00:23:59
you know like a caesar howitz or an as90
00:24:01
or one of these new boxer howitzers that
00:24:03
the British army you're getting uh
00:24:05
they're clearly better than a certain
00:24:07
number of inferior housers but what
00:24:09
exactly is the ratio and isn't enough to
00:24:12
make up to vastly Superior numbers that
00:24:13
the enemy might be able to throw at them
00:24:15
and is it a better invest of the money
00:24:17
it's really very hard to know perhaps
00:24:19
after the Ukraine war we can analyze the
00:24:21
data and we could say you know because
00:24:23
the the the the ukrainians have maybe a
00:24:25
dozen Caesar plus they've got some
00:24:27
German uh self forb Howard shows that
00:24:29
are supposed to be excellent you know
00:24:31
maybe you can see that okay each one of
00:24:33
these things is worth X number of
00:24:35
inferior things and then you could kind
00:24:37
of do the math and figure out which is
00:24:39
the better buy it's really hard to know
00:24:41
but I don't think we know at the moment
00:24:43
I do strongly believe that
00:24:45
pound-for-pound both armies are very
00:24:49
good and both armies would cut the
00:24:50
Russians to Pieces uh I will bet money
00:24:53
on any British or French infantry squad
00:24:56
or company or Tank Company over nearly
00:24:59
any conceivable adversary just because
00:25:01
of their training their skills they're
00:25:03
really really very good both of them uh
00:25:06
I think the training in professionalism
00:25:07
really counts for a lot we saw this in
00:25:09
the fauland war where in the fauland war
00:25:12
you had a relatively small number of
00:25:14
highly trained British professionals go
00:25:16
up against Argentine conscript it was
00:25:19
hardly a fair fight which is exactly
00:25:21
what you want you don't want a fair
00:25:22
fight in combat um and and I I also
00:25:26
think that the French with their
00:25:27
emphasis on maneuver and speed and and
00:25:29
having uh uh lower ranking officers take
00:25:33
the initiative I think they they would
00:25:34
dance around the Russians and just
00:25:36
slotter them but then they'd run out of
00:25:37
ammunition and they might run out out of
00:25:39
ammunition really very quickly and then
00:25:42
at some point the Russians could just
00:25:44
drown them in Mass just overwhelm them
00:25:46
with with the sheer numbers we like to
00:25:48
laugh at the images of these these the
00:25:50
Russians sending t-62s into battle on
00:25:52
Ukraine t62 is of course being these
00:25:54
ancient Cold War vintage things that are
00:25:57
cre easily wildly obsolete on the modern
00:26:00
battlefield but it's not funny anymore
00:26:02
if youve got nothing left in your
00:26:03
inventory to stop the t62 other than
00:26:06
maybe be throwing rocks at them so at
00:26:08
that point the t62 actually becomes a
00:26:10
significant threat to to your own side
00:26:13
the reality is that both armies reflect
00:26:15
the fact that between the end of the
00:26:16
Cold War and relatively recently neither
00:26:18
country took seriously the possibility
00:26:20
of ending up in a large war and
00:26:23
certainly not one in Europe they as a
00:26:26
result they're really just not equipped
00:26:27
to do that
00:26:28
so let's agree that neither Army can
00:26:31
handle a big war at least for any length
00:26:33
of time although I would argue that the
00:26:34
French because of the larger size would
00:26:36
do a little bit better but so what so
00:26:39
now we get to part part four does it
00:26:41
really matter in the end do they really
00:26:44
need to be able to do this nuclear
00:26:46
weapons still exists the Russians still
00:26:48
have nuclear weapons during the Cold War
00:26:50
the French calculated that that they
00:26:52
even though they had a gigantic Army at
00:26:54
the time that that a war with the
00:26:57
Soviets sooner rather than later was
00:26:58
going to end up going Nuclear So they
00:27:00
didn't need an army that could actually
00:27:02
fight the Soviets for the duration
00:27:04
because there would be no duration there
00:27:05
would be nuclear war or hopefully there
00:27:08
would be some sort of offramp that both
00:27:09
sides would would would find before the
00:27:13
thing went nuclear and the and the and
00:27:14
the world ended if the British and
00:27:16
French are not fighting the Russians
00:27:18
then who are they actually fighting like
00:27:20
who what plausible scenario is there
00:27:22
actually that either country would find
00:27:24
themselves in a major land war against
00:27:26
whom and where and when and also neither
00:27:29
country is likely for the foreseeable
00:27:31
future to do what it takes to fix this
00:27:34
situation which is to spend a lot of
00:27:37
money many many billions of dollars to
00:27:41
turn their armies into things that are
00:27:43
actually capable of getting into and
00:27:46
sustaining and fighting large Ground
00:27:48
Wars in in Europe against somebody like
00:27:50
the Russians or I don't know who it's
00:27:52
just not going to happen so I want to
00:27:54
leave you I want to leave you with some
00:27:56
concluding remarks from Jean Dominique m
00:27:58
uh and he's of course talking about
00:27:59
France and the French army but I believe
00:28:01
that what John M M says is equally
00:28:05
applicable to the United Kingdom and the
00:28:07
British army mé calls for not spending
00:28:12
more money but for greater
00:28:14
resilience and he talks about the French
00:28:17
in the in 1914 and he talks about how
00:28:20
France just barely hung on at the first
00:28:23
battle of the mar and then afterwards
00:28:25
was able to to sort of absorb the
00:28:27
horrible losses of 1914 and then to
00:28:30
adapt he says that it it adapted it
00:28:32
built up the the quote kind of force and
00:28:34
quality and quantity that it needed and
00:28:37
he says that France's industry and its
00:28:39
people also responded beautiful
00:28:41
beautifully and with a remarkable sense
00:28:43
of unity and purpose now France today he
00:28:46
says I'm quoting we must therefore
00:28:49
cultivate our faculty for resilience but
00:28:52
above all for adaptation flexibility and
00:28:54
elasticity first of all intellectually
00:28:57
to do that M writes we have permanently
00:29:00
to encourage strategic debate and to
00:29:02
listen to those who think outside the
00:29:04
box that comfortable box that ensures
00:29:07
good careers and the financing and
00:29:09
research contracts further M concludes
00:29:12
it's not for war that we must be ready
00:29:14
because that is impossible rather what
00:29:16
one must be ready for is quote the the
00:29:19
possibility of having to adapt quickly
00:29:21
and well to a radically new situation
00:29:24
this he adds might be War but it also
00:29:27
goes for other major threats such as
00:29:28
pandemics natural or Technic
00:29:30
technological catastrophes or economic
00:29:33
crashes if you like this video thank you
00:29:35
very much please like And subscribe you
00:29:37
know the drill also please check out in
00:29:39
the description I put links to uh
00:29:41
various articles I've written about the
00:29:43
British and the French armies as well as
00:29:45
my LinkedIn my Twitter to my website
00:29:47
Michael shen.com and my substack and if
00:29:50
you have any recommendations if there's
00:29:52
something that you'd like me to talk
00:29:53
about in the future uh add them to your
00:29:55
comments uh I've had a lot of good
00:29:57
recommendations so I've got a lot of
00:29:59
stuff in the pipeline as a result thank
00:30:01
you very much
