The Syrian Consequence: Israel's Opportunity || Peter Zeihan

00:08:20
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zVBZQA9ALpY

概要

TLDRPeter Zeihan explores the geopolitical ramifications of Syria's collapse for Israel. Historically, peace with all neighbors was deemed essential for Israeli stability, but shifts in regional dynamics have altered this premise. With Syria's disintegration, Israel can fully assert control over the Golan Heights and mitigate threats like Hezbollah, now weakened by the disruption of Iranian supply routes. Egypt and Jordan maintain stable relations with Israel, while Lebanon struggles without Hezbollah's influence. In Gaza, Israel is isolating Hamas territorially, managing ongoing insurgencies. Long-term, Israel faces challenges in monitoring post-Assad Syria's evolution and navigating its complex relationship with Turkey, a major regional power. These developments herald significant, if uncertain, changes to Israel’s strategic landscape.

収穫

  • 🌍 Syria's collapse shifts the Middle East's geopolitical dynamics.
  • 🏔️ Israel can assert control over the Golan Heights without a peace deal.
  • ⚔️ Hezbollah is critically weakened without Syrian and Iranian support.
  • 🚧 Israel isolates Gaza to curb Hamas insurgencies.
  • 🇪🇬 Egypt remains one of Israel's key regional partners.
  • 🇯🇴 Jordan is economically tied to Israel, ensuring mutual stability.
  • 🇱🇧 Lebanon struggles with weakened governance after Hezbollah's decline.
  • 📉 The Shia Crescent's disruption cuts Iran's regional influence.
  • 🔍 Israel remains cautious about the future of post-Assad Syria.
  • 🇹🇷 Turkey’s stance on Israel will shape major regional dynamics.

タイムライン

  • 00:00:00 - 00:08:20

    Peter Zeihan outlines Israel's shifting strategic landscape in the Middle East following Syria's collapse. With peace sustained with Egypt and neighboring powers weakened or neutralized, Israel faces limited external threats. Syria's fragmentation undermines Iran's influence and Hezbollah's functionality, constraining regional opposition. However, unresolved challenges remain with Hamas in Gaza, maintaining low-level insurgencies. Looking ahead, Israel's focus may shift to post-civil war Syria's structure and its evolving relationship with Turkey, emphasizing its significant influence on Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics.

マインドマップ

ビデオQ&A

  • What is the geopolitical adage mentioned about Israel?

    'There is no war without Egypt and no peace without Syria,' highlighting the need for peace with all neighbors for Israel's stability.

  • What changes have occurred in the Golan Heights?

    With Syria's collapse, Israel can now potentially make full use of the fertile Golan Heights without a land-for-peace deal.

  • What has happened to Hezbollah after Syria's collapse?

    Hezbollah has been significantly weakened, as it can no longer receive Iranian support via Syria and has lost much of its leadership.

  • What does the collapse of Syria mean for Iranian influence?

    It cuts the 'Shia Crescent' in half, limiting Iran's ability to project power through Iraq, Syria, and into Lebanon.

  • What is the current situation with Hamas in Gaza?

    Israel is isolating Gaza into smaller cantons to manage insurgencies, though hostility and low-level conflict persist.

  • How has Israel's relationship with neighboring states evolved?

    Egypt is now relatively friendly, Jordan is economically tied to Israel, and Lebanon is weakened without Hezbollah.

  • Why has Israel refrained from intervening in the Syrian Civil War?

    Israel viewed Assad's regime as the 'least bad' option compared to a potentially hostile Sunni Arab majority.

  • What concerns does Israel have about post-Assad Syria?

    Israel is cautious about the form Syria might take as it consolidates, fearing long-term instability.

  • What is the importance of Turkey in Israel's future geopolitics?

    Turkey's evolving identity and its stance on Israel will shape regional dynamics, impacting whether Turkey-Israel relations are cooperative or combative.

  • What is the broader implication of Syria's collapse for regional powers?

    It shifts strategic dynamics, limiting Iranian control, weakening Hezbollah, and opening opportunities for Israeli recalibrations.

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  • 00:00:00
    hey everybody Peter Zion here coming to
  • 00:00:01
    you from Egmont National Park uh that's
  • 00:00:04
    mount taniki in the background and I'm
  • 00:00:06
    walking through the auk kawakawa swamp
  • 00:00:09
    uh which is non-standard anyway um we're
  • 00:00:13
    going to continue talking about the
  • 00:00:14
    consequences of the fall of the Syrian
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    government and today we're going to
  • 00:00:17
    cover Israel there's an old adage going
  • 00:00:20
    back to the late 70s uh that says that
  • 00:00:24
    there is no war without Egypt and no
  • 00:00:28
    peace without Syria the last major
  • 00:00:31
    Israeli uh Arab conflict was in 1973 and
  • 00:00:35
    it ended it was a surprise attack um
  • 00:00:38
    that probably shouldn't have happened
  • 00:00:39
    but it ended with a resounding Israeli
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    Victory and after that it set the stage
  • 00:00:43
    for peace talks with the Egyptians which
  • 00:00:46
    concluded under Jimmy Carter in 1979 but
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    Syria always stayed on the outside and
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    the whole concept of that phrase is that
  • 00:00:52
    Israel is a vulnerable state and until
  • 00:00:54
    it has peace with all of its neighbors
  • 00:00:56
    it has peace with none of its neighbors
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    uh because there just isn't any
  • 00:00:59
    strategic de
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    but now the situation has changed uh and
  • 00:01:03
    there is an opportunity here for Israel
  • 00:01:04
    to do a few things differently should it
  • 00:01:05
    so choose uh the border with Egypt is
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    internationally monitored and Egypt is
  • 00:01:11
    as close to a friend as the Israelis
  • 00:01:13
    have in the region um and that provides
  • 00:01:17
    some strategic opportunities here
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    especially since now that the uh
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    Northeastern border is open so this is
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    going to take a few places uh first of
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    all the Golan Heights that's a chunk of
  • 00:01:25
    territory that the Israelis captured
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    from the syrians in a series of conflict
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    throughout uh the 20th century uh it
  • 00:01:33
    hasn't really been settled because
  • 00:01:35
    there's always this idea that there was
  • 00:01:37
    eventually going to be a land for peace
  • 00:01:38
    deal well that doesn't have to happen
  • 00:01:40
    now so you should expect to see the
  • 00:01:41
    Israelis make the most of what is
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    actually some significantly fertile
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    territory that uh could help a country
  • 00:01:47
    that Imports over half of its food
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    stuffs uh second the remaining security
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    concerns are now somewhat limited uh
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    there's this thing called the Shia
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    Crescent that starts in Iran goes
  • 00:01:58
    through Iraq Northern Syria and into
  • 00:02:01
    Lebanon and the idea is this is the area
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    that the Iranians would use to project
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    power and one of the big fuckups that
  • 00:02:08
    the Americans did with the Iraq war is
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    basically shatter what was an Arab Sunni
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    power that ruled that area and allowed
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    the Iranians to penetrate into the
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    region very very deeply they don't
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    control Iraq but they're certainly the
  • 00:02:22
    first Power in the country well now with
  • 00:02:25
    Syria broken uh the Shia cresant has
  • 00:02:27
    been cut in half and the Iranians can no
  • 00:02:30
    longer drive or even reliably fly
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    equipment or arms or men uh to the
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    western part of the Crescent which means
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    that Hezbollah which is the militant
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    group that the Iranians founded and
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    sponsored but the syrians managed that
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    operates mostly in Lebanon uh is now I
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    don't want to say dead that's maybe the
  • 00:02:48
    wrong word but certainly gutted and it
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    will have to do with its own resources
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    and without the syrians or the Iranians
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    to manage them or reinforce them or
  • 00:02:58
    provide them with weapons uh that's not
  • 00:03:00
    a lot and that's before you consider
  • 00:03:02
    that over the last couple of months the
  • 00:03:04
    Israelis have done a a damn solid job of
  • 00:03:07
    gutting the entire uh Hezbollah
  • 00:03:09
    leadership uh so there's still a lot of
  • 00:03:11
    anger there's still plenty of people to
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    recruit from but as a functional
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    organization Hezbollah is functionally
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    gone at this point and with Syria now
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    gone there's really no way to
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    rehabilitate it very quickly uh this is
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    not the Cold War this is not a period of
  • 00:03:24
    heavy globalization where Freedom of the
  • 00:03:25
    Seas is sacren this is a world where if
  • 00:03:28
    you want to get equipment from A to B
  • 00:03:30
    you have to basically get it there
  • 00:03:31
    yourselves and provide the military
  • 00:03:33
    escort that's necessary and Iran's not a
  • 00:03:35
    naval power okay that just leaves where
  • 00:03:38
    this all started in recent days uh Hamas
  • 00:03:42
    in Gaza now my assessment of what's
  • 00:03:45
    going on there really hasn't changed uh
  • 00:03:47
    Hamas uh rules Gaza Gaza is occupied
  • 00:03:50
    territory as long as it's occupied
  • 00:03:52
    territory there will be no end of people
  • 00:03:55
    who are willing to fight the occupiers
  • 00:03:57
    and the occupiers are the Israelis the
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    only question is whether or not the
  • 00:04:00
    organization that runs the place can get
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    enough equipment and weapons uh to fight
  • 00:04:05
    back in a meaningful way like they did
  • 00:04:07
    uh a year ago October when they did that
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    big assault that killed a thousand
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    people uh the Israelis are in the
  • 00:04:14
    process of crunching it down they're
  • 00:04:15
    building a cordon in the edge of Gaza um
  • 00:04:20
    and then cutting it in half basically
  • 00:04:23
    splitting into tiny little cantons that
  • 00:04:25
    they feel they can manage more directly
  • 00:04:27
    now this will guarantee that the
  • 00:04:28
    population will all always be hostile to
  • 00:04:32
    them but you're talking about a
  • 00:04:34
    low-level simmering Insurgency as
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    opposed to something that could generate
  • 00:04:39
    the military organization that's
  • 00:04:41
    necessary to actually attack a state so
  • 00:04:43
    it's ugly it will continue to be ugly in
  • 00:04:46
    fact it will probably from a human
  • 00:04:47
    rights point of view and a starvation
  • 00:04:49
    point of view get uglier but that
  • 00:04:51
    doesn't mean it's a threat to the state
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    of Israel and that's everybody uh
  • 00:04:56
    everyone
  • 00:04:57
    around uh Israel has now been clipped or
  • 00:05:02
    befriended Jordan is basically an
  • 00:05:04
    economic satellite who's indirectly
  • 00:05:06
    sponsored by Israel in the United States
  • 00:05:08
    Egypt is relatively friendly Lebanon in
  • 00:05:10
    a good day is a failed State and without
  • 00:05:13
    Hezbollah they might actually be able to
  • 00:05:14
    make a go of being a semi is kind of
  • 00:05:17
    sort of normal State and Iran lacks the
  • 00:05:20
    ability to uh dick around in Israeli
  • 00:05:22
    Affairs so long as there is no Syria now
  • 00:05:26
    uh there's two things to keep in mind
  • 00:05:27
    for longer term first of all Syria
  • 00:05:29
    itself
  • 00:05:30
    one of the reasons that the Israelis
  • 00:05:31
    never got involved in the Syrian Civil
  • 00:05:33
    War is they felt that if the majority in
  • 00:05:36
    Syria was able to take control the Sunni
  • 00:05:38
    Arabs then they would be dealing with
  • 00:05:40
    something like Gaza and Hamas but on a
  • 00:05:42
    much larger scale and so they didn't
  • 00:05:45
    like Assad or Assad Syria but they felt
  • 00:05:48
    it was the least bad option so as
  • 00:05:50
    whatever post Assad Syria consolidates
  • 00:05:53
    into a new form the Israelis are going
  • 00:05:54
    to be acting very very cautiously going
  • 00:05:56
    to be watching very very closely and
  • 00:05:58
    there may based on the way way politics
  • 00:06:00
    evolves may be a strong far stronger
  • 00:06:03
    case for Israeli intervention in post
  • 00:06:06
    Civil War Syria than there was during
  • 00:06:08
    Civil War Syria of course we'll probably
  • 00:06:10
    have a second Civil War now all the
  • 00:06:12
    Sunni Arabs figure out who's in charge
  • 00:06:14
    so as long as it hasn't Consolidated
  • 00:06:16
    Israel's fine once it starts to
  • 00:06:18
    consolidate Israel is going to be
  • 00:06:19
    watching very closely because it might
  • 00:06:20
    not like the form that it takes what's
  • 00:06:23
    next uh second and the bigger question
  • 00:06:25
    the longer term question and the
  • 00:06:26
    question that ultimately is going to
  • 00:06:28
    occupy uh Israeli strategic thinkers for
  • 00:06:31
    decades is the relationship with turkey
  • 00:06:34
    now in the past the pre- Israel Jews got
  • 00:06:38
    along with the Ottoman Empire and during
  • 00:06:40
    the Cold War the Israelis got along with
  • 00:06:42
    Cold War era turkey but that is not
  • 00:06:45
    where we are right now turkey is in the
  • 00:06:46
    process of redefining what it is to be
  • 00:06:49
    Turkish and based on how that definition
  • 00:06:51
    goes there may or may not be room for
  • 00:06:56
    Israel in that definition uh the issue
  • 00:07:00
    is is that turkey is a major power and
  • 00:07:02
    there is nothing that Israel could ever
  • 00:07:03
    do to change that and so Israel is stuck
  • 00:07:06
    dealing with whatever the new Turkish
  • 00:07:08
    identity happens to be now me taking the
  • 00:07:12
    armchair
  • 00:07:13
    look a a turkey that partners with
  • 00:07:17
    Israel is one that de facto controls the
  • 00:07:19
    entire Eastern Mediterranean Egypt would
  • 00:07:20
    probably be brought along for the ride
  • 00:07:22
    and it becomes a major regional power in
  • 00:07:23
    its own right and Israel that doesn't
  • 00:07:26
    get along with turkey is one that is
  • 00:07:28
    locked down in a series of local
  • 00:07:30
    conflicts uh that greatly sap its power
  • 00:07:33
    and its ability to project in any
  • 00:07:34
    direction so if the government of turkey
  • 00:07:38
    can decide that Jews are okay then we go
  • 00:07:42
    One Direction and for the powers of
  • 00:07:44
    Europe all of a sudden turkey is a major
  • 00:07:46
    player that can't be ignored if the
  • 00:07:49
    Turkish leadership decides that the Jews
  • 00:07:51
    are the problem then we have a very
  • 00:07:53
    different situation where the Europeans
  • 00:07:55
    side with the Israelis to keep the Turks
  • 00:07:57
    boxed up now that is a debate and a
  • 00:07:59
    question and a time frame that will be
  • 00:08:01
    decided years from now but now that
  • 00:08:04
    Syria has been broken that is the next
  • 00:08:06
    big thing on the Israeli and the Turkish
  • 00:08:09
    agenda
タグ
  • Israel
  • Syria collapse
  • Golan Heights
  • Turkey relations
  • Iran influence
  • Hamas
  • Hezbollah
  • Middle East geopolitics
  • Shia Crescent
  • Post-Assad Syria