Scammers PANIC After I Hack Their Live CCTV Cameras!

00:23:20
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=58JqGuclqng

概要

TLDREste video detalla cómo un investigador se infiltra en un call center de estafas, accediendo a sus sistemas a través de un truco de acceso remoto. Al conectarse a sus computadoras y cámaras de seguridad, captura pruebas dándole la vuelta a la situación y confrontando a los estafadores. Muestra información sobre las estafas que ejecutan, las sumas de dinero que roban y sus identidades, culminando en la exposición de sus prácticas delictivas. Finalmente, se revelan acciones tomadas por el investigador para desmantelar sus operaciones y notificar a las autoridades.

収穫

  • 📞 Llamada en vivo a estafadores en pánico.
  • 💻 Acceso a sistemas de estafadores mediante engaño.
  • 🔍 Recolección de pruebas a través de cámaras de seguridad.
  • 🚨 Revelación de identidades y ubicación de los estafadores.
  • 💰 Estimaciones sobre dinero robado: $2.7 millones en 3 años.
  • 🔒 Informar a las autoridades y proteger a las víctimas.
  • 👥 Nombres y contactos de los estafadores expuestos.
  • 🛠️ Medidas de sabotaje contra los estafadores.
  • 📹 Confrontaciones grabadas de los estafadores.
  • 🏢 Ubicación real del call center en India.

タイムライン

  • 00:00:00 - 00:05:00

    Neste segmento, o creador de contido chama a un estafador chamado Sanjie, revelando a identidade del estafador e preguntando por que está estafando á xente. O creador explica como descubriu a lista de sitios web fraudulentos que aparentan ser legitimos, destinados a estafar a usuarios de Alexa. Describindo como interactuou co soporte para chegar á conexión remota, acorda a súa intención de devolver a conexión para espionar as accións do estafador.

  • 00:05:00 - 00:10:00

    O creador conecta remotamente á computadora do estafador, mostrando como intenta vender un plan de soporte falso por un prezo elevado, malia que non hai ningún problema na computadora. Ficando frustrado co engano, comeza a confrontar ao estafador, organizando a conexión da cámara de seguridade do centro de chamadas. Este acceso permite que o creador vexa as actividades dentro do centro de estafa, xunto cunha vez de xente comendo e socializando como se fose un traballo normal. A intención do creador é recoller probas

  • 00:10:00 - 00:15:00

    Despois de revisar a información recollida, o creador atopa un grupo de cámaras de seguridade na oficina do estafador, permitindo a introspección sobre o funcionamento do centro, fantasmas internos e nomes de contacto dos estafadores. A partir do que se atopa, começa a dar cunha serie de nomes relacionados co centro. Identificando a un xestor da oficina, comeza a decatarse das tensións internas do equipo. Adicionalmente, segue investigando as contas financeiras dos estafadores, reunindo información para un posterior reporte.

  • 00:15:00 - 00:23:20

    Finalmente, o creador localiza a ubicación física do centro de estafas e averigua cómo atopar e reportar a actividade. Usando coordenadas, pode identificar a estrutura exacta e observa os procesos de transaccións fraudulentas. Ao final do seu plan, establece un esquema para reflexionar e exponer aos estafadores, incluso reportando a información a diferentes autoridades e actuando en contra dos métodos do centro. Conclue con un videoconferencia que revela aos estafadores, provocando pánico e confusión entre eles.

もっと見る

マインドマップ

ビデオQ&A

  • ¿Qué sucedió con los estafadores?

    Fueron confrontados en vivo y se mostraron en pánico tras ser expuestos.

  • ¿Cómo se descubrió a los estafadores?

    A través de una investigación y grabaciones en sus sistemas y cámaras de seguridad.

  • ¿Qué tipo de estafa estaban realizando?

    Estaban engañando a las personas haciéndoles creer que necesitaban soporte técnico falso.

  • ¿Cómo se llegó a la ubicación del call center?

    Utilizando coordenadas obtenidas de la red Wi-Fi y CCTV.

  • ¿Qué medidas se tomaron contra los estafadores?

    Se reportaron sus cuentas a las autoridades y se comenzaron a reembolsar a sus víctimas.

ビデオをもっと見る

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オートスクロール:
  • 00:00:00
    this is live footage of scammers fully
  • 00:00:03
    panicking let's give these scammers a
  • 00:00:05
    phone call and record their live
  • 00:00:06
    reactions to a hacker revealing their
  • 00:00:09
    true identities yeah my name is sanjie
  • 00:00:11
    your name is sanjie and your friend next
  • 00:00:13
    to you is wearing a brown shirt so Sanji
  • 00:00:15
    why are you scamming people
  • 00:00:22
    [Music]
  • 00:00:25
    sanjan oh yeah this is definitely it
  • 00:00:28
    they're taping it forever
  • 00:00:33
    all right so I'm going to explain to you
  • 00:00:34
    how I found these scammers I was doing
  • 00:00:36
    my usual look around for scammer phone
  • 00:00:38
    numbers when I came across a list of
  • 00:00:40
    websites that looked very scammy to say
  • 00:00:42
    the least the website looks fairly tame
  • 00:00:44
    and legit on the surface but in reality
  • 00:00:46
    it's all a scheme to get you to pay for
  • 00:00:47
    useless drivers or security but who are
  • 00:00:50
    the people coming across a fake website
  • 00:00:51
    that's offering Alexa support well
  • 00:00:53
    someone who just purchased themselves a
  • 00:00:55
    brand new Amazon Alexa device and when
  • 00:00:57
    they tried to set it up the instructions
  • 00:00:59
    informed them to download the Alexa app
  • 00:01:01
    so they go on Google and search
  • 00:01:02
    something up like download Alexa app but
  • 00:01:05
    instead of coming across the Google Play
  • 00:01:06
    store or the App Store they get those
  • 00:01:09
    fake sponsored scam links that I showed
  • 00:01:10
    you previously now on the website the
  • 00:01:12
    victim is given multiple options of
  • 00:01:14
    download I'm using Windows so I go ahead
  • 00:01:16
    and initiate the download for Windows
  • 00:01:18
    and I get this fake looking progress bar
  • 00:01:20
    and after it loads it gives me the exact
  • 00:01:23
    same error message every single time
  • 00:01:25
    reading network error we couldn't
  • 00:01:27
    complete your download please chat with
  • 00:01:29
    us for more info and under that a little
  • 00:01:31
    option to join the chat at this point I
  • 00:01:33
    know exactly where this is going as soon
  • 00:01:35
    as I join the support chat the scammers
  • 00:01:37
    will ask me for my name and phone number
  • 00:01:39
    for a call back to my cell phone once
  • 00:01:41
    they have me on the phone they will
  • 00:01:42
    convince me that I need to install
  • 00:01:44
    remote access software for them to fix
  • 00:01:46
    the issue and I do the one thing that
  • 00:01:47
    you are never supposed to do I let them
  • 00:01:50
    remotely gain access to my computer but
  • 00:01:52
    while they attempt to connect to me I am
  • 00:01:54
    actually connecting back to them
  • 00:01:55
    reversing the access onto their computer
  • 00:01:58
    what is that let me just show you I
  • 00:01:59
    don't know what the I is look over here
  • 00:02:02
    do you see that here what that these are
  • 00:02:04
    the people who were connected with your
  • 00:02:06
    computer sir they're connected with my
  • 00:02:08
    computer right now right now the scammer
  • 00:02:10
    is connected to my computer but I've
  • 00:02:12
    actually connected right back to hers
  • 00:02:14
    and I'm watching her computer screen as
  • 00:02:15
    she attempts to run the scam with your
  • 00:02:17
    devices yes and in order to do that sir
  • 00:02:19
    in order to install the device drivers
  • 00:02:22
    and to make sure that they works fine on
  • 00:02:24
    your computer and there'll be no trouble
  • 00:02:25
    in the future uh you how long you want
  • 00:02:29
    the driver so you want it for the 2
  • 00:02:30
    years you want it for the 3 5 10 now
  • 00:02:33
    while the so-called issues on the
  • 00:02:35
    computer are actually completely normal
  • 00:02:37
    and everything the scammer has told me
  • 00:02:38
    up to this point has been a lie you will
  • 00:02:41
    now try to pitch me one of their bogus
  • 00:02:42
    support plans oh okay and what's it
  • 00:02:44
    called okay so I see the price here say
  • 00:02:47
    $299 for two years then I see 3 the
  • 00:02:50
    protection of your yes for the it is the
  • 00:02:54
    protection on your devices as well for
  • 00:02:55
    example if in the future somebody gets
  • 00:02:58
    connect with a computer or your IP
  • 00:03:00
    address and they try to do anything bad
  • 00:03:02
    activity on the devices of yours they
  • 00:03:04
    won't be able to connect with you so
  • 00:03:06
    okay wonderful so that's all all I have
  • 00:03:08
    to do is pay for the security and all
  • 00:03:10
    those problems will stop uh yes but
  • 00:03:12
    there was not a single problem in the
  • 00:03:14
    first place with this fake virtual
  • 00:03:16
    computer that I created 10 minutes ago
  • 00:03:18
    and honestly I wasted enough of this
  • 00:03:20
    scammer's time so I decided to confront
  • 00:03:22
    her about the scam yes sir do you want
  • 00:03:24
    this driver do you want the security or
  • 00:03:26
    you don't want this sir I don't know
  • 00:03:28
    some of those Services were supposed to
  • 00:03:29
    be running there some of them are
  • 00:03:30
    supposed to be stopped some of them are
  • 00:03:31
    supposed to be running and you're
  • 00:03:32
    telling me there's something wrong with
  • 00:03:33
    my computer I'm starting to think that
  • 00:03:34
    you're a scammer are you a scammer why
  • 00:03:37
    would have a scammer it sounds like
  • 00:03:38
    you're a scammer why are you
  • 00:03:39
    disconnecting from my computer you fake
  • 00:03:42
    scammer that's what you're think sir but
  • 00:03:44
    that's the truth you know you're a
  • 00:03:45
    scammer right you're that's not the
  • 00:03:47
    truth all right so where are you located
  • 00:03:49
    right now where are you located right
  • 00:03:52
    now so while that was happening I was
  • 00:03:54
    silently taking a look into this
  • 00:03:56
    scammer's network and that was actually
  • 00:03:58
    when I found the set of CCTV security
  • 00:04:00
    cameras guess the password and could see
  • 00:04:02
    everything that was going on inside of
  • 00:04:04
    this massive scam call center these
  • 00:04:06
    cameras gave me an insight into the
  • 00:04:07
    day-to-day lives of these scammers and
  • 00:04:10
    gave me a good sense of what the call
  • 00:04:11
    center looked like and what the layout
  • 00:04:13
    of the building was the first thing I
  • 00:04:15
    wanted to do is make a mini map of the
  • 00:04:16
    call center in total they had 12 camera
  • 00:04:19
    views and by doing a simple headcount I
  • 00:04:21
    could see that there were around 15 to
  • 00:04:22
    20 agents usually on the floor at once I
  • 00:04:25
    spotted them many times eating and
  • 00:04:26
    socializing just like in any normal job
  • 00:04:36
    now while I gained access to only one
  • 00:04:38
    machine in this call center and just
  • 00:04:40
    breach their CCTV security cameras I
  • 00:04:42
    didn't know how I was going to further
  • 00:04:43
    Advance my investigation in proving that
  • 00:04:45
    these people are guaranteed scammers I
  • 00:04:48
    had access to their cameras but they
  • 00:04:49
    didn't have a feature that allowed me to
  • 00:04:51
    listen into the audio and even if I
  • 00:04:53
    could listen into the audio it would be
  • 00:04:55
    very difficult for me to record any
  • 00:04:56
    scams the scammers were actually nice
  • 00:04:58
    enough to have call recording on their
  • 00:05:00
    phone system switched on but even better
  • 00:05:02
    yet they had an application on some of
  • 00:05:04
    their machines by the name of flashback
  • 00:05:05
    recorder which is an application that
  • 00:05:08
    not only screen records the actual
  • 00:05:09
    desktop display but the microphone
  • 00:05:11
    connected to that computer now yes I can
  • 00:05:13
    match the timeline of the audio to the
  • 00:05:15
    timeline of the cctv's internal playback
  • 00:05:18
    to watch scams that have happened in the
  • 00:05:19
    past but the scammers have made it even
  • 00:05:21
    easier for me by not using any
  • 00:05:23
    traditional phone systems but rather
  • 00:05:25
    virtual ones I ended up getting access
  • 00:05:27
    to a couple more machines in this call
  • 00:05:29
    center which allowed me to get some rock
  • 00:05:30
    solid evidence of their activities okay
  • 00:05:33
    that is also not working it's giving me
  • 00:05:34
    the same error message can't re can't
  • 00:05:36
    reach the page Ma I'll do one thing for
  • 00:05:39
    you I'll guide you some steps on your
  • 00:05:41
    computer please follow it let me connect
  • 00:05:43
    with your computer remotely and I'll set
  • 00:05:45
    it up for you would it work that's fine
  • 00:05:49
    so this victim followed some random
  • 00:05:51
    strangers instructions and installed a
  • 00:05:53
    remote access tool on her
  • 00:05:55
    computer now look at here ma'am can you
  • 00:05:57
    see there are number of services which
  • 00:05:58
    is stop right now and network
  • 00:05:59
    connectivity Network assistant by any
  • 00:06:02
    chance did you stop it ma'am most of
  • 00:06:04
    your services are down right now that
  • 00:06:06
    connect your smart devices together and
  • 00:06:08
    that's the reason you're having this
  • 00:06:10
    trouble uh with the network M so let me
  • 00:06:13
    do one thing for you let me put a proper
  • 00:06:15
    scan on it so we can get the result why
  • 00:06:17
    it's saying it okay I think I've now
  • 00:06:18
    heard enough of this and it's now time
  • 00:06:20
    for me to warn this person about the
  • 00:06:22
    scam hi hello hello yes yeah I just
  • 00:06:26
    wanted to ask you were you on the phone
  • 00:06:28
    with a gentleman that sounded in in a
  • 00:06:29
    second ago yes I wanted to tell you man
  • 00:06:32
    that person wasn't from actual tech
  • 00:06:34
    support I deal with fraud like he was a
  • 00:06:36
    scammer he was trying to like ask yeah
  • 00:06:38
    IED that when he was trying to download
  • 00:06:40
    stuff on my computer yeah yeah just like
  • 00:06:42
    I wanted to warn you for the future like
  • 00:06:43
    if someone ever tells you to install
  • 00:06:45
    something like that on your computer
  • 00:06:46
    it's like 99% always a scam okay
  • 00:06:49
    thankfully I was able to successfully
  • 00:06:51
    warn that person about the scam but
  • 00:06:52
    there were many more people who had
  • 00:06:54
    previously been scammed before I had a
  • 00:06:55
    chance to intervene this was evident
  • 00:06:57
    from the many photos I downloaded from
  • 00:06:59
    the scammers computers showing payments
  • 00:07:01
    made via credit card and checks anywhere
  • 00:07:03
    from $100 to $1,200 or even $3,000 for
  • 00:07:07
    absolutely nothing this photo in
  • 00:07:09
    particular that made me really disgusted
  • 00:07:10
    with these scammers showing how they
  • 00:07:12
    forc an elderly looking man to open his
  • 00:07:14
    webcam write a check for them and send
  • 00:07:16
    it off to some random shell company in
  • 00:07:17
    the United States this is not only why I
  • 00:07:19
    wanted to identify the heartless
  • 00:07:21
    scammers in India but also the people
  • 00:07:23
    facilitating the laundering of money
  • 00:07:25
    because processing checks
  • 00:07:26
    internationally is far more difficult
  • 00:07:27
    and could arouse suspicion the scammers
  • 00:07:29
    will instead instead have their victims
  • 00:07:30
    make them payable to Shell companies in
  • 00:07:31
    United States there are many such
  • 00:07:33
    companies involved in the scheme and I
  • 00:07:35
    blurred their names because I reported
  • 00:07:36
    all them to US Federal authorities where
  • 00:07:38
    they're being investigated the
  • 00:07:39
    information on those checks contain the
  • 00:07:41
    types of details that are very suitable
  • 00:07:43
    towards data Brokers data Brokers sell
  • 00:07:45
    your information to scammers and anyone
  • 00:07:46
    else who may want to Target you your
  • 00:07:48
    full name email home address health
  • 00:07:51
    records your relatives it's all out
  • 00:07:54
    there that's why I've been using Aura
  • 00:07:56
    the sponsor of today's video Aura shows
  • 00:07:58
    me which data brok are selling my
  • 00:08:00
    information and automatically submit op
  • 00:08:02
    out request for me cleaning up my
  • 00:08:04
    information not only helps reduce the
  • 00:08:05
    amount of spam I get but it protects me
  • 00:08:07
    from hackers who could use this
  • 00:08:08
    information to help them access my
  • 00:08:09
    social media accounts bank accounts or
  • 00:08:12
    other sensitive information I don't know
  • 00:08:13
    if you saw this but AT&T revealed that
  • 00:08:16
    over 73 million customer records both
  • 00:08:18
    existing and former customers were
  • 00:08:20
    released on the dark web they recommend
  • 00:08:22
    those affected use strong passwords
  • 00:08:24
    monitor account activity and consider
  • 00:08:26
    credit freezed or fraud alerts from
  • 00:08:27
    credit bureaus well Ora does all this
  • 00:08:30
    for me and best of all I don't have to
  • 00:08:31
    download several different apps just
  • 00:08:33
    because a company couldn't keep my data
  • 00:08:35
    secure if my info was compromised in the
  • 00:08:37
    AT&T breach I wouldn't worry because
  • 00:08:39
    Aura is always on and always doing the
  • 00:08:41
    hard work of keeping me safe I value my
  • 00:08:43
    privacy and I value yours too so you can
  • 00:08:45
    head on over to ora.com Nano on any web
  • 00:08:48
    browser and my link will offer you a
  • 00:08:49
    14-day free trial which is risk-free
  • 00:08:51
    with or 60-day money back guarantee
  • 00:08:53
    anyways I can't show you the business
  • 00:08:55
    names that I reported to law enforcement
  • 00:08:57
    but what I can do is try to get the
  • 00:08:58
    identities of every sing single person
  • 00:08:59
    working inside the call center in India
  • 00:09:02
    my first approach was taking a look into
  • 00:09:03
    the scammer files in their computers but
  • 00:09:05
    this would turn out to be unsuccessful
  • 00:09:06
    as they mostly only stored scam related
  • 00:09:08
    documents and not really any personal
  • 00:09:10
    information that led me to identifying
  • 00:09:11
    who they were so at this point I didn't
  • 00:09:13
    really know how I was going to get the
  • 00:09:15
    information of all 30 of these employees
  • 00:09:17
    but that's when I noticed someone on one
  • 00:09:18
    of the camera views in a separate cabin
  • 00:09:20
    this individual is AET she were turned
  • 00:09:22
    out to be one of the HR managers working
  • 00:09:24
    in this call center and my proof of this
  • 00:09:26
    is that the room she operates in
  • 00:09:27
    literally has a sign that says h room
  • 00:09:30
    and this is where I actually used the
  • 00:09:31
    CCTV cameras to my advantage I simply
  • 00:09:33
    watched the cameras until Avnet would
  • 00:09:35
    come into the office waited for her to
  • 00:09:36
    take the laptop out of her bag wased her
  • 00:09:38
    connected the hijacked internet that I
  • 00:09:40
    had access to and then I was able to
  • 00:09:42
    Pivot to her computer directly on her
  • 00:09:44
    computer alone I downloaded over 500
  • 00:09:46
    files containing confidential data I can
  • 00:09:49
    tell you this because the first few
  • 00:09:50
    files I clicked on had things like
  • 00:09:51
    employee resumés photos of their ID
  • 00:09:53
    cards even pictures of the scammers
  • 00:09:55
    themselves and finally a spreadsheet
  • 00:09:57
    that contains all of the agents and
  • 00:09:58
    managers personal names phone numbers
  • 00:10:01
    email addresses and the exact location
  • 00:10:03
    of where they live this is a big leak
  • 00:10:05
    into the company's employee data and the
  • 00:10:07
    reason the HR manager would store the
  • 00:10:08
    scammer's ID photos on her computer was
  • 00:10:10
    because these scammers don't use
  • 00:10:11
    traditional keys to enter the call
  • 00:10:13
    center but rather access cards here I
  • 00:10:15
    can see the HR manager using the portal
  • 00:10:17
    to request a new access card for one of
  • 00:10:19
    the agents it says she's using an
  • 00:10:20
    account owned by someone with the name
  • 00:10:22
    of beuchat and we can see a company name
  • 00:10:24
    on the left side that read skyer
  • 00:10:26
    Ventures private limited and if I do a
  • 00:10:28
    quick Google search of that company the
  • 00:10:29
    first thing that comes up is a scammer
  • 00:10:31
    doino post that was created back in
  • 00:10:33
    November of 2021 the information listed
  • 00:10:35
    on that post were things like the
  • 00:10:37
    director's names of the company beuchat
  • 00:10:39
    aora and rajat and where have I seen
  • 00:10:42
    those names before well I saw it 10
  • 00:10:44
    seconds ago on the HR manager's laptop
  • 00:10:46
    when she logged into the portal to
  • 00:10:47
    submit the access card and at this point
  • 00:10:49
    I already found public records of these
  • 00:10:51
    two scam frauders registering Sky saer
  • 00:10:53
    Ventures private limited back in 2019
  • 00:10:55
    this would turn out to be the real
  • 00:10:57
    Indian company so here I could confirm
  • 00:10:59
    that Raj and beu we're going a scam call
  • 00:11:02
    center in Punjab India and if you still
  • 00:11:04
    don't believe me I went and found Raj's
  • 00:11:06
    LinkedIn account which showed me a photo
  • 00:11:07
    of how he looks like and what do you
  • 00:11:08
    know the HR manager has a photo of
  • 00:11:10
    someone on her hard drive that looks
  • 00:11:11
    very similar to the profile picture on
  • 00:11:13
    LinkedIn this is rajad now it was time
  • 00:11:16
    for me to Pivot my access to the people
  • 00:11:17
    who actually manage all of the finances
  • 00:11:19
    and bookkeeping okay so these agents
  • 00:11:22
    when they reach the finale of their scam
  • 00:11:23
    they open up their remote land chatting
  • 00:11:25
    tool and passed the victim information
  • 00:11:27
    over to someone by the name of Chavi I'm
  • 00:11:29
    pretty sure this guy manages all of the
  • 00:11:31
    financial data in this call center let's
  • 00:11:33
    put his name onto Google and see what
  • 00:11:34
    comes up okay so I see a LinkedIn
  • 00:11:36
    profile let's click on this Javi yeah
  • 00:11:40
    that's definitely our guy look at that
  • 00:11:41
    photo okay yeah he's the operations
  • 00:11:43
    manager we definitely need to access his
  • 00:11:45
    computer so after a couple of days of me
  • 00:11:47
    just waiting and waiting I finally got
  • 00:11:49
    access to his computer I won't tell you
  • 00:11:51
    how I hacked this computer since I want
  • 00:11:53
    to use the same methods in the future
  • 00:11:54
    but I pretty much got the keys to all of
  • 00:11:56
    the financial information that you could
  • 00:11:57
    imagine I'll talk more about that that
  • 00:11:59
    in a second but I realized I didn't even
  • 00:12:01
    need to gather more information on Chavi
  • 00:12:02
    because when I downloaded those 500
  • 00:12:04
    files worth of confidential employee
  • 00:12:06
    data off of the HR manager's computer I
  • 00:12:08
    got all of his info in the process I
  • 00:12:10
    have his personal information sheet his
  • 00:12:12
    Indian identity card or AAR card and
  • 00:12:14
    multiple snapshots including this very
  • 00:12:16
    clear photo that matches up perfectly
  • 00:12:18
    with his ID card and his personal
  • 00:12:19
    LinkedIn page finally it was now time to
  • 00:12:21
    extract all the data on his computer and
  • 00:12:23
    let me tell you now this guy had access
  • 00:12:25
    to everything I could see the payment
  • 00:12:27
    databases the stripe accounts and even
  • 00:12:29
    the scammers creating the invoices on
  • 00:12:31
    PayPal that they would directly send to
  • 00:12:32
    their scam victims of course if the
  • 00:12:34
    scammers were already dumb enough to let
  • 00:12:35
    me see all of this surely they would be
  • 00:12:37
    dumb enough to not set passwords on
  • 00:12:39
    their confidential spreadsheets right
  • 00:12:40
    well let's find out okay let's open this
  • 00:12:44
    ah dang looks like we can't access their
  • 00:12:46
    Master tracking spreadsheet oh wait I
  • 00:12:48
    suppose if I have access to their
  • 00:12:49
    internal cameras I can just watch them
  • 00:12:51
    type the password to the spreadsheets
  • 00:12:52
    live on
  • 00:12:53
    CCTV if only it was that easy though
  • 00:12:56
    actually it was that easy because I
  • 00:12:58
    exported over 200 50 clear text
  • 00:13:00
    passwords from the scammers their
  • 00:13:01
    computers this gave me direct access to
  • 00:13:03
    all of these accounts and the first
  • 00:13:04
    thing I did was log into these accounts
  • 00:13:06
    and silently export all the transactions
  • 00:13:08
    that had been initiated on stripe and
  • 00:13:10
    PayPal that's when I noticed these
  • 00:13:11
    scammers are even dumber than I
  • 00:13:13
    originally thought Raj one of the
  • 00:13:15
    directors and key players of this
  • 00:13:16
    operation used his real name phone
  • 00:13:19
    number and personal email address to set
  • 00:13:21
    up this fraudulent PayPal this guy who
  • 00:13:23
    thinks he's tough with his call center
  • 00:13:25
    and illegal scams put his real name on
  • 00:13:28
    this PayPal congrat congratulations you
  • 00:13:30
    played yourself this allowed me to trace
  • 00:13:32
    the scam payments right back to his
  • 00:13:33
    Indian bank account finally I gained
  • 00:13:35
    access to their simple invoice page
  • 00:13:37
    which revealed how much money they have
  • 00:13:38
    stolen between the years of 2021 and
  • 00:13:41
    2024 each month these scammers on
  • 00:13:43
    average steal around
  • 00:13:44
    $100,000 and in the time span of just
  • 00:13:47
    one year they steal over $1.1 million if
  • 00:13:50
    we do the math of how much money they
  • 00:13:52
    have stolen over the course of 3 years
  • 00:13:54
    it would be exactly
  • 00:13:56
    2,785 728 just from us and Canadian
  • 00:14:00
    citizens so if I had all of this
  • 00:14:02
    information what else was I missing well
  • 00:14:04
    I still had no idea where the scam call
  • 00:14:05
    center was located I had access to two
  • 00:14:07
    outside angles on the CCTV that gave me
  • 00:14:10
    a look into the entrance of the call
  • 00:14:11
    center on one of those views I could see
  • 00:14:13
    a security booth and a little road but
  • 00:14:15
    this scam call center has Wi-Fi in and
  • 00:14:17
    outside of the building and by using the
  • 00:14:18
    names of the wireless networks as well
  • 00:14:20
    as their strengths relative to the
  • 00:14:22
    scammer computers we can precisely
  • 00:14:23
    determine where the scam call center is
  • 00:14:25
    located and when I put those coordinates
  • 00:14:27
    into Google Earth I get zoomed into this
  • 00:14:29
    this location in moali Punjab so when
  • 00:14:31
    you enter street view you can see Villa
  • 00:14:33
    Verde residential Tower Cork City and
  • 00:14:35
    then this text over here is two blurry
  • 00:14:37
    for me to read uh and then some more
  • 00:14:39
    Cork City and then the atrium Cork City
  • 00:14:41
    so I thought this security booth right
  • 00:14:43
    here was the same one but if we actually
  • 00:14:45
    compare it to the one on the CCTV
  • 00:14:47
    they're actually just completely
  • 00:14:48
    different so at the beginning I thought
  • 00:14:50
    this building on the right was the
  • 00:14:52
    actual scam call center but it's not so
  • 00:14:55
    the actual location of the scam call
  • 00:14:56
    center is towards the back of the
  • 00:14:58
    building so if we do a quick zoom in we
  • 00:15:00
    can see on the left side over here
  • 00:15:02
    that's the the security booth so let's
  • 00:15:04
    take a look at the CCTV and that's the
  • 00:15:06
    same and if we look on the right side we
  • 00:15:08
    can see the parking lot and on the left
  • 00:15:10
    side we have that turn so I believe the
  • 00:15:12
    scammers are in this building right here
  • 00:15:13
    so these scammers are located in the
  • 00:15:15
    atrium Cork City building of sector 74
  • 00:15:18
    phase AB moali Punjab when I put that
  • 00:15:21
    address into Google the first result is
  • 00:15:23
    the official cork city.com website which
  • 00:15:25
    is the exact same website I saw the HR
  • 00:15:27
    manager using previously I very quickly
  • 00:15:29
    found this YouTube video giving a tour
  • 00:15:31
    of the building and at first I
  • 00:15:32
    recognized the entrance from Google
  • 00:15:34
    Street View imagery but when they
  • 00:15:35
    brought the camera to the back of the
  • 00:15:36
    building I was 100% able to confirm the
  • 00:15:38
    location of the call center in this
  • 00:15:40
    Frame right here they even got a shot of
  • 00:15:42
    the entrance which matches up perfectly
  • 00:15:44
    with what we can see on the CCTV cameras
  • 00:15:46
    so these scammers are located in this
  • 00:15:47
    very high-end building as stated in the
  • 00:15:49
    description in this video the building
  • 00:15:51
    has a ton of amenities like a massive
  • 00:15:53
    swimming pool a full fitness center CCTV
  • 00:15:56
    security cameras and a 24/7 on-site
  • 00:15:58
    security team I wanted to identify if
  • 00:16:00
    any other people have dealt with this
  • 00:16:02
    call center in the past and while
  • 00:16:03
    looking at many reviews made by
  • 00:16:05
    previously scamed victims I actually
  • 00:16:06
    remembered that I picked up a password
  • 00:16:08
    to the scammer's Better Business Bureau
  • 00:16:09
    account allowing me to have full control
  • 00:16:11
    of all of the reviews no I want to like
  • 00:16:13
    response every be like oh this is a scam
  • 00:16:15
    company that we oh we do we actually
  • 00:16:17
    sorry want your money back go to your
  • 00:16:20
    bank and ask for a charge back I'll
  • 00:16:22
    actually give you the director's name
  • 00:16:23
    while I'm at it
  • 00:16:26
    yeah here's his personal phone number
  • 00:16:28
    here you go so that's exactly what I did
  • 00:16:30
    I replied to all the people agreeing
  • 00:16:32
    with their statements and even
  • 00:16:33
    confirming that they are indeed a scam
  • 00:16:35
    company and at this point I have
  • 00:16:37
    gathered pretty much all the evidence I
  • 00:16:38
    needed I had the names of the bosses and
  • 00:16:41
    most of the employees I had their exact
  • 00:16:43
    location and finally I was able to trace
  • 00:16:45
    the scam payments right back to the
  • 00:16:46
    managing directors instead of just
  • 00:16:48
    watching them and doing nothing let's
  • 00:16:50
    rather engage in some sabotage the first
  • 00:16:52
    thing I did was report the scammers
  • 00:16:54
    Google AdSense account so that nobody
  • 00:16:55
    can find their website anymore then I
  • 00:16:57
    decided to report the website itself to
  • 00:16:59
    go daddy so that no victims can access
  • 00:17:00
    their chat support and phone numbers
  • 00:17:02
    thirdly I reported the scammers their
  • 00:17:04
    service agreements to DocuSign next I
  • 00:17:06
    sent all of the scammer nesk IDs to my
  • 00:17:08
    friend Matt who works at nesk and he
  • 00:17:09
    managed to ban all of them permanently
  • 00:17:11
    off of the platform and rat I reported
  • 00:17:13
    all of your personal information to the
  • 00:17:15
    FBI as well good luck trying to scam now
  • 00:17:17
    buddy finally I logged into the
  • 00:17:19
    scammer's PayPal account and manually
  • 00:17:21
    started to refund each one of their
  • 00:17:22
    victims of course this process would
  • 00:17:24
    take way too long so I reported their
  • 00:17:25
    fraudulent accounts to PayPal themselves
  • 00:17:27
    who then responded by Banning their
  • 00:17:29
    PayPal account no more direct debit
  • 00:17:30
    payments for them in late December of
  • 00:17:32
    2023 the scammers actually removed the
  • 00:17:34
    CCTV cameras off of the main Network
  • 00:17:36
    that I had access to ultimately killing
  • 00:17:38
    my visual view into this call center but
  • 00:17:40
    the scammers forgot about one critical
  • 00:17:42
    thing I could watch them through the
  • 00:17:44
    laptop webcams well kind of these
  • 00:17:46
    scammers actually taped up most of the
  • 00:17:48
    laptop webcams in this call center so I
  • 00:17:50
    unfortunately wasn't able to call any of
  • 00:17:51
    the scammers directly looking at their
  • 00:17:53
    face but maybe I can confront them from
  • 00:17:55
    a different angle no one really uses
  • 00:17:56
    this computer right here and the closest
  • 00:17:58
    people sitting next to this computer are
  • 00:18:00
    these guys so let's give these scammers
  • 00:18:01
    a scare by revealing their true
  • 00:18:03
    identities on a phone
  • 00:18:05
    call yeah you speak to one of my
  • 00:18:07
    superiors okay hold on okay let me speak
  • 00:18:10
    to
  • 00:18:11
    him yes home I help you yeah so I I bet
  • 00:18:14
    I can actually guess your name yeah my
  • 00:18:17
    name is sanjie your name is sanjie and
  • 00:18:19
    your friend next to you is wearing a
  • 00:18:21
    brown shirt so Sanji why are you
  • 00:18:22
    scamming people sanjie what yeah your
  • 00:18:25
    name is sanie yeah your name is sanjie
  • 00:18:28
    yeah yeah you know Chavi go you know
  • 00:18:30
    Chavi and rajat you know rajat rajat
  • 00:18:35
    yeah yeah it the HR manager so Shan
  • 00:18:39
    sanjie let's let's talk for a bit you
  • 00:18:40
    know I can see you right now wave at the
  • 00:18:42
    camera you see the CCTV camera you see
  • 00:18:45
    the cameras right above you look up look
  • 00:18:47
    up at the CCTV sanjie sanjie look at the
  • 00:18:49
    CCTV look at the CCTV sanjie no no man
  • 00:18:52
    you are wrong no I'm wrong so you're
  • 00:18:54
    running scams right sanjie you're
  • 00:18:56
    running scams no yes you are
  • 00:18:59
    yeah I can tell you your job your job is
  • 00:19:01
    to manage all of the chats so like the
  • 00:19:03
    people send you the chat and then you
  • 00:19:05
    give it to the so so how are you not the
  • 00:19:07
    scammer explain to me how you're not the
  • 00:19:08
    scammer sanjie explain to me no no no no
  • 00:19:11
    no no no no no no you are wrong are you
  • 00:19:13
    pan yo the HR manager is right next to
  • 00:19:16
    you hello yeah yeah can you please pass
  • 00:19:19
    the call back to David or
  • 00:19:22
    not I am like I mean you are already
  • 00:19:25
    talking to him oh I'm speaking to David
  • 00:19:27
    right now yes oh okay so David you're
  • 00:19:30
    wearing a brown shirt right now right
  • 00:19:32
    you're wearing a brown shirt like look
  • 00:19:33
    behind you you know so you know Sky Fair
  • 00:19:36
    travels look at the CCTV cameras behind
  • 00:19:38
    you like you know like look behind you I
  • 00:19:41
    don't know what turn around in your
  • 00:19:43
    chair turn around like turn turn around
  • 00:19:45
    like I'm looking at you turn around in
  • 00:19:46
    your chair no bro turn around oh he's
  • 00:19:50
    getting someone he's getting someone
  • 00:19:52
    right now I think at this point sanjie
  • 00:19:54
    the scammer that I just confronted
  • 00:19:56
    decided it would be a good idea to tell
  • 00:19:57
    the boss rajad what just happened
  • 00:19:59
    earlier that day the HR manager
  • 00:20:01
    conveniently left her computer in
  • 00:20:03
    rajat's personal cabin which allowed me
  • 00:20:05
    to grab this webcam
  • 00:20:17
    footage you arean you
  • 00:20:20
    arean I know human is all
  • 00:20:24
    chat chat
  • 00:20:37
    r
  • 00:20:41
    [Music]
  • 00:20:53
    [Music]
  • 00:21:04
    [Music]
  • 00:21:11
    after this conversation the HR manager
  • 00:21:13
    entered the cabin and she unfortunately
  • 00:21:15
    grabbed the laptop and took it back to
  • 00:21:17
    her office when she made it back to her
  • 00:21:19
    room they finally told her everything
  • 00:21:21
    that had happened due to a technical
  • 00:21:22
    issue I wasn't able to get audio to this
  • 00:21:25
    portion of the confrontation but we can
  • 00:21:26
    see the HR manager Avet looking visually
  • 00:21:29
    concerned when she notices her webcam
  • 00:21:31
    light is on as well of course she
  • 00:21:33
    doesn't know anything about computers so
  • 00:21:34
    she leaves the room to grab someone with
  • 00:21:36
    more experience when she comes back in
  • 00:21:38
    we can see her Point directly at the
  • 00:21:40
    webcam Sanji the person we can see right
  • 00:21:43
    here tells her it might be a good idea
  • 00:21:44
    to put some tape over the webcam
  • 00:21:46
    fortunately for us this is the HR
  • 00:21:48
    manager and not the IT guy so instead of
  • 00:21:50
    taping the actual webcam itself she
  • 00:21:52
    taped the webcam light instead
  • 00:22:06
    as for the main room everyone was sort
  • 00:22:07
    of in a panic mode with a ton of people
  • 00:22:09
    looking pretty concerned here we can see
  • 00:22:11
    Chavi the operations manager holding a
  • 00:22:13
    piece of tape and then pointing straight
  • 00:22:15
    at the webcam I assume you can guess
  • 00:22:17
    what's coming
  • 00:22:21
    next system
  • 00:22:28
    CA
  • 00:22:59
    oh yeah this is definitely it they're
  • 00:23:01
    taping it
  • 00:23:04
    [Applause]
  • 00:23:06
    forever why are you guys smashing the
  • 00:23:08
    laptop they're smashing the laptop and
  • 00:23:11
    the scammers lived miserably ever after
  • 00:23:13
    if you guys did enjoy this video make
  • 00:23:15
    sure to like And subscribe before
  • 00:23:16
    clicking off thank you for watching and
  • 00:23:18
    have a nice day
タグ
  • scammers
  • hack
  • exposure
  • fraud
  • call center
  • investigation
  • technology
  • safety
  • security
  • CCTV